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PART ONE: OBJECTIVE; OBJECT; METHOD 
Part one defines this thesis's research questions: how has Management come to be such 
a powerful but unquestioned presence in Western lifie?; and, why does so much 'new' 
Management knowledge appear to be similar to earlier Management thinking? It outlines 
the object under investigation and detennines the method by which these questions may 
best be investigated. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This work investigates two seemingly unrelated phenomena. First, Management has come to cast 
great influence across life in the 20th century, with most aspects of knowledge and being now 
seen as subject to Management principles, principles regarded as universal. This appears to be 
normal or regular, and largely goes without comment. Second, so much espoused as new in 
Management may be seen to be a re-iteration of similar principles. This work argues that these 
phenomena can both be accounted for by the same reason: Management's co-dependent 
relationship with the 20th century's dominant, but specific, world-view - 'Modernism'. This 
chapter defines this study's focus, outlines 'Management' and introduces the c* ounter-historical 
approach of Michel Foucault as the method best suited to carrying out this investigation. 
2. FOUCAULT 
Foucault's aim was to write counter-histories that exposed the way in which subjects develop 
grand-origins and histories to make their present singular conceptions appear more solid, universal 
and objective. This undermining of an established history enabled assumptions to be re-framed 
and, consequently, 'thinking differently'. While his methods changed throughout his studies, 
Foucault's penultimate book, The Use of Pleasure, demonstrated how his different approaches 
could be seen to inform one another. Using this work and the interpretations of Dreyfus, Rabinow 
and Deleuze as guides, a method that draws on Foucault's archaeological and genealogical 
approaches is described. A method that outlines different world-views (epistemes) as a means of 
isolating and analysing the forms and statements that constitute Management, before examining 
how the formation of these forms creates a web of power that shields privileged ways of seeing 
and speaking from conceptions that might question their universal and objective status. 
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PART TWO: GRID 
In Part Two a normative tableau is developed. Three different episteme are presented 
as a framework against which the specificity of Managements forms, formation and 
subsequent ways of 'seeing and speaking'can be analysed in Part Three. 
3. THE ANCIENT GREEK EPISTEME 
The Ancient Greeks saw wisdom as inetis: the ability to incorporate many orders, forms and 
dimensions and apply them in one's own fashion on a pragmatic basis. It is based on the following 
assumptions: that the world is composed of a kosmos and an irreducible chaos; that the world may 
be seen as a macrocosm of one's self and that all beings' movements are shaped by their particular 
telos; that access to knowledge comes through one's interpretation of similitude; that history and 
time would change while its elements often 'spiralled' back; that there will always be many 
schools of thought; and that human behaviour or ethical decisions will be steered by custom, 
convention and the particular telos of the individuals concerned. 
4. MODERNISM 
Modernism sees intelligence as the furthering of certainty and control, via a general method, 
toward objectively measurable universal ends. It is based on the belief that firm foundations for 
knowledge can be found by looking beneath secondary conventions to the universal dimensions of 
space; the analogy that the world and its components are directed and move as a clockwork 
mechanism; that knowledge comes from measuring and representing things objectively through 
the application of objective units; a view of time as universally linear, history as evolution and 
being as driven by the quest to be at the cutting-edge; that at this edge there should only be one 
central school of thought, and this is scientific; and, that human sciences will determine the correct 
or normal manner in which Man should act. This promotes looking at the world from a 
hierarchical-triangular perspective, as an observer from a detached, objective, central perch, upon 
particular subjects against universal measures and aims. The universal aims that Modernism has 
come to speak in terms of include Humanism, the new, capital gains and, since the turn of the 20th 
century, performative efficiency. 
5. POSTMODERNISM 
Postmodernism advocates the 'faulty' logic or eclectic mix of ideas from whence, it argues, 
difference may flourish. It is based upon the dissolution of the unitary foundation-space and 
essentialism of Modernism and a return to 'secondary' surfaces; seeing the world as a rhizome; 
discovery as nomadology and eclecticism; history and time as more than linear and progressive; 
Modem science as being just one 'language game; and, the death of Man and return to particular 
conventions, journeys and ends. Its style is not the expert's homology, as in Modernism, but the 
inventor's paralogy. For this way of thinking to work, Postmodernism requires the recovery of 
Ancient or un-Modern forms so as to relativise Modernism. 
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PART THREE: ANALYSIS 
Part Three examines the way that Managenzent's history encourages the privileging of 
certain fornis and 'visibilities'. These aspects, which are widely regarded as universal, 
are shown to be specifically Modernist. However, their privilege is maintained by a web 
of links orforniation of institutions that discourages their being questioned. Management 
is thus a particularly injluential subject within Modernism. However, it is limited by 
appearing unable to speak or see in any manner other than Modernist. 
6. SERMON - THE HISTORY OF MANAGEMENT 
Management's history claims that Management principles are universal but only since the 
application of a scientific approach has Man begun to fully understand them. This view is made 
regular by a tight knit, but not obvious, web of different fora that repeat the same message. 
However, it is demonstrated that this is based on the prevailing beliefs of Management historians 
in the 1950s and 1960s. They identified the origins of their present in the work of engineers who 
they saw as the first to begin uncovering Management's basic good: 'efficiency'. However, this 
discovery can be shown to be due to subjective beliefs and politically contingent expedients 
encouraged by problems bought to the fore by Modernism. As Management sought more 
academic credibility, a more ancient heritage was sought. But the past was looked at only in terms 
of the Modem principles that historians had determined as their object. Thus, Management sees 
nothing of the past apart from that which further strengthens the belief in the universality of 
prevailing Modem beliefs. The 'sermon of development' promoted by Management's history is a 
singular view that maps neatly onto the beliefs of Modernism. 
7. PULPIT - THE SHAPE OF THE BUSINESS SCHOOL 
Doubling the formation of Management's historical sermon is the simultaneous emergence of a 
pulpit: the Business School. In the 1950s and 1960s the professionalisation of Management saw 
the development of complementary associations concerned with the subject and a particular form 
of Business School come to be regarded as belonging at universities. A large contributing factor to 
these schools being taken seriously was the establishment of a standard curriculum that located 
Management's place on the 'Tree of Knowledge'. This curricula promoted a way of seeing re- 
iterating that of the history of Management, by drawing from psychology, sociology and, in 
particular, economics. As the histories of these subjects are wholly Modem, these connections 
further reinforce the acceptance of the forms that are taken as contributing to Management. This 
Business School, a singularly American institution, is entrenched as it is identified as a 'best 
practice' model for the rest of the world. 
8. PROPHESIES - MANAGEMENT'S VISIBLE FUTURES 
Management's formation is doubled again by the nature of what is seen by the Business School 
gaze. In the 1960s and 1970s the view emerged that organisations were more like organisms than 
machines. However, informed as it is by Modernism, Management's conception of the organism 
was highly mechanised. In the 1980s, culture was seen to be the answer to organisational 
problems but only as it was linked to efficiency and viewed in a positivistic and unitary manner. 
In the 1990s, Management developed a Postmodern approach that was, unlike other fields' 
conceptions, strangely Modernist. Management, tightly bound by its singularly Modem historical 
conception of itself, lacks the ability to access other forms that might enable it to relativise this 
singular view and say anything substantially different. 
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PARTFOUR: DISCUSSION 
Reformulating the historical view of Management may enable it to see differently. Part 
Four investigates how this might be done andflags up the implications of doing so for 
Western society in general. 
9. THINKING OTHERWISE: RE-FRAMING HISTORY, RE-VIEWING MANAGEMENT 
Having identified Management's tight-knit Modernist history as limiting, one may begin to think 
differently by taking a wider historical view and connecting to un-Modern. ways of seeing. Two 
aspects problematised in Management over the past decade are broached as examples: whether 
strategy is about 'top-down' design or 'bottom-up' emergence; and why business ethics seems to 
have little impact on decision making. With a broader historical conception of Management, the 
first problem, based on a triangular hierarchical view of organisation and the idea that one must 
represent the way things are without logical contradiction, would not be framed: strategy may be 
seen as both emergence and design. The second problem might be differently addressed by 
questioning the Modernist assumption that business ethics must be about the provision of general 
codes. 
10. COM-MUSION 
Management comes to have such a powerful yet unobtrusive presence in Modem times because its 
particular formation, its ways of seeing and speaking replicate Modernism's beliefs and are well 
suited to providing answers to Modernism's key problematisation: the determination of general 
non-personal ends toward which progress may be objectively measured and through which control 
may be maintained without recourse to subjective traditions. However, the other side of this 
productive capacity is that Management is so well cut to fit Modernism that its historical 
formation cannot incorporate anything other than Modem forms. This disables its ability to think 
differently which is why much of what is presented as new in Management appears similar to 
what it has said before. The similarity of their formations means that not only are Management's 
singular forms maintained and shielded by Modernism, but that Modernism's singular perspective 
is shielded and maintained by Management. Thus, re-framing the history of Management, apart 
from enabling Management to think differently, may go some way toward challenging 
Modernism's hold on our world. In light of this, areas for future research toward dimming the 
limiting influence of Management and Modernism's specific diagram are highlighted. 
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PART ONE.: OBJECTIVE, 
OBJECT METHOD 
In a very real sense, these papers constitute a history of 
management written by those who made that history. 
They present it with vision, with vitality and with an 
authority that is beyond challenge. [Tbus] the principal 
directions in which management thought will develop 
in the foreseeable future have already been pointed out 
by the pioneer thinkers who provide the substance of 
this book. 
Merrill, Classics in Managenient (1960 & 1970). 
This has been a story about footprints, the individuals 
who left them, and the times in which these people 
lived. The past must not be buried but used as a 
foundation and guide for the footprints that will be 
made in the future. Within the practices of the past 
there are lessons of history for tomorrow; there is a 
flow of events and ideas that link yesterday, today and 
tomorrow in a continuous stream. 
Wren, The Evohition ofManagetnent Thought (1972 & 
1994). 
Management's conception of its past gives it vision, vitality, foundation and authority. 
Management histories like to promote this effect. However, what they remain silent on is 
how this conception, the continuity between past, present and future that gives the field a 
sense of universality, represses alternative vistas. 
This thesis may be best described as a 'counter-history'. That is not to say that it 
develops a more truthful version of the events that have led to Management. Rather it 
attempts to unsettle the orthodox history of Management by putting forward an 
alternative view: that what is conceived as the 'continuous stream that provides an 
authority beyond challenge', is a particular and contingent view of a specific object that 
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was formed far more recently than Management histories would have us believe. It 
therefore stems Management thought for no fundamental reason. 
In so doing, this work may often appear somewhat polemical. However, it should 
be recognised that such an approach is well suited to its aims, within the limitations of a 
thesis such as this. Its 'pole' is that Management's current 'stream' is so narrow, and its 
set of historical 'substance' so limited, that Management's 'foreseeable futures' are 
destined to continually repeat the same lines. Moreover, given the increasing diffusion of 
Management principles and the subsequent influence of these principles through their 
now being applied in evaluating performance in many different subjects, this limit effects 
more than that which we might directly associate with the realm of Management. 
If Management is to say anything substantially different then its history must be 
re-thought. Re-thinking this history may also enable the diminution of the stifling effect 
that Management's narrow range of principles presently has on 'being' in Western 
society. Part One begins this argument by outlining the study's objectives and research 
questions, its object of inquiry and the method used toward these aims. 
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This work investigates two seemingly unrelated phenomena. First, Management has come to cast great 
influence across life in the 20th century, with most aspects of knowledge and being now seen as subject to 
Management principles, principles regarded as universal. This appears to be normal or regular, and largely 
goes without comment. Second, so much espoused as new in Management may be seen to be a re-iteration 
of similar principles. This work argues that these phenomena can both be accounted for by the same 
reason: Management's co-dependent relationship with the 20th century's dominant, but specific, world- 
view - 'Modernism'. This chapter defines this study's focus, outlines 'Management' and introduces the 
counter-historical approach of Michel Foucault as the method best suited to carrying out this investigation. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
L Objective 
The extent of this study's compass came into view as these two renditions of the same 
passage of Aristotle's Metaphysics (XII, 1075a) were placed side by side: 
For the efficiency of an army consists partly in the order and partly in the general; 
but chiefly in the latter, because he does not depend upon the order, but the order 
depends upon him. 
We must consider also in which of the two ways the nature of the universe 
contains the good or the highest good, whether as something separate and by 
itself, or as the order of the parts. Probably in both ways, as an army does. For the 
good is found in the order and the leader, and more in the later; for he does not 
depend on the order but it depends on him. 
The first is from the inside front cover Fwictions of the Executive by Chester Barnard 
(1938). The translation Barnard uses is H. Tredennick's, published in 1935 by Bamard's 
publisher: Harvard University Press. The second is Smith and Ross's Oxford translation 
from 1908. 
Barnard is now regarded as having had "a more profound impact on the thinking 
about the complex subject matter of human organization than any other contributor to the 
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continuum of management thoughf '(George 1972: 140). Moreover, The Functions of the 
Executive, reproduced in 1968 to widespread acclaim, is considered "the most influential 
book in the entire field of management... since Taylor's Scientijlc Managenient" (Koontz 
1980: 5 1; Clutterbuck & Crainer 1990: 15). 
Bamard's reproduction of Aristotle may not seem so significant. It is not one of 
Bamard's famous phrases or a key proposition. However, it tees up, frames and adds 
weight to the famous phrases to come. Barnard was not an authority on armies, but on the 
Management of organisations. The quotation, cast with the authority of Aristotle, serves 
to show how important leadership is to the Management of organisations of any sort. 
Aristotle's words thus provide the effective condition within which Barnard's view of 
Management is set, the criterion by which the leader or manager will have his worth 
bestowed. This is efficiency. 
What strikes upon the juxtaposition of the two Aristotles at the head of this 
chapter is the lack of efficiency in the 1908 translation. Indeed, for anyone familiar with 
Ancient Greek (or the development of English), Barnard's version immediately grates. 
The Greeks did not have a word to equate with efficiency as we read it now. How then 
does Axistotle come to begin Management's most influential book in this way? 
Barnard's quotation starts part way into Aristotle's passage, turning 'For the 
efficiency... ' into the beginning of a sentence which it is neither in Treddenick or the 
original Greek (thus, we do not get the sense that Aristotle was using the relations of a 
general and an army as an analogy to describe how the world contains the highest good - 
or how the world is given form). However, the word efficiency is taken from 
Treddenick's translation. How does it come to be there? How does the good, the greatest 
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good, or the ultimate cause of form (for it is in this sense that Aristotle is referring to 
'good'), come to be efficiency? 
One might surmise that Tredennick transposed a meaning of efficiency much 
earlier than our own into this position. For Aristotle is, in a sense, writing of 'the efficient 
cause' of things in the manner that a pious Isaac Newton claimed concern in his physics 
only for what he called 'efficient causes' - those things that God's design caused (Clark 
1992). From the Latin efficiens, efficient, in the 17th and 18th centuries, was taken to be 
'the cause that makes effects to be what they are'. Perhaps efficient has been placed in 
this way, but this is not our century's view of the word. Our understanding springs from a 
sense channeled in the last half of the 19th century, as efficiency was applied to machines 
by engineers and subsequently became a measure of a machine's worth: 'the ratio of 
useful work performed to the total energy expended or heat taken in'. In the Oxford 
English Dictionary (OED), the first application of this meaning as an analogy for human 
behaviour is attributed to Alfred Marshall in 1916. However, it was used a few years 
before this by manufacturing theorists with engineering backgrounds. Here it was taken 
to be the general measure of an organisation's worth. 
However, this thesis is not driven by an aim to uncover what Aristotle really 
meant, or by seeking to demonstrate that Smith & Ross's earlier translation is more 
correct than Treddenick's. Its objective is not to trace the evolution of the word efficiency 
or prove that Barnard wrongly appropriated Aristotle to his own ends. ' Rather, what is of 
interest to this investigation is how this invocation of efficiency 'comes to pass', to seem 
natural, unobtrusive and regular in our century. This is not an account of how 
Management appropriates other ideas and fields, but of how Management's language and 
' Barnard's (1938: 60) personal definition of efficiency, "eliciting of sufficient individual wills to cooperate", is quite 
different from the perception of efficiency that most modems bring to interpreting his presentation of Aristotle. 
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its way of looking at the world has come to be so powerful as to inform other ideas and 
fields that one might consider removed from it. 
When one reads the first page of Barnard's book, one is both interested and 
comforted by the fact that the wise Aristotle infonns Management. However, when the 
translation from before what most authorities consider the origin of the discipline of 
Management (the publication of Taylor's Scientific Managenzent in 1911) is placed 
against Barnard's, one may begin to wonder at how, in our age, Management seems to be 
guiding our translation of Aristotle? It may not be a conscious process, but Aristotle is 
attached to Management (and reinforces the prevailing conception of it) as he speaks the 
Modem language of Management, a language that did not exist when he spoke. How is it 
that by the middle of the 20th century, Management consciousness (or unconsciousness) 
informs Aristotle? Why does it seem natural that efficiency is, in Aristotle's day and ours, 
universally, self-evidently, the evaluative condition? 
This is not just a Management matter. Management is now a necessary hub 
through which most of life must pass. Management education has been the fastest 
growing sector in Western higher education since 1940 (Locke 1988) and Management 
techniques are increasing employed to organise the provision of other academic 
disciplines. Civil government, health, sports, education - all must now be seen to be 
efficient or subject to good Management. Being has now become a Management problem. 
How does Management come to have such force, a force that is as pervasive as it seems 
unobtrusive? 
While this is this thesis's scope, it was arrived at via a more particular focus. This 
project began as an investigation into why Management had difficulty recognising 
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Postmodernisin in a manner that other fields such as architecture, philosophy and art 
history did? Management's view of Postmodemism seemed decidedly Modem. It was 
seen by Management as a revolutionary advance celebrating the new above the old, and 
was dismissive of other approaches that it saw as naive or 'less true' than it. Following 
this line of questioning led this research to broader concerns. A further question, which 
addressed the same phenomenon but in a more general way, arose: why does so much 
that is presented in Management as 'new' appear similar to what has gone before? 
Examining these questions led to an inquiry into Management's unobtrusive social force 
as it became apparent that the answer to them had wider consequences. It would turn out 
that Management's pervasiveness and why ideas presented in Management as new appear 
similar to what has gone before could both be accounted for by the same reasoning. A 
reasoning that will be better grasped after what this thesis takes Management to be and 
the method by which this reason was reached have been outlined. 
H. Object 
This study's object of inquiry is 'Management'. Given the wide-ranging nature of the 
usage of this tenn, it is pertinent to outline its contours with regard to this particular 
work. Firstly, Management here is limited to Western views and English language 
discourse (although it could be argued that what is espoused in this forum is seen as a 
'global model'). Secondly, the focus is on the discourse of Management knowledge or 
Management's way of seeing knowledge rather than the practice of Managers. While The 
Academy of Management is not the only society dedicated to the articulation and 
dissemination of this knowledge, it is regarded by most 'dealing in' Management 
knowledge to be the premier association of its type. Much about the nature of this study's 
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object can be understood by looking at The Acadeiny'S formation as a microcosm of the 
contours of Management itself. 
The Acadeiny was formed in the late 1950s. Its stated purpose is "to foster the 
general advancement of research, learning, teaching, and practice in the management 
field... publish[ing] scholarly papers, conduct[ing] forums for the exchange of 
management knowledge, and provid[ing] services that enhance the science and practice 
of management". While The AcadeinY has a global reach and effects, it is based in the 
United States and dominated by US members (over 80 countries are represented, but 83% 
of the membership is US based). Figure 1, which shows an advertisement for The 
Academy'S web-site, depicts this global yet American nature. 
A further key dimension of Management is its connection of 'business' and 
'universities'. Firstly, Management primarily means 'Business Management'. This close 
association with business may be seen in the structure of The Academy's sub-divisions. 
Of the 22 of these (as at 1998), one is specially marked out to deal with the 'Tublic and 
Nonprofit Sector" (or anything other than Business Management). However, at the same 
time, almost all of The Acadeiýzys Board of Governors, chairpersons of its sub-divisions 
and Editorial Boards of its journals are university academics. This indicates the 
legitimation granted Management knowledge by its association with universities, 
Western society's highest seats of learning. Management is thus a conjunction between 
two previously un-joined aspects of life: Business and Universities. This conjunction 
takes place in the fonn of the Business School. 
In keeping with this, the nature of Management is shaped by its particular 
differentiation and connection of 'practitioner' and 'academic' constituencies. 
Management's form in this regard can be further illustrated with reference to the way The 
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Academy's "Journal" has developed into three. According to their respective statements 
of purpose, the "Journal" now specialises in empirical investigations, often written in 
highly statistical language that make recommendations about "organizational practice and 
management technique". The Acadenzy's "Review" publishes "scholarly" works that 
"advance the conceptual development of organizational and management theory". The 
Acadeniy's "Executive" aims to be a "bridge", taking academic knowledge and 
communicating it in a suitable form for business managers, while also accepting articles 
from professional practitioners. Other Management journals are also arranged along this 
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academic-practical continuum. The wider Management literature also ranges from more 
academic theorising to 'pop-Management' aimed at practicing managers, with the 
understanding that the theoretical-academic and empirical-practical inform one another. 
The aim of The Acadeniy's journals is to publish "articles in fields of interest to 
members of the Academy of Management [and] these fields of interest are reflected in 
[its] divisions and interest groups". Eleven of these fields are aspects of the object 
Management and named accordingly (e. g., International Management, Social Issues in 
Management). However, almost all of the remainder relate to aspects of organisation or 
organisational issues (e. g., Organization Development and Change, Organizational 
Behaviour). This highlights that the field we are seeking to map here relates to the 
Management of, or Management within, organisations. Hence, how the subject of 
Management sees the object 'organisation' greatly informs its formation. 
In sum, the configuration of 'Management', in this particular study, refers to 
discourse relating to Management's archive of knowledge and its manner of looking to 
' The "Journal", at the academic end with the "Review", relates to peers such as the Adininistrative Science Quarterly, 
the Journal of Applied Psychology and the Journal of Applied Behavioral Science (Beyer 1997). The "Executive" 
seeks the same bridge to 'enlightened practitioner' as the Harvard Business Review, theSloan Management Review or 
Business Horizons. 
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build this archive. Management centres around the Management of business although its 
influence may spread wider than business itself (this is beginning to manifest itself in The 
Academy as one of the most recent sub-divisions, Health Care Management, illustrates). 
Management is simultaneously associated with universities and business via its 
placement within business schools. Management means the management of 
organisations. Management is an institution centred around The United States of 
America, although its regard, and most would say influence, is increasingly global. 
III. Method 
The objective of this thesis is to investigate two questions: how does Management come 
to have such force, a power that means that so much of life must be approved by its gaze, 
a potent and unobtrusive or natural presence?; and, why does so much that is presented in 
Management as new seem remarkably similar to what has gone before? What does one 
assume in asking questions such as these? And, consequently, how might one investigate 
them? 
Firstly, these are questions of how what counts as knowledge in a particular 
domain is produced; the power that maintains, supports and diffuses this knowledge into 
other areas; and the institutions, both 'material' (e. g., the Business School) and not just 
material (e. g., the assumed history of Management) that uphold and give expression to it. 
Secondly, these questions assume that Management is a pervasive force, but they 
do not assume the existence of a fundamental management object. Hence the objective 
here is to question the current orthodoxy, but it is not hermeneutic in the sense that it does 
not seek to recover the essence of management or knowledge in general. At the same 
time, this line of questioning acknowledges the structural influences of history, but it is 
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not structuralist in the sense that it embraces an existential ability to influence the 
direction of thought by being critical of current orthodoxies. Hence, these questions have 
a critical dimension, not so much in the sense of bringing the 
power/knowledge/institutions of Management down, but in that they are concerned with 
how the contingent institution of Management stifles alternative conceptions. 
Thirdly, these are historical questions, but not in the sense of a conventional 
history that charts the progression of a particular concept from its origins to its present, 
more advanced state, but in that they consider the way in which conceptions have 
changed over time without there being any fundamental essence underpinning them. 
Fourthly, they are questions that investigate how a particular network of 
knowledge/ power/institutions can diffuse over time to influence whole cultures. Thus, 
they require an investigation that cuts across many epochs and traditional disciplines. 
Finally, these questions are asked not with recourse to the activity of managers or 
academics, but to the discourse of Management contained in texts. The assumption is that 
the 'play of meaning' in texts is representative of Management and, conversely, that this 
play has an impact upon the practice of Management. In light of this line of questioning, 
this study employs the works of Michel Foucault. In presenting the case for employing 
Foucault the altematives are firstly reviewed. 
The quotations that began this chapter might make Alasdair Maclntyre's work 
immediately appear relevant. MacIntyre's (1981; 1988; 1991) broad ranging histories are 
concerned with the developments that have shaped Western moral beliefs. He is best 
known for advancing the thesis that all rationality must be historically constructed and 
based on traditional practice, and that the Enlightenment project of developing an 
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objective and universal ethical code has left us with no recourse with morality - despite 
our language presupposing this recourse. MacIntyre's solution is a return to a 'true' 
Aristotelian ethics. While Maclntyre's approach would likely uncover much of interest in 
a project such as this, his nostalgic bias toward essential old-world views; his being, apart 
from his anti-progressive stance, a more or less conventional historian; his subsequent 
taking of texts largely as read; and his concern with morality and philosophy above social 
institutions, make his work less than consummate. 
Were this thesis to focus solely on the play of meaning within and between texts, 
then the work of Jacques Derrida would provide an excellent focal point. Derrida (1976: 
158) believes that there is nothing fundamental that provides meaning in our world and 
"nothing outside the text". Meaning comes only from the relativity of words at play in 
texts, and this is a play that embroils us and is beyond our control (Derrida 1981: 41). 
Derrida sees these relationships as historical rather than essential. However, rather than a 
critique that seeks to 'bring down' a particular way of thinking, his strategy consists of 
working 'within' a metaphysics or set of traditional beliefs, finding its weak points (its 
inconsistency where consistency is promoted; its historical rather than fundamental 
privileging of terms), and then attempting to widen the breaches thus uncovered. 
Consequently, Derrida recognises no evolutionary direction to history or any utopic state 
that we may recover from the past. Despite our beliefs to the contrary, meaning unfolds in 
a process of dissemination as words and texts cut across, inform and 'build upon' one 
another. Claiming that "A text always has several epochs and reading must resign itself to 
this fact", Derrida (1976: 102) seeks to trace a path among textual strata in order to stir up 
and expose forgotten and dormant sediments of meaning that have accumulated and 
settled into the fabric of the text. 
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Derrida's critical focus on texts and disbelief in fundamentals appear to make him 
a more useful source of method for the achievement of this work's objectives than 
MacIntyre. However, while Derrida emphasises the role of power in maintaining what we 
privilege as knowledge, he does not analyse powerper se or employ a particular theory of 
it. In addition, his focus on philosophical thought and texts rather than on institutions in 
the 'real world', and the lack of a strong historical dimension to his critique (while 
Derrida recognises text-meaning as historically stratified, he is more interested in 
exposing instances of this fact rather than examining how they came to be), prevent 
Derrida's mode of inquiry from being ideal in this instance. 
By contrast the work of Edward Said would maintain the emphasis on text 
analysis while establishing a closer contact with knowledge and its institutions. Said 
(1976: 4 1) is concerned with the power that texts convey or have over us, but deplores the 
position that elevates textuality to a privileged place in the production of meaning, 
claiming that it is "not only naive, it is worldly-blind". For Said (1983: 35), texts are "in 
the world, and hence worldly". The analysis of a text is thus important, not in and of 
itself, but because it offers us a way to engage with the world. 
This brings us to a crucial difference between Said and Derrida. Said claims that 
the great failing of modem critics is their uprooting of their critical work from the 
historical or cultural realities that shape it - they achieved methodological independence, 
but by forfeiting an active situation in the world. According to Bove (1992), Said's 
differentiation stems from a desire born of his immediate worldly work of the 1970s - to 
encourage the Palestinian resistance by exposing the workings of 'Orientalism'. This 
required a critical-political discourse that made more of both the intellectual's 
engagement on the side of the repressed and the nature and availability of resistance. 
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Criticism, for Said, is consequently a political act in the service of a moral 
principle. In keeping with this, his work generally proceeds by revealing colonial or racist 
attitudes in canonical literary texts or, on a larger scale, engages whole cultural myths 
(e. g., the Western concept of 'Orientalism'). His critical task is to challenge dominant 
value systems, to provide a politics of textual and socio-political "decolonization". It is 
about "struggles for definition, attempts at overcoming" (Harari 1979: 47). It is 
"oppositional" and its "goals are non-coercive knowledge produced in the interests of 
human freedom... a fundamental human and intellectual obligation" (Said 1983: 30). 
The strengths and weaknesses of Said's approach with respect to the aims of this 
thesis are likely already apparent. Said is more concerned with text analysis than 
Maclntyre, while his clear linking of text and world gives his studies a more institutional 
and historical dimension than those of Derrida. However, Said's utopian view of 
fundamental human obligations and moral principles that the critic must work in the 
name of, and his presupposition of a hegemonic 'colonial' opposition that is more 
obvious, and less insidious or beguiling than the object of this inquiry, count against his 
work being used as the method of inquiry here. 
A more detached, apolitical or general view of the self-sustaining ability of 
networks of knowledge, power and institutions may be found in Meyer's (1977) and 
Powell and DiMaggio's "neo-institutionalism" (1983; 1991). This argues that institutions 
emerge in self-reinforcing clusters as isomorphic responses to and reflections of 
structures and beliefs held in the culture in which they reside. Had this view develoPed 
more of an emphasis on how particular practices come to shape entire cultures, as 
opposed to just how particular institutions are the result of a culture, and an emphasis on 
tnon-material' institutions like histories as much as what are traditionally seen as 
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organisational institutions, then this approach may have proved as fruitful as following 
Foucault. Indeed, Meyer, Powell and DiMaggio's more structured approach is used to 
mark out Chapter Ts examination of the formation of the Business School among a 
cluster of Management corporations that sprang up simultaneously in the 1950s and 
1960s. However, perhaps the aspect that counts most against using neo-institutionalism 
here is its tendency to a structuralist perspective that appears to encourage the idea that 
institutions are bound to be a reflection of the structures about them and downplay the 
influence of particular individuals. This thesis wishes to emphasise that Management 
could have, and can be, different. 
While the work of Foucault shares much with those outlined above, there are 
crucial differences. Like MacIntyre, Foucault had an affinity for employing other systems 
of thought to relativise current thinking, but he was not overtly nostalgic. Like the neo- 
institutionalists, Foucault saw contingencies as shaping institutions more than any 
rational grasp of the true nature of things. However, he would also use particular practices 
toward making more general comments regarding society, pay particular interest to the 
influence of how a power/knowledge/institution web thought its history, and be 
ultimately concerned to actively show how things could be 'thought differently'. 
Like Derrida, Foucault did not recognise a centralising force that 'grounds' 
knowledge, or fundamental, timeless meanings - for both, truth is shaped by specific 
views and by systems of micro-power that maintain them and limit alternative 
conceptions. In this respect, both Foucault and Derrida regarded texts as a kind of 
theatrical space within which these power-plays take place. However, Foucault's work 
has a considerably 'thicker' historical dimension to it (indeed, the idea that the institution 
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of knowledge does not relate to universal conditions - that every such configuration is 
historical and particular - is threaded through all of Foucault's work). It is with regard to 
these historical configurations that Foucault advanced his attempts to understand the 
dynamics of power in the formation of knowledge. 
As Said (1983) notes in his comparison of Derrida and Foucault, Derrida's theory 
of textuality brings criticism to bear on a signifier freed from any obligation to anything 
signified, whereas Foucault's theories move criticism from a consideration of the signifier 
to a description of the signifier's place, a place rarely innocent, dimensionless or without 
the affinnative authority of discursive discipline. Foucault also believed in the 
individual's ability to change thought and thus shape practices. Thus, Foucault (1972: 
602) focussed on texts because this was where the multiplicity of power-forces that shape 
societies can be seen and shown, as the first step toward practical reconfigurations. He 
consequently denounces Derrida's textual isolationism as "trifling". Whereas Derrida 
regards language as all-encompassing, Foucault finds that power occurs prior to language 
or knowledge, both producing and repressing it. Relations of power to knowledge thus 
became the aim of Foucault's critiques. 
It is this view of power that primarily distinguished Foucault from Said. Whereas 
Said criticised Derrida's focus on texts, he criticised Foucault's over-emphasis on power. 
Said (1983: 245) writes that: "The problem is that Foucault's use of the term pouvoir 
moves around too much, swallowing up every obstacle in its path (resistances to it, the 
class and economic bases that refresh and fuel it, the reserves it builds up)". This 
obviously vexes Said, as Foucault's assertion that power is 'always-already' everywhere 
leaves little room for the generally active adversarial critic. Hence, Said's typical charge 
against Foucault (as well as Derrida) is "political quietism". However, Foucault's 
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"provisional but powerful amoralism" (Robbins 1992: 61) is a necessary step in his 
analysis for two reasons: firstly, because any 'side' is just as capable of becoming an 
orthodoxy and marginalising other alternatives; secondly, because his theory of power led 
him to believe that general opposition 'against the power' would only enable the power to 
organise itself against that position and hence become stronger. Hence Foucault sought: 
not to arrive at a priori moral or intellectual judgments on the features of our 
society produced by such fon-ns of power, but to render possible an analysis of 
production itself [and] this scrutiny of power in terms of knowledge and 
knowledge in terms of power becomes all the more radical... through its rigorous 
insistence on this particular brand of neutrality (Gordon, in Foucault 1980: 237). 
Foucault would thus be vehemently opposed to Said's belief in universal moral 
principles, and a 'general best way of being' was seen by Foucault as the sort of nostalgic 
hermeneutics that he wanted to get beyond, particularly in his later works. 
However, Foucault did not let this limitation preclude him from finding particular 
positions to critique the hegemony of particular orthodoxies. Indeed, at the level of the 
particular case, Foucault's works are so compelling that even Said (1983: 224) admits 
that "in his concrete presentation of the local situation in which... power and knowledge 
are deployed, Foucault has no peer". It is Foucault's failure to take a general political 
stance, other than seeking to undennine particular orthodoxies, and then see where this 
might lead him without first determining a general moral stance, that Said finds 
problematic. However, it is this and the other qualities described above that makes a 
Foucauldian method the most appropriate means of investigating this study's object. 
This Foucauldian approach is outlined in more detail in the following chapter. 
This thesis will then draw upon these to shed light upon why so much that is presented in 
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Management as new appears'similar to what has gone before, and why Management has 
come to be such a powerful but unobtrusive force. The reason that this thesis provides to 
account for these phenomena is reasonably simple: Management is sustained by the 
elements and networks of the 20th century's dominant, but specific, mode of thought, 
hereafter called 'Modernism'. Management has difficulty recognising anything other than 
Modem forins. It has only one style and that is 'Modernist'. 
Consequently, most of what is presented in Management as 'new' is remarkably 
similar to what has gone before because it is all Modernist. Indeed, conceptions of 
Management are so tightly Modernist that it is almost impossible to recognise other un- 
Modem configurations of organisation or management as such (hence, Management has 
difficulty recognising Postmodemism in the way that other fields do because their 
recognition relies upon an eclecticism that can draw from a myriad of historical styles). 
Moreover, Management comes to have such a potent and regular force because it suits 
prevailing Modernist ways so well. In fact, one could say that it is the Modernist world- 
view that has enabled Management's configuration. Management has formed in response 
to the Modernism's key problernatisation: the need for objective non-personal 'ends' by 
which progress can be generally measured and though which society may be controlled 
without outwardly impinging on the liberty of individuals - ends like efficiency. This has 
enabled Management to be considered a science, or at least on its way to becoming a 
science. In return, Management supports the continuation of Modernism's dominance. 
Hence, Management easily spreads far and wide in our consciousness: from business to 
pleasure to academe, and even into the translation of ancient texts. It fits and it suits. 
Having prefigured this work's conclusions, it is important to point out its 
limitations. In order to delineate the contours of this thesis's object, certain liberties have 
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been taken. The wording of the previous sentence has been chosen carefully so as to 
indicate that this study has stopped short of 'defining' its object, as might be the nonn for 
a work such as this. This is due to the belief that tying down what management 'is' at the 
outset would defeat the purpose of a work that argues that management could be thought 
differently. At the same time, as the use of Barnard at the outset of this thesis indicates, 
management is more a complex network of other concepts (e. g., 'administration', 
'leadership', 'organisation') than Section 11 of this chapter may have indicated. Had a 
more open view of the outline of management been used, then the nature of the work that 
follows would likely have been quite different, perhaps focusing on the dynamic interplay 
of different forces and conceptions within management, and consequently being 'messier' 
than what is presented here. Indeed, the counter-history presented here, in taking 
Management to be a unitary object, is a more straightforward or 'arboreal' story than 
what might otherwise be the case (an irony that will become more obvious at this thesis 
folds toward its conclusions). 
Given that this is a broad and exploratory study, it should be understood that 
working within these sorts of limits is a 'necessary evil'. However, recognising them here 
will enable many areas for future research to be easily identified in the concluding 
chapter of this work. Before this, the following chapters examine how the historical 
fon-nation of Management and Modernism reinforce one another, and how this fon-nation 
is specific and contingent and granted its privileged status for no objective reason. 
Therefore it need not be respected. And, once this has been recognised, they demonstrate 
how one may begin to think differently by countering a taken-for-granted history. 
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Foucault's aim was to write counter-histories that exposed the way in which subjects develop grand-origins 
and histories to make their present singular conceptions appear more solid, universal and objective. This 
undermining of an established history enabled assumptions to be re-framed and, consequently, 'thinking 
differently'. While his methods changed throughout his studies, Foucault's penultimate book, The Use of 
Pleasure, demonstrated how his different approaches could be seen to inform one another. Using this work 
and the interpretations of Dreyfus, Rabinow and Deleuze as guides, a method that draws on Foucault's 
archaeological and genealogical approaches is described. A method that outlines different world-views 
(epistemes) as a means of isolating and analysing the forms and statements that constitute Management, 
before examining how the formation of these forms creates a web of power that shields privileged ways of 
seeing and speaking from conceptions that might question their universal and objective status. 
2. FOUCAULT 
The object was to learn to what extent the effort to 
think one's own history can free thought from what it 
silently thinks, and so enable it to think differently. 
Foucault, The Use qfPleasure (1985). 
Seven years after Foucault had begun his series on the history of sexuality with the 
publication of his introductory volume, the second volume had still not appeared. The 
problem was one of method. Unbeknown to Foucault, Volumes 2 and 3 of The History of 
Sexuality were to be the culmination of his work, followed as they were by his untimely 
death. It now seems apt that after the long pause to reconsider his approach, Foucault 
began Volume 2, The Use of Pleasure, with an overview of his work to that point, an 
expression of why the two volumes to come needed to indulge in a detour in order to 
achieve the original aims of the series, and, in the light of this, boldly state what he could 
now see as the telos of all his histories. This is described in the quotation above: "learning 
to what extent the effort to think one's own history can enable one to think differently". 
This may seem a simple enough objective, but Foucault (1985: 8) spent four decades 
thinking how he could work toward this within what he referred to as "the labyrinth one 
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enters when one sets out to trace the history of the games of truff'. 
Foucault's particular aim in The History of Sexuality was a history of 
"sexuality", but not in the sense of tracing sexuality's evolution by outlining its 
successive variations toward the pinnacle of our understanding of it in the present. 
Rather, it sought to counter the notion of such a history. Foucault wished to examine how 
the experience of sexuality came to exist and be self-sustaining through a correlation of 
fields of knowledge, constraining nonns, and forms of subjectivity that now made us see 
ourselves as subject to sexuality. He wished to investigate how this web was so well- 
formed that it had made "sexuality", a recent invention and "singular experience", seem 
so "banal" or so normal that we assume that it refers to a constant universal object which, 
consequently, must have a history that stretches well beyond our own society's culture. 
In the introduction to The Use of Pleasure, Foucault explained that to write of 
"sexuality" as a singular rather than a constant experience in this way required tools 
capable of analysing the three major "axes" that constituted it: the formation of the 
sciences that refer to it; the systems of power that regulate its practice; and the forms 
within which individuals are able and obliged to recognise themselves as subjects in 
terms of "sexuality". His earlier works could provide the methods that enabled him to 
tackle the first two axes. The third, however, required that Foucault take a step back. Part 
way into his study of sexuality, he realised that he could not achieve his aims without a 
critical history of the desiring subject. If he was to argue that sexuality was a singularly 
Modem experience, he now recognised that he needed some basis for saying so. He had 
to be able to point to the possibility of an individual experiencing himself or herself as a 
subject but without the Modem emphasis on sexuality. Volume 2 and 3 of the History of 
Sexuality, The Use of Pleasure and The Care of the Seý(, would take a detour back to the 
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Ancient Greeks and Romans to show an alternative conception. 
While these themes will be revisited later in this chapter, they illustrate at the 
outset how Foucault's method was very much a work-in-progress intertwined with his 
particular counter-histories. The introduction to The Use ofPleasure does offer a diagram 
that links all of Foucault's work, a diagram that has been best fleshed out by Dreyfus and 
Rabinow's articulation of what they tenn "Interpretative Analytics" and Deleuze's 
discussion of what he calls "Foucault". Their depictions, along with Foucault's histories, 
form the basis of the method to be followed in this study. However, before they are 
broached, it will be helpful to understand thb ways in which Foucault is not a regular 
historian and the development of his particular variations on his counter-historical style. 
L Not a historian 
The studies that follow, like the others I have done 
previously, are studies of "history" by reason of the 
domain they deal with and the references they appeal to; 
but they are not the work of a "historian". 
Foucault, The Use qfPleasure (1985). 
Entitling this thesis as a "Foucauldian history" makes it important to specify how the 
adjective "Foucauldian" changes what might be perceived as straightforward history. 
Foucault himself provides a clue in his claim to write histories without being a 
"historian". The historian that he does not wish to be confused with is that individual who 
writes history in a Hegelian manner - he who uncovers the truth of the events, the theses 
and anti-theses, of a past period and presents them as a chain of progress across linear- 
time that leads to (i. e., causes) the present higher-level synthesis. Here, events or causes 
not seen as contributing to our current achievements are glossed over. This adds up to a 
history of 'winners', where past events, while seen as separate from the present, are 
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believed to be linked in a cumulative sense, and this 'chain' is looked back at in terms of 
present circumstances. What this type of history does, albeit unwittingly, is simply 
legitimate or add credence to the present establishment. 
Foucault (1985: 9) claimed that "instead of legitimating what is already known", 
his endeavour was to know how and to what extent it might be possible to think 
differently by rethinking the history of historians. Further insight into what such an 
approach entailed is provided by Maurice Florence's entry on "Michel Foucault" in the 
Dictionnaire des Philosophes (Huisman 1984). It suggests that Foucault's opuses be 
referred to as "critical histories of thought". These are neither histories: 
of the acquisitions of truth nor a history of its occultations; [but] the history of the 
emergence of truth games. It is the history of 'veridictions', understood as the 
forms according to which discourses capable of being deemed true or false are 
articulated within a domain of things: what the conditions of that emergence have 
been; what price has been paid for it, as it were; what effects it has had on the real; 
and the way in which, linking a certain type of object with certain modalities of 
subject, it has constituted for a time, a space, and particular individuals, the 
historical a priori of a possible experience (Florence, in Huisman 1984: 314). 
It has recently been revealed that Florence was an anonymous pseudonym for Foucault. 
Foucault proposed that the histories of "historians" are part of the "truth games" 
that created objects that we assume to have a real or ahistorical existence. It was these 
histories that he sought to question. Hence, he used such histories, or the assumptions 
they promoted, as points that his work would unravel by showing them as part of a web 
of contingent relations. Foucault's histories engaged in a "recurrent dialogue" with the 
historian's history to produce "counter-history" (Noujain 1987), or "a countennemory a 
transformation of history into a totally different form of time" (Foucault 1977b). 
Foucault's counter-historical practice consisted of a number of non-conventional 
approaches: a historical nominalism; a writing of histories of the present that resisted 
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writing the past in terms of the present; an exposition of problems rather than periods; an 
awareness of the dispersion of events; a promotion of a multiplicity of lines of 
explanation; an acceptance that history must be written from a particular viewpoint; 
seeing continuities where historians see discontinuity and vice versa; and a focus on the 
spatialisation as opposed to a temporalisation of reason. These aspects are described 
below. 
Throughout his work Foucault remained sceptical of historical abstractions or 
generalised objects that were believed to remain true across all periods (e. g., Man, 
madness, power, homosexuality), instead seeing only singular instances. Rather than 
believing in a history that traced the development of objective separate institutions and 
the separate subjects that examine them, Foucault adopted a 'historical nominalism' that 
viewed subject and object as enabling the articulation of one another. Hence, he argued 
that 'Man' did not exist until the practices constituted by the rise of humanism and the 
human sciences took hold (Foucault 1970); that Madness could not be conceived without 
the conditions that enabled psychology (Foucault 1965); and that Power in general does 
not exist but is always-already locally present in particular diagrams of strategic 
relationships (Foucault 1977a). 
Thus, Foucault saw the generalised objects that we take for granted as objective 
and universal as singular nominal entities created by a particular way of thinking about 
specific problems. Homosexuality was not, for Foucault (1978), a timeless experience 
that has only recently been correctly addressed. But nor was it the name by which a 
different, more profound experience has been misunderstood. Rather, homosexuality, as it 
is now understood, only became comprehensible in terms of discourses and practices 
carried on in response to the problem that the Modem age made of homosexuality: it was 
24 
not seen to contribute to the value that Modernity placed on the stable nuclear family and 
the efficient production and management of the next generation. A discourse on this 
problem created our object 'homosexuality'. Our nominal understanding of 
homosexuality today has a real impact on current practices, but Foucault argued that it 
should not be assumed that other periods would conceive of homosexuality as a problem 
(and thus an object) in the same way, nor be less or better developed in their 
understanding. The Ancient Greeks, for example, encouraged homosexuality amongst 
men of the upper classes below marrying age, as a means of satisfying male sexual and 
companionship needs while ensuring that the women they should marry remained 'pure'. 
In producing histories of these co-constituted diagrams of subjects and objects, 
Foucault did not seek to articulate the string of evolution from past to present. In 
Discipline and Punish (1 977a: 3 1) he asks of himself why he wanted to write history: 
"Simply because 1 am interested in the past? No, if one means by that writing a history of 
the past in terms of the present. Yes, if one means writing the history of the present". 
Foucault wished to counter the notion that our objects have developed independent of us 
throughout history. To this end he focused on how they are singularly constituted by a 
web of relations that spreads out to sustain understanding, rather than seeking to plot the 
past in terms of its attempts to arrive at what we now hold dear. Foucault argued that the 
webs of relations that sustain our current beliefs and objects expand out from the 
development of a particular problem in a dispersive manner. Hence, the transition into 
Modernity, which sought to move beyond customs and traditions like the power of the 
sovereign or his agents to 'do violence' in order to maintain control of society, made a 
problem of how control or discipline was to be upheld. This problem created the 
necessity, among other things, for human sciences to come forth and objectively state 
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what the norms that should be adhered to were. From this point, a web of relations spread 
out to legitimate this development. Crucially, this web included a history that would 
connect the human sciences to the firmly established natural sciences and demonstrate 
how the human sciences constituted a further advance. Noujain (1987) demonstrates this 
dispersive outlook by illustrating the key dimensions of Foucault's depiction of the 
formation of psychoanalysis (Figure 2). The subject emerges as part of Modernity's quest 
for bands of nonnality, which sustains itself by latching onto the already accepted 
scientific institutions of the Modem hospital and the science of psychology. The history 
of psychoanalysis spoke of how these advances led to its subject, but it remained silent on 
how it joined and thus gave increasing power to other non-scientific elements that 
Foucault saw as crucial and intertwined with the possibility of psychoanalysis: for 
example, the confessional, a particular inheritance of Christianity and the presence of the 
organisational form of asylums once used for containing leprosy victims before the 
decline of the disease. 
This picture presents psychoanalysis as informed and sustained though a 
concentration of elements interwoven across time. Thus, Foucault's (1977b: 159,153) 
histories, rather than seeking a "supra-historical viewpoint [that] aims to draw within a 
totality well closed upon itself a history at last devoid of diversity... capable of endowing 
all the shifts of the past with a semblance of reconciliation", instead offered "a system of 
complex elements, each of them multiple and distinct, incapable of being ruled by any 
power of synthesis". This dispersive view of events should be seen together with the 
promotion of a multiplicity of lines of explanation. For, given the shape of history 
described above, it becomes impossible to capture and determine how events were truly 











FIGURE 2: NOUJAIN's DEPICTION OF FouCAULT's HISTORY OF 
PSYCHOANALYSIS. 
SOURCE: NOUJAIN "HISTORY As GENEALOGY: AN EXPLORATION OF 
FouCAt JLT's APPROACH To HISTORY" ( 1987). 
Consequently, the counter-histories of Foucault did not attempt to explain whole 
periods in relation to other periods against the criterion of linear progress. Instead, they 
began with present concerns or particular problems: 'why prisonsT, 'why do we treat 
madness as we do? '. Through a depiction of contingencies of the sort described above, 
they then sought to problematise assumptions that are taken for granted: 'because they are 
the best form for discouraging criminals', 'because our methods are the best suited to 
counter (i. e., normalise) madness'. Foucault did not, for example, seek to give us a whole 
picture of Modem society, but started by saying 'confession has become a vital 
component of Modem society', before asking 'how did this come to passT 
Given the dispersive nature of events and the multiplicity of lines of explanation, 
there are always many ways to write history. Because there was a "polyhedron of 
intelligibility" (Flynn 1994: 38), Foucault insisted that no history can give the complete 
or objective story. Consequently, he sought not to reveal the whole truth, but rather just 
enough to question what historians promoted as the truth of the evolution of an object. 
"Historians", wrote Foucault (1977b), "take unusual pains to erase the elements in their 
work which reveal their grounding in a particular time and place". Foucault's "historical 
sense" would become one that was "explicit in its... acknowledg[ing] its system of 
injustice. It's perception is slanted, being a deliberate appraisal, affinnation, or negation". 
One way that Foucault pursued this aim was by problematising conventional 
continuities and discontinuities. Modem historians needed to depict how some things 
ceased across linear time (i. e., archaic methods of knowing Man) while others continued 
(e. g., the object Man). Foucault sought, for example, to demonstrate that Man was a 
discontinuous, recent and singular conception, while the new human sciences that would 
'know Man more truthfully' actually continued with many archaic traditions. 
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Foucault also moved from linear time as the model for history to space as a 
guiding paradigm in order to upset the historian's history. He drew upon spatial 
metaphors like Bentham's model prison "The Panopticon" or Velasquez's "Las Meninas" 
to depict the 'architecture' through which people in a particular society saw the world. 
These ways of looking would, Foucault argued, determine and shape whatever objects are 
seen and how they are spoken of Foucault often began his histories by juxtaposing two 
different 'shapes' or ways of seeing, as in Discipline and Punish where the violent public 
torture unto death is placed next to the order of a prison's daily timetable from a few 
decades later, or in The Order of TIdngs (Foucault 1970: xv) where a Chinese 
encyclopedia's categories illustrate "the exotic charm of another system of thought 
[which is at once] the limitation of our own, the stark impossibility of thinking thae'. 
An approach to history like the one described above might be considered anti- or 
un-historical (indeed, Clifford Geertz (1978) tenned Foucault a "nonhistorical historian"). 
However, only, claimed Foucault (1980: 70), by "those who confuse history with the old 
schemas of evolution, living continuity, organic development, the progress of 
consciousness or the project of existence". Foucault sought to counter this view by 
engaging different histories in a number of ways on the coil of his working life. 
H. The histories 1: early works 
But after all this was the proper task of a history of thought, 
as against a history of behaviours or representations: to 
define the conditions in which human beings 'problematize' 
what they are, what they do and the world in which they live. 
Foucault, The Use ofPleasure (1985). 
While the counter-historical aims described above were present, to greater or lesser 
extents, throughout his work, Foucault's histories are often divided into periods. Usually 
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a distinction is made between the early, archaeological and genealogical works (cf 
Burrell 1988). While these categorisations represent clear differences of approach, one 
should be wary of viewing them in isolation. Each indicated a reconfiguration of 
approach given the recognition of problematic elements of the methods that preceded it. 
However, Foucault's approaches do not replace one another: "each is discovered after the 
fact to have been of implicit interest to the earlier one, for which it served as a moving 
force" (Flynn 1994: 28). 
In his early works, Madness and Civilization (1965), Mental Illness and 
Psychology (1976b) and The Birth of the Clinic (1975), Foucault developed a critique of 
psychology and psychiatry: a critique of the scientific or positive psychology that 
assumes "normal" (and subsequently "abnormal") sanity, to be an objective, pre-existing 
condition. Foucault (1976b: 73) contests this assumption via a counter-history that shows 
that "Man became a 'psychological species' only when his relationship to madness made 
a psychology possible"; only when the Age of Reason made madness a problem to be 
isolated and resolved and, hence, an object of inquiry. 'Madness', as such, was not 
always present, waiting to be discovered by a rigorous enough science of the human; 
rather, it was brought into being by the very practices that made talk of such a science 
possible and the 'institutional gaps' of a particular age (e. g., empty leprosoriums). 
Thus, Foucault (1965: 548) termed his history of madness "a history of what 
made the history of the science of psychology possible". Madness and Civilization 
critiqued the way in which psychology constructed its own history, one that enabled it to 
perceive itself as 'arriving' in "that happy age in which madness [an objective continuity] 
was at last recognized and treated in accordance with a truth to which we had long 
remained blind" (Foucault 1965: 142); a history that blinkered itself from recognising 
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that the very possibility of its existence is historically constituted. 
In order to write such a history, those promoting psychology are shown by 
Foucault to engage in questionable practices. Firstly, they write history as anticipation, 
where the past is viewed in tenns of the present's advanced heights. This in turn enables 
an interesting accepted, but paradoxical, history to take hold. A history that incorporates 
the view that madness was an unrecognised object up until it was rigorously grasped by 
Modem science. Here, Modem historians retrospectively find the origin of psychology. 
But also, to further demonstrate psychology's worth, this history incorporates the view 
that the approach taken to madness before Modernity was ei-roneous, notwithstanding 
that history is telling us that such an object had not been recognisedyet. 
Psychology's 'madness as mis-recognised object' thesis promoted its own 
scientificity. Moreover, by idealising the move by which it made its breakthrough into 
becoming a science and demoting anything that went before this, it filtered out of its 
history any view that might challenge it. It had to. Psychology's claim to have achieved 
the first access to an object that was already present before its discovery can only remain 
plausible if psychology links in the disappearance or discontinuity of the un-Modern 
beliefs that promoted the false assessment of madness. Foucault's counter-history 
presented evidence that many pre-Modem views continued into Modem psychology. 
Foucault took these conclusions further. Not only did he seek to show that 
psychology was un-scientific (i. e., based on historical contingencies that created it and its 
object, and gaining legitimacy from a self-made, non-factual and paradoxical history), but 
also that its attempt to found itself as a science had not overcome a mis-recognition. It 
had, in fact, led to a mis-recognition of a primordial understanding of its object. Foucault 
(1965; 1976b) claimed that the Modem discovery of 'madness' concealed real madness: 
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prior to psychology, Renaissance understanding was richer and more realistic. 
Foucault's counter-history led many to question the privilege afforded psychology 
and psychiatry, but it also met with criticisms. Most obviously problematic was the 
assumption that madness has an essence that psychology is taking us away from and 
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which Foucault's seemingly hermeneutic reading might bring us back to. For we may 
ask, how was it that Foucault knew that the earlier experience was more essential 
(Derrida 1978; MacIntyre 1991)? Moreover, even if Foucault did have access to a 
knowledge of true madness, he failed to make this knowledge clear. Nor did Foucault 
define exactly what he took psychology or scientificity to be. Consequently, it is hard to 
know what he leveraged his critique against. Also, his belittling of psychology, by 
claiming it to be un-scientific, had the effect of further promoting accepted scientific 
norms as something that should be universally aspired to. In acknowledging these 
problems, Foucault was obliged to reformulate his approach. 
III. The histories 2: archaeology 
Foucault's archaeological period comprised two major works: The Order of Things 
(1970), which investigated the formation of sciences since the 16th century, and The 
Archaeology of Knowledge (1976a), primarily a methodological discussion. While 
Foucault (1970: xxiv) claimed The Order of TIiings to be "an echo of my undertaking to 
write a history of madness in the Classical age", it also marked a number of changes in 
his approach. Rather than addressing the history of a particular human science, Foucault 
(1970: xi-xii) now sought "to determine the basis or archaeological system common to a 
whole series of scientific 'representations"'. He maintained the target of critiquing the 
tscientificity' of human sciences. However, the critique of the practices of a particular 
31 
human science because of its 'un-scientificity' was replaced with a critique of the 
historical interpretation that all human sciences give to their own scientificity. He did so 
by focusing on their common object (Man) and on the role played by common discourse 
in shaping practices. Foucault's problem was no longer 'how could a counter-history 
show a particular Modem science to not be a science and thus keeping us from the truthT 
Instead, he was now concerned with 'what, in our Modem times, inotivated the human 
sciences to present themselves as sciences, to create histories that promoted their 
scientificity and the consequences of this will-to-science? ' 
Subsequently, archaeology's most important concept is that of the epistenie. 
Recognising the difficulties in promoting a pre-Modem understanding of madness as 
superior to the Modem, Foucault now presented the view that all knowledge, all 
conceptions of objects, are historically bound by the epistemic 'strata' within which they 
are situated. He (1970: xiii-xxii) defines an episteme as "the conditions that a statement 
has to fulfill... to give it, at the time when it was written and accepted, value"; the 
"modalities of order [that are] recognized, posited, linked with space and time, in order to 
create the positive basis of knowledge"; the "space of order [within which] knowledge is 
constituted". Or, as he explained in a later work: 
something like a world-view, a slice of history common to all branches of 
knowledge, which imposes on each one the same norms and postulates, a general 
stage of reason, a certain structure of thought that the men of a particular period 
cannot escape (Foucault 1976a: 191). 
In the Modem episterne the view is such that the human sciences had to satisfy the 
conditions of the so-called 'normal' sciences. 
By following the "rules of a 'discursive policing... (which they have to do in order 
to have value), statements continually reactivate and entrench these rules (Foucault 
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1976a: 61). Foucault (1970: xxii) claimed that his enterprise now was "not so much a 
history, in the traditional meaning of that word, as an 'archaeology'... a history which is 
not that of [knowledge's] growing perfection, but rather that of its conditions of 
possibility". By showing these singular conditions and the specific statements that these 
conditions would allow, he sought to show that current epistemic arrangements are not 
natural or superior or having a value that must be respected. 
Foucault drew a number of different episteme in The Order of Things. The first, 
from the Middle Ages to the 16th century (the "Renaissance"), characterised knowledge 
according to the interpretation of the web of traditional or mythological similitudes 
between various beings, across what Modems would see as separate categories. Here, 
both people and words were defined as other beings within the web of reality. The second 
episteme (the "Classical") ran from the 17th to the 18th century and sought to order 
knowledge by using universal measures to differentiate objects from one another and 
represent them via positivistic language (now separated from other beings) on objective 
tables. The third (the "Age of Man") sought to know the depth behind the tables 
(Foucault claimed that it added "verticality" to the Classical's "horizontality"). This came 
about as the object 'Man', a generic species, was recognised. Man was seen as above 
other species. In order to make sense of this, the Age of Man added a time series to the 
Classical age's tables to show the evolution or progression of beings. This required the 
essential functions and origins underlying different variations to be determined so that the 
stages of progression that each being stood at could be plotted. 
Foucault demonstrates the epistemic change from the Classical Age to the Age of 
Man by showing the way that the 17th century's 'natural history', 'grammar' and 'the 
study of wealth', which had focused on measuring and recording different things relative 
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to one another, were replaced with biology, linguistics and economics. In order to show 
the progression that concerned the Age of Man, biology searched for essentialfinictions 
and how these could be seen to rank the species, with Man, given his superior faculties, at 
the top. Linguistics, making an object of language, searched for the root of all languages 
showing Man's development as a languaging animal. Economics, seeing Man as an 
economic animal, added the underlying coniponent of labour that explained the categories 
of wealth and impoverishment - categories whose order the Classical Age left without 
explanation. This Age also saw the invention of what 'the human sciences' - psychology, 
sociology, anthropology - according to the discursive rules and modalities of order of the 
Age of Man. 
The history of the human sciences tells us that the application of the scientific 
method enabled us to see the object 'Man', which had been poorly understood by earlier 
episteme. However, Foucault (1970) claimed that Man "the study of whom is supposed 
by the naive to be the oldest investigation since Socrates" appears (or is separated out and 
privileged) for the first time in the field of Western knowledge only as the human 
sciences emerged in the Age of Man. We pay a price for not recognising this and for the 
will-to-science that sees Man as a universal object subject to scientific inquiry. 
Foucault found that the Age of Man and its empirical sciences (linguistics, 
economics, biology - themselves modeled upon chemistry, physics and natural history) 
shaped the historical emergence of the human sciences. It was only in an episteme where 
beings could be viewed as solely empirical objects, and plotted relative to one another on 
tables subject to temporal development, that generic 'Man' could be spoken of. It was 
only in an age where Man could be seen as the empirical sciences considered plants or 
minerals that the human sciences could emerge. It was only by being guided by the 
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mechanisms and classificatory schemes of the empirical sciences that the human sciences 
could gain a purchase on their object. Furthermore, there was no alternative for the 
human sciences but to develop a historical link with the empirical sciences if they were to 
become regarded as legitimate branches of knowledge, and for their statements to have 
value within the Modem epistcmc. However, by doing this, the human sciences entered 
into a state of instability that immediately and irrevocably deprived them of any possible 
scientificity, and, at once, any possible alternative grounding. 
Foucault (1970: 366) argued that the way in which the object of the human 
sciences is conceived "at the same time makes it impossible for them to be sciences". 
While human fields of study attempted to become more scientific, their object, unlike the 
animal and mineral objects of biology and chemistry, continued to be understood to be, in 
no small part, transcendental as well as empirical. The effects of transcendentals are 
difficult to know empirically, but the human sciences needed to use empirical methods of 
discovery if they were to be sciences. Thus, the human sciences burden themselves with 
an unsatiable need for self-demystification, because one can never prove, with the 
instruments of the empirical sciences, the role that the unconscious or spirituality, for 
example, is playing. Foucault (1989: 4) describes the human sciences as consequently: 
caught as it were in a double obligation, a double and simultaneous obligation: 
that of hermeneutics, interpretation, or exegesis: one must understand a hidden 
meaning; and the other: one must formalize, discover the system, the structural 
invariant, the network of simultaneities. 
In other words, Man is an impossibly "half-empirical, half-philosophical" being 
(Foucault 1970: xxiii). Add to this the fact that the Age of Man has made Man both the 
subject and the primary object of knowledge, and one finds that "the sciences of man, 
caught in various doubles, simply cannot be normal" like the sciences that they appeal to 
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(Dreyfus & Rabinow 1983: 116). This peculiar and paradoxical form infuses the human 
sciences with an oscillatory and uncertain nature, a "transcendental mobility" (Foucault 
1970: 364). Hence, we have witnessed a historical debate, ever since their inception, as to 
whether the human sciences are yet proper sciences, and how, if they are not, they may be 
made so. Foucault (1970: 3 65) now claimed that this whole debate is "vain and idle" - the 
human sciences are structurally incapable of becoming sciences. 
The Order of Things goes on to argue that more than being vain and idle, this 
debate is counter-productive. The desire to apply scientific method as a means of being 
considered capable of producing legitimate knowledge, leaves the human sciences 
oscillating about uncertainly in a 'no man's land' between attempting to be scientific and 
not becoming sciences, while not motivated to stake out approaches of their own. 
Moreover, the episternic drive to 'anthropologisation' led to the established sciences 
incorporating 'human concerns', eroding their previously well-defined abilities and their 
credibility. Foucault (1970: 355) claimed that this was the greatest problem facing 
knowledge in our times. His solution? - that we must recognise the 'specificity' of human 
studies, that what we now refer to as the human sciences should not be viewed as 
sciences at all, but "constitute... side by side with the sciences and on the same 
archaeological ground, other configurations of knowledge". 
While Foucault had plugged many of his early method's loop-holes, archaeology 
was to open more. While his counter-history now went further toward specifying that 
which his critique was leveraged against, through the drawing of episternes, Foucault still 
did not define the nature of scientificity. Moreover, the manner of his critique could not 
help but reinforce the worth of 'normal sciences' by accepting that they had achieved 
methods suitable to their objects. In addition, Foucault still indicated that access to a 
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positive or true understanding of objects was possible. How else could his specificity 
thesis work? Also, if one took specificity seriously, did it not lead to a point where 
infinite orders of knowledge could be justified on the grounds of the specificity of 
particular objects? If this was the case, how then can one offer any sort of critique? 
This leads to a deeper conundrum, one that Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983) see as 
akin to the doubled entrapment that The Oi-der of Things accuses the human sciences of 
Archaeology's bind is that Foucault implies that an episteme is deterministic and 
enclosing: a structure of thought from which the thinkers of a particular period cannot 
escape (e. g., 1968: 17-19; 1976a: 72-4,146-7). Foucault the archaeologist, like anyone 
else, can say nothing outside of this structure. Despite this obvious entrapment, Foucault 
insisted that the archaeologist remains detached and just describes the general discourse 
that determines particular practices. On this logic, Foucault must lose touch with the 
practices that he seemed to want to have some effect on. In any case, if he had wanted to 
engage with particular concerns, nothing he could say now would make any difference as, 
based on the logic described earlier, whatever he said would be always-already caught up 
in the epistemic web of his time. Foucault's rigid, structuralist (although the association 
angered him - cf. Foucault 1970: xiv) conception of episteme and the archaeologist's 
relation to them, denuded Foucault's ability to offer any critique of consequence. 
IV. The histories 3: genealogy 
What was missing from my work was the problem of 
'discursive regime', the effects of power proper on the 
enuciative play. I confused it too much with systernaticity, 
the theoretical form, or something like a paradigm. 
Foucault, PowerlKnowledge (1980). 
While Foucault (in Dreyfus & Rabinow 1983: viii) maintained that he was never a 
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structuralist, he admitted that during his archaeological period he was "not as resistant to 
the seductive advances of structuralist vocabulary as he might have been". After a six- 
year period of reflection, Foucault found in Nietzsche the inspiration to continue his 
counter-historical work without the elements of archaeology that now sat uneasily with 
him. While he continued his quest to show up particular practices as contingent and thus 
un-scientific, he announced a change of method in the paper Nietzsche, Geitealogy, 
History (I 977b). All the seeds of Foucault's later work may be found within it. 
Foucault picks up on Nietzsche's anti-positivist view (particularly apparent in 
The Genealogy ofMorals which argued that good and evil were historical developments), 
that there are no objective or essential forms that can be appealed to. All that exists are 
chaotic webs of change and chance relations. However, in being afraid of this non- 
foundational uncertainty, people look to historians to sort through things so as to show 
that the present in actual fact rests upon profound intentions and immutable necessities. 
In order to ensure our belief in current morals (or anything else), historians scour the past 
for their grand origin and demonstrate how we have progressed from there to our present 
state. In Foucault's words (1977b), this "origin [becomes] the site of truth" and in a 
circular manner "makes possible a field of knowledge whose function is to recover it". 
"In placing present needs at the origin, the metaphysician would convince us of an 
obscure purpose that seeks its realization at the moment it arises"; this "truth" then 
becomes "the sort of error that cannot be refuted because it [has been] hardened into an 
unalterable form in the long baking process of history". 
In adopting Nietzsche's view, Foucault escapes from the structural positivist 
tendencies of archaeology. All knowledge is historical as before, but all history, and 
consequently the development of humanity, can now only be "a series of interpretations" 
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(Foucault 1977b: 151). Moreover, these interpretations have been created and imposed by 
particular interests, not by the nature of things. 
Our historical foundations have no real foundation at all. However, they have 
real effects in shaping of knowledge. The obvious question, which remained unasked in 
archaeology (where there were merely episternes guiding things and no further 
explanation given), becomes 'if there is nothing positive that knowledge can attach itself 
to, then what sustains our belief in the interpretations that we take as knowledgeT 
Nietzsche's answer was 'power'. It became Foucault's as well. Whereas archaeology 
concerned itself with highlighting the statements that constituted various archives or 
epistemes of knowledge, genealogy would move on to focus upon the relationship 
between knowledge and power, or as Foucault (1977a: 28) called it: "power/knowledge": 
it is not the activity of the subject of knowledge that produces a corpus of 
knowledge, useful or resistant to power, but power/knowledge, the processes and 
struggles that traverse it and of which it is made up, that determines the forms and 
possible domains of knowledge. 
It is important to note that the power/knowledge relationship that genealogy is 
concerned with draws upon unconventional views of both power and knowledge. 
Knowledge is not looked at as being either objective or subjective, but is regarded as a 
real and central competent in the historical transformation of various regimes of power 
and truth. Power, on the other hand, was not seen as a possession that one group holds 
and another lacks, but a complex "network of relations, constantly in tension, in activity" 
(Foucault 1977a: 26). Nor is power seen as negative. It is particularly not seen as 
something that knowledge is, or should be, free of the effects of. For genealogy, 
knowledge is only possible but for power: 
We must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in negative 
terms... In fact, power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of 
objects and rituals of truth. The individual and the knowledge that may be gained 
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of him belong to this production (Foucault 1977a: 194). 
The role of power in the establishment and ordering of a field, in setting out what 
knowledge can be and what it is not, is what permits it to speak of knowledge. Hence, 
"there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, 
nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power 
relations" (Foucault 1977a: 27). This is why Nietzsche saw claims to objective reason as 
nothing more than the disguised 'will to power', and Foucault (in Dreyfus & Rabinow 
1983: 114) came to believe that the idea that science is knowledge without the influence 
of power or interpretation is "our own deepest lie". 
However, while power is positive, or "perpetually creating knowledge" in this 
sense, Foucault (1980: 52) believed that "conversely, knowledge constantly induces 
effects of power". Alternatively, as Deleuze (1988: 29) described it, "Power 'produces 
reality' before it represses". Playing an integral part in the producing-repressing 
power/knowledge web of a field, or what it sees as the truth, is the linear progressive 
history that a subject constructs for itself out of a multiplicity of potentially contributing 
elements. This historical aspect produces by shaping the view and boundaries of the 
subject, thus making knowledge possible. However, it at once forms a network that 
represses any other interpretations which might challenge its unity and truth. This 
network may not be consciously developed but it is played out in a subject's discourse. 
Here we might find texts reduplicating events and origins taken to be important, and these 
texts used to educate initiates, so as to eventually nullify their particularity and personal 
nature. Things thereby come to appear more solid and objective, so as to make them seem 
regular or beyond doubt (Eribon 1989: 220-1). 
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What, consequently, does genealogy seek to do? Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983: 
120) simply state Foucault's research strategy at this time as: 
study those doubtful sciences thoroughly enmeshed in power, which in spite of 
their own orthodoxies show no sign of becoming normal sciences; study them 
with a method which reveals the truth itself to be a central component of modem 
power. 
A central element of the web that sustains the truth of subjects that are claiming to be 
scientific is a history written so as to connect the subject to Modem science. Hence, 
Foucault aligned his project to Nietzsche's (Daybreak 44) concern to expose the 
influence of a field's grand origins and subsequent continuities to the present, to show 
"the insignificance of the origin... with more insight into an origin". Insight that would 
show the revered origin to be an arbitrary construction based on present concerns -a 
simulated foundation. Thus, the genealogist sets out to demonstrate that the objects of his 
or her investigations have: 
no essence, or rather, its essence is that their essence was fabricated in a 
piecemeal fashion from alien forms. [While the] entire historical tradition aims at 
dissolving the singular event into an ideal continuity [genealogy] transposes the 
relationship ordinarily established between the eruption of an event and necessary 
continuity... records the singularity of events outside of any monotonous finality... 
disturbs what was previously considered immobile (Foucault 1977b). 
Henceforth, Foucault (1977b) spoke of counter-history as being "effective" to the degree 
that it deprives subjects "of the reassuring stability of life and nature" that is believed to 
underpin them; to the degree that it "introduces discontinuity into our very being", 
"uproots traditional foundations and disrupts pretended continuity". 
Within Foucault's archeaologies, the specificity of particular fields came from a 
positively existing difference in that field's object. ln this way, all specific approaches 
could be shown to be equally valid if an understanding of their primordial object was 
recovered. After the genealogical turn, Foucault regarded all subjects as shaped by a 
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solidifying web constructed of past strategic problematisations, expedient relationships, 
alliances and chance meetings, subsequently interpreted into a history that gave the 
appearance of positivity. Genealogy was thus concerned to investigate and stress the 
arbitrary development of these power/knowledge relationships - the manner in which they 
produce knowledge and marginalise alternatives. No longer are practices or epistemes 
conceived as marginalising the truth of reality, or the specific nature of what subjects aim 
to be. What these orders marginalise, due to the power invested in a particular historical 
line of privileged elements, are other possibilities. 
Foucault would still cast doubt on the scientificity of human sciences, but he no 
longer sought to critique human sciences due to their un-scientificity or to critique the 
motivation behind the will to link their histories to established sciences. Foucault's work 
was now directed against a subject's claim to scientificity as an attempt to invest 
particular forms of knowledge with the power of a surplus value to the detriment of 
others. Genealogy asked: 
What types of knowledge do you want to disqualify in the very instant of your 
demand: 'Is it a scienceT Which speaking, discoursing subjects... do you then 
want to 'diminish' when you say: 'I who conduct this discourse am conducting a 
scientific discourse, and 1 am a scientistT (Foucault 1980: 85). 
Recognising the way that archaeology's detached manner had distanced him from 
the things that he wanted to redress, Foucault now sought to first get inside specific sites 
where particular practices of power take place. He then looked at how particular groups 
imposed a particular interpretation on events and made 'history' of them by connecting 
them to specific contingent elements in the past. Instead of looking from the outside into 
the practices that were determined by an episteme, Foucault now worked from the inside 
out. He returned to the case approach of his early works' dispersive examinations of 
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particular practices. However, given that he now believed the historical effects of power 
to be always-already present, he now dismissed the nostalgic hermeneutic approach that 
claimed to be able to read and recover some underlying essential truth. Foucault (1980: 
218) now also saw no compulsion to be bound by analysing the particular practice he 
began with. Given that power was an all-encompassing, all-connected network of 
relations, he would start with a particular "obligatory historical given... give it serious 
consideration" ("I do not place myself outside it", he now said, in recognition of one of 
archaeology's flaws, "because it is not possible to do this") and then let what he 
discovered of the power/knowledge surrounding this take him to other things. 
The first genealogical study, Discipline and Pimish (1977a) was sub-titled The 
Birdi of the Prison. Foucault began with the assumption that prisons represent the 
pinnacle of a great natural progression upon previous punishments. He then demonstrated 
this assumption, based on a history that showed prisons as an outcome of Man's 
increasing civilisation, liberty and humanity to Man, to be dubious, and delineated the 
manner in which the power/knowledge invested in the discipline and punishment system 
that sustains prisons diffuses across all fields of knowledge and life in Modernity. 
Discipline and Punish started with the juxtaposition of two quotations. One 
described the gruesome public torture and slaying of the regicide Damiens in 1757. The 
next, dated some 80 years later, listed the rigid timetable of activities for boys 
incarcerated in a young persons' prison in Paris. A great discontinuity had taken place. 
All of a sudden, prisons and universal penal codes had sprung up in Russia (1769), 
Prussia (1780), Tuscany (1786), Pennsylvania (1786), Austria (1788) and France (1791). 
Foucault argued that this discontinuity came as control was problematised. While the 
sensibilities of the late 18th century made violence carried out in the name of the 
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sovereign on the bodies of individuals unacceptable, order and control were just as 
imperative. Foucault portrayed a transition from traditional modes of societal control, 
from authorities with the power to take lives and brand bodies to authorities with the 
power to observe, examine and know normal human functions and in turn communicate 
how internal self-discipline or self-management with regard to these functions constituted 
'good behaviour'. This problematisation of control saw the deployment of what Foucault 
described as the two prongs of Modernity's instrument of power: sta-veillance and 
nonnalisation. While it was not 'good form' to tell individuals how to behave, it was 
acceptable for science to identify what is normal so that people could maintain and 
correct themselves in the interest of the 'greater good'. Nor was it appropriate for 
Modems to be seen to force others to act in certain ways against their will, but it was seen 
as not inappropriate for the powers that be to monitor developments in order to ensure 
adherence to nonnal standards. 
By the 20th century, prisons were entrenched as the institution for managing and 
reforming criminal deviance in Western societies. This assumption was reinforced by a 
history that highlighted how superior (morally or economically) prisons were to earlier 
methods. The institution of the prison formed a self-sustaining system with other new 
Modernist practices. By standardising all-encompassing laws and guidelines for 
punishment, each person (case) could now be tried by an overseeing judge as an 
individual responsible for his or her own actions (in keeping with the liberal thinking of 
the day) against an independent objective catalogue of types of crimes (i. e., 
manifestations of abnon-nality) and appropriate general punishments (i. e., corrective 
measures). Deviants could be incarcerated in prisons for the appropriate length of time 
and monitored accordingly, further reinforcing norms regarding suitable forms of 
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non-nalising 'treatment'. A catalogue that could be subject to rigorous scientific statistical 
analysis emerged (here we have the birth of the science of criminology). Alternatives to 
this system could not provide empirical statistics and were subsequently dismissed as un- 
proven. 
Foucault's counter-history argued that rather than criminals being a natural pre- 
existing object that Modem methods could now treat properly, Modem legal codes in 
tandem with Modem prisons shaped them. Prisons, rather than reforming criminals, 
actually created them. Foucault showed that through a contingent history where those in 
power have controlled knowledge in their field, the prison system had established, grown 
and maintained itself while consistently failing to achieve its stated aims and 
undermining alternatives (one might note how prison populations have grown since their 
inception, the response to which is almost always a call for tougher codes and more 
prisons). 
The prison became the hub of Foucault's analysis. The geography, or 'spatial 
visibility', of the Modem prison, and in particular Bentham's Panopticon with its ability 
to maintain surveillance over a number of different cells (Figure 3), became for Foucault 
(1977a: 184) the metaphor of the spirit of Modemity. From here, he argued that other 
Modem organisations - annies, factories, schools - achieved the same aims in similar 
ways, despite accepted histories to the contrary. He viewed fields like pedagogy and 
criminology as sustained by similar power/knowledge webs. Further, he revisited his 
early studies on psychology and medical practice with genealogy's change of emphasis. 
At this point, Foucault re-viewed the emergence of the medical science and its 
counterpart, the well-disciplined and ordered Modem hospital, as enabling the 
establishment of one another while simultaneously marginalising alternatives. 
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Throughout the 17th and 18th centuries, public health had increasingly been 
problematised by states whose governments saw 'surety of human resources' as a crucial 
cog in their economic and military well-being. Correspondingly, medicine was to become 
more like physics or chemistry and take its references not so much from various author- 
authorities but from an objective object: Man. In order to do so, it required a domain of 
such objects to be perpetually offered up for examination in order to enable the formation 
of a 'back catalogue' that could create general objective categories: categories of 
measurement and bands of normality within those measures. In order for the hospital to 
emerge, it had to provide the conditions that enabled the formation of these categories 
and nonns or laws (e. g., nonnal function, type of illness/symptoms or 'abnormalities', 
pulse, temperature, colour, blood count) and an examination facility where Man could be 
charted and monitored against these standard criteria. The hospital emerged to provide a 
tableau or order, against which the individual case could be plotted, codified and treated 
objectively by the overlooking subject of medical science. 
The influence of The Order of Things still resonates as this is the "operating 
table" that Foucault (1970: xvii) referred to then: 
in two superimposed senses: the nickel plated, rubbery table swathed in white, 
glittering beneath a glass sun devouring all shadow - the table where, for an 
instant, perhaps forever, the umbrella encounters the sewing-machine; and also a 
table, a tabula, that enables thought to operate upon the world, to put them in 
order to divide them into classes. 
However, beyond describing this episternic gaze, genealogy is interested in showing the 
way the operating tableau provided by the Modem hospital links with medical science 
and the general object Man so as to perpetuate each other within a self-sustaining system. 
A system that spreads out to incorporate the schools that educate doctors; the legal and 
other institutions (e. g., prisons) that reward their discipline and punish their indiscretions; 
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and, the general emphases of Modem society. 
While the Modem hospital might be seen as a consequence of advances in 
medical science (Porter 1997), Foucault's (1977a) analysis demonstrated that one could 
not have formed without the other. Rather than a linear-causal view of scientific methods 
being applied to Man which enabled his truth to be known, thus leading to the 
establishment of medical science and to the establishment of the Modem hospital, 
Foucault's genealogy showed the sub ect (medical science) and object (Man) sustaining j 
one another in conjunction with a new type of institution - the bureaucratic hospital where 
subject continually meets/creates object. Once this network was established, the power 
vested in the web of relationships between doctors and 'specialists', their scientific 
education and research, hospitals, clinics, and Modernity's general scientific and 
humanist beliefs, marginalised alternative un-scientific therapies (which lacked the 
objective tableau necessary to support claims to scientificity) and the individual's 
particular knowledge of him or herself. 
While Foucault began with the particular problem of the accepted presence of 
prisons, his genealogy spread to incorporate the view that while Modernity believed that 
science had enabled a certain objective knowledge of Man, by demonstrating that the 
body obeys the laws of physiology which escape the influence of history, these laws were 
in fact a historical formation. The general theme of DisciplMe wid Ptudsh (1977a: 25-6) 
thus became demonstrating that knowledge of "the body is also directly involved in a 
po itical. field... Power relations have an immediate hold upon it; they invest it, mark it, 
train it... force it to carry out tasks". Foucault recognised that the combination of 
knowledge and power localised in the body, indicating how the body should be looked 
after and used by its owner, was now a general mechanism of power of great import. 
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After Discipline and Punish, Foucault continued his genealogical quest by 
focusing on the way in which sexuality had become part of this general mechanism of 
power, and subject to increasing normalisation and surveillance. By the late 20th century, 
it was common knowledge that Modem Western society had finally begun to approach 
sexuality in an appropriate manner. After the barbarity of pre-Modem societies and the 
Victorian Age's humorous prudishnessness with regard to sexual practice, the matter-of- 
fact application of scientific methods to sex and sexuality was enabling Modems to chalk 
up another advance and further 'emancipate' themselves. 
The first volume of this project, The Histoiy ofSexuality - An Introduction (1978), 
highlighted the way that history has formed to support contemporary views regarding 
how sexually liberated and therefore advanced our times were. It then argued that these 
beliefs could be shown to be not a moral advance, or reflective of a better understanding 
of the object 'sex', but related to the emergence, development and effects of a singular 
problem and a specific configuration of power/knowledge. 
This counter-history questioned the orthodoxy that held the Victorian Age to be 
repressed and prudish, seeing instead a period with an unusually fervent interest in sex. In 
Victorian times, an individual's 'sexuality' became subject to intense scrutinisation, a 
further human object for scientific codification and normalisation. Foucault (1978: 24) 
argued that sex, like illness and crime, came to be: 
inserted into systems of utility, regulated for the greater good of all, made to 
function according to an optimum. Sex was not something one simply judged; it 
was a thing one administered ... ; it had to be taken charge of by analytical discourses. In the l8th century sex became a 'police' matter - in the full and direct 
sense of the word at the time: not the repression of disorder, but an ordered 
maximization of collective and individual forces. 
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Sex thus became an important problem to be considered and new discourses emerged. At 
the level of the individual, nomis of sexual behaviour were laid out and types of deviance 
or abnormality came into view and were registered. At the end of the 19th century, 
perhaps the height of the Age of Man or Modernism, Freudian psychology emerged, and 
the effects of types of sexual behaviour on whole populations and society came to inform 
newly-created fields like sociology and population ecology. Foucault showed that the 
notion of defining one's sexuality in terms of a particular 'type' did not appear until the 
Victorian's invented it (debunking the idea that sexuality was an object continuous 
through history). Further, rather than our century being a liberated break from Victorian 
prudishness, Foucault (1978: 34) displayed our age as a continuation of their "regulated 
and polymorphous incitement to discourse" about sex. 
Genealogy had enabled Foucault to overcome many of archaeology's problems. 
He was no longer constrained by the all-encompassing deterministic notion of the 
episteme, nor by the positivism of his earlier hermeneutic or structuralist quests to 
detemline the underlying essence or cause of things. By engaging first with a particular 
problem or field and then working outwards, Foucault could engage with real issues and 
develop counter-histories with a view to enabling people to think differently. However, 
genealogy soon encountered problems of its own. 
Whereas archaeology was denuded by the all-embracing nature of the current 
episteme, genealogy's argument left no space outside of power. While archaeology could 
no longer think an inauthentic order (any order could be justified with regard to a 
particular object), genealogy turned every order, even the genealogist's, into an 
inauthentic order, a facade sustained by power and necessarily marginalising alternatives. 
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This was perhaps not too difficult a problem for Foucault as he claimed that his works 
should never be regarded as new orthodoxies, only as tools for undennining established 
orders. However, by taking his anti-orthodox stance further, Foucault did paint himself 
into something of a comer. Foucault now recognised no order. Swinging away from the 
concept of the episteme, he rejected all critical or structuralist forms, disparagingly 
associating them with "left intellectual... master of truth and justice". He would not state 
even the nonnative position that his analyses took (Foucault 1980: 126). 
As critics were quick to point out, this left no point from which Foucault could be 
critical, as any critique could only be made relative to an established standpoint. Taylor 
(1986: 93), among others (Habermas 1986; Hormeth 1991; Brenner 1994), argued that 
Foucault's histories relinquish any critical power they may have by claiming there is "no 
order of human life... or human nature, that one can appeal to in order to judge or evaluate 
between ways of life". Foucault's claim to be critical while eschewing even a normative 
framework amounts to a "perfon-native contradiction" (Habermas 1987: 276ff. ). He could 
not criticise institutions unless he made clear what his critical analysis was based upon or 
what his standpoint, even if it was onlY considered a nonnative standpoint, was. 
In any case, despite eschewing them, Foucault does adhere to normative positions 
and even universal theories (e. g., "there is no power relation without the correlative 
constitution of a field of knowledge"; "the exercise of power creates and causes to 
emerge new objects of knowledge" (Foucault 1977a: 27; 1980: 52). Indeed, this is not 
surprising given that Foucault (1977b: 156; see also 1975: 134) claimed that genealogy, 
having much "in common with medicine", is an "approach similar to that of a doctor who 
. 
looks closely, who plunges in to make a diagnosis and to state its difference". To see 
things so, Foucault must have, at least implicitly, worked from some standpoint and used 
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some criteria. Indeed, a number of passages in Discipline and Punish condemn the effects 
of power on the grounds of the "asymmetry" involved (Kunneman 1986: 368). Foucault's 
genealogy stood accused of "crypto-nonnativism" (Fraser 1981: 283). 
V. The histories 4: interpretive analytics 
Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow at Berkeley enabled me, 
through their comments and their rigorous questioning to 
undertake a theoretical and methodological reformulation. 
Foucault, The Use ofPleasure (1985). 
Foucault paused for seven years after the first Volume of The Histog of Sexuality. The 
problems with genealogy's criticality, described above, clearly concerned him. He had 
struck up a working relationship and friendship with two American professors, Paul 
Rabinow and Hubert Dreyfus, during his visits to Berkeley in the late 1970s. At the 
beginning of The Use of Pleasure, he credits this association with enabling him to 
undertake what would be his last methodological reformulation. In the work that 
articulated this re-think, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, 
Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983), in discussion with Foucault, arrived at a combination of 
genealogy and archaeology: a style beyond structuralism's belief in there being a positive 
social rule-structure that detennines discourse and knowledge, and hermeneutics' search, 
through some form of exegesis, for the deeper universal meaning of things behind the 
structural-cultural boundaries apparent in discourse. They term it "interpretive analytics". 
Whereas Foucault's early works might be termed hermeneutical, and archaeology 
(despite Foucault's protests) structuralist, Dreyfus and Rabinow claim that genealogy is 
the beginning of Foucault's attempt to move beyond late-Modernity's two most obvious 
choices for undoing conventional or naive historical analyses. However, interpretive 
analytics emerged as Foucault took "the archaeological step back" from genealogy 
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necessary to enable him to be analytical and critical. Interpretive analytics requires a 
blend that was undervalued as Foucault, increasingly concerned to respond to the 
weaknesses inherent in archaeology, moved toward a genealogical emphasis and 
commentators tried to articulate the difference between what they took to be two distinct 
methods. 
Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983: 104, their italics) make it clear that one should not 
look for a "pre- andpost-archaeology or geizealogy M Foucault". In order to demonstrate 
the potential complementarity of the two, they return to the cusp where Foucault 
recognised the deficiencies of archaeology while seeking to retain it within his research 
strategy. In his 1970 inaugural lecture as Professor of the History of Systems of Thought 
at the College de France, he announced his proposed research programme by drawing 
links between the genealogical and the archaeological (here tenned "critical"): 
Critical and genealogical description are to alternate, support and complement 
each other. The critical side of the analysis deals with the system's enveloping 
discourse; attempting to mark out and distinguish the principles of ordering. 
exclusion. and rarily-in discourse... The genealogical side of analysis, by way of 
contrast, deals with series of effective fon-nation of discourse: it attempts to 
grasp... the power of constituting a domain of objects, in relation to which one can 
affirm or deny true or false propositions. (Foucault, in Dreyfus & Rabinow 1983: 
105, underlining added). 
While genealogy looked at the role of power in the forination and maintenance of 
knowledge, archaeology enabled the provision of a system within which the fornis or 
statements of this formation could be marked out and analysed. 
Dreyfus and Rabinow argue that while the role of archaeology may have been 
downplayed in an attempt to differentiate Foucault's later method, it is always crucial to 
genealogy. Archaeology does the initial work of. 
free[ing] us from a residual belief in our direct access to objects; in each case the 
"tyranny of the referent" has to be overcome. When we add genealogy, however, 
[another] level of intelligibility and differentiation is introduced. After 
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archaeology does its job, the genealogist can ask about the historical and social 
roles [a practice] plays (Dreyfus & Rabinow 1983: 117). 
Genealogy looked at the power/knowledge of a specific discourse and its history. 
However, one must remember that Foucault the genealogist was also concerned to show a 
specific discourses place in the larger context of power/knowledge in order to evaluate its 
claim to describe reality. Thus, while Discipline and Punish and The History of Sexuality 
began with particular unquestioned problems and the power/knowledge that sustained 
them, in interpretative analytics it is important to acknowledge that underlying this 
particular concern, and the universal history of continuity that adds value to it, must be an 
archaeological belief in cultural discontinuities, that things have been different and 
subsequently could be different again. As Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983: 106) put it, 
"having begun on the inside" as a genealogist, Foucault must then employ archaeology to 
"move one step back from the discourse he is studying and treat it as a discourse object". 
He must recognise that to be historically analytical or critical requires an archaeological 
isolation of the present condition relative to alternatives. It requires something like an 
articulation of different episteme. 
In response, Foucault introduced the concept of the dispotif. While Foucault did 
not spell out its limits, Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983) believe that the dispotif is similar to 
the episteme except in two crucial respects. Firstly, it encompasses the non-discursive 
practices or ways of seeing that genealogy was concerned with as well as the discursive 
statements that archaeology took as its focus. As Foucault (1980: 194) explained, a 
dispotif may include both what we might call 'high-brow' and 'low brow' forms of 
knowledge: "discourse, institutions, architectural arrangements, regulations, laws, 
administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophic propositions and morality". 
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Secondly, unlike the episteme, the dispotif is not seen to be a positively existing structure 
that causes all discourse. It is a nonnative construct that depicts general socio-cultural 
trends toward a particular purpose. By drawing from discursive and non-discursive 
components, the analyst seeks to interpret a set of flexible relationships and merge them 
into a single apparatus in order to isolate a specific historical problem. 
Consequently, the dispotif is a framework constructed by the interpretive 
analytical counter-historian that relates to the practice being analysed. Hence it cannot be 
a universal grid for analysing all things and it must be recognised that the grid itself will 
be necessarily connected to the practice in question. The outlining of a dispotif provides a 
sense of distance necessary for analysis. However, dispotif and practice should not be 
seen as detached. Foucault's English translators generally turn dispotif into a "particular 
apparatus" (Dreyfus and Rabinow prefer "grid of intelligibility") to convey Foucault's 
concern that it be viewed as a tool to aid analysis, not as an end in itself. 
Foucault, as an interpretive analyst, was analytical (but not structuralist) by taking 
seriously the problems, cultural beliefs and conceptual tools of the past and present, but 
not the solutions and conclusions based on them. He replaced the notion of ontology with 
a kind of history that simply focused on interpreting the cultural practices that have made 
us what we are, accepting that we are nothing but our history and that our practices are 
not less real for being historically constructed. Foucault, as interpretive analyst, was 
interpretative here (without being henneneutic). By seeking to get close to the actors' 
involvement wid then distancing himself from it, in order to provide a comparative 
reading of the coherence of the practices of society, he did so believing that he may lead 
people to re-think and change things without claiming that his reading corresponded to 
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the truth of the everyday meanings shared by the actors or revealed the intrinsic meaning 
of practices. The interpretive analyst realises that they are themselves produced by what 
they are studying and can consequently never stand fully outside it, but that they must 
create some nominal distance in order to say anything that could encourage thinking 
differently. 
The step back to archaeology that Foucault had to take to report the strangeness or 
singularity of our practices no longer considered these practices as meaningless because 
they were without foundation. Since we share cultural practices, we may interpret other 
practices in other societies as different and we may thus develop some common footing 
for proceeding with analysis. In interpretative analytics, however, such footholds can no 
longer claim to be universal, guaranteed, verified or grounded. 
Foucault consequently re-started his counter-history of sexuality by carrying 
forward genealogy's focus on particular problems and on more than just discursive forms, 
while at once echoing the statement of intent issued at the College de France over a 
decade earlier: 
It was a matter of analysing not behaviors or ideas, nor societies and their 
"ideologies", but the 12roblematizations through which being offers itself to be, 
necessarily, thought - and the practices on the basis of which the 
problematizations are formed. The archaeological dimension of the analysis 
made it possible to examine the forms themselves; its genealogical dimension 
enabled me to analyze their formation (Foucault 1985: 12). 
Taking seriously the singularly Modem interpretation of the sexual subject as a problem 
that had a real effect on people today, as drawn in first volume of The Histoiy of 
Sexuality, he stepped back to construct a dispotif or grid; a grid that at once related to the 
problem he was seeking to isolate and could provide a backdrop against which the 
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singularly Modem sexual subject could be viewed. A grid, beginning with the Ancient 
Greeks, that drew altemative views of subjectivity from that of the Modem subject, with 
its general sexual orientation based on the human sciences' discoveries. 
VI. Method. Foucault 
As for what motivated me, it is quite simple... It was 
curiousity - the only kind of curiosity, in any case, that is 
worth acting upon with a degree of obstinacy: not the 
curiousity that seeks to assimilate what is proper for one to 
know, but that which enables one to get free of oneself. After 
all, what would be the value of a passion for knowledge if it 
resulted only in a certain amount of knowledgableness and 
not, in one way or another and the extent possible, in the 
knower's straying afield of oneself? 
Foucault, The Use ofPleasure (1985). 
Foucault died shortly after completing the Care of the Setf (1985), leaving the History of 
Sexuality project unfinished. It was left to others to more fully articulate or speculate 
upon the method that his histories had sought. The most highly regarded of these post- 
Foucault reviews is that of Foucault's friend and fellow philosopher Gilles Deleuze. 
Deleuze's overview was not afraid to view the past in tenns of the present by 
seeing Foucault's concluding works as what his earlier studies had been aiming for (an 
irony that Foucault would have likely enjoyed). Foucault's work "culminated", wrote 
Deleuze (1988: 96), "in the Use of Pleasure's searing phrase: 'to get free of oneself". 
Adopting such a perspective, Deleuze is able to skip across the debates over the 
differences between genealogy and archaeology and see Foucault's works as one. Hence, 
the title of the book in which Deleuze describes Foucault's approach is simply Foucault. 
How do Foucault's inquiries merge so as to culminate in the stated aim of The 
Use ofPleasure: re-thinking history so as to get free Of one's self? Deleuze best sums this 
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FIGURE 4: DELEUZE's DIAGRAM OF FOUCAULT. 
SOURCE: DELEUZE "FOUCAULT" (1988). 
Foucault's subjects are constituted through the existence of material 8r-ataa, a diagram o 
12ower/knowledge, a line of the outside and the fold of subjectivation. 
The stratum is a combination of the archive that archaeology took as its task to 
draw, with its regularity of statements (or 'statement curves' as Deleuze calls them), that 
created subjects, objects and institutions; and, the particular ways of seeing that Foucault 
focused on in later works. The strata of knowledge are a "practical assemblage" of ways 
of saying and viewing which continually reactivate and reinforce one another. 
"Loosely lacing" the seen and said, the view of the subject, objects, institutions 
and the way they see, and maintaining these forms over other alternatives, is a diagrani of 
relationships of power/knowledge. These diagrams are not necessarily consciously 
detennined but their "alliances weave a supple and transversal network that is 
perpendicular to the sedimentary strata" and blend a ... mushy mixture' of the visible and 
the articulable" (Deleuze 1988). The diagram always marks out the line of the outside of 
the strata. Its formation protects the strata from other influences that could undermine and 
radically alter its fonns. 
The diagram and line of the outside are, of course, the work of Foucault's 
genealogical period. However, as Deleuze (1988: 96) points out, the first volume of The 
History of Sexuality "explicitly closes on a doubt... an impasse". This is not due to the 
conception of power but rather because Foucault found the impasse to be where power 
itself places us. If power is all-inclusive, everywhere and limiting everything, how can we 
get free of it, to the outside of it? Foucault came to think that the only means was the fold 
of "the inside of thought, the self'. Hence the knowing subject or the "zone of 
subjectivation" becomes a third axis of Foucault, beyond knowledge and power, an axis 
that Deleuze (1988: 96) claims was perhaps: "present from the beginning in Foucault 
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Oust as power was present from the beginning in knowledge). But it could emerge only 
by assuming a certain distance, and so being able to circle back on the other two". 
The three dimensions of knowledge, power and self are irreducible yet constantly 
imply one another. Moreover, and crucially, the idea that runs through all Foucault's 
work is that these dimensions are not universal conditions - they are historical. This 
means that they are subject to change if one can get to the outside of their present 
constitution to bring non-stratified or diagramatised points into the present. Foucault 
(1985) believed that the best access to the outside lies on the "inside of thought". Here 
one may invoke a "memory of the outside, beyond the brief memory inscribed in the 
strata and the archives, beyond the relics remaining in the diagrams"; so as "to think 
one's own history" rather than take for granted the history or "memory" that sustains the 
present fonns; "so as to enable thinking differently". Thus, Deleuze's (1988: 119) 
Foucault concludes by claiming that "to think7' (by this he means to engage in effective 
thought as a counter-historian) means: 
to be embedded in the present-time stratum that serves as a limit: what can I see 
and say today? But this involves thinking of the past as it is condensed in the 
inside, in the relation to oneself (there is a Greek in me, or a Christian in me, and 
so on). We will then think the past against the present and resist the latter, not in 
favour of a return but 'in favour of a time to come' (Nietzsche), that is, by making 
the past active and present to the outside so that something new will finally come 
about, so that thinking, always, may reach thought. Thought thinks its own history 
(the past), but in order to free itself from what it thinks (the present) and be able 
finally to 'think otherwise' (the future). 
This helps explain Foucault's return to the Greeks. On the one hand, the re- 
visitation offered access to an 'outside' set of power/knowledge relations, something 
other than the present forms and their formation that might enable thinking otherwise. On 
the other hand, the Greeks placed great stock on the 'care of the self', on thinking oneself 
as well as responding to general norms, something that the Modem quest for codes of 
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normality diminished. The dispotif that began in Volumes 2 and 3 of The Histoty of 
Sexuality provided both a context and an alternative for critiquing Modem arrangements. 
The method employed by this study takes its cues from the counter-histories of 
Foucault and Dreyfus, Rabinow and Deleuze's interpretations of what Foucault was 
seeking to achieve by them. As the research questions stated in Chapter I indicate, this 
work is generally concerned with the way in which Management has become established 
as something that all forms of life must appeal to; the way that all domains are now 
potentially open to Management; the way that being has become subject to Management. 
This state of affairs goes largely unquestioned as Management's importance now seems 
so natural or banal. It is a state promoted by historical assumptions that suggest that the 
recognition of good Management as an important problem represents an advance on 
earlier societies, societies that were either not clever enough to recognise Management or 
working towards Management but not scientific enough to address it properly. This thesis 
develops a counter-history, taking the historical configuration of Management that is 
"given to us as universal, necessary, obligatory" (Foucault 1984a: 45) and subjecting it to 
a "nominalist critique" by tracing it to "arbitrary constraints" and showing the "historicity 
of the subject" and its "constitutive charactee' (Foucault 1981: 14; 1984a: 45; 1984b: xi): 
a counter-history that argues that "institutions and ideas that we take for granted" may be 
more recent than we assume (Foucault 1988a: 161). Its aim is to call the present 
establishment of Management into question by illustrating its singularity so as to enable 
thinking otherwise. 
Having set this up this line of questioning in Part One, Part Two creates a dispotif 
or grid. It is comprised of three normative episteme. As mentioned earlier, this work 
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argues that Management, as it is presently seen, is completely Modernist. Management is 
completely sustained by, and plays no small part in sustaining, Modernist beliefs. It is 
claimed that this is why Management has come to be such a powerful but unobtrusive 
presence (and at once seemingly unable to innovate substantially). In order to 
demonstrate Management's tight-knit relationship with Modernism, Part Two's dispotif 
is built around Modernism's approach to knowledge, something close to a combination of 
the Classical and the Age of Man episterne that Foucault drew in The Order of Things? 
As a means of demonstrating alternative ways of thinking, two further episteme 
are presented. One is an interpretation of the approach to knowledge that Modernism 
strove to overcome, the Ancient Greek view that was revitalised during the Renaissance. 
The other depicts the view that has in recent decades mounted the most serious threat to 
Modernism's hegemony: a mode that requires accepting the pre-Modem so as to 
relativise the Modem that is here tenned Postmodemism. This grid will enable a 
framework against which the forms and formation of Management may be evaluated in 
Part Three. 
Part Three comprises three chapters. The first, Chapter 6, begins by outlining the 
accepted history of Management and the consequent nature of its forms that this history 
presents as universal. Placing them against Part Two's grid shows them to all be 
specifically Modernist. It then develops a history that counters Management's history 
across a number of dimensions. It suggests that Management, and Management's view of 
organisation, was established by historians of the 1950s and 1960s whose particular 
3 Combining two modes of thought that Foucault saw as distinct is not seen to be too problematic. As Dreyfus and 
Rabinow (1983: 99) point out, dispotifs should always be relativised, and in any case: "Foucault's analysis of the 
Classical Age also reveals, in spite of his insistence on the cataclysmic break between the Age of Representation and 
the Age of Man, a deep continuity with the present. In the Classical Age all beings were already represented in a 
totalizable picture on a table, and although the rcprcscntcr who lays out the table had not yet emerged, the place was 
already awaiting him where he would appear as Man. " 
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predisposition saw a way of seeing articulated by engineers at the turn of the 20th century 
as a grand ofigin. This view is shown in this thesis to be an expedient personal response 
to a political situation brought about by Modernism's specific problernatisation of and 
particular need for universal and unifying non-traditional ends. In addition to detennining 
these disciplinary origins, Management also seeks an Ancient heritage to provide it with 
more grandeur. Chapter Ts counter-history goes on to demonstrate how this is achieved 
by viewing the pre-Modem past and key historical figures through the eyes of the Modem 
present. The chapter then examines the way in which the subject has striven for scientific 
status but never quite gained agreement as to the achievement of this status. It concludes 
by outlining the web of repetition and reduplication that discourages us from seeing 
Management's singularity or questioning its perceived solidity or universality, despite the 
contingencies described above. 
To use Foucault's (1978: 8) terms, what Management is about and what remains 
to be achieved, which is the integral historical "sen-non" of Management's formation 
investigated in Chapter 7, is redoubled by the establishment of the "pulpit" from which 
the sermon is developed and issued: the Business School. Through their close alliance, 
the forms of Management and the subject-view of Management represented by the 
Business School enable one another. Chapter 7 investigates the emergence of a particular 
type of business school in the 1950s and 1960s, the way in which this connects to already 
established disciplines (economics, psychology, sociology) and how this form is 
spreading to become a global model. 
The formation of Management's accepted history and sermon of development, its 
accepted forms and the specific form of the Business School link to create a diagram of 
power that draws a line of the outside that sees anything other than Modem as other to 
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Management. The diagram of Management maps perfectly onto the diagram of 
Modernism. Hence, each strengthens the other. However, Management is limited by its 
consequent lack of ability to speak and see in any other manner apart from Modernist. 
Chapter 8 examines the way in which this formation's gaze has blinkered Management's 
view of the future, making new objects, like the idea of the organisation as an organism 
rather than a machine, culture and Postmodemism, into Modernist forms and again 
redoubling the establishment of the sedentary Management sermon and the Business 
School pulpit. 
The final part of this thesis attempts to achieve Foucault's aim to 'think 
differently by re-thinking history'. Taking the view that the formation of Management is 
a "historical and cultural reality", and as such, subject to change (Foucault & Sennett 
1981: 4), Chapter 9 seeks to 'get free' of what Management sees and says by connecting 
to the 'outside' provided by the survey of the Ancient Greeks and a Postmodem 
approach. It takes areas problematised by Management in the past few decades and asks if 
they might be viewed otherwise without the constraints of their unrecognised Modem 
heritage. Such a critique may help Management to begin to 'stray afield of itself' and 
think differently. Given Management's current influence on life in general, it may also 
help us to question some of our assumptions about how being in the world is judged. 
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PART Two: GRID 
Part One outlined this study's objective - to investigate how Management has come to 
have such force in society, and why so much that is presented in Management as new 
seems remarkably similar to what has gone before. It defined 'Management', the object 
under scrutiny. Further, it described the method by which the questions posed of this 
object will be addressed -a blend of Foucault's archaeological and genealogical 
approaches in keeping with what Dreyfus and Rabinow term 'interpretative analytics' and 
what Deleuze simply calls 'Foucault'. 
Part Two now outlines the particular dispotif or grid against which Part Three's 
exploration of Management's forms and formation will be analysed. The grid is 
composed of three chapters, each outlining three normative episteme: the Ancient Greek - 
the approach to thinking that Modernism sought to overcome; Modernism - the past three 
centuries' dominant world-view; and Postmodernism - the term most commonly used to 
encapsulate the many thinkers that now challenge Modernism's dominance. Each chapter 
is divided into seven sections addressing each episterne's view of space, place and 
foundation; the analogies that it draws from; how it believes knowledge should be read or 
discovered; attitudes to time and history; the co-existence of many different schools of 
thought; what is seen to guide human action; and, by way of conclusion, a summary of 
the ways of seeing and saying privileged by that episterne. 
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The Ancient Greeks saw wisdom as nietis: the ability to incorporate many orders, forms and dimensions 
and apply them in one's own fashion on a pragmatic basis. It is based on the following assumptions: that 
the world is composed of a kosmos and an irreducible chaos; that the world may be seen as a macrocosm 
of one's self and that all beings' movements are shaped by their particular telos; that access to knowledge 
comes through one's interpretation of similitude; that history and time would change while its elements 
often 'spiralled' back; that there will always be many schools of thought; and that human behaviour or 
ethical decisions will be steered by custom, convention and the particular telos of the individuals 
concerned. 
So THE ANCIENT GREEK EPISTEME 
Koyre (in Shapin 1996: 1) distinguishes the conceptual changes at the heart of 
Modernism as "the most profound revolution achieved or suffered by the human mind 
since Greek antiquity". The primary body of thought that Modernism would look to 
transcend and overcome grew out of the Ancient Greek episteme. 
This attempt to outline the Ancient Greek world-view must be prefaced with a 
number of admissions. That this is a brief chapter seeking to describe the way a collection 
of different people thought across many centuries, indicates that what it presents is a 
simplification. That the Greeks were not one nation and that one of the points made in 
this chapter is that many schools co-existed within their 'thought-world' indicates that 
this chapter is a synthesis. Further, in drawing upon material from Homeric, Archaic and 
Classical periods, this chapter falls foul of those Modem scholars who like to contrast the 
different 'shame' and 'guilt' cultures that begin and end this span of periods. However, 
this contrast is less absolute than some imagine and the differences indicated above are 
relative - there are more than enough consistencies from which a normative episteme 
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significantly different from Modernism can be drawn. In so doing, the ways of seeing and 
saying of the Ancient Greeks are explored across six interconnecting aspects: the co- 
appreciation of kosmos and chaos; the microcosmic analogy of the human; knowledge as 
the interpretation of similitude; time and history as a spiral; the existence of many 
incommensurable schools of thought; and ethics shaped by telos, custom and convention. 
L Kosmos on an irreducible chaos - thepresence of the determinate and indeterminate 
In the beginning, Eurynome rose naked from Chaos, 
but found nothing substantial to rest her feet on. 
Graves, Greek origin inyth (198 1). 
The central presupposition in Greek creation myths was that k-osinos relied upon chaos 
(more correctly thought of as a 'gap', a 'yawning' or an 'indeterminate void' in addition 
to its singular Modem connotation of disorder - Castoriades 1997). The first distinct 
cosmological entities emerged out of an originative gulf, and the Greeks appreciated the 
co-existence and ultimately irreducible co-dependence of k-osinos and chaos in the world. 
One enabled and defined the other. 
The best known representation of these forces is the dual characterisation of 
Apollo and Dionysus or Bacchus (see Figure 5), the Athenian art and drama gods that 
Nietzsche made so much of in Tlje Binh of Tragedy. Here, Nietzsche outlined his view 
that the combination of k-osinos and chaos, the appreciation of the necessary co-existence 
of the Apollonian propensity to calmly shape the world with ideal forms of pleasing 
proportion" and the licentious Dionysian tendency to shatter fonn and transgress the 
4 Apollo: is the god of light, prophesy, divination and 'law and order'. He is often associated with the laws of the 
sciences of music and medicine. Pindar (Pyth. 5.63) described him as the god who implants in humans "a harmonious 
disposition" and is the god most clearly a constructor. Apollo's hymns arc filled with stories of his activities: great and 
beautiful foundations, splendid walls, impressive framcs, imposing heavy roofs (Dcticnne 1989: 45). Handy (1978) 
characterizes Apollo as the "god of bureaucracy". 
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FIGURE 5: DIE FORMS OF APOLLO AND DIONYSUS. 
SO[ WT: FARNFLI. -CULTS OF Tlll-ý GRFEKSTATIýS- (1907). 
boundaries between reason and unreason', was the "metaphysical miracle of the Hellenic 
will" that enabled the Greeks' intellectual achievements. Nietzsche did overstylise the 
characters of Apollo and Dionysus. However, what their co-rule symbolised pervaded 
Greek thought: from the tragedy of Euripides, Sophocles and Aeschylus that worked from 
the premise that even the most ordered and purposeful life was permeated with ambiguity 
and uncertainty, and subject to a tricky, individual fate (Vemant 1978) to Thucydides' 
political analysis, where life was a mixture of orderliness and the contingent, 
unpredictable and indeterminate (Edmunds 1975; Johnson 1993). 
Such thinking was also manifest in what we might distinguish as philosophy. As 
an example, one may consider the way in which Christian scholars misconstrued 
Heraclitus' description of the one constant 'truth' (aletheia). Aletheia, for the Greeks, was 
defined as "taking entities out of their hiddenness and letting them be seen" (Dreyfus 
1991: 270). This implied that there was an innumerable number of 'things' that might be 
known but that complete certainty of knowledge was never possible. Many things were 
'in light' or formed part of the kosi)ios, while many were unseen. We might bring things 
'out of the chaos' in our inquiries; at the same time, others would fade into darkness. 
However, Heraclitus wished to make clear that there was one constant, something that 
was never hidden or that we could never hide from. Infi-agiiiew B 16, he cryptically asks: 
How can one hide himseý(bqfiore that which never sets? 
Christian thinkers took Heraclitus to mean that no human could hide from the 
5 Dionysus or Bacchus is the god of wine and vegetation. He represented the unreasonable element in humans and the 
conflict of reason and convention on the one side, emotion on the other Prc-sentimentally, a young Dionysus, disguised 
as a goat-kid, was tom, limb from limb by the Titans. It was Apollo who formed the ambulance corps that reconstructed 
the Dionysian puzzic-picces, In contrast to Apollo, Dionysus was humble and suburban, travelling from makeshift 
room to room enjoying temporary residences and "changes of set" (Robert & Robert 1973: 110). Others have 
suggested that Dionysus "defies definition" (Henrichs 1984: 209) due to the "multiple inversions and contradictions" 
of his character (Segal 1982: 266). Given this, Henrichs (1984: 234) and Goldhill (1987) agree that the best way to sum 
up Dionysus is as the "god of paradox". Dionysus' worship was fostered as a healthy antithesis of civilisation. 
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omnipresence of God. However, a different view emerges on considering the Greek 
language used. Heraclitus spoke of the thing that never sets, that never-goes-into- 
concealment, that never reaches an end but is at once always rising and hence ever- 
present or ever-true. There is a double meaning in the Greek 'never-sets' (X&Oot) that 
implies both revealing and concealing. The riddle, therefore, is not just 'what never sets 
or is always ascending or always present', but also 'what never sets but is at once 
revealing and concealing'. The answer was not some essence -of things or omnipresent 
creator. It was rather an 'unfolding' of being, whereby the light of one's becoming 
revolved to place some things in view or light, while at once leaving some things 
concealed. What never sets is always present and is always revealing some things from its 
point-of-view but concealing others, always uncovering some k-osinos, but putting a chaos 
in darkness. It was the unfoldingness of being, where one sees some aspects, but can 
never see or know all at once (Heidegger 1984). 
This non-linear view of development led the Greeks to a different understanding 
of innovation from Modernism. Feyerabend (1987: 143-61) contrasts the Ancient and 
Modem by juxtaposing passages from the 4th and 16th Centuries: one from Augustine 
(354-430) illustrating the quantitative importance of progress which arose in antiquity, 
describing how the arts and sciences are enriched by recording and thus increasing the 
number of remembered skills, styles and senses; and one from Vasari's (1511-74) Lives 
of Artists: "it is inherent in the very nature of the arts to progress step by step, from 
modest beginnings, and finally reach the summit of perfection". By Vasari's day, 
development did not mean the recognition of more styles. On the contrary, by aiming 
toward capturing essential truths, it sought to unify and reduce them. 
The Greeks' development of mythology provides a good example of their view 
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here. Origin myths, like the one quoted at the beginning of this section, were a well- 
spring to which a tapestry of myths and tales referred, all connected in some way, but not 
necessarily consistently so (Elliot's depiction in Middlemarch of Casaubon struggling to 
write a 'Key to All Mythologies' but overwhelmed by material on which he could impose 
no hierarchical order is an irony illustrative of Modernity's attempt to come to grips with 
the Greek manner). This tapestry came to pass, as the Greeks approach to the 
6supernatural' was both innovative wid conservative. 
Mythology was dynamic in that new deities, from the East or North perhaps, or 
new stories added to the archive of old deities, were continuously being 'unconcealed'. 
However, the new took their place alongside, rather than supplanted, the old (innovation 
increased the number of beings rather than homogenised and increased their quality). 
Often old myths would fall into darkness as they lost relevance or popularity, but the 
Greeks did not actively overthrow traditional beliefs. This made for a somewhat messy 
mythological palette but by a series of expedient compromises, the many dynamic deities 
flourished side by side. The Olympians came to co-exist (not always peacefully, but co- 
exist nonetheless) with one another and a myriad of regional gods and goddesses and 
semi-historical figures without being undermined by them (Kearns 1985). 
All developments were seen by the Greeks as interconnected with the whims, 
fates and loyalties experienced by the myriad of gods. All things, or every being, was 
"full of gods" (Aristotle OTS. - 411 a 7-8). Herodotus' (9.100) historical survey concluded 
that "the role of the divine in affairs [,, va]s clear through many proofs" (all Herodotus' 
cwise men' knew this, e. g., Solon, 1.32; Amasis, 3.40; Artabanus, 7.10) and there was 
what Dodds (1953: 13) terms a "constant daily dependence" on what we would call the 
supernatural. Consequently, Modem historians often imply that the Greeks' belief system 
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was 'un-developed'. Murray (1934: 265) claimed that their kind of religion "was not 
really religion at all". Similarly, Bowra (1930: 222) observed that the Greek's 
"anthropomorphic system has of course no relation to real religion or morality. These 
gods are a delightful, gay invention of the poets". While Greek religiosity did not square 
with the singular and detached ideal form of the "Rational planner" God, encountered in 
the next chapter and with whom Bowra and Murray are familiar, their views overlook the 
way in which the Greeks did not separate the supernatural and the natural, religion and 
everyday life, the visible and unseen, the detenninate and indetenninate, in the way that 
Modems tend to. 
Language may again provide insight here. For the Ancient Greeks, inythos, at its 
most basic level, meant 'word', but it could be used in many different variations: rhetoric; 
conversation; a thing said, fact, or matter; a threat, command or mission; something 
thought, an unspoken word or purpose; a saying, proverb or rumour; a tale, story or 
narrative; or a professed work of fiction. Myth could refer to both what we might call 
tangible and non-tangible things, the present and the imagined. This indicates the extent 
to which the Greeks could feel the presence and influence of both the seen and unseen or 
heard and unheard (this also illustrates the ambiguity of Greek where a word's exact 
meaning was often only discernible with reference to the context in which it was used - 
this was a relativistic rather than a positivistic system). " Hence, the scene from the Illiad 
(1.198) where Athena plucks Achilles by the hair and warns him not to strike 
Agamemnon. Athena may only be visible to Achilles' subjective aletheia, and therefore, 
6 Similarly, logos has many competing translations: 'discourse', 'story' (Thucydides dismissed Hcrodotus as a 'logos- 
maker' in this sense), 'relationship', 'reason', 'judgment', 'definition', 'ground'. Modems, finding such things 
frustrating from a positivistic point of view where language is supposed to mirror reality, would emphasise 'reasoned 
judgement'. Modern historians of science would praise the Greeks for having developed the concept of logos but see 
them as naive for not having worked with a universal conception of it or method by which it could be applied 
(Whitehead 1926; Barnes 1987). 
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not what Modems would see as objectively true, but to the Greeks she was real, 
nonetheless. Similarly, the Greeks developed the word panic (after Pan) because they felt 
the presence of a real invisible being who swayed the emotions of flocks and herds and 
thus named what they were conscious of (Barfield 1926; Boardman 1997). 
II The analogy of the intelligent organism 
The universe was folded in upon itself. the earth echoing 
the sky, faces seeing themselves reflected in the stars. 
Foucault, The Order of Things (1970). 
In an episterne where beings were constantly being 'unconcealed', without any belief in 
reductionism or fundamentalism and with a relative and ambiguous language, it was 
essential that relations of microcosm to macrocosm should be conceived, as both the 
guarantee of knowledge and some limit of its expansion. The Greeks consequently used 
themselves as a model for their world. As Collingwood (1960: 8) writes: 
The Greek view of nature as an intelligent organism was based on an analogy: an 
analogy between the world of nature and the individual human being, who begins 
by finding certain characteristics in himself as an individual, and goes on to think 
of nature as possessed of similar characteristics. 
While Modernism would ground its gaze upon the clockwork machine and the notion of 
evolution or progressive development, the analogy informing the Ancient Greeks was 
their subjective understanding of themselves (Clark 1992 - see Figure 6). 
Humans were quite literally, as Protagoras (Refl. ) said, "the measure of all 
things". For the Greeks, the stars were not, as they are for us, "bodies infinitely remote in 
space, which move according to the inflexible laws of mechanics, and whose composition 
is chemically determinable". They were "divinities" (Seznec 1953: 37). When pre- 
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"bodily vesture, as it were, of a living being" (Barfield 1926: 85); a living being 
comprising a combination of other beings (see Figure 7). This analogy gave the Greeks a 
perspective that viewed the universe like an individual human, as consisting of 
qualitatively different parts that required different treatment (Dresden 1968). It also 
meant that each individual's aletheia was largely subjective - dependent upon 'looking 
out' from their understanding of themselves. It encouraged seeing both order, structure, 
certainty (as one could find in a human life) and consistency (as one could see across 
humanity); ayid disorder, chance, paradox, unpredictability (as one could find in a human 
life) and difference (as one could see between humans). Heraclitus (fkag, B50, B2) made 
sense of this by claiming that while all things are one, united in the fact that the universe 
is at once divisible and indivisible, generated and ungenerated, mortal and immortal, most 
lived as though they had an understanding of their own. 
Viewing the world through the analogy of themselves, the Greeks could do 
nothing else but conceive of their Gods anthropomorphically, or 'naively', as Bowra 
accuses. In keeping, the gods and goddesses displayed all the human emotions: they were 
kind and cruel, merciful and merciless, petty and petulant and, as Herodotus is fond of 
reminding us, "jealous and interfering" - they each had highly developed and developing 
'personalities'. Furthermore, just as in human societies, there was a plurality of gods and 
goddesses each having their own spheres of interest that often conflicted with those of 
others. Indeed, even within each god, there was a plurality of loyalties. This made conflict 
inevitable, their knowledge imperfect and their decisions unclear. That the gods were not 
necessarily 'all-knowing' further reinforced the notion that people could not overcome 
life's chaos - to think so would be hubris (Sophocles Ant. 456-7). These were quite 
different role models from the Christian deities. 
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FIGURE 7: THE ANCIENT SPRIRAL OF BEINGS - ASTROLOGICAL CEILING, 
SOURCE: SEZNEC "THE SURVIVAL OF THE PAGAN GoDs" (1953); 
AN ANCIENT VIEW OFTHE HEAVENS WITH COPERNICAN I, OGICSUPF-RIMPOSI. -, 'D, 
SOURCE: LODGE "PIONEERS OF SCIENCE" ( 1913). 
Movement in space, of god, a person or anything else, was also conceived in 
terms of how people saw their own movement. The Greeks generally believed in 
teleology, that the entire world's beings (we might say 'things') were animated, like 
people, by a unique destiny or telos. The sun rose over the still earth each day because it 
was fulfilling its telos. Hence, the sun would be punished if he should "transgress his 
measures" by exceeding the particular task assigned to him (Dodds 1953: 8). Hence, 
Helios' son Phaethon was struck down for being so bold as to reach beyond himself by 
taking the sun-chariot's reins from his father. Hence, the helmsperson would be punished 
for not acting in the way that could be connected to the tradition of good helmspersons. 
Thus, all natural motion had a developmental character, in the sense that all bodies 
naturally moved so as to fulfil their traditional natures, to transform the potential into the 
actual, to move toward where it was natural for them to be. Aristotelian physics was in 
this sense modelled on biology, employing explanatory categories to comprehend living 
beings. Just as the acorn's development into the oak was the proper and obvious 
transformation of potential into actual, so the fall of a stone or the rising of the sun was 
the actualisation of their potential, the realisation of their particular 'nature'. Beings that 
were thought heavy were attracted to the heavy earth and fell; beings seen as light were 
attracted to the air and rose. For this reason, Ancient views of matter are often referred to 
now as "animistic". Adina ('soul' in Latin) was in all beings in keeping with what were 
seen as their particular purposes. The Modem Hobbes could sarcastically remark that it 
was "as if stones and metals had a desire, or could discern the place they could be at, as 
man does". But pre-Modem thinkers would not have got the joke. 
The resonance between traditional accounts of natural motion and the flow of 
personal experience is evident. People offered teleological explanations of their behaviour 
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that identified what are known to be traditional purposes of things, or 'natural effects', as 
their cause. For example, on this view, a striker in football moves toward the opposition's 
penalty area when his team is on the attack because he is moving into his natural position 
to fulfil his purpose, to score goals - not because the neurones in his brain send signals to 
his nervous system to operate his body in an efficient ergonomic way. Greek knowledge 
was consequently heavily dependant upon not only the personal analogy but also custom 
and tradition to support it and define its categories or 'places for beings'. It was also 
based upon a belief that a 'similitude' between particular beings could be read. 
III Knowledge through the interpretation of sintilitude 
The most important traditional view [of how we know] 
was that of Aristotle, according to which when we come 
to know something, the mind becomes one with the object 
of thought. Of course, this is not to say that they become 
materially the same thing; rather, the idea is that they are 
informed by the same eidos [or Being]. Here was a 
conception quite different from the representational 
model... being informed by the same eidos, the mind 
participated in the being of the known object, rather than 
simply depicting it. 
Taylor, Overconting Episteniology (19 87). 
The Greek manner of knowing is the opposite of Modem science in that while the 
scientist's access to knowledge is granted by her application of a method that detaches 
her from the object under investigation, the Ancients saw knowing as a matter of 
connection. Here, the knower knew by achieving a 'sympathy' between herself and what 
she is seeking to know or by becoming sympathetic to the connection between other 
beings. One knew by recognising signs that indicated similitude via such means as 
analogy, affinity, sympathy and antipathy. 
These links created a great web that connected the beings of the universe. Here, 
stars, in general, had the qualities of eyes (and vice versa) as both gave out light, while, as 
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Crollius told it, the constellations of stars were: 
the matrix of all the plants and every star in the sky is only the spiritual 
prefiguration of a plant, such as it represents that plant, and just as each herb or 
plant is a terrestrial star looking up at the sky. So also each star is a celestial plant 
in spiritual form, which differs from the terrestrial plants in matter alone... the 
celestial plants and herbs are turned towards the earth and look directly down 
upon the plants they have procreated, imbuing them some particular virtue. 
Such similitude could only be discerned through the reading and interpretation of 
signatures - or signs on the surface of things. As Foucault (1970: 27) describes: 
the unexpected affinity... between aconite and our eyes... would remain in 
obscurity if there were not some signature on the plant, some mark, some word, as 
it were, telling us that it is good for diseases of the eye. The sign is easily legible 
in its seeds: they are tiny dark globes set in white skinlike coverings whose 
appearance is much like that of eyelids covering an eye. 
The walnut was a microcosm of the human head - so the shell of the fruit cured wounds 
of the pericranium, while internal head ailments could be prevented by the use of the nut. 
Opium sent you to sleep because poppies had a particularly dormative gait, not because it 
had a corpuscular microstructure that acted on physiological structures in such a way as 
to cause sleep. The sun and the sunflower naturally attracted one another; while some 
plants shared historical-mythological hatreds - the olive and the vine hated the cabbage 
and the cucumber flew from the olive (Gabbey 1985). 
Galen's (129-99AD) human anatomical knowledge, the West's dominant tradition 
until the end of the 16th century (although this view persisted in China and India), was 
criticised by Modems because it was not based on the dissection of humans (Petherbridge 
& Jordanova 1997). However, as plants were like animals living head down, their mouths 
buried in the earth, cutting humans was not necessary for Galen. Knowledge of the 
human body could be ascertained from analogy with animal and plant anatomies (see 
Figure 8). The world here was a vast collection of beings. Modems would separate these 
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FIGURE 8: GALEN'S PHYSIOLOGICAL VIEW. 
SOURCE: SINGER "GREEK BIOLOGY AND GREEK MEI)I('[Nl,, " (1922). 
into hierarchical categories: natural and supernatural, terrestrial and celestial, animal, 
vegetable and mineral, beings and things; but the Ancients saw a 'flat' mass criss-crossed 
by a network of plural relationships. Knowledge required connecting with and 
interpreting these relations (see Figure 9). 
Rather than having any detached representational qualities, language was another 
being woven through this tapestry. It lived and partook in the great network of 
resemblance and signs. Due to the fact that words were subject to similitude too, they also 
contained signs. The Greeks wrote from left to right because writing was connected to the 
movement of the 'second heaven' - home of the seven planets; and the names of being 
were lodged within the beings they named: strength was 'written' in the body of the lion, 
regality in the eye of the eagle. Thinkers in the Renaissance (Duret 1613: 40) queried this, 
finding that, while other languages had lost this quality, it remained in the ancient 
language of Hebrew. Here: 
the stork, so greatly lauded for its charity toward its father and its mother, is called 
Chasida, which is to say, meek, charitable, endowed with pity... The horse is 
named Sus, thought from the verb Hasas... and it signified to rise up, for among 
all four-footed animals the horse is the most proud and brave... 
As indicated in Taylor's quotation at the head of this section, the human 'mind' 
could no more be above this web of similitude than language. Just as there was no 
distinction between language and other beings, there was no separation between mind and 
matter, or between subject and object. The knowing human was just another element 
subject to sympathy or antipathy, connection or disconnection from knowledge. The 
sympathetic view of knowledge led, in this respect, to what Modem philosophers call 
Greek psychology's "failure to distinguish", via Cartesian logic, perception and 
intelligence or mind, which is seen to have created confusion (Urmson & Ree 1989: 259). 
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FIGURE 9: THE ANCIENT INTERCONNECTEDNESS OF BFING. 
SOURCE: SEZNEC "THE SURVIVAL OFTHE PAGAN GODS" (1953). 
For the Ancient Greeks, knowledge came to one as she found herself connected to 
the similitude relevant to her situation. Often wise connections (or feelings) came 
suddenly, placed by gods who were connected to relevant spheres of interest. It was as if 
there was a mass of knowledge elements that one might hold at one's disposal to deploy 
on an 'as-needed' basis, have revealed to one or be concealed from one as appropriate (in 
this manner the Trojans were described as "remembering flight and forgetting resistance" 
-M 16.356). It was as if one hoped that the gods would allow them the necessary 
connections or at least not obscure them at the vital moment (as when Automedon is 
described as having had a god "put an unprofitable plan into his breast and taken away his 
excellent understanding" - Ill. 17.469); or, that when the connection was best not known, 
the gods would prevent it (as when Patroclus hopes that the gods with "preserve him" 
from Achilles' vindictive feelings -. 111.16.35). Thus, thoughts or impulses often arose 
against one's 'will'. They were not owned by one's consciousness but endowed with a 
personality and energy of their own and so could pass through one or be implanted. 
People could have the power of the gods within them leading to a temporary insanity 
which was not ascribed to psychology, but to an external daemonic agency (wine was 
said to produce a similar effect but the implication was not that this boldness can be 
produced naturally, but rather that wine had a supernatural connection). Hence, Sophocles 
(Ant. 603) could speak of madness as "an Erinys in the braiW'; Achilles could be said at 
one point to know "lion things" (Ill. 24.41) while Nestor and Agamemnon shared 
thoughts "friendly to each other" (Odjý 3.277). 
Surnmarising many of the themes discussed here thus far, Demokritos (in 
Simplicius CoOTH 294-5) related that "We in reality know nothing finnly but only as it 
changes in accordance with the condition of the body and of the things which enter it and 
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of the things which resist it... And a man must recognise by this rule that he is removed 
from reality". On this way of seeing, how could someone own thoughts like a possession? 
Further, how could one consciously accumulate and transfer objects of knowledge into 
the head of another? On the one hand, knowledge's connections had personalities of their 
own and one had to develop their own relationships with them. On the other, because the 
relations between gods and humans and language and other beings were always shifting, 
and the hermeneutics of similitude and the serniology of signatures always coinciding 
with some parallax (hence the need for interpretation), every situation to come would be 
different and no general theory would be practical. 
The Ancients' approach to educating followed this. Recognising that there was no 
useful transferable prescriptive approach, they favoured story-telling or narrative (which 
sounds more impressive) as a means of stimulating each person's unique telos, daeiwn or 
approach to seeking to connect with the connections of knowledge. Perhaps the best- 
crafted exposition of this approach is that of Plutarch (Per. 2): 
It is true, of course, that our outward sense cannot avoid apprehending the various 
objects it encounters, merely by virtue of their impact and regardless of whether 
they are useful or not: but a man's conscious intellect is something which he may 
bring to bear or avert as he chooses, and can very easily transfer it to another object 
as he sees fit. For this reason we ought to seek out virtue not merely to contemplate 
it, but to derive benefit from so doing so. A colour, for example, is well suited to 
the eye if its bright and agreeable tones stimulate and refresh the vision, and in the 
same way we ought to apply our intellectual vision to those models which can 
inspire it to attain its own proper virtue through the sense of delight they arouse. 
[Such a model is] no sooner seen than it rouses the spectator to action, and yet it 
does not form his character by mere imitation, but by promoting the understanding 
of virtuous deeds it provides him with a dominating purpose. 
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IV. Spiral time - history changingwhile its elements are repeated 
[H]uman affairs form a circle, and... there is a circle in all 
other things that have a natural movement and coming 
into being and passing away. T11is is because all other 
things are discriminated by time, and end and begin as 
though conforming to a cycle; for even time itself is 
thought to be a circle. 
Aristotle, Physics (Book IV). 
Despite the claim of Modem historians that their tradition began in Ancient Greece, the 
writers of Greek antiquity never undertook what Fukuyama (1992) calls a "Universal 
History", that is, an attempt to find a linear-progressive patterns in the overall 
development of human societies generally. The historical excursions of Herodotus, 
Thucydides and Xenophon certainly do not fit this bill, and while Plato spoke about a 
certain natural cycle of regimes in the Republic, and Aristotle's Politics discussed the 
causes of revolution and how one regime yields to another, 'revolution' was used very 
much in its now less common sense of 're-volving', rather than overthrowing and moving 
forward. In keeping with the views described above, Aristotle believed that no regime 
could satisfy people completely and that the ensuing dissatisfaction would lead to the 
development of a different regime as another was concealed, in an endless imperfect 
cycle. 
History for the Greeks was cyclical or, more exactly, spiral, given that elements 
would often come around again without joining up to form the same pattern. Time, by the 
Classical period at least, was a combination of linear and circular. While things 
constantly changed and were different than before, they were not qualitatively 
progressive. Elements, including knowledge, would always be coming and going. 
Herodotus, who described his work- as the result of his wanderings and researches from 
his particular viewpoint (or histo)-jai) in an attempt to keep the memory of some deeds of 
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the past alive in the present, considered his work "artistically completed" with the 
revisiting of the character of Cyrus the Great that began the work, with "the tail of the 
snake curved round into his mouth" (Rawlinson 1997: 727). While Eco (1992) notes that 
although Modem historians like to focus on what they see as the embryonic rational or 
linear-progressive aspects of Greek thought, the Greek world was at once attracted by 
Apeiron (infinity) or that which has no modus: that which existed but was not part of 
present nonns, yet could, one day, spiral back. This way of seeing was connected to the 
myth of Hermes: 
Fascinated by infinity, Greek civilization, alongside the concept of identity and 
non-contradiction, constructs the idea of continuous metamorphosis, symbolized 
by Hermes... In the myth of Hermes we find the negation of the principle of 
identity, of non-contradiction... and the causal chains wind back on themselves in 
spirals: the after precedes the before, the god knows no spatial limits and may, in 
different shapes, be in different places at the same time (Eco 1992: 28-9). 
Subsequently, the past, present and future were interwoven. The concept of telos 
made the past and future very much alive in the present and time was not able to be 
separated out into progressive stages. Given the web of knowledge relationships and 
interests, time and history could not follow a linear united path progressing toward to a 
unifying end or connected to some underlying universal humanity. Greek physics also 
worked from these assumptions. In Demokritos' atomism, matter was made up of minute 
particles. Different rearrangements produced the effect of changeable qualities but there 
was no guiding intelligence. The blind interplay of atoma happened by chance: 
The atoms struggle and as they are carried about... because of their dissimilarities 
and... differences, and as they are carried about they collide and are bound 
together in a binding which makes them touch and be contiguous with one another 
but which does not genuinely produce any other single nature whatever from 
them; for it is utterly silly to think that t'wo or more things could ever become 
one... they hold on to one another and remain together up to the time when some 
stronger force reaches them from their environment and shakes them and scatters 
them apart (Simplicius CoOTH 294.30-295.22). 
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The notion of a Universal History is therefore not a universal concept - it would 
be Christianity that first introduced the necessary beliefs to sustain an interest in it: the 
concept of the fundamental equality of all men and all nations as branches of a more 
general humanity under God's plan; and the concept of a history that was linear and finite 
in time (beginning with God's creation of man and ending with his final salvation). 
V. Many schools of thought 
The factors preventing knowledge are many: the 
obscurity of the subject, and the shortness of human life. 
Protagoras, (frag. 4). 
Modems resolved the 'factors preventing knowledge' by agreeing a universal method, 
dividing the world up and specialising in order to build up the collective store: de- 
personalising knowledge so that intelligence, accumulated in a life of relations, did not 
die with individuals. Modems, unlike the Greeks, did not assume that connections would 
continuously multiply or that some portions of knowledge would always be in chaos. 
Hence, Laplace (1749-1827) would write that the expressions of probability, used in his 
time to describe the likelihood of events, were expressions of partial ignorance that the 
Modem 'Commonwealth of Knowledge' would soon resolve. He argued that because we 
did yet not know all the mechanical causes of things we had to resort to conjecture in the 
interim and some conjectures could be shown to be more probable than others. 
Greek thinkers, not seeing themselves as part of a Commonwealth with a common 
cause and one true general method, and lacking the will to collectively know all, were 
free to be less 'disciplined' and more broad-ranging than their Modem counterparts. For 
the Greeks, the spreading, relative and interpretative nature of things meant that one 
school of thought would limit rather than determine knowledge. Many incommensurable 
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and unspecialised schools (now usually referred to collectively as 'pre-Socratic' - i. e., pre 
proper philosophy) existed side by side and one could legitimately postulate many 
different answers to questions like "what came first? " Mythology suggested Chaos. 
Thales answered Watei-, AnaximenesAii-. Parmenides countered that since plurality and 
change were 'givens' and no unity could generate a plurality, there could be no singular 
primordial element. Empedokles posited Fire, Water, Earth and Air as the uncreated 
elements that produced the world through processes of Love and Strife or connection and 
separation. Demokritos postulated a vast number of constituent elements which "act and 
are acted upon as they happen to touch (for in this way they are not one) and generate by 
coming together and interlocking" (Aristotle OCTB 325a 33-5). Others named a single 
directive force or principle - Mind or Intelligence. This all amounted to what Dodds 
(1953: 43) called an "imperfectly mapped jungle" of thought. Modem historians of 
science would look back on the Greeks and claim that what needed to be overcome was 
the existence of many schools operating independent of each other, each "infected with 
an eager generality" (Whitehead 1926: 10). However, this 'jungle' enabled the 
development and co-existence of the wide-ranging, and quite different, views of the 
West's two most influential thinkers: Plato and Aristotle. 
In his Early Dialogues, seeking the elimination of conflict of meaning through the 
convergence of all parties on a single stable view, Plato depicted Socrates seeking pure 
definitions through a dialectic of argument, refutation and counter-argument. Socrates 
asked questions like "what is courage? " and worked toward the essential answer by 
reasoning against specific answers like "look at Laches, he is courageous". 
Plato built upon these ideas in what are usually referred to as the Middle 
Dialogues, searching for un-hypothetical starting points on which to found knowledge, 
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the permanency underlying change that explained the essence of objects. From this 
emerged the 'Theory of Forms'. This distillation, from Socrates' search for definitions, 
evolved from Plato's observation that common names were used for different examples. 
Given this, he believed that there must be, for example, a perfect 'beautiful' form that we 
refer to in giving meaning to calling particular things beautiful. Empirical observations 
would show that such fonns did not exist in the world around us but they had to exist to 
make sense of our world and speech. There must be, Plato argued, another world that 
contains these forms, a second 'Theory World' of ideal or pure Forms, which had to be 
sought in our 'mind's eye' or imagination. Knowledge of these Forms must therefore be 
the starting point for development. Once these ideals were conceived, we could direct our 
own imperfect world toward them. 
ideal 
forms 





While the position adopted by Plato may appear orthodox from a Modem point of 
view (largely because it was utilised by the founders of Modernism, as the next chapter 
will demonstrate), it idiosyncratically transformed many elements of popular belief in his 
own time (Davies 1984). For example, Plato turned the unique telos or daeiýzon within 
each human that various gods may act upon into a sort of lofty universal spirit or 
Freudian super-ego (Dodds 1953). It was this transformation that led to Plato being 
named the psychological key to Christianity, scientific rationalism and Modemism 
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(Lovibond 1990). ' 
While Aristotle also demonstrated Apollonian or Modem characteristics, ' more 
significant were his attempts to counter Plato's idealistic Theory World (Annas 1986). 
For Aristotle, every-being existed on the surface of everyday life - one could not lift or 
abstract Forms over and above particular things and actions. Subsequently, he avoided 
applying general theories across a number of subjects, respecting the circumstances of 
specific cases, claiming that one should "look for precision in each class of things just so 
far as the nature of the subject admits" (NE 1094b. 23-5). He thus exhorted thinkers not to 
aim at a general certainty in human affairs. The thinking of both Aristotle and Plato co- 
existed for a time. However, beyond antiquity, it was Aristotle's brand, closer to the pre- 
Socratics than Plato, that prevailed (Toulmin 1990). 
VI. Ethos: telos, custont and convention 
To ask whether Homer's people are determinists or 
libertarians is a fantastic anachronism: the question as never 
occurred to them, and if it were put to them it wouldVifficult 
for them to understand what it meant. 
Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational (1953). 
As indicated above, a human's direction in life was influenced in this episteme in a 
number of ways at once: by the gods and the particular relationships that one had with 
them, by relationships with other sympathetic or antipathetic beings, by the customs and 
traditions that shaped these relationships, and by the individual human in question. Even 
7 It should be noted that elements of Plato's later thought are mindful of the irreducible nature of chaos, returning to 
the pre-Socratic type views he sought to overthrow. For example, Plato's Later Dialogues appear at times to 
undcn-nine the Theory of Forms (e. g., Thitacus 29). Above all, the later Plato points out that there will always be 
arbitrary factors and things we cannot explain: "the world is the product not of reason alone, but of the combination of 
reason and... the indeterminate cause" (Thn. 47-8; Laws 709,899). 
8 He developed structured schema and categories that classified reality; while he thought that there were many different 
sciences, each with their own axioms, he carefully divided and classified these and defined their logics drawing largely 
on the model of geometry; and his investigations into first causes and dynamic principles have been identified as 
laying the foundations for Modern science. 
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'within' each human a number of conflicting relationships played. Indeed, the Archaic 
Greeks had no unified concept of what we call 'soul' or 'personality'. Homer, who has no 
word for the living personality, only credits people with something like it once they are 
dead or near death. The thiaws that he refers to may have been 'the organ of feeling', but 
this enjoyed an independence which the word organ does not suggest to us, influenced as 
we are by the later concepts of organism and organic unity. One could converse with their 
thunios, almost as one person to another. Usually one took its advice, but one could scold 
it or act without its consent. A person may even have more than one, as did Odysseus 
when he "planned in his thwýios" to kill the Cyclops immediately but was restrained by a 
second voice (Odyssey 9.299ff. ). It is on this basis that Aristotle describes humans as 
cpolitical animals' for they acted not only on instinct or deterministically but also by 
debating and weighing up the claims of their different interests and influences before 
making decisions that could shape their destiny. 
Consequently, the Greeks saw their actions as influenced from a number of 
different competing angles in a manner that Modem psychologists or structuralists would 
call "over-detennined". This allowed the Greeks to explain why things did not always 
work out as anticipated (there was always a gap in knowledge here because it was hard to 
know which detennining forces were in play and which would win out). However, it was 
problematic if one wished to establish linear causal links between actions and 
consequences. It also made it difficult to believe in a general prescriptive moral code as 
actions in particular circumstances could not be determined in advance of those 
circumstances and the interests that converged on them playing themselves out. However, 
the Greeks saw ethical questions as of great importance. A great deal of thought was 
given to how one could 'carry oneself, given the assumptions described above. 
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For Aristotle, the responsibility fell to the prudent individual Nvho understood that 
they were operating in an unstable domain, without underlying essence or overriding law, 
and that their success subsequently owed "more to a good eye than to an unshakeable 
knowledge" (Aubenque 1963: 23). The prudent individual must therefore be open to 
opportunity or inspiration and seek connection to the relevant types of knowledge and 
tradition as they became apparent on a case by case basis. For example, the Greeks 
believed that the actions of a skilled physician did not follow a textbook but were 
connected to those of a skilled helmsperson. Both, given that it was impossible to know 
with certainty the anger or benevolence of the conditions in advance, had to negotiate a 
route with the aid of recognisable signs and compared with their experience of analogous 
situations, and obliged to make their way by conjecture based on particular traditions, 
individual circumstances and opinions (Pindar Pyth. IV270; Plato Rep. 360e-I a). 
Acknowledging particular traditions or teloi rather than general codes 
consequently shaped ethics and correct human action. Aristotle's moral schema involved 
three elements: untutored human nature, a human-as-he-could-be-if-he-realised-his-telos 
and the moral precepts that allow him to pass from one to the other. Once one was aware 
of the telos they was aiming for (an awareness that could only come from self-reflection 
on one's tradition and place in one's world), "is" could imply "ought" and moral 
statements became statements of fact. 'Knowing thyself (the Athenian's favourite 
maxim) as opposed to knowing the general rules or human norms was what was most 
imPortant here as this would enable one to know the interests, gods, myths, analogous 
situations and traditions that acted upon oneself or that one regarded as important. 
Knowing, or not forgetting, or connecting with, these things would help answer what one 
must do in order to be true to one's traditions and community of relationships. This was 
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what one ethically ought to do and early Greek thought did not distinguish between ought 
and must. For example, to say 'they are a good helmsperson' implied that they, for a fact, 
did certain things that helmspersons traditionally did. This inspiration from the past 
would enable the helmsperson to react to the unique situations they faced and the 
influences acting upon them, thus adding to the tradition. On this view, each must seek to 
fulfil a unique combination of roles: member of a family, citizen, helmsperson, 
philosopher, servant of his or her Gods and so on, each of which had its own point and 
purpose. Of course, these things, which hinge upon the second of the three Aristotelian 
elements, are particular, culture-bound and shaped by tradition. 
The subjectivity and the influence of particular customs and traditions that 
Modem science and ethics would try and be above were consequently crucial elements 
here. This was reflected in all aspects of Greek thought. Cambyses was shown by 
Herodotus (3.36) to be mad for failing to respect traditions other than his own, for not 
recognising that "custom is king of all"; Protagoras' showed that any given thing was "to 
me such as it appears to me, and is to you such as it appears to you" (Plato Theaet. 152a); 
and for the atomist Demokritos (in Simplicius CoOTH 294-5), everything was "by 
convention". By 'convention', writes Galen (EATH I 417-SK), Demokritos "means 
something like 'by custom', 'relatively to us', 'not in virtue of the nature of things in 
themselves"'. 
Ethos here was more about individual deportment across a community of 
relationships than achieving objective universal 'goods' or adhering to general nonns, 
about finding a way of carrying oneself in a manner that was consistent enough to 
contribute to the community and different enough to enable others to recognise one and 
think one exemplary in one's difference. Ethics was at once about being unique and about 
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complementing a community of relationships, aware of and developing one's traditions 
so as to be remembered in a positive light. For the Greeks, ethics were both determined 
and existential, both individualistic and collective. 
VU. Summary - seeingwisdom as metis 
I think of what Apollo affirms when, through the mouth 
of the poet Bacchylides, he says to Admetus: "You are a 
mere mortal; therefore your soul must harbour two 
thoughts at once". 
Blanchot, The Infinite Conversation (1993). 
The world seen and spoken of by the Ancient Greeks comprised an irreducible blend of 
chaos and kosmos; cycles, spirals and lines; particular paths and connections and ordered 
frameworks. In their episteme there was order to be found but it co-existed on an 
irreducible measure of chaos. Their way of seeing was informed by the subjective 
analogy of the individual person and their numerous relations, who they saw as a 
reflection of a multi-dimensional mass of gods and goddesses. In particular, the personae 
of Apollo and Bacchus were invoked to characterise the co-dependence of kosmoslchaos. 
This analogy of the intelligent organism provided a microcosm which promoted 
the appreciation of the commonality or generality between things and the fact that each 
being had a nature, place and path particular to it. These particular natures were inter- 
connected according to traditional contingencies and organised according to no 
overriding logic. They connected to others sympathetic to them and resisted those that 
were antipathetic. Knowledge was thus to be gained by reading similitudes. However, 
these connections were always relative, multiple and unfolding (while the spiralling inter- 
connection of past-present-future ensured that being remained constant, beings were 
always becoming or changing, with some aspects in light and others in dark) so 
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interpretation had to be used and the outcomes of particular actions in advance would 
always be somewhat uncertain. The plurality of the network of relations and the fact that 
humans and their language were constantly wound up in this play rather than objective 
knowers and representers encouraged the co-existence of many schools which, because of 
the connectedness of what Modems might see as things from disparate categories, did not 
specialise in particular spheres. Ethically, one sought to become a unique identity while 
being true to one's many relations and traditions. One's ethos or alms in the present were 
thus seen by the Greeks to be influenced by one's particular relations and traditions. This 
pre-Modem visibility may be expressed with reference to the symbols below. Symbols 
that represent the 'architecture' with which they saw: the webs of being and connections 
that had to be read in order to know; the subjective microcosmic analogy; the co- 
appreciation of kosmos and chaos represented by the co-fonns of Apollo and Dionysus; 
the spiral of history and particular inter-connections of past traditions, present and future. 
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This architecture was matched by the Greek's manner of speaking. Articulating 
this world required the reading of similitude through the interpretation of analogous signs 
rather than appealing to objective universal measures. Language was thus seen as part of 
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the system of signs, relativistic and context dependent and analogous stories were 
invoked as a means of inspiring others to make a connection to knowledge. The style of 
thinking/acting and speaking that was admired was nietis, perhaps best translated as 
'practical wisdom' or 'effective intelligence' 
For the Greeks there existed a dichotomy between being and becoming, between 
order and contingency, between the integrative and dispersive. However, as Detienne and 
Vernant (1978: 5-6) explain, it was not simply: 
that a series of oppositions between antithetical terms [were] set up. These 
contrasting concepts which are grouped in couples together form a complete 
system of antinomies defining two exclusive spheres of reality. On the one hand 
there is the sphere of being, of the one, the unchanging, of the limited, of the true 
and definite knowledge; on the other, the sphere of becoming, of the multiple, the 
unstable and the unlimited, of oblique and changeable opinion. Within this 
framework of thought there can be no place for inetis. 
Subsequently, unlike the multi-dimensional Athena -a woman born from a man - neither 
Apollo or Dionysus are described in myth as having nielis on their own. It is significant 
that the quotation by Blanchot that began this section describes Apollo speaking through 
connection to 'Baccylides'. Detienne and Vernant (1978: 5-6) continue: 
Metis is characterised precisely by the way it operates by continuously oscillating 
between two opposite poles... Thus when the individual who is endowed with 
nietis, be he god or man, is confronted with a multiple, changing reality whose 
limitless polymorphic powers render it almost impossible to seize, he can only... 
enclose it within the limits of a single, unchangeable form within his control - if 
he proves himself to be more multiple, more mobile, more polyvalent than his 
adversary. Similarly... to pursue his way... across a world which is fluctuating and 
constantly oscillating from one side to the other, he must himself adopt an oblique 
course and make his intelligence sufficiently wily and supple to bend in every 
conceivable way and his gait so askew that he can be ready to go in any direction. 
Not surprisingly, Plato was at great pains to dismiss intelligence as niefis, going to 
considerable lengths to expose the impotence and harmful nature of its oblique 
procedures. The various forms that it could take ran contrary to his singular Ideal Forrns- 
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Aristotle, by contrast, lauded metis (Detienne & Vemant 1978). Hence we see the reason 
why the much-admired wily Odysseus is most commonly preceded by the epithet 
'resourceful' - his greatness lay in his happy knack of being able to bring the right 
knowledge and experiences, lived or heard, to bear at the right moment to determine the 
best path for him in the circumstances. This view of wisdom reflected back into the 
episteme thus described. It supposed a relativism but not one that collapsed into an 
'anything goes' solipsism. Moreover, it guaranteed the existence of chaos. For how could 
metis be practised if not for the uncertain collusion, connection and cross-pollination of 
different circumstances and traditions? 
After the co-existence of many disparate schools, the particular legacy from the 
Greek tradition that emerged into the Middle Ages is termed 'Aristotelianism', a manner 
of thinking based on Aristotle as modified by the Scholastic philosophers of the Middle 
Ages. Plato's thinking survived in translation in the Arabic world but it had, for the time 
being, been lost to the West. The Renaissance of the 15th and 16th centuries was so 
called as many of the Ancient works that had been lost were 'unconcealed' again as they 
were brought back from the East (in particular, those of the more idealistic or 
mathematical philosophers like Plato and Pythagoras). 
This was a time of great ferment as thinkers attempted to describe the world that 
was being resurfaced around them, an age of fantastic books of great range that would 
offend the sensibilities of the 17th century, books such as della Porta's (1535-1615) 
Natural Majick where instructions for making a mirror to make one's face "seem like an 
Ass, Dog, or Sow" and "merry sports with plain looking glasses" were placed next to 
'serious' discussions of the uses of concave mirrors; or Aldrovandi's (1522-1603) 
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Natural History where animals (including an excellent chapter on serpents) were outlined 
via a mix of exact descriptions, reported quotations, fables, their use in heraldry, their 
habitat, their sympathies and antipathies, their mythological values and their use in 
medicine and magic. Buffon (in Foucault 1970: 38) would later express astonishment at 
such a work, complaining that it was "all legend" ("Indeed", Foucault wrote, "for 
Aldrovandi and his contemporaries, it was all legenda - all signs to be read"). 
Thinkers such as Machiavelli (1469-1527) and Montaigne (1533-1592) were once 
again free to be incommensurably informed by both a practically-minded Aristotelianism 
and a theoretically-minded Platonism. Machiavelli worked from the premise that 
investigations should issue generalisations from which laws could be drawn. However, he 
also believed that no matter how good a stock of generalisations one amassed, Forunia, 
the goddess of unprcdictability, was ineliminable from human life (Maclntyre 1981). His 
approach consisted in a willingness to follow laws or virtues when possible and an equal 
willingness to disregard them when fortune and changing circumstances constrained him 
or presented unexpected opportunity. Given that things were unpredictable, it was 
pointless to take a solely reductionist approach to theory making. Consequently, 
Machiavelli "confronted theory with practice", expressing his maxims via narrative 
experiential examples rather than general laws (Skinner & Price 1988). Montaigne (1995: 
79) similarly found "all grosso-iiiodo judgements to be lax and defective" and that the 
"only thing that is universal about the human race is precisely its irreducible difference" 
(in Gardiner 1996: 42). He also concluded that "unless some one thing is found of which 
we are completely certain, we can be certain about nothing". In rising to this challenge, 
Modernism would soon upset the incommensurable co-habitations that inspired nietis. 
The Westem World's last serious microcosm picture is dated 1572 (Seznec 1953). 
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Modernism sees intelligence as the furthering of certainty and control, via a general method, toward 
objectively measurable universal ends. It is based on the belief that firm foundations for knowledge can be 
found by looking beneath secondary conventions to the universal dimensions of space; the analogy that the 
world and its components are directed and move as a clockwork mechanism; that knowledge comes from 
measuring and representing things objectively through the application of objective units; a view of time as 
universally linear, history as evolution and being as driven by the quest to be at the cutting-edge; that at 
this edge there should only be one central school of thought, and this is scientific; and, that human sciences 
will determine the correct or normal manner in which Man should act. 71iis promotes looking at die world 
from a hierarchical-triangular perspective, as an observer from a detached, objective, central perch, upon 
particular subjects against universal measures and aims. The universal aims that Modernism has come to 
speak in terms of include Humanism, the new, capital gains and, since the turn of the 20th century, 
performative efficiency. 
4. MODERNISM 
Modernism is a complex system seeking to assert 
itself and achieve mastery in an environment deemed 
dynamic and complex. 
Touraine, Modernity and Cultural Specificities (1988). 
"The knowledge, I think, therefore I ani, is the first and most certain that occurs to one 
who philosophises orderly". This is Descartes' 17th century rock of certainty, upon which 
much of how the Modem world sees is built. It was well received by a society 
increasingly ill at ease with the chaos, relativity and uncertainty accepted in an episteme 
influenced by the Ancient Greeks. It proved a successful counter-punch against 
Montaigne's 16th century "unless some one thing is found of which we are completely 
certain, we can be certain about nothing". 
Why was one century comfortable with Montaigne while the next warmed to 
Descartes? Toulmin (1990) argues that the rise of Protestantism challenged Europe's 
over-arching unifying authority - the Catholic Church. In the unstable aftennath of wars 
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fought over foundational assumptions, the 17th century wanted to find a way whereby 
divisive pluralism could be laid to rest once and for all - through the development of an 
all-encompassing rationality. 
Giddens (1990) relates this desire for certainty to the rise of four "institutional 
dimensions" that furthered and were enabled by the rise of European nation-states. The 
economies of these states brought together the Win dimensions of capitalism and 
industrialisation, marking a break from traditional modes of production and conspicuous 
consumption to the measured and collective implementation of technology in a 
continuous quest for cost minimisation and profit maximisation. This sparked increased 
investment and continual growth via constant innovation and reworking of production - 
processes. Consequently, a capitalist economy is intrinsically unstable and restless. 
However, for it to function well, it requires a stable certain enviromnent conducive to 
encouraging the long-term investment (chaos on kosinos rather than the other was 
around). The success of a nation-state thus relied upon providing an underlying stability 
without overly harnessing capitalism's restless energy. This required the development of 
the two other dimensions: gentle methods of surveillance and the monopoly control o 
violence through the development of national military forces, police and judiciary 
systems. The implementation of these two means of co-ordination and control required 
the establishment of certain objective foundations against which particular actions could 
be measured. Such procedures were also necessary to bring order to property rights, 
another crucial cog in the wheels of capitalism. 
Foucault (1977a) similarly put the desire for objective universal certainty down to 
the arrival of an Age that saxv the rise of humanism, egalitarianism, secularism and 
capitalism making traditional modes of control - customs, class-systems, violence done to 
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the body - increasingly untenable. He argued that these had to be replaced with other, 
more subtle, forms of control. The emphasis shifted to the development of centralised 
procedures of nornialisation via the identification of bands of objectively non-nal 
behaviour and surveillance, in order to ensure that these norms were adhered to. 
However, the Philosophes of the 18th century Enlightenment did not see 
developments as so contingent. For them, the ideas of the l7th century's great thinkers - 
Descartes, Galileo, Newton - came about and proved persuasive because they were closer 
to the truth than what had passed for knowledge before. The Philosophes, or 'Modernes' 
as they were often called, saw themselves and the events they lived through as 
ad . udicators of a contest between the 'ancien regime' and a new body of knowledge that 
they delineated. They judged the new to be a progression, a sign of contemporary Man's 
righteous assertion over other worldly beings. Combining this with the opposition being 
fought out in their Age between traditional and new forms of production and government, 
enabled this to be seen as the Age of Revolutions: the Glorious, the French, the 
American, the Industrial and the Scientific. These are 'revolutions' in the Modem sense, 
as the overthrow of the past, rather than the Ancient view of re-emergence or things 
coming around again? 
Modernism's key beliefs, and two differences from the Ancient Greek episteme, 
can be seen in the desires described above. Firstly, they indicate that it had become Man's 
aim and destiny to overcome chaos, via the accumulation of a certain ordered set of 
general principles that represented the way things actually worked. This was the project 
that the thinkers of the 17th century are seen to have begun. Secondly, they indicate that 
Modernism is 'revolutionary' in that the new, because it is regarded as bringing us closer 
9 To the 17th century, a 'revolution', in keeping with its Latin prefix 're' (meaning 'back to' or 'again'), invoked the 
idea of celestial bodies moving around in an circular orbit, or the return and recurrence of a particular point in time. 
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to certain understanding, is both better than the past and 'consigning it to history'. This is 
how the Philosophes made sense of the ideas of the 17th century. They articulated the 
history of thought as a linear path and saw themselves as moving on this path beyond a 
view of the world that accepted an ever-present measure of uncertainty or chaos, and the 
corresponding view of intelligence as metis. Man now believed he had the power, if he 
put his mind to it, to assert a great degree of kosnios over chaos and gain a greater degree 
of control. Intelligence was now about furthering certitude, about "enlarging the bounds 
of Human Empire, to the effecting of all things" (Bacon NA 111: 156). 
The assertion of objective certainty over inetis required a complex system of 
interlocking components. The objectification of space via the removal of subjective 
particularity from our comprehension of it would enable traditional opinions to be swept 
away and 'finn foundations' on which to build to be established. The clockwork 
mechanism would provide a complex but unvarying analogy for conceiving motion 
against objective space. Certain knowledge would untangle the messy web of similitude 
via the development of mathematics as a 'universal calculus', the development of 
horizontal tableau assigning certain 'species' a definite place within universal space, and 
the discovery of underlying characteristics would order a verticality of progress or 
hierarchy of evolution. This verticality encouraged an objective certainty of time, nature, 
history and knowledge as cumulative, collective and linear - where the new must be more 
evolved than the old. The Scientific Method would be identified as the most evolved and 
hence one true school of thought, and the centralisation of knowledge academies would 
establish institutions with which to accumulate, order and unify these laws. Finally, the 
birth of Man, a generalisable object subject to scientific inquiry, would enable certain 
norms about this most complex of specimens to be developed, norms that would inform 
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humane general codes and provide certainty with regard to normal human action and the 
general ends toward which humanity should direct itself. The following paragraphs 
describe the development of these dimensions of Modernism's system of assertion. 
L Kosmos uiideriieatli: firitifottiidatioiis, certain space 
Men are taught and wont to attribute stupendous 
unaccountable effects to sympathy, antipathy, fitga vacid, 
substantial forms, and especially to a certain being that 
they call Nature; for this is represented as a kind of 
goddess, whose power may be little less than boundless 
[and this] veneration has been a discouraging impediment 
to the empire of man over the inferior creatures of God. 
Boyle, Works 5 (c. 1620). 
To measure a quantity one needs a unit. Ideally this unit 
should [have] universal rather than local significance. 
Anonymous, The Making of The Modern World - 
Milestones ofScience and Technology (1998). 
The Greek tradition encouraged veneration towards the natural world and the unclear web 
of relations that sustained and moved its beings. This dynamic web was now seen as an 
impediment to the pediment that had to be laid as a foundation for certain knowledge. 
Bacon wrote of commencing "the whole thing anew upon a better plan... a total 
reconstruction of sciences, arts, and all human knowledge, raised upon the proper 
foundations". Descartes was "convinced of the necessity of.. commencing anew the work 
of building from the foundation, if [we] desired to establish a firm and abiding 
superstructure in the sciences". His "design was singly to find ground of assurance, and 
cast aside the loose earth and sand that I might reach the rock". In Power's words, these 
were "the days that must lay a new Foundation of a more magnificený21iilosophy, never 
to be overthrown, a true and pennanent philosophy". 
To achieve this pediment, knowledge had to be disenchanted, de-individualised 
and depersonalised (Midgely 1992). 'Surface differences' had to be undennined to reach 
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the common, the underlying and the unvarying. Mereas the Aristotelians had been 
"deceived about the character of the facts of the natural and social world by interposing 
interpretations between themselves and experienced reality", Modet-nes would "strip 
away interpretation and theory and confront fact and experience just as they are" 
(MacIntyre 1981: 78). The Modem depersonalisation and consequent 'Enlightenment' 
required the establishment of newly ordered categories and distinctions. 
Firstly, in the Ancient Greek episteme, all things contained and were moved by 
aninia (cf. Hobbes' quip that it was as if "stones and metals had a desire"). However, 
there was now an increasing distinction made between animate and inanimate objects, 
between animal, vegetable and mineral. Now a hierarchy was set whereby the mineral 
and then the vegetable provided the static ground upon which animals, of which Man was 
superior, moved. 
Secondly, the Aristotelian view assumed different domains of space, each subject 
to particular principles dependant on the 'personalities' of the beings involved. All beings 
on earth, and between the earth and moon, were subject to familiar processes of birth and 
change and decay and all motion was rectilinear and discontinuous while the perfect 
bodies of the sun, the stars and the planets moved in steady and smooth circles over the 
world. Galileo's identification of blemishes on the sun that moved irregularly and a far 
greater array of celestial forms than had previously been encountered, Banns that did not 
always appear to be moving in a circular progression, threw the Aristotelian system into 
doubt. The observations and experiments of Kepler and., Galileo would show space as a 
singular domain, a consistent unvarying fabric against which action took place (Shapin 
1996). 
Thirdly, Descartes made I think, therefore I anj the rock of certainty upon which 
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all knowledge could be founded. Once this had been established, the knowing mind was 
the one unvarying thing we could be sure of This bestowed upon the mind a privileged 
status, taking it out and placing it above the action. From here, we could begin to build 
from this foundation toward a knowledge of all else. All other objects extended below the 
knowing mind were inatter. Descartes moved the world beyond the Greek view of 
knowing as an indistinguishable combination of thinking and acting (Pan-nenidesfi-ag. 3). 
Reason became a detached activity, humans seen as Rational in that they could self- 
consciously think without having these thoughts coloured by particular involvements. 
Fourthly, from his mind-matter split, Descartes' account of the reality of matter 
began by distinguishing between primmy and secondary qualities. The secondary 
qualities were those based on convention and sense data that Descartes claimed could not 
have real existence. Underneath these, however, lay permanent objective primary 
qualities (a quite different perspective from the Ancient view that placed an emphasis on 
interpreting the signs on the surface of things). A knowledge of the underlying primary 
qualities, largely determined in terms of 'function' or movement across the fabric of 
space, would provide further foundation. This process of 'Enlightemnent' is depicted 
below. 
4 objective mind 
secondary surface qualities 
primary qualities 
univcrsal fabic or grid of mcasurcs 
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If this is combined with Descartes' distinction between the separate, observing, 
knowing mind and extended matter or 'body', it can be said that reality (i. e., primary 
qualities) is pure extension in 'space'. In On Method Descartes explains, "Nothing 
remains in the idea of a body except that it is something extended in length, breadth and 
depth; and this something is comprised in our idea of space, not only of that which is full 
of body, but even what is called void space [chaos]". As mind is regarded as pure 
thought, unextended and separate from the body, so real matter, its counterpart, is pure 
extension devoid of substantial qualities except those involved in the nature of extension 
across the units of objective space. The 'deadening' of the mineral and the vegetable, 
under the animal; the creation of a unitary backdrop of space; the separation of mind over 
matter; the focus on the existence of objective primary functions beneath the superficial 
qualities - together, these assumptions re-ordered the prevailing view of the world. 
The changes are manifest in this period's development of mapping. Maps had 
always existed. However, Modernism's quest for objective certainty, voyages of conquest 
that brought forth a diverse flow of empirical facts to be codified, the recovery of the 
Ptolemaic map into Europe and geographical knowledge and objectivity in spatial 
representation becoming commodities (as accuracy of navigation, the exact determination 
of property rights and investments, political boundaries and rights of passage became 
imperatives for the new nation-states), led to very different forms. 
Medieval mapping emphasised the personal and 'mystical', rather than the 
rational-mathematical and objective qualities, of spatial order. Landmarks were often 
depicted in terms of their relative importance to a community or map-maker at the time of 
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t map's construction, as opposed to their 'actual' size. The Ptolemaic grid, by contrast, 
. -esented an underlying objective framework on which 
in-coming data could be spatially 
. gged (see Figure 10). Ptolemy had imagined how the world as a globe would look from 
atside or above. As a result, one could imagine that mathematical principles could be 
len as primary and applied, as in optics, to the problem of global representation. Maps 
ecame abstract and functional systems for the factual codification and control of 
henomena in space. HeIgerson (1986) argues that Saxton's (1579) Atlas of England and 
7ales (its cover emblazoned with "justice and peace have kissed each other - Truth shall 
pring out of the earth and justice shall look down from heaven"), enabled the English for 
ie first time to assert a "visual and conceptual possession of the[ir] physical kingdom". 
Man's ability to objectively space and hence assert himself over his world was 
dvancing in other spheres. Vasari reported the Renaissance's progress with regard to the 
bility to represent Man and his surrounds with perfect perspective and an accuracy that 
luplicated the senses (Byzantine art was now dismissed as a naive attempt, or a step on 
ýe way to more truthful expressions, rather than a particular style with different 
bjectives of depiction). In the 17th century, Still Life (natiti-e-mone) would go further, 
eeking to isolate, capture the essence of and represent Man's objects (Sterling 1981). At 
he same time, patterns of life were increasingly measured against abstract units of 
neasurement. Worth was objectified through the spread of centralised monetary systems 
vhile other objectivising practices emerged in banking, accounting, trade, agricultural 
)roduction and the setting of standard chronological time (Kostof 1985). 
The new order is apparent in Elizabethan portraiture where the presence of maps 
tnd globes mastered by Her Majesty and her court is a recurring theme. The Armada 
lortrait (see Figure 11), for example, shows the Queen in stark realistic style, with her 
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FIGURE 10: TI It-, CHANGING VISIBILITY OFMAPPINGj - -PLAN DES IAMFIS 
Cl IAMPEAUX -(C. 15 "' CENTURY); MERCATOR'S DFVFI, 0PMFNTOI: 
PTOLEMY'S PFRSPECTIVF (C. 10111 CENTURY); MAPoITRANCFFROM A 
PROSPECTUS FOR A 'Not WELLE TOPOGRAPHIE' (1780), MAPDRAWN UP BY 
T[ IE FRENCI I NATIONAL Assi-. mi3LY'I'O FACILITATE. PROPORTIONAL 
RF-PRESENTATION (1789). SOURCF: HARVEY (1990). 
FiGAIRE 11: Ei-IZABETHAN PORTRAITI IRE -Tin., 'ARMADA' PORTRAH'(1589), 
Tiv 'Drivill. 1-Y PORTRAIT(1592). 
hand resting surely on the world and the imperial crown significantly placed over it - the 
world becoming 'subject' to centralised human knowledge and control. A certain depth, 
that did not exist within the web of similitude had emerged - the beginnings of a new 
hierarchy. The 'Mind of Man' may look down on all the operations of life with the belief 
in their being underlying common grids, and primary qualities marked out using objective 
units, subject to the universal language of geometry or mathematics. 
This spatial visibility transcends linear time to still be with us today, particularly 
in the form of multi-national corporations as they make particular decisions against 
underpinning general foundations. These fonns are taken as indicative of an underlying 
global business culture as they span the nations of the world above local differences 
(Figure 12). They implement general principles of human psychology, motivation, 
marketing and business ethics. They employ advances in communications technology that 
overarch and unite the world's disparate traditions, making earth an increasingly smaller 
and monitorable place. They are housed in offices of the Modem or International style, 
which, drawing from the great technological optimism at the turn of the 20th century, 
presents Modernism's starkest expressions, a style that seeks to reduce buildings to "the 
absolute Platonic, pure minimum evocation" (Filler 1986), as indicated in the functional 
maxims of its gurus (e. g., Mies' "Less is more", le Corbusier's "a house is a machine for 
living in", and Loos' "Useful = Beautiful") 
On the walls of these towers, Modem, mostly abstract, art is hung, cutting under 
secondary cultural differences to the essence of humanity, saying something to everyone 
from everywhere, while saying nothing explicit that could be claimed as offensive by any 
(Figure 13). While architecture was at its 'most Modem' in the first decades of the 20th 
century, Abstract Impressionism, a style that attempted to go further than the perfect 
101 
FIGURE 12: GLOBAL ASPIRATIONS - CHAIRMEN oi. - KPMG AM) 
ERNST& 
YOUNG, SOURCE "THE TIMES" (21/2/1998)-, 
CHAIRMEN OF M&C PLC, SOURCE: -THI-- Timi-, S" (23/4/1999). 
FIGURE 13: THE ZENITH OF MODERN ARTAND ARcm, rF("i, uRI,, -'FIIE 
ROCKEFELLER CENTRE, SOURCE: HARVEY "Ti u-, CONDITION OF 
POSTMODERNITY" (1990). JACKSON POLLOCK, "CATHEDRAL" (1947). 
representation of the senses offered in Still Life and the height of Modem art, peaked in 
the 1950s. Impressionism had sought deeper understanding by representing what an 
artist's eye 'really saw' at the Mment of conception, not what one could study in detail 
in perfect relieff Munch Aemonstrated the possibility of getting beneath surface 
appearance and distilling emotions into universal experiences through the use of 
simplified, sinuous forms and evocative blocks of colour (Piper 1988). Apollinaire 
described the works of his Cubist friends as "paintings in which the artist had tried to 
express the essential reality with great purity". The Abstract Impressionists, who saw 
colours and shapes as the purest means for expressing emotion, sought a medium freed of 
all extraneous conventions to capture the objective essence of the human experience and 
psyche and "to make individual psychology extinct" (Compagnon 1994: 67). 'o 
H. The analogy of the cloclovork mechanism - certainty of objective motion 
The universe is not similar to a divine animated 
being, but similar to a clock. 
Kepler, Mysterizini Cosinographicitin (c. 1605). 
Kepler added to this view in a footnote to the second edition of Mysterium 
Cosmogi-aphicum in 1621: "[flf you substitute the word 'force' for the word 'soul' then 
you have the very principle on which [my] celestial physics... is based". While lie 
formerly believed that the cause of planetary motion was an internal soul that animated 
the planets, like other beings, toward their particular telos, lie was now convinced that 
they were moved from without by a unified mechanistic force. 
The conception of the foundation of an objective universal space, underneath 
I 
10 Freud's psychoanalysis, often referred to as 'depth psychology', is marked out as a key point in Modernism's 
advance for similar reasons (Toulmin 1990). Freud's (1895) Interpretation of Dreanis expresses the belief that the 
workings of repressed memories rather than base surface physiological abnon-nalitics cause most nervous illnesses (and 
are also the basis of non-neurotic personalities). 
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particular actions, was twinned with a rcconfiguration of the understanding of movement. 
The depth provided by unitary characteristics presented a backdrop against which action 
could be objectively measured and understood as subject to unifying principles. In the 
words of Edgerton (1976), the "most far-flung places could all be precisely fixed ir 
relation to one another by unchanging co-ordinates [meant] that their proportionatc 
distance, as well as their directional relationships, would be apparent". This possibility 
emerged as the Ancient Greek view of movement was seen as not particularly useful to 
enlarging the bounds of the human empire of knowledge. Bacon, for example, was 
exasperated by the Aristotelian animating principle, not so much because it did not make 
sense to him, but because he could not imagine an 'applied' teleology as he could 
imagine an applied mechanistic physics (Crombie 1957). 
But how did one make palpable and communicate a new view of movement that, 
while it might seem more useful, went against sensory perception and everyday 
experience? Galileo's part in establishing Modernism's unitary backdrop has already 
been mentioned, but it is worth noting here that while his telescope had enabled him to 
question many traditional premises, it was not yet so powerful as to provide enough 
empirical evidence to infer an alternative model of movement. Galileo required more to 
seriously undermine this aspect of the Aristotelian system. The influence of Platonism, 
mathematics and the clockwork analogy would further develop what his telescope saw. 
In the 15th and 16th centuries Plato was 'recovered' via the re-translation of his 
works from the Arab world (Brown 1994). Thinkers during the Renaissance had 
demonstrated how theories could be given more credence if they could be connected back 
to 'the classics' (Dresden 1968) and the invocation of Plato enabled Galileo to bridge a 
gap. Reference to Plato and Pythagoras legitimated an imaginative and mathematical 
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treatment of the world, as opposed to a dutiful empiricism or Aristotelian traditions. For 
Plato, the material world was an imperfect realisation of an ideal world on which it was 
patterned. Thus, one could best understand the material world by viewing it first in 
imagination from the vantage point of the ideal (Westfall 1971). This point could only be 
found in the mind's-eye, in reason and imagination. "Imagine what would be observed, " 
the Galilean Salviati says to the simple Aristotelian Simplicus in Galileo's Dialogue, "if 
not with one's actual eyes, at least with those of the mind". 
The Platonic view also looked on nature in geometric terms and conceived of the 
kosinos as constructed according to the principles of mathematical order. Galileo now 
argued that knowledge ought to be imagined as mathematical in form because nature was 
mathematical in structure, quoting Plato's dictum that "the world was God's epistle 
written to mankind and it was written in mathematical letters" (Kepler claimed likewise 
that "God... in creating the universe and regulating the order of the cosmos, had in view 
the five regular bodies of geometry as known since the days of Pythagoras and Plato"). 
Mathematical reasoning was, however, somewhat difficult and abstract. It did not 
bring to mind an analogy that could readily express the new system that the new thinkers 
proposed. However, suitable metaphors were now ready-to-hand. The development of 
chronometers had paralleled advances in the objectification of space. While early clocks 
were somewhat unreliable and costly, by the late l6th century (with the discovery by 
Galileo of the isochronism of pendula), mechanical clocks telling time according to one 
constant rhythm that did not vary in length according to the season and latitude as with 
the sundial, had become an increasingly reliable feature of everyday life and language. 
The clock provided a credible and powerful analogy that could be used to transmit a 
challenge to traditional thinking that people could relate to. The universe must move like 
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clock-work, a complex arrangement of parts moving in different directions at different 
angles and speeds in unison and regular harmony, according to a universal logic against a 
universal space. The machine-clock consequently became the "founding metaphor of 
Modem science" (Dupre 1993: 2). 
For the astronomical tradition up to Galileo, only the heavenly motions offered 
scope for geometrical analysis. However, after Galileo's success it was thought that 
mechanics could also be applied back to terrestrial motions. If it was possible to infer the 
movement of the heavens through a mechanistic and mathematical imagination, then, 
given that space was universal, so it was that the behaviour now attributed to the heavens 
could be brought down to earth. Perhaps the vegetable, the animal and even Man was like 
a machine? Hobbes, dubbed the father of psychology, wondered what it was that held 
action in human societies together, from whence did or could an underlying order and 
equilibrium in changing human affairs come (this was later termed the 'Hobbesian 
mystery')? After visiting with Galileo in 1636, he conceived of generalising the science 
of mechanics, geometrically deducing human behaviour from the abstract principles of 
Galileo's science of motion. Hobbes thought that an all-inclusive theory could be built, 
starting with simple movements studied in geometry and culminating in the movements 
of humans in political life (Valentine 1997). 
Descartes also adopted Galileo's new view. The machine provided him a powerful 
analogy with which to conceive movement on earth: "it is not less natural for a clock, 
made of the requisite number of wheels, to indicate the hours", lie would claim, "than for, 
a tree which has sprung from this of that seed, to produce a particular fruit". Descartes 
endeavoured to further eliminate obscurity by promoting the view that all natural 
phenomena are caused by invisible (but imaginable) mechanisms, entirely similar to 
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those mechanisms becoming familiar in everyday life. Vniile one could not sense these 
mechanical characteristics, one could employ one's mind's eye to find them. This view 
implied that complex objects were best tackled by dismantling them and treating their 
component parts, or building blocks of matter, before reconciliation via over-arching 
unifying theories. This conception of nature was "startling in its bleakness - but 
admirably contrived for the purposes of Modem science" (Westfall 1971: 3 1). 
For Descartes, the human body was also "a machine", but one "made by the hand 
of God, which is incomparably better arranged and adequate to movements more 
admirable than is any machine of human invention". Despite Galileo's well documented 
problems with the Catholic church, the Churches soon took to and reinforced these new 
mechanistic views. The Ancients believed that the human body was connected to the 
universe through a series of 'occult' correspondences and influences that had emerged 
with no over-riding logic. However, the mechanical metaphor implied that the world had 
been built according to some plan, and who else could have built such a magnificent 
machine but God? For thinkers like Bacon, Descartes and Newton, faith in God was both 
a conclusion of research and a starting point. Newton, for example, dealt only with what 
he called 'efficient causes' - those things that God's design caused. He never doubted that 
the only possible final cause was God - The Prime Mover, an all-knowing, all-overseeing, 
rational planner (Dupr6 1993; Clark 1992). This view was soon regarded by the Churches 
as far more agreeable than aninia. Imbuing the natural world with a range of inherent 
active powers tended to dispense with the explanatory role of a God conceived as the one 
wholly supernatural entity. The idea of one all-powerful God as the Rational creator of a 
wondrous artifice that only human vice could upset, promoted the Church as the 
monopoly supplier of a complete and stable knowledge of the supernatural. 
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Modernism was thus set in motion as mathematically inclined astronomers 
discovered that their unitary creator God was a mathematician who had employed 
Platonic principles of geometry. Galileo's telescope and Kepler's experiments provided 
enough evidence to induce that Aristotle was incorrect. Their mathematical reasoning and 
idealism, combined with these evidential empirical fragments, gave a vantage point from 
which to deduce an alternative. Galileo's assertion that the Earth would "become a 
heavenly body in the Copernican system" (Westfall 1971: 22) indicates how the Modem 
had turned over the Ancient. From a view of the world, and upward to the heavens, 
through the metaphor of a person in terms of their own experience, the gaze of knowledge 
had now become one where the world's movements were looked down at as operating 
like an ideal mechanism, just like Galileo and Kepler had proven the heavens to be. 
III. Representation, order and beyond - certainty of knowledge 
Method consists entirely in the order and disposition of 
the objects towards which our mental vision must be 
directed if we would find out any truth. 
Descartes, On Method (c. 1637). 
[N]ow the history of man is merely the continuation of that 
of animals and plants; the universal historian finds traces 
of himself even in the utter depths of the sea, in the living 
slime. He stands astounded in the face of the enormous 
way that man has run, and his gaze quivers before the 
mighty wonder, the Modem man who can see all the way! 
He stands proudly on the pyramid of the world-process; 
and while he lays the final stone of his knowledge, he 
seems to cry aloud to listening nature: "We are at the top, 
we are at the top; we are the completion of Nature! 
Nietzsche, The Use wid Abuse offfistory. 
Changes brought about by the Modem episterne with regard to how knowledge was 
sought have already been indicated. The separation of universal primary features and 
units of measure underneath the play of similitude, and the rational knowing mind as over 
and above, had made a knowledge of action based on generalisable external factors a 
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possibility. Beyond this, Modernism would seek to apply three new measures toward 
ordering things and making knowledge more certain: detaching an objective universal 
language that the separate knowing mind could bring to bear to represent things (formerly 
'beings'); establishing objective tables, not unlike Ptolemy's grid, upon which different 
things could be pennanently ordered; and, finding the underlying characteristics that 
united the spread of things tabled. 
Now that all matter could be viewed as comprising mechanisms, and since 
mechanistic workings could be expressed in mathematical symbols, mathematics became 
fonnally capable of objectively representing all things. The novelty in Descartes' method 
was the affinnation that knowledge is not created through the deduction of particular 
sympathies, or from the accumulation of particular cases as Bacon suggested, but from 
perceiving the universal, general and timeless in the particular. Similarly, Descartes 
looked behind the differences of separate modes of inquiries to their common method and 
assumptions. The Method describes his subsequent discovery, by the application of 
algebra to geometry, of the generality of mathematics. Mathematics could underpin and 
unify all the spheres of knowledge that Aristotle was content to leave subject to their own 
particular maxims, its objectivity bedding down the fabric of abstract time and space 
without reference to local human experience against which all being could be seen. 
In this spirit, Leibniz (1646-1716), whose early work, included a project to 
preserve peace within Europe by finding a rational foundation for Christendom 
acceptable to both churches and the construction of a calculating machine, developed the 
Infinitesimal Calculus. It was Leibniz's belief that the aims of the Enlightenment could 
be more readily achieved if a characteristica universalis could be developed. The l7th 
century had witnessed a lively interest in the invention of an artificial language to replace 
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Latin as the medium of international communication and scholarship, that left Leibniz a 
substantial body from which to work. " An interest in such systems developed at this 
point for two reasons. Firstly, mastering Latin was seen as time-consumingly inefficient: 
Milton remarked that "we do amiss to spend seven or eight years merely in scraping 
together so much miserable Latine and Greek, as might be learnt otherwise easilY and 
delightfully in one year" (OE 1644). Secondly, the lack of a logical relationship between 
Latin words and their objects came to be regarded as problematic. Latin, although far less 
relativistic than Greek, had developed without systematic forethought. Modems wished 
for a language built from a clean slate to logically represent objects, a language in which 
"grammar was regular and simple... syntax grew from natural processes of thought, and 
the significance of every part of an unknown made its meaning clear upon analysis" 
(Schumaker 1982: 134). Much less exertion would be required to distract the memory 
from the further intelligence and, more importantly, mastery of the language (given that it 
positively mirrored reality) would bring a certain understanding of everything. 
In addition to language losing its kinship with other beings, to become regarded 
like mind, as a separate entity capable of objectively representing things, Modernism saw 
the development of what Foucault (1970) calls a "general science of order". The 
establishment of measures, like mathematical units, independent of the teeming world but 
having real meaning, would enable objective grids, tables or taxonomies upon which 
different beings could be classified. Different 'things' would come to be categorised by 
common units of size, function, complexity, life-span and so on. While, the old system of 
11 For example, Lodgwick's (1647) A Common Writing. Whereby Two. Allhough Not Understanding One the Others 
Language, Yet by the Help Thereof, May Coninillilicale TIleir Afillds Onc loAnothcr, Beck's The Universal Character, 
By Which All the Nations of the World Afay Understand Onc Anothcm Conceptions, Reading Out of Olle C0111111011 
Writing Their Own Mother Tongues (1657), and Dalgamo'seirs Signomin (166 1), announced by the author as "News 
to the Whole World ofthe Discovery ofa Universal Character, and a Nmv Rational Language ". 
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similitude was messy, hard to graph and always open to fresh possibilities, the Modem 
system of comparative order mapped out and fixed things and made the relations between 
them certain. It did so by appealing not to particular signs that have to be inteqreled but 
to general units that could be used to analyse particular cases. Linnaeus' (1707-78) 
project of discovering the concrete domains of nature, which led to the "certain 
characterisations of organisms" (Bames-Svarney 1995: 139), is but one example of "the 
table" as the 18th and 19th centuries' "centre of knowledge" (Foucault 1970: 75). 
A certain 'verticality' would be added to this horizontal tabling of knowledge in 
the 19th century. Behveen 1775 and 1825, the Age of Revolutions, people became 
increasingly conscious of change or the discontinuity of the present vis-a-vis the past. 
Men wondered at where the characters in their tables had come from and became curious 
of the primary essences that must underlie the different characters they had categorised. 
'Time' was thus added to the tables via the search for intemal similarities, similarities 
that went deeper than the characteristics that were used in the comparisons that 
detennined the lay out of tables. In biology we witness the search for essential functions. 
In economics, the basic underlying component of 'labour' is added to the categories of 
wealth and impoverishment. In linguistics the root of all languages is sought in order to 
make sense of differences and similarities between existing dialects. This verticality 
would certainly connect phenomena and express the coherence of empirical multiplicity. 
It is manifest in the 'trees' or 'pyramids' that are now a commonplace way of 
representing life and the linear relations between different types of life: with Man at the 
top looking down on the slime at the bottom (see Figure 14). 
Ordering things into objective tableaux, denionstrating their uniforni links over 
time, and recording these things with a universal representative language (all enabled by 
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the belief in a certain objective space underpinning being, a means of objectively viewing 
things from above and the external and universal analogy of action running like 
clockwork), encouraged Modernism to see knowledge differently from the Ancients. 
Now knowledge did not have to be experienced or connected to. It could be captured, 
codified, put behind glass or accumulated in the archive, and transferred without personal 
contact. Modernism thus solved the problem of "the entry of the individual into the field 
of knowledge" (Foucault 1977a: 191; 1975) and enabled the "sciences of the individual" 
that Aristotle had warned against (Flynn 1994: 43). Knowledge had become both 
cumulative and progressive. 
IV. Linear time, history as evolution, the qitestfor the new - certainty of development 
Infinity is [now] posed as that which has not yet been 
determined, as that which the will must indefinitely 
dominate and appropriate. It bears the names of cosmos, of 
energy. It gives rise to research and development. It has to 
be conquered, to be turned into the means to an end. 
Lyotard Political Writings (1993). 
With regard to authority, it shows a feeble mind to grant so 
much to authors and yet deny time his rights, who is the 
author of all authors, nay, rather of all authority. For 
rightly is truth called the daughter of time, not of authority. 
Bacon (c. 1620), in Shapin The Scientific Revohition (1996). 
The notion of time that Bacon refers to was no longer cyclical or spiralling. No longer 
were the past, present and future interwoven. Time, like other units of measure, was 
readily reducible to objective units. It was linear, unidirectional and positive. Modems 
come later than Ancients, time and knowledge is cumulative, both quantitatively and 
qualitatively. Therefore the virtue of being 'new' implies a greater knowledge. In the 5th 
century, the Latin tenn Modernus was used to distinguish the official Christian present 
from the pagan Roman past, and to this day to be Modem is to be new over and above the 
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old. The titles of many of the Scientific Revolution's key texts indicate the inversion of a 
scheme that had given the past an intellectual authority: Kepler's (1609) Astrowiida 
Nova, Galileo's (1638) Discourses and Demonstrations concerning Two New Sciences, 
Pascal's (1647) Experiences Nouvelles Touchant le Vide, Boyle's (1660) New 
Experiments, and Bacon's (1626 & 1620) New Atlantis and New Organon (labelled so as 
to highlight its replacement of Aristotle's Orgawn). Modernism sees the authority of past 
authors as 'dated' and tradition as something that could and should be overcome, 
promoting a view whereby being or thinking 'new' becomes the value above all others 
(Compagnon 1994). Being was "reduced to the novitm ", to be at the 'cutting-edge' 
(Vattirno 1988: 99). This edge was seen as leading an advancing mastery via increasing 
the store of certain objective knowledge - the hunting down of infinity or chaos. 
Modem capitalism, science and art all promote this will for the new. The nature of 
market competition forces capitalists to seek out new processes that will enhance their 
own profitability, relative to the social average, by reducing inputs over outputs. The 
scientific method would enable knowledge to advance on the 'path of certain progress' by 
uniting the Commonwealth of Knowledge. Once united, the Commonwealth could march 
forward efficiently building on firm foundations and ever-reducing chaos. This process is 
fomialised in the notion of falsification whereupon scientific reason is a dialectic process, 
accumulating and progressing via the application of 'negative method', hunting down and 
eliminating internal contradiction and discord toward stable laws. 
Linking this view of time and knowledge as advancing upwards and onwards 
toward the certain truth with Modernism's characteristic of seeking the underlying 
essentials that unite particulars, Descartes, in On Method, explains that "we shall comply 
with [reason] exactly if we reduce involved and obscure propositions step by step to those 
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that are simpler, and then starting with the intuitive apprehension of all those that are 
simpler, attempt to ascend to the knowledge of all others by precisely similar steps". 
Modem art followed a similar path. At the conclusion of the famous Salon of 1846, 
Baudelaire described the "advent of the new! " as the imperative that artists must strive 
for. Manet obliged, and is regarded as the first Modem artist due to his showing the 
present, as opposed to mythological or historical stories. Once art reaches the point of 
representing the present, rather than reflecting traditions into the present, it attaches itself 
to, and begins to move with, 'the times'. Once tradition is left behind, it is a short step to 
a concern with being at the cutting-edge and art thus develops a sense of continual 
forward revolution. However, in order to distinguish itself from decadence, or change for 
change's sake, revolution had to be identified with a course leading toward some sort of 
collective bettennent. To this end, what the Modems sought was 'the essence of art'. 
Change must be about reduction and purification: from Manet to the Impressionists, the 
Cubists, the Abstractionists and on to "the white canvas, the slashed canvas, the charred 
canvas" (Eco 1994: 66; Compagnon 1994), all seeking to abstract the essence of art, life, 
emotion, and to be ahead of previous attempts in this respect. 
With time regarded as a one-way advance, the future is ahead of the present and 
the present ahead of the past. History becomes progressive (how else could the 
Philosophes make sense of the Modems over the Ancients?; how else could revolution be 
seen as an overcoming and leaving behind of the past? ). Such thinking was not unique at 
the time of the 18th century revolutions. It can be connected to the early Christian 
scholars like Augustine who thought of progress in wisdom as the movement upwards 
toward God. What was different here was that this idea was now used to dismiss 
traditional thinking. Indeed, the Modem desire to revolt was acted out in the belief that it 
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would enable Man to emancipate himself from the shackles of tradition. As Collingwood 
(1960: 10) has observed, this aspect of Modernism could only have arisen from "a 
widespread familiarity with historical studies... of a kind which placed the conception of 
process, change and development in the centre of their picture". 
Descartes dismissed history as an improper branch of knowledge because it 
focused on particulars rather than universals. However, Modernity's gathering of 
information from all parts the world, and its interest in turning all beings into knowable 
objects, brought a great vogue for historical books by the time of the French Revolution 
(Bryson 1968). Yet, if history was to be taken seriously this interest had to be aligned 
with the view that human nature was universal. As Hume (1711-76) explained, history's 
"chief use" would become "to discover the constant and universal principles of human 
nature, by showing men in all varieties of circumstances and situation, and furnishing us 
with materials from which we may form our observations and become acquainted with 
the regular springs of human action and behaviour" (Hume Enq. ). 
History became a predominant facet of Modernism by becoming the search for the 
universal underlying uniformity of the many particular historical events that were coming 
to be seen, thus addressing what Descartes saw as its original weakness. The differences 
between particular cases could be accommodated if one could show how the present state 
of a case had progressed from the past by building over the underlying origins. Turgot 
(1727-8 1), in On Uhiversal History, sums up history's new approach thus: 
Universal History encompasses a consideration of the successive advances of the 
human race, and the elaboration of the causes which have contributed to it... the 
human race always remaining the same during these upheavals, like the water 
during storms, and always proceeding towards its perfection. To unveil the 
influence of general and necessary causes, that of particular causes and the free 
actions of great men, and the relation of all this to the very constitution of man; to 
reveal the springs and mechanisms of moral causes through their effects at i 
what history is in the eyes of a philosopher. 
Sý 
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Consequently, historical similarities were seen as confirming the universality of human 
nature, and differences perceived as the result of being at a different stage of a common 
process of development. The growing awareness of change over time, combined with the 
desire for the commonalities that bind, promoted the Modem aim to bring to light the 
permanent structures and essences that underlay all phenomena - to provide the unifying 
gmeta-narratives' ('meta' from the Greek for 'over and above') that explained the 
mechanism by which all history's narratives progressed forth (Toulmin 1990). The most 
influential historical meta-narratives are those of Hegel, Marx and Darwin. 
Kant (1724-1804) had viewed humans as eternally divided between animal desires 
and reason. Hegel (1770-1831) argued that this division was not natural, it could be 
overcome and equilibrium restored, reason and reality brought back into accord (Windsor 
1990). In Ancient Greece, Hegel claimed, human nature was more harmonious, people 
were not conscious of any conflict between their desires and reason. By questioning and 
showing that conventional assumptions could not be logically sustained, Socrates upset 
the balance. History here witnesses the birth of the Modem concept of a reasonable, 
reflexive, restless and somehow alienated, individual consciousness. As a result, simple 
hannony breaks down. History, in Hegelian tenns, is consequently seen as a purposive 
process of dialectic change, whereby there is a movement of thesis, anti-thesis, synthesis, 
thesis, and so on, toward the restoration of equilibrium at a higher level, embodied in a 
state of intellectual freedom called 'Absolute Knowledge' ("a higher form of truth 
through reconciliation and the unification of oppositions" - Gadamer 1981). 
Consequently, Hegel defined history as the charting of this process. This 
perspective of the history of thought as a progressive mediation of lower positions, with 
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each new step witnessing the redundancy of those before it, strives to decipher, describe 
and analyse our steps along such a path. Aspects that cannot be seen as contributing to 
collective progression can be dismissed as not relevant - hence the mixed reception 
afforded the Greeks by Modem historians of science. What these historians do not see is 
Nietzsche's 'brilliant un-unified co-appreciation'. Instead, the Apollonian aspects are 
categorised as the 'beginnings' of Science that will be developed upon, the Dionysian 
aspects and appreciation of metis either left aside or listed as evidence of the naivet6 that 
science was to overcome as it progressed (Whitehead 1926). The Hegelian dialectic has 
become Modernity's most pervasive view of the nature of history (Crombie 1957). 
The depression of 1847, the first crisis of capitalism recognised as such, threw 
into doubt assumptions about its ever-progressive nature (Harvey 1990). Modernity could 
now be seen to not only be alienating Man from his true nature, as Hegel saw it, but also 
failing to provide material gains. Marx (1818-83) and Engels' Conununist Manifesto was 
published in 1848. Like Hegel, Marx took alienated Man as his start-point. Through 
capitalism, an individual's 'force' becomes an objectified commodity to be bought and 
sold. This objectification of work served to alienate workers and consumers from the 
fruits of labour and separated Man from his natural state. While Marx sought the 
overthrow of capitalism ("one of the names of Modernism" - Lyotard 1993: 25), his 
model was essentially Modem. History progresses dialectically to culminate in a conflict- 
free society where Man realises his fundamental nature and is emancipated. If Man 
asserted himself over the machinery of history ("up to now, history has made man: from 
now on Man can make history" wrote Marx (Gl)), a consensual utopia would result. 
The idea of historical progress as a common process that connects and effects all 
aspects of life received a great boost from Darwin's (1809-82) Ofigin of Species (1859). 
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"All species, here or long gone", wrote Darwin (in Silver 1998: 271), "belong to one 
biological family [and they can be arranged] on the great Tree of Life" (Figure 15). The 
thesis put forward by Darwin argued that the species that survived and prospered on the 
tree were those best suited to their enviromnents. This explained the change of all species, 
regardless of particular differences. No longer did each species require a special act of 
divine creation: its particular fonn could be put down to natural causes operating over 
time within the system of the real world. 
On this view one could no longer be satisfied with just looking for causes in the 
present within God's divine design. Whereas thinkers like Newton had merely focused on 
the 'efficient causes' of God's machine as it came to us - the stationary engine, Darwin's 
view encouraged looking back down the linear causal chain of life. Modernism now saw 
time as an infinite causal chain stretching ever-back and ever-forward. Modem Man 
could no longer depend upon definite beginnings any more than he could be comfortable 
with particular traditional ends, notions that Aristotelian teleology and Christian 
providence had provided. Time was now a train, unfixed and without hub or terminus. " 
Modemism's point-of-view comes to be "the idea of history with its two corollary 
notions of progress and overcoming" (Vattimo 1988). "Historical periodization, a way of 
placing events in a diachrony ruled by the principle of revolution" becomes, in Lyotard's 
(1991: 34) words, "an obsession characteristic of modernity". 
12 Married to the notion of linear time, Darwin's particular use of 'evolution' even changed the West's conception of 
the word. No longer would it be seen in its earlier sense of vegetative growth, an unfolding out from and circling about 







FIGURE 15: DARWIN'STAXONOMIcTREE- SHOWINGTHERELATION 01" MAN, rO 
OTHER PRIMATES. DRAWN By DARWIN ON APRIL 21,1869. 
SOURCE: GRUBER "DARWIN ON MAN" (1974). 
V. One science and the centralisation of knowledge - certainty of method and institutions 
Reason must not be content to follow, as it were, the 
leading strings of nature, but must proceed in advance with 
principles ofjudgement according to unvarying laws, and 
compel nature to reply to its questions. For accidental 
observations, made according to no preconceived plan, 
cannot be united under a necessary law. But it is this that 
reason seeks for and requires. It is only the principles of 
reason which can give to concordant phenomena the 
validity of laws, and it is only when experiment is directed 
by these rational principles that it can have any real 
utility... To this single idea must the revolution be 
ascribed, by which, after groping in the dark for so many 
centuries, natural science was at length conducted into the 
path of certain progress. 
Kant, Critique ofPure Reason (Bxii-iii). 
Bacon wrote that the mind should not be "left to take its own course" but should be 
"guided at every step; and the business done as if by machinery". The passage reproduced 
above is part of Kant's depiction of the strides made, from Bacon until his own day, 
toward a Modem method, a method that is largely 'Newtonian'. With time an arrow, only 
one school of thought could be closest to representing the truth without logical 
contradiction. The view of knowledge brought together by Newton is that which 
Modernism identified as 'cutting-edge'. 
Inspired by the mechanistic philosophers he first encountered as an undergraduate 
(Descartes, Boyle, Hobbes), Newton (1642-1727) had similarly seen his mission (Opt. 
Query 3 1) as overthrowing the case-specific approach of the Ancients: 
To tell us that every Species of Things is endowed with an occult specifick 
Quality by with it acts and produces manifest Effects, is to tell us nothing: But to 
derive two or three general Principles of Motion from Phaenomena, and 
afterwards to tell us how the Properties and Actions of all corporeal Things follow 
from those manifest Principles, would be a very great step in Philosophy. 
Newton's work toward this aim would bring together mathematics and mechanism in 
what would become the definition of Good Science - the 'holy-grail': a universal theory 
that showed the world and its constituent parts to follow mechanical laws that could be 
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expressed in the language of mathematics. 
Other laws of force had been developed, but before Newton they were largely 
specific (e. g., the magnet attracts iron but not copper). Newton's Law of Gravitation 
proved a power of gravity pertaining to all things proportional to their quantities of 
matter. This was universal, applying to planets revolving around the Sun and apples 
falling to Earth. As such, it affirmed the Modem tenets that space was universal, that all 
matter contained related basic building blocks or essence, and that it was uniformly 
subject to forces other than telos. Newton asserted an infinitely sized universe united by 
the identity of its fundamental contents and laws, a universe with no qualitatively 
physical distinctions, where astronomy and physics become interdependent and united 
because of their common subjection to mathematics. His law showed the world to be 
ordered and deterministic, that equilibrium maintained through gravitational attraction 
was a natural state and, being universal, extending beyond what had been observed in the 
present or past to what has escaped observation or has not yet been observed, it 
encouraged the belief that future states could be predicted. 
Newton (1953: 1) summed up his method for arriving at such laws as follows: 
"discovering the frame and operations of nature, and reducing them, as far as may be, to 
general rules or laws - establishing these rules by observations and experiments, and 
thence deducing the causes and effect of things". It was based on the following 
assumptions. Firstly, that pbenomen positively exist unaffected by, and independent of, 
the human mind. Secondly, that these phenomena exhibit generalisable laws that can be 
seen to govern events. Thirdly, that these laws can be grasped by inductio (whereby 
laws can be discerned in the observation of events) combined with deduct reasoning 
(whereby laws can be developed in one's mind and then tested). Fourthly, these laws can 
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be used to make predictions about the nature of future events. To this model would be 
added what Popper termed 'falsiflability' whereby the scientist would seek to improve 
knowledge (i. e., reduce the chaos of uncertainty) by comparing predictions with 
phenomena and adjusting laws in light of the difference. (One can see how this model 




or Phenomena Predictions 
This is the model of seeing knowledge that has held sway in the West since the 
18th century. It is clearly different from the Greek approach and adds deduction to 
Bacon's half-Modem model of accumulating observations of phenomena. In effect, it 
replicated the step into his mind's eye that Galileo made in order to overthrow Aristotle 
(combining empirical observation with Platonic idealism) but it was Newton's success in 
developing his universal theory that would see it formalised as a universal method. 
Following Galileo, Newton rejected physical theories unless they could be 
mathematically expressed and deduced from experiment. Their view in this regard is 
indicative of another of Modernism's idiosyncrasies. As the telescope and the clock were 
being accepted as containing objective truth, mechanical means, in the fonn of artificially 
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contrived experiments controlled by the machinery of the laboratory, became increasingly 
acceptable as 'standing for' things in nature, despite showing things as different to how 
they were often felt by the human senses. Since space had been shown to be one and all 
matter subject to the same underlying principles of movement, it followed that 
mechanical experiments could replicate natural activity. 13 Mathematics and machines 
would substitute for common human experience in order to provide a better window on 
knowledge. One of Aristotle's basic distinctions - that what was natural and what was 
contrived belonged to distinct categories, so that one could not be implied from the other 
- was undennined, and human experience was no longer the measure of all things. 
Agreement on the certain method for gaining knowledge, and the idea that 
experiment in one domain could stand for action in another, meant that learning could be 
centralised into public institutes by the Modem nation-states. The medieval schools had 
been run by independent schoolmen and had thrived on argument, conflict and 
contentiousness. The 'sickness' of Ancient knowledge practices was seen by the 
Modernes to have at least partly resulted from such competitive individualism. Their 
ccure' lay in making the 'method-machine' a State tool. 
Laying out a template in New Atlaidis, Bacon described "Salomon's House" as a 
bureaucratically organised research institute serving the interests of an imperialising state. 
Its purpose, typically Baconian, was both the extension of the "knowledge of Causes" and 
the "enlarging of the bounds of Human Empire". Moves to establish such institutions 
were soon afoot. Observatories at Greenwich and Paris were founded in Charles II's time, 
13 By arguing that orthodox doctrine and common sense should not be taken for granted in physical reasoning this 
stance that had to be taken. This reasoning could not be tested other than by mechanical analogy: the motion of a 
cannonball would have to serve as a model for the motion of Venus. 
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with the specific aim of "perfecting navigation and astronomy" (Clark 1969: 214). Others 
with more general aspirations followed in the late-17th century in France, Britain, Italy 
and Gennany (Ronan 1983). 
The British Royal Society was established in 1660 "in order to bring together all 
manner of different thinkers from different traditions, in the hope of bringing to fruition 
the refonn of natural philosophy which was widely perceived to be already well under 
way" (Porter & Teich 1992). This was to be achieved via the pursuit of "a Dominion over 
Things, and not only over one anothers Judgments" (Sprat 1667). A publicist of the 
Society (in Shapin 1996) wrote that very "mischievous consequences" had flowed from 
the fact that "the Seats of Knowledge, have been for the most part heretofore, not 
Laboratories, as they ought to be". It was hoped that subjectivities such as insensory 
capacity, variations in wit and divergence of interest might be corrected by the 
mechanical action of the proper method carried out under the auspices of public 
academies. " Instead of old ideas talked round in circles, new knowledge would be born 
and shown to be true to all. The combination of the Modem institute and scientific 
method allowed the collection of information (hiputs) to be subjected to the same 
standardised processes in order to produce objectively true laws (outputs). These could 
then be accumulated, building up the collective store of knowledge upon firm foundation. 
The new Academies developed a form uniquely geared to the production of the new 
along predetennined lines - bureaucracy. 
The centralisation of academic pursuits enabled the decentralisation and 
14 At the outset, the Modem institutes further reinforced the primacy afforded science by seeing other spheres as best 
lcft aside. It was felt that discussions on religion and politics had generated unproductive divisiveness and conflict 
(Boyle noted that the progress of knowledge had been held back by the consideration of "morals and politicks into the 
explications of corporeal nature, where all things arc transacted according to laws mechanical"). Thus, it was decided 
prior to its inaugural meeting that since such subjects could only divide people, there would never, under the auspices 
of the French Acadende, "be a discussion of the mysteries of religion or the affairs of state" (Shapin 1996). 
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specialisation of academia. Once the proper method was established, scientists could 
forgo time spent developing and justifying approaches and get on with probing deeper 
into particular areas, knowing that others would be addressed in a similar fashion through 
the Commonwealth adding to a collective store. This is illustrated by the emergence of 
the Modem encyclopedia in the 18th century. The Encyclopedie, brain-child of the 
Philosophes, was one of the first reference books to recruit experts as contributors in their 
respective discipline areas, earlier works with similar aims having been written by one or 
a small group of 'jacks-of-all-trades'. Unlike the work of Montaigne, della Porta and 
Machiavelli, each contributor here wrote careful to efficiently publicise only the facts that 
had been produced so as to appear disinterested, his accounts devoid of personal 
experience and nuance. Moreover, in the Modem encyclopaedia, authors did not need to 
print their name after their essays, the person reporting the knowledge was no longer 
regarded as important - the knowledge was objective and spoke for itself 
In the Prospectus of the Encyclopedie, Diderot (1780) announced that in forming 
the "tree of all knowledge" (the "first crucial step" in the volume's planning), he was 
indebted to the "extraordinary genius" of Bacon's bureaucratic vision from New Atlawis. 
Diderot envisaged the Encyclopedie as truly bringing together the many aspects of 
knowledge hitherto gathered by the Commonwealth (Figure 16). While knowledge now 
had many branches, sub-branches and leaves, they could all be connected back to one 
unitary originative stem: scientific 'Raison'. 
123 
FIGURE 16: THE MODERN 'TREE OF KNOWLEDGE' - THE SCHEMA UNDERLYING 
DIDEROT'S "ENCYCLOPEDIE", WITH 'RAISON' AS THE CENTRAL UNIFYING 
TRUNK, PRESENTED AS A FRONTISPIECE OF VOL. I OF THE INDEX (C. 1751-80). 
ONLY A PORTION IS SHOWN HERE. 
VI Human sciences - certainty ofMan, his correct actions and our collective aim 
Nature and Nature's laws lay hid in Night; God said, 
Let Newton be! And all was Light. 
Alexander Pope (1688-1744), in Clark (1969). 
Newton's [natural philosophy is] chiefly to be 
valued as it lays a sure foundation for natural 
religion and moral philosophy. 
Colin Maclaurin (1698-1746), in Spiegel (1971). 
Modems, not content with the Ancient's subjective, over-determined and teleological 
view of what guided human action, soon sought to remedy the situation through the 
application of the principles outlined above. While the Modem knowledge institutes that 
formed in the 17th century chose to leave divisive human affairs to one side, Newton's 
breakthrough, an increased confidence in his method as universally applicable, and 
discoveries that pointed further toward there being common elements underlying all 
things (e. g., Hooke's (1635-1703) discovery of vegetable cells with his microscope), soon 
saw 'human things' brought into the fold. Finding a correspondence between the general 
harmony of nature and that of humans and human society was the next step in 
Modernism's assertion. It was a step that other changes brought about by Modernity had 
now made very necessary. 
The nation-states of the West had become powerful by developing along capitalist 
lines. For this to continue, they needed to maintain their capitalist economies, and this 
required stability - stability that had previously been ensured by traditional means (e. g., 
religion, knowing one's place, teleology, a sense of community). Modernism's invention 
of time as linear and progressive and the undermining of particular customs now threw 
these into doubt. Having removed the influence of particular subjective or tradition-based 
ends in its quest for the certain, the general and the collective, Modernism would require 
some measures to enable it to give being an aim and enable progress to be assessed. Thus, 
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new problems were created. How does one define general modes of being? Modernism's 
answer: nornialisation or through recourse to a definition of what is normal and hence 
acceptable for every human. The question then became: how can the norm-rules be 
policed in order to maintain a stable society? Modernism's answer was through 
surveillance. Modernism would see the development of two particular forms toward this 
quest for the provision and maintenance of general directions or collective measures of 
progress: gencric Man, a new being driven by common elements to be investigated by the 
new 'human sciences'; and bureaucracy as an ideal form of organisation, applicable not 
only to centralised knowledge academies and the military, but to all of Man's institutions. 
One may see the transformation of the human object by Modernism through 
contrasting the figures of Da Vinci and Borrelli (Figure 17). Leonardo depicts the 
particular life-model he found before him, and still draws from Galen's animal analogies 
(by the end of the 16th century, Vesalius' (1514-64) more stylised anatomy, based on the 
dissection and aggregated observation of humans, had become the legitimate system in 
the West). By the late 17th century, Borelli's De Motit Animalizan saw the body not just 
using an ordered and exacting approach, but reductively and idealistically through the 
metaphorical template of a machine (O'Malley 1969; Porter 1997). Da Vinci still 
attributed human action to a spontaneous animistic principle or the Yiatura iiaturayis. By 
the end of the 17th century this concept had disappeared, and the word 'nature' itself had 
come to mean mechanical properties or natura Yzaturata. By the 18th, the works of 
Camper and von Soernmering that emphasised measurement of space and proportion 
claimed to be influenced by the aesthetics of Winckelmann who, in 1764, proclaimed 
"the absence of individuality" as an attribute of beauty. A new being had emerged: a 
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generalisable object called Man comprised of the functional elements universal to his 
species. In time, Man's minutest actions (soldiers' steps, sitting, digestion) were subject 
to detailed analysis and a rigorous classification of bodily inputs, processes and according 
to this sort of abstract depiction. Norms for all aspects of human physiology and 
behaviour could henceforth be established by experts who scrutinised this object in ever- 
increasing detail. 
Man's social relations also became subject to the Modem gaze. Locke, having 
absorbed the work of Descartes, put forward a liberal interpretation of the State of Nature 
that resonated with the objective space appealed to in physics in his Treatises on 
Government (1689-90). "Man is free" he claimed, "and in this condition all men are 
equal" (Osbome & Gaenler 1992: 87). Locke's philosophy was influential in the drafting 
of the American Constitution, the outcome of a revolution that saw Americans breaking 
free of the shackles of the ancien regime and building society anew upon objective 
principles. The Declaration ofIndependence concludes: "We hold these truths to be self- 
evident [Franklin having substituted "self-evident" for Jefferson's original "sacred and 
undeniable"]: that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their creator with 
certain unalienable rights, among these are life, liberty ..... ... Its claim to 
"self-evident" 
truths" is modelled not only on Locke and Descartes, but also on Newton, Euclid (a great 
influence on Newton) and, through these men, on the geometry of Plato and Pythagoras. 
Indeed, one can see the 18th century's doctrine of natural rights as a search for Euclidean 
axioms in politics (Russell 1961: 55). 
Modem states would govern more certainly than before by invoking self-evident 
truths in the way that Descartes had based Modem philosophy on finding and using self- 
15 Rousseau's argument for direct democracy governed by an abstract general will that arose as individual differences 
cancelled each other out, often seen as the philosophical underpinning of the French Revolution, argues similar lines. 
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evidentials as the basis of knowledge (Clark 1969). This was a view of society where 
equilibrium would be assured by appealing not to strong individuals or traditions, but to 
the underlying essentials that characterised all humans. Further, as the optimism 
regarding the finding of 'objective best ways' grew, secondary differences between 
humans could be increasingly tolerated. Laws such as the English Toleration Act (1689) 
were subsequently founded in an attempt to quell post-Reformation factional conflict, 
"confident in the ability of the Truth to vindicate itself' (Lyon 1994: 62). 
We find here an equivalent of the Modem aim to separate knowledge from 
particular traditional circumstances and unite it under general principles. Modem Man 
can be separated out, seen as an independent atom above traditions, without chaos 
ensuing as each individual is subject to common properties that ensure equilibrium. The 
Ancient Greeks did not consider themselves as separate atoms but as members of 
particular traditions that they sought to develop (Bremmer 1983). In the Modem world, 
with all matter made of the same essence and subject to common principles, even society 
could be broken into constituent units of analysis and subject to universal tradition-free 
laws. With particular traditions no longer accepted as guiding action, one was compelled 
to self-consciously reflect on oneself against humanity as a whole. To ask "Am Ia good 
human? " as opposed to "Am Ia good helmsperson? "; reflection that could be informed 
by the universal standards of nonnality being produced by the bureaucratically arranged 
knowledge institutes as they began to apply themselves to the 'sciences of the human', 
and maintained by bureaucratic forms of Modem governments, legal systems, police 
forces and military bodies. Saint-Simon (1760-1825), later termed the 'founding father' 
of sociology, saw such forms as the great hope for Man's stability and progress in the 
aftennath of the French Revolution. 
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This combination of bureaucracy and the objective scientific knowledge of Man 
had a double effect: a knowledge of what the normal human was and should do, and a 
subjection to be maintained, either by bureaucratic institutions, or by individuals 
themselves who could be provided with information about normality and keep themselves 
and their fellows 'under surveillance' accordingly. Foucault (1977) consequently named 
the Modem prison, that emerged simultaneously across Western countries along with new 
penal codes in the 18th century, and in particular Bentham's (1843) Panoplicon (see 
Chapter 2), as the metaphor of Modemity (Miller 1993), a form that reflected that of the 
bureaucratic nature of the times. Bentham's (1748-1832) design replicated the triangular 
scientific method and was the mirror image of Diderot's tree, the surveillance stem 
matching the trunk of reason - the one way of looking into, knowing and maintaining all 
subjects. 
The belief in general commonalities that inspired this gaze also seemed to offer great 
possibilities for the establishment of a certain objective moral code and provide universal 
aims for Man to collectively progress toward. The key thinkers from the 17th to the 19th 
centuries, Locke, Kant, Smith and the Utilitarians, rejected the Aristotelian view of 
humans as having a specific telos comprising their many individual roles that implied 
case-specific ways of acting toward particular ends. Instead, they sought to find the 
underlying ethical principles behind an individual's different roles, secondary 
characteristics and traditional circumstances. Modem ethics took the first and the last 
elements of Aristotle's scheme - an un-tutored human nature and the moral precepts that 
allow one to pass from this to something better - but wished to remain silent about telos. 
It disconnected individual difference from how they ought to act. In the words of Henry 
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Sidgwick (1838-1900), a new ethical science would be born from applying "the same 
disinterested curiosity to which we chiefly owe the great discoveries of physics" (in 
Maclntyre 1990: 18 1). 
Thus, the Modem desire for the new would be twinned with the removal of 
traditional ends from ethical equations and lead to the opening out of the Christian notion 
of time that first heightened the will to see oneself as improving and moving upward unto 
God. Time, in Modernism, positively progresses, but as economic or scientific logic 
gathers steam (fuelled by an increasing secularization of society encouraged by the 
aforementioned increasing toleration of surface or secondary religious differences), this 
progress becomes unbound by providence. One life on Earth before God implied an 
ending. 'Man', emphasised by the Modem focus on the general human, may go on 
indefinitely. The belief in providence transfonned into a belief in Man's progress as the 
ultimate aim (Lyon 1994). After undermining the Aristotelian view of teleology, change 
had to be given a general direction (Clark 1992). 
A number of starts toward the identification of general directions or achievements 
against which progress could be measured were made. Kant arrived at one unifying 
ethical principle. Believing there was a element of objective reason in all moral 
judgements, he defined the Categorical Imperative: "Act as if the maxim from which you 
act were to become through your will a general law". Utilitarians such as Bentham and 
IS. Mill (1806-73), aimed for universal emancipation (or the greatest freedom for the 
greatest number), arguing that the moral rightness of an action, or progress, was to be 
judged on the contribution it makes to the increase of general human happiness (or 
'greatest good'). How the fathers of the newly established United States sought to fill the 
morality gap left by the removal of telos (xvith a mix of Protestant/Capitalist ethic and a 
129 
utilitarianism implying that anything that led to this ethic was 'good') is characterised in 
the writings of Benjamin Franklin (in Weber 1930). Franklin declared that "Honesty is 
useful, because it assures credit; so are punctuality, industry, frugality and that is the 
reason they are virtues". 
However, Modem ethical theorists seemed unable to fully cover the chaos they 
had created by abstaining from particular customs and ends. The general ends and 
maxims they suggested in their stead proved as problematic. Despite the apparent 
disinterested reasonableness of ends such as the 'greatest good' or the 'greatest use', they 
were difficult to measure and it was hard to find solid foundational reasons why people 
should fall in behind them without circularity of argument. Franklin (in Weber 1930: 53) 
had to make a 'twist back' to tradition to validate his position. He asks: "If we thus ask, 
why should 'money be made out of men'T', Franklin asserts, one only need consult the 
Bible for the answer: ... Seest thou a man diligent in business? He shall stand before 
kings"'. However, such reasoning would become increasingly unacceptable in a 
secularising age. At the same time, Kant and the Utilitarians general moral ends were 
running aground as it was recognised that people's surface differences often made them 
reason 'abnonnally' and wish for different general laws. 
However, a de facto general morality, hinted at in Franklin's words, was 
establishing itself. The capitalist market was coming to be seen as resolving the 
Hobbesian mystery and filling the morality 'gap' that Modernism had created. A new 
science called political economy emerged to argue that social order was possible because 
of the myriad free and independent decisions to buy and sell on the market which the 
price mechanism allows. The market, an 'invisible hand', is thus the source of 
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spontaneous order. The objective, fundamental principle or general law that co-ordinates 
human behaviour and society, is that every-Man, whether a helmsperson, wood-turner or 
parent, acts in terms of economic self-interest. Economic gain was discovered to be a 
universal aspect of human nature, not just a means for achieving particular ends as was 
previously thought, but a universal end-in-itself (MacFarlane 1978; Roll 1992). 
Of course, the founding document of this new science is seen to be Smith's (1723- 
1790) Wealth of Nations (Roll 1992). Smith's view dove-tailed neatly with emerging 
Modem tenets and subsequently gained much credence. Smith was greatly inspired by 
Newton, whose system he used as a model. He constructed his system by demonstrating 
mutual connections between individual cases and thus the interdependence of all 
economic phenomena (while the atoms, acting according to universal propensities with 
which they are endowed, are, in Smith's work, humans - each held in equilibrium by the 
invisible natural law of the market that operates like the invisible hand of gravity - Smith 
1983: 145-6; Lowe 1951; Blaug 1992). Further, his "concept of the market, with its ideal 
perfection and preordained rationality", stood like a Platonic ideal fonn (Lowry 1987: 4). 
In addition, Smith 'spoke' in such a way that carried more weight in the Modem 
episteme than the alternative philosophies of the time. Whereas Mandeville's (1714) 
Fable of the Bees had put forward a view that required the State to maintain "human vice 
or passion of luxury for the good of society" (McMylor 1994: 92), Smith's system was a 
self-regulating mechanism that worked if left alone (after all, it was built by God, whose 
work an earthly repairman could never improve on) and replaced Mandeville's key words 
'passion' and 'vice' with the seemingly disinterested, unernotive, unsubjective terms like 
'interest' and 'advantage' (Hirschman 1977). Whilst Steuart's (1767) Pi-inciples of 
Political Econoniy, published a decade earlier than The Wealth of Nations but making 
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most of the same points, compared Modem states to watches which are continually going 
wrong, making "the workman's hand... necessary to set it right", Smith's mechanism was 
perfect. Pope's (1710) Essay on Criticism could say "'tis with our judgements as our 
watches, none go just alike, yet each believes his own", 70 years further into Modernity 
this would not do. The Wealth of Nations subsequently suited the Modem way of seeing 
right down to the ground. It clearly argued that a laissez-faire economics was the obvious 
system of natural liberty and thus the greatest provider of good. Further, its measure of 
progress mapped neatly onto the arboreal form described in this chapter. This measure 
was the division of labour or specialisation toward collective economic achievement. 
By the end of the 19th century, moralists who had continued the quest for' a 
general law had developed a principle that shared economics' foundation of the self- 
interested individual. G. E. Moore (1873-1958) had 'discovered' a liberating general 
moral law - 'emotivism': the view that all moral judgements, for all people in all cultures 
at all times, are "nothing but expressions of preference, expressions of attitude or feeling" 
(Maclntyre 1981: 11). The universal moral foundation was that we all act as separate 
individuals according to our own detached self-interest. To a large degree, people today 
now think, talk and act, as if emotivism were true, regardless of their theoretical stand- 
point. Hence, the science of psychology has, in the 20th century, been given far more 
credence than ethics as a guide to behaviour. 
The belief in economic Man and emotivism further strengthens the human 
sciences and bureaucracy. If we take emotivism to be universally true, owners of capital 
are justified in believing that all workers are consistently acting in accordance with only 
their short-sighted wants and thus justified in believing that a measure of external control 
is necessary to ensure that our collective rational-economic ends are met. Bureaucratic 
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forms are therefore necessary and applicable instruments in all situations. At the same 
time, given Modernism's corresponding belief that people will not necessarily feel any 
compulsion to do anything for anyone else, organisation or community, bureaucracies 
must apply the laws of motivation and other psychological and social science to get the 
most out of people. 
Reviewing the development of Modernism, one may note the important role that 
the triangular-hierarchical bureaucratic form, based on centralisation and specialisation, 
plays. It is the form of the institutes that produce scientific norms, and the fonn that 
polices society in the light of these norms. It is the form to which the science of 
economics looks to provide the measure of social progress: the division of labour. Even 
though the objective norms or ends that are produced via it may be questioned, it has 
become increasingly difficult to question the overarching 'end' according to which this 
form acts. MacIntyre (1981) tenns this Bureaucratic Rationality: the circular process of 
matching ends like economic progress and performative efficiency, through the means of 
increasing efficiency. Subsequently, performative efficiency has become both the means 
and end of Modernity, albeit a 'restless' or 'infinite' end that can never be arrived at. 
As was discussed in Chapter One, this is a quite recent manner of speaking 
efficiency. It emerged only as the bureaucratic form became entrenched, as a way of 
saying to match Modernism's architecture for seeing. At what was perhaps the height of 
Modernism's scientific-mechanistic optimism, the last half of the 19th century, this 
Modem sense of efficiency was first used by engineers as the measure of a machine's 
worth. It was soon employed to fill the gap that Modernity had opened up in its search for 
a general measure and end for Man. The following quotation from a popular science 
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compendium, of the same decade as Barnard's (1938) translation of Aristotle that began 
this work, shows the extent to which this new sense of efficiency had come to provide a 
general way of understanding Man's underlying essence by the mid-20th century: 
We can measure the amount of food that a man or an animal consumes over a 
given period of time, and we can measure the energy yielded during the same 
period. If we bum an equal weight of similar food in a suitable apparatus and 
find out how much energy its combustion yields, and if this value is equal to the 
energy yielded by the experimental subject, then evidently the living-organism 
so far as its energy output is concerned is really and precisely a combustion 
engine (The Science ofLife, Wells et al. 1931: 22). 
The Science ofLife then presented a diagram of the human digestion system (Figure 18), 
a general input-process-output order that stands for all humans. 
In lieu of the discovery of more tangible general ends that Man can be related to, 
performative efficiency, and the economic and psychological logic that underpins it, has 
come to stand as a potential standard measure of achievement. Hence, Modernism's 
bureaucratic architecture of seeing informs, and comes to be reinforced by, a new mode 
of speaking: speaking in terms of performative efficiency. Lyotard (1993: 25) 
subsequently tenns Modernism's crucial equation as 'performativity', expressed as inputs 
over outputs, where the object is "the endless optimization of the cost/benefit ratio". 
Thus, the apparatus of the triangular-hierarchy looks down upon the arrow of 'inputs- 
processes-outputs-' and judges the process of life according to the ratio of the first over 
the last. By the first decades of the 20th century, after a long quest for general objective 
human ends, this thinking, perhaps more than anything else apparent at the time, appears 
to provides Modem Man the possibility of a certain direction and a general measure of 
progress toward which it could legitimately aim and govem according to. 
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FIGURE 18: MAN AS MACHINE (OR AN INPUT-PROCESS-OUTPUT SYSTEM). 
SOURCE: WELLS ET AL. THE COMPLEX BODY MACHINE AND HOW IT WORKS, IN 
"THE SCIENCE OF LIFE" (193 1). 
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VU. Summary - Seeing intelligence as working toward objective universal ends 
Modernism is about Man collectively asserting himself over and above particular 
traditions, other beings and ahead of the past by increasing his stock of ordered certainty 
and reducing chaos. Its complex system began to emerge as the Philosophes of the 18th 
century declared the great thinkers of their own time and the century previous to be in 
advance of anything that had gone before. It reached its expressive heights in the 
scientific-mechanistic optimism of the late 19th century, Modem architecture in the first 
part of the 20th century and Modem abstract art in the 1940s and 1950s. 
Modernism sees the world as constructed upon universal dimensions and 
underpinned by essential characteristics. Thus, if one can sweep away the subjectivities of 
tradition, one may find finn foundations upon which a certain knowledge of the world 
may be built up. Thus, the best way of seeing is from an objective viewpoint, detached 
from particular influences. This enables the primary commonalities and secondary 
differences between things to be measured, drawn and ordered with certainty. 
As these things are established, Modernism can see action as subject to a unifying 
common logic that can be objectively expressed and understood, and hence controlled. To 
express this, the machine replaces the analogy of the individual subjective microcosm as 
the way of seeing, and the objective and universal language of mathematics becomes a 
key mode of articulation. Modernism also separates the beings that the Ancients saw as 
enmeshed in the web of similitude into 'parts': 'mind' for objectively inducing and 
deducing, 'words' for positively representing, 'past' and 'future' separated from 'present' 
in order to see progress, and the ordering of all other things into 'boxes' on universal 
grids which enable the links between things to be tidied up and certainly established. 
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The view of past, present and future as separate but unified along one collective 
continuum, and history as evolutionary, promotes the idea that there should only be one 
best mode of being closest to the truth, one school of thought. For Modernism, this is the 
triangular, detached observational mode of Modem science. Once the mode of inquiry is 
centralised, bureaucratically-arranged institutions that produce and present a unified and 
depersonalised spectrum of objective knowledge flourish. The tree, the mirror image of 
the triangular-hierarchy and mapping neatly onto a belief in an omnipotent Rational- 
unitary overseeing God, provided a united and decentralised analogy with which to see 
both knowledge and life as stable, cumulative and growing onward into the future. 
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Modernism sees in terms of general units and tables, 'objective' viewpoints above 
the surface of being used so as to see the underlying primary essences of things, 
arboreams characterised by central stems and specialised branches, causal decision trees, 
linear time with past present and future distinct from one another, and the analogy of the 
machine that sees in terms of inputs and outputs. Knowledge here must strive to 
136 
positivistically represent or articulate the order of the way things, for all people, are - 
irrespective of context. Hence, Modernism privileges equations, statistics and diagrams 
over pictures and stories as these expressions tend to depict general theories or nonns. 
The gaze depicted above would be applied to enable a new generic object to be 
articulated: Man. The data gained by this application could be used to determine general 
behavioral norms for guiding correct human action and substitute for traditional modes of 
control. Hence, Modems would boil physiology down to expressions of general 
mechanistic functions, economics would speak of economic self-interest as universal, 
moralists would arrive at emotivism, and psychology would inform Modems more than 
ethics. The conception of this new being would enable Modernism to replace the 
Ancients' dependence on case-specific ends and speak of general meta-narratives toward 
which humans can aim and against which cases can be objectively measured. However, 
by the turn of the 20th century while physiological norms had been developed, moral 
norms against which progress could be measured had proved difficult. What was 
'discovered' in lieu of these, however, was that Modem economic logic, particularly 
specialisation and the arboreal division of labour, psychological emotivism, and the idea 
of performative efficiency inspired by mechanical engineers might suffice. 
The style of thinking privileged here is a homology that builds up the store of 
general theories from the base of the Commonwealth of Knowledge. Modems speak and 
see in terms of the hierarchical triangle, of standing over and above, looking down on the 
straight arrow-tipped line and measuring performance against a universal grid of 
measures. Consequently, Modernism requires the dismissal of the Ancient Greek 
conception of nietis - the subjective ability, learnt from analogous experiences and tales, 
to shuttle in one's own way between certainty and chaos, between general theory and 
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particular uncertainty, of respecting and working with both Apollonian and Dionysian 
tendencies. Intelligence in Modernism is about being at the cutting-edge of knowledge, 
employing the complex system described above toward the establishment of objective 
certainty, about expanding the Apollonian and marginalising the Dionysian - about a will 
to assert oneself above, to contest and to dominate, chaos. 
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Postmodemism advocates the 'faulty' logic or eclectic mix of ideas from whence, it argues, difference may 
flourish. It is based upon the dissolution of the unitary foundation-space and essentialism of Modernism 
and a return to 'secondary' surfaces; seeing the world as a rhizome; discovery as nomadology and 
eclecticism; history and time as more than linear and progressive; Modem science as being just one 
'language game'; and, the death of Man and return to particular conventions, journeys and ends. Its style is 
not the expert's homology, as in Modernism, but the inventor's paralogy. For this way of thinking to work, 
Postmodernism. requires the recovery of Ancient or un-Modem forms so as to relativise Modernism. 
5. POSTMODERNISM 
Simplifying to the extreme, I define postinodenz as 
incredulity toward meta-narratives. 
Lyotard, The Postinodern Condition (1984). 
Baudelaire argued that style depended upon positioning with respect to flux and change, 
ephemerality and fragmentation, irrationality and paradox: one "could contest them, 
embrace them, try to dominate them, or simply swim with them, but never ignore them". 
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Modernism, by this logic, is best defined as seeking to contest and dominate, to ground 
and build an order that captures the chaos of complexity and look down upon this order 
with a certain perspective. Postmodernism, by contrast, is happy to find and use 
Modernism's forrns, while at once embracing and swimming the chaos. It does not view 
chaos as a predicament to be rectified. It sees the gaps between forms and orders as 
necessary if one is to go-between and combine them in order to create. 'Post-ist' terms 
signifying the decline of the Modem style (e. g., post-industrialist, post-avant-gardist, 
post-structuralist, post-empiricist, post-Fordist) have been in circulation for some time. 
However, Jean-Francois Lyotard's expansion of the term 'Postmodern' from the arts into 
the social sciences in Vie Postniodern Condition (1984) has provided the word most 
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commonly used to encapsulate the alternative approach to knowledge that now challenges 
Modernism's dominance (Beatson 1990). 
Lyotard (1984) defines the Postmodern against Talcott Parsons' view of society as 
a unified totality (a "unicity") and Habennas' (1975: 105) vision of a 'fully 
communicational society' where the 'right norms' are agreed upon and a unifying 
consensus may be fairly attained. Parsons claimed to have conquered Hobbes' mystery of 
order by seeing a 'central value system' - shared orientations that bound all societies 
beyond disparate individual motivations. Hence, for the Modem Parsons (1954: 216-8), 
46a process or set of conditions either 'contributes' to the maintenance (or development) of 
the system or it is 'dysfunctional' in that it detracts from the integration, effectiveness, 
etc., of the system" and "the most essential condition of successful analysis is a continual 
and systematic reference of every problem to the state of the system as a whole". For 
Lyotard (1984: xxv), Parsonian thinking in particular and the general Modem drive to 
apply seemingly benign external and unifying criteria from 'on high', like 'integration', 
'progress', and 'efficiency', "does violence to heterogeneity". 
Jurgen Habermas' answer to this potential for 'violence' was the move to a "fully 
communicational. society" where a consensus as to criteria that were fair to all would be 
reached allowing us to proceed with certainty. However, in a later work, The Differend, 
Lyotard (1991) explains why some party will always be wronged by universal consensus 
across heterogeneous genres. To debate how a resolution between two parties will be 
reached, or how we might litigate toward a consensus, we must first assume a language 
for doing so - and this language will already favour one or other of the parties. For 
example, strikes by workers and demands by trades unions habitually invoke matters of 
pay and conditions which accept the language of the employer and argue, toward 
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consensus, along the lines that the employer is not respecting the terms of that language 
(by the same token, the search for truth in Modernity is directed by the language of the 
scientist, giving him or her the advantage). 
Postmodernism is incredulity toward the appeal to meta-narratives that Parsons 
believes must override the particular and speak for the system as a whole, or that 
Habermas' society must bring to bear in order to achieve consensus; the meta-narratives 
that communicate, either consciously or subconsciously, the objective general rules and 
measures that litigate over specific cases. By connection, Postmodernism is at once 
incredulous to what Blanchot (1987: 80) calls Modernism's "accelerated accumulation of 
rational apparatuses" that hoist these metanarratives up to create the distance between the 
objective view that employs these metanarratives and particular cases. Its approach is to 
undermine Modernism's complex system without revolutionarily dismissing its forms, 
products and orders, for to overthrow in this manner would be to continue to support one 
of Modernism's key metanarratives: 'avant-garde iconoclasm'. 
Postmodernism comprises a number of interconnected strategies which will be 
outlined in the sections to follow: the dissolution of the unitary space, finn foundations or 
grounds upon which Modernism built; a return to being in amongst the 'secondary' 
surface conditions that Modernism sought to overcome; the consequent adoption of the 
analogy of the 'rhizome' as opposed to the unitary arboreum; a subsequent emphasis on 
discovery through nomadology and eclecticism; time and history as more than linear; 
seeing Modem science as one form of inquiry among many rather than as the method 
above all others; the death of Man and the re-appreciation of particular conventions in 
guiding human action; and finally, knowledge as 'paralogy' instead of furthering the 
marginalisation of chaos through the detennination and application of one central logos. 
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These strategies provide problems with regard to seeing Postmodernism as an 
episteme in the epochal sense that Foucault applied in The Order of Things. In fact, as 
Lyotard notes, neither the Modem or the Postmodem can be defined as clearly 
circumscribed historical entities. The Modem because it always comprises within itself 
the compulsion to exceed itself (although Lyotard (1991) claims to see its "dawnings" in 
Descartes' first-person narrative where the ego "confesses" its desire to "master every 
datum, including itself'); while, in a sense, the Postmodern is the Modem in its nascent 
state - the state of narratives before the construction of metanarratives. As Lyotard (1991: 
34) would say "I used the term 'postmodem' [in] a slightly provocative way of placing 
(or displacing) into the limelight the debate about knowledge. Postmodernity is not a new 
age, but the rewriting of some of the features claimed by Modernity". 
L The dissolution of unitaryfoundation-space and return to 'secondary surface' 
It remains to be seen whether the ground arrived at is 
really a ground, that is, whether it provides a foundation; 
[whether] it is an ultimate ground [Ur-gntnaj; or 
whether it fails to provide a foundation and is an abyss 
[Ab-grunaj; or whether the ground is neither one nor the 
other but presents only a perhaps necessary appearance 
of foundation. 
Heidegger, Introduction to Metapliysics 2-3. 
Giving grounds must come to an end sometime. But the 
end is not an ungrounded presupposition: it is an 
ungrounded way of acting [because the language in 
which we think] is not based on grounds. It is not 
reasonable (or unreasonable). It is there - like our life. 
Wittgenstein, On Certainty 110,559. 
The primary element of Modernism that Postmodernism rewrites is its "claim to ground 
its legitimacy on the project of liberating humanity as a whole through science and 
technology" (Lyotard 1991: 34). What does this claim entail? Firstly, Humanity - the idea 
that there is a generic Man with universal characteristics. Secondly, Science and 
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TechnologY - the idea that there is an objective Science that looks upon all objects the 
same and informs the development of Technology which is controlled by Man toward his 
assertion or liberation. Thirdly, beneath all this, Ground - that there is something 
substantial standing-under (sub-stantia) being, enabling Science's apparatus to be based 
on solid foundations and providing the backdrop or standards of non-nality against which 
progress can be measured. Postmodernism calls this grounding, making meta-narratives 
like Science and Liberation and objects like Man possible, into question. Its development 
may be seen as influenced by the coming together of many disparate historical events. 
The first of these events was the transposition of the belief in providence into the 
Modem belief in progress. The Christian notion of providence altered the conception of 
time, encouraging an emphasis toward a serene ideal future-place. Then Modernism 
added a crucial desire. This desire sought a universal core of natural (in addition to 
supernatural) certainty that could ground all knowledge and unite subjective differences. 
In the confidence that such a core was on the way to being discovered, difference was 
relegated to being a mere surface or secondary condition. For example, the English 
Toleration Act of 1689 was supported by the authorities, including the Church, because 
of their confidence in the ability of a deeper primary truth to vindicate itself over 
subjective views from different traditions. This will to overcome tradition eventually 
fixed upon the Church(es) as their supernatural certainty was dismissed as mere 
secondary belief in the name of a natural certainty beyond religion. In Christian societies 
the quest for a better future was underwritten by clear ends as promoted by the Scriptures. 
As Modernity brought these down in the quest for pure objectivity, all that remained were 
means, which became defacto universal ends. Hence, the belief in providence became a 
belief in progress where the most acceptable measure of progress was secular 
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performativity (ever more efficient and essential expressions), a metanarrative beyond 
particular traditions (so it was thought). Modernism thus quested in ever-decreasing 
circles toward a core of evermore essential abstractions. This abstractionism can be seen 
in the Ptolemic grid, the Universal Calculus or Newton's and Kepler's theories, but also 
in the forms of Modem architecture and art. Art became Modem as it moved beyond 
relating the past into the present. An avant-garde component emerged, inspired by the 
establishment of the 'art market' (capitalism's restless quest for innovation plays a part 
again) that sought to be at the forefront of the present, to settle a score with the past and 
tradition, to leave it behind, to 'deface' it, to wipe out its vestiges and find an unsullied 
essential purity - the universal experience beyond time: to show ... the heavens in a 
handful of dust' as in the paintings of a Pollock" (Eco 1994: 62). Painting went upwards 
and onwards until artists found themselves with nothing left but to destroy the figure and: 
arrive at the abstract, the informal, the white canvas, the slashed canvas, the 
charred canvas. In architecture and the visual arts, it will be the curtain wall, the 
building as stele, pure parallelepiped, minimal art; in literature, the destruction of 
the flow of discourse, the Burroughs-like collage, silence, the white page; in 
music, the passage from atonality to noise to absolute silence (Eco 1994: 66-7). 
The Modem style was here painted into a comer of its own making. All had come to pure 
nothing, ground zero. A prominent architect observed that "Mies based his art on three 
things: economy, science, technology; of course he was right. It's just that I am borcd. 
We all are bored" (Filler 1986). Mies and his Modem peers had reduced architecture to a 
point where it was, in his own words, "almost nothing" and after almost nothing, the only 
thing left to do was nothing. However, as we have seen, Modernism must be about the 
production of the new - doing nothing new was intolerable. 
A second event, running parallel to Modernism's quest to dry out and establish 
essential common-ground, was information technology's bringing more difference into 
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the picture. The world witnessed an "explosion and proliferation of Weltanschamme' 
(Vattimo 1992: 5), as these were made more visible due to laws like the Toleration Act, 
world travel and advances in communications. Developments from the printing press to 
the internet increasingly displayed differences from all over the world and highlighted the 
inability to achieve universal centres without recourse to anti-progressive censorship. 
Other developments shook the ground that Modernism built. The emphasis on 
marketing and customer needs, on consumer choice as opposed to scale efficiencies, 
flexible production processes, the diffusion of market information and knowledge, access 
to a myriad of commodities and views, and speedy world-wide distribution and 
dissemination, have contributed to what Bell (1973) termed the 'information age'. Here, 
information is primarily for the benefit of consumers and consuming rather than efficient 
supply "becomes the hub around which the life-world rotates" (Lyon 1994: 66). Bell 
(1976) went on to write of the way that Apollonian principles of regulation now struggle 
with the Dionysian principles of diffusion, fragmentation and total experiences as forces 
for global standardisation confront individual consumer choice. Touraine (1971: 4-5; see 
also Berger et al. 1973) writes of this paradoxical condition where: 
economic decisions and struggles no longer possess either the autonomy or the 
central importance they had in an earlier society which was defined by the effort 
to accumulate and anticipate profits from directly productive work. Such a 
statement may seem paradoxical since society as a whole is more than ever 
influenced by the instruments of economic growth and its tangible results. [Indeed 
t]he type of society we live in is more 'driven' by economic growth than any 
other. [But t]he individualized features of private life, as well as local societies 
and their ways of life have been profoundly effected - even destroyed - by ever- 
growing geographic social mobility, by the massive diffusion of information and 
propaganda, and by broader political participation than ever before. Precisely 
these factors make it impossible for exclusively economic mechanisms to be 
maintained any longer at the center of social organization and activity. 
In a seemingly paradoxical way, the unified global culture facilitated by the spread of 
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electronic technologies has done much to relativise once-dominant Modernist ideas, by 
enabling individuals to access and juxtapose a myriad of world views for their own 
individual ends, to mix and match or 'channel-hop'. 
This is the world for which Baudrillard writes. In Baudrillard (1988a; 1988b), the 
media is the medium for the signs that stand for consumer objects. These signs still 
contain meaning but now 'float freely' without direct or obvious representational 
qualities. Think of "Marlboro Country, " "The Real Thing, " Benetton campaigns and car 
advertisements where the mechanics of the car are secondary to surface symbolic 
statements. This illustrates a condition of 'hyper-reality', with the dissolving of 
distinctions between objects and their representations and meaning being relative rather 
than centralised. Understanding is here composed of multiple "images, interpretations and 
reconstructions circulated by the media in competition with each other and without any 
'central' co-ordination7 (Vattimo 1988). In this state, people are left to draw their own 
desired or pragmatic connections. This allows space for the involvement of particular 
cultures once diminished by Modernism. Contrary to the belief that Modem mass-media 
would bring about the homogenisation of society, developments have enabled minority 
groups and local initiatives to voice particular concerns as post-industrial information 
networks fragment (Huyssen 1986; Compagnon 1994). 
To recap, Modernism sought ever more essential expressions in its quest to both 
ground things and produce the new towards this aim. However, this ethos became 
problematic as Modernism's centres increasingly ran dry, bereft of the stuff of invention. 
At the same time, pluralistic forces saw an increase in the awareness of difference while 
the emphasis on individual consumer wants and needs increased the legitimacy of 
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particular as opposed to general choice. Eventually, artists and thinkers, offered nothing 
more by Modernism's ethos, could not resist playing with pluralism. Progress eventually 
had nowhere to go but to let go and disintegrate into an eclectic 'hyper-plurality' - and 
this is ten-ned the Postmodem style. 
It is a style most obviously manifest in the post-industrial city. Here, elements of 
the pre-Modem city (e. g., Venice) with its ancient buildings and cultural and historical 
landmarks, and the Modem (e. g., New York) with its sturdy grid-iron streets upon which 
functionalist high rise buildings were established, give way and collapse together. Lyon 
(1994) and Harvey (1990) suggest Los Angeles as an archetype (Deleuze and Guattari 
suggest Amsterdam with its web of canals for reasons that will become clear in the 
section that follows this). LA houses Star Wars technologists and movie stars, squalid 
slums and gentrified neighbourhoods. It sprawls heterogeneously but lacks an identifiable 
centre. It comprises mini-cities that refer nostalgically to other geographies (Manhattan, 
Venice, Westminster) but which in no way represent the 'original'. Roman/Greek 
columns, Chinese dragons and Egyptian pyramids are intermingled with office blocks 
and giant adverts for Coke and Marlboro. Cultural 'space', in the sense that local cultures 
were considered separate and objectively definable on the world-grid, is problernatised, as 
traditions wash into one another without losing their sense of place. The work-a-day time- 
clock world, originally designed to schedule workers so they could uniforraly service the 
machinery of organisation in the Industrial Revolution, is also problematised as global 
markets and instantaneous communications require, and enable, an increasing number to 
work 'odd' hours. Being becomes vivid, simultaneous and interconnected. 
But what of Hobbes' mystery? In the circumstance described above, what is it that 
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grounds and binds things or at least stops them from falling apart while enabling change? 
Modernism's answer of 'the underlying essences' had run dry as it eventually closed off 
all avenues for invention. Lyotard (1993: 21) re-writes this puzzle by drawing on 
Wittgenstein to theorise the existence of the Postmodern Condition. 
Wittgenstein's early work, recorded in the Tractatus, was Modem in extrends. Its 
atomistic, hierarchical 'picture theory' of language (where Objects = Names, States of 
Affairs = Elementary Propositions, Facts = Propositions and World = Language) built 
upon the Cartesian split of the matter in the world and the mind that represented it 
through language, and suggested, like the universal grammarians, that one can translate 
sentences of language into logical calculi that represent exactly what can be said without 
any scope for misunderstanding. The sum of the calculi would lay bare the structure of 
legitimate thought about the world and the problems of philosophy would be solved. 
However, the first paragraph of Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein's only other 
book, illustrates a great change of heart. It is an excerpt from Augustine ("the first 
Moderif' - Lyotard - 1993: 25). Wittgenstein (PI) claimed that this offers "a particular 
picture of the essence of human language. It is this: the individual words in language 
name objects... Every word has a meaning. This meaning is correlated with the word. It 
is the object for which the word stands". Wittgenstein had set his target: his earlier 
'picture theory' and the tradition that goes back to Plato that words get their meanings by 
association with essential ideas. Due to the general acceptance of this particular view, 
Wittgenstein claimed that we have been led to ask the wrong questions. Specifically: 
questions of the essence of language, of propositions, of thought [suggesting that 
language] is not something that already lies open to view, but something that lies 
beneath the surface... hidden from us. [It thus] comes to look as if we should 
search for something like a final analysis of our forms of language... as if there 
were something hidden in them that had to be brought to light. [W]e [therefore] 
feel as if we have to penetrate phenomena (PI 90-2). 
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The same conclusion is drawn by Heidegger, named, along with Nietzsche, as 
"the philosopher of postmodernity" (Vattimo 1988; Collini 1992; Compagnon 1994). 
Heidegger critiqued the Modem assumption that what is ultimately real is what 'stands 
under' things. From this springs Modernism's 'spectator attitude' which looks down upon 
the world and encourages questioning along the lines of 'what is thisT or 'what is thatT, 
cwhat is lifeT or 'what is a cultureT, as if these 'things' were solid, stable objects against 
solid objective units of measure, and away from questions like 'what is isT or 'what is 
being? ' Heidegger (BT 24) argued that while Descartes' cogito ergo suin claimed to put 
things "on a new and finn footing", what it left underdetermined was "Me meaning of the 
Being of the 'suni "'. It had to, claimed Heidegger, because Being occurs only as 
'unfolding', 'being-in-life' or 'Being-there' (Dasein) - it is never an object (BT 427). 
In its quest for certainty, by separating things out for analysis, Heidegger claimed 
that Modernism made us forget that "[s]elf and world belong together in the single entity 
Dasein. Self and world are not two beings, like subject and object" (BPP 297). We can be 
the kinds of people we are only by virtue of the practical contexts of worldly involvement 
in which we exist. Hence, Being is what unfolds in the web of interactions and traditions 
that we move through life - there is no external foundation ground beneath or external 
viewpoint above (BT 194). 
Assuming we have an either/or choice between ur-gnind or ab-grutid, Modems 
believed the discovery of there being no ground to indicate that all is chaos. Neither 
Heidegger nor Wittgenstein saw it thus. For both, we may not be able to determine how 
the world and words hang together, but we can say that they do and that they do so by 
people living and using language. Wittgenstein explained that "It is what human beings 
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say that is true and false; and they agree in the language they use. That is not agreement 
in opinions [intentional states] but in the fonn of life" (PI 241). For Heidegger and 
Wittgenstein, the source of intelligibility of the world was the public practices or 
language 'game-rules' through which alone there can be any understanding. What is 
shared is not a conceptual schema, a belief system that can be made explicit and justified. 
Rather, it is 'average comportments', manners that enable us to 'carry ourselves' in 
particular publics. As this rule-following is not a hidden inner mental activity but a 
socially created public matter it "presupposes a custom" (PI 80-1). Hence, being is 
shaped by the rules provided by custom and tradition as conveyed in social interactions 
through language (BT 165,212). Language, in conveying custom, is the 'House of 
Being'. 
Due to the existence of many different unfolding practices and traditions, there is 
no one logos of language, there are many different 'language-games', each governed by 
their own rules. Consequently, words can have different uses in different language games 
so there is no essential ideal underpinning words or measure of over and above the 
context of a particular game. However, these local language logics hang together with 
others to ensure that we always act with an appearance of 'grounds', albethey shifting. 
Individuals may comprise many different gaming relationships without having a 
core essence or essential human characteristics. Hence, both our selves and our words are 
without unitary essences. However, things are imperfectly held together in a manner that 
Wittgenstein calls 'family resemblance'. To illustrate, if we take the word 'game' we find 
that there are many types of things that we call games: professional sports, mind-games, 
games played with children and solitaire games. One might expect that for us to recognise 
the many different game-things as games, they must all share an essence or a pure form 
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and have some quality or qualities that make them positively distinguishable from those 
that are not games. Wittgenstein claimed that they only have a 'family-resemblance' in 
the way that a set of brothers and sisters may share certain similarities that enable them to 
be identified as related, without having a discernible essence as distinct from other sibling 
sets. Our understanding of what the 'thing' that is referred to by the word 'game' is 
created by the context in which it is used. 
To gain a theoretical means of expressing the Postmodem, Lyotard appropriates 
Wittgenstein's notion of an irreducible plurality of language games. Lyotard sees no 
unified continent of language, only islands ruled by different language games, logical 
according to their own logic. All that remains under or in being are flexible networks of 
these games which may not have anything in common nor be translated into one another, 
just as a full-house may not be translated into a chess move. However, if we concern 
ourselves less with establishing the common ground beneath them, if we cease seeing 
"truth as a deep matter" (Rorty 1989: 9), we are freer to move in and out of them as our 
particular concerns see fit. Thus, the heterogeneous web of language-games present the 
appearance of foundation that prevents all being chaos while enabling people and 
communities to invent by moving between and combining elements of different games in 
unusual ways -a movement enabled by the imperfect fit between games. Knowledge here 
becomes more akin to island hopping than collectively stoking the engine of one big 
train. 
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II The analogy of the rhizome 
We're tired of trees. We should stop believing in trees, 
roots, and radicles. They've made us suffer too much. 
All of arborescent culture is founded on them, from 
biology to linguistics. Nothing is beautiful or loving or 
political aside from underground stems, aerial roots, 
adventitious growths and rhizomes. 
Deleuze & Guattari, Mille Plateaux (1988). 
At the end of The Postmodenz Condition Lyotard (1984) concludes that the public in the 
so called information-age must be given free access to "the memory and the data banks". 
Language games would then be played, dispersed and connected with maximum, 
unchannelled information, so as to be: "non-zero-sum games, and by virtue of that fact 
discussion would never risk fixating in a position of minimax equilibrium because it had 
exhausted its stakes". Knowledge here would not be contained in an arboreal way. 
The centralised control of knowledge that Modernism has required to achieve its 
aims, symbolised in the application of the analogy of the tree, is viewed incredulously by 
Postmodernism. In Mille Platteaux, Deleuze and Guattari (1988: 18) note that it "is odd 
how the tree... the root-foundation, Gnaid, i-acine, fondenient... has dominated Western 
reality and all of Western thought, from botany to biology and anatomy, but also 
gnosiology, theology, antology, and all of philosophy". As outlined in the previous 
chapter, the tree was well suited to Modernism's development. Well suited to depicting 
categorisation in such a way as to determine the one branch to which the object in 
question belonged, for depicting binary either/or logic. Well suited to showing the causal 
path that underlies something and the progression and evolution of things across linear 
time. Well suited to illustrating the stem of Raison that connects all things and, in mirror 
image, the hierarchies with those at the top (e. g., Man) looking down on those below. 
Deleuze and Guattari argue that this view supports the uncritical acceptance of there 
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always being an originating first principle or arch8, which subsequently sees beings 
categorised too rigidly; a philosophy of representation and identity that over-looks the 
cgap' or difference between particular manifestations or interpretations of the same 
concept; a philosophy that is 'sedentary'. As an antidote they advocate the 'rhizome'. 
The rhizome, according to Deleuze and Guattari, may assume many diverse 
forms, from ramified surface extension in all directions to concretion into bulbs and 
tumours. To illustrate, they begin their discussion of the rhizome with a musical score 
that sees the ordered Apollonian note-lines combined and transgressed by a dissolute 
Dionysian string (Figure 19). Unlike a tree or tap-root that plots points, unifies and fixes 
an hierarchical order, any point of a rhizome can cut across space and time to connect to 
another. Rhizomes are thus made up of dynamic multiple lines of connection, rather than 
positions. While the tree is filiation, the rhizome is about alliance. The tree imposes the 
sedentary verb 'to be', but the fabric of the rhizome is the conjunction 'and ... and and... '. 
And yet, the rhizome does not destroy the tree. Indeed, within the world-rhizome tree 
structures may exist and guide action. "The brain itself is much more a grass than a tree 
but many people have a tree growing in their heads" (Deleuze & Guattari 1988: 15). 
Guattari's (1995) Chaosmosis subsequently develops a vision of philosophy part dipped 
in chaos, and a liminal. people happily shuttling between chaos and fonn while 
acknowledging that beneath being no universal 'plinth' is given. 
That the rhizome is 'flat-surface' or 'simultaneously all-connected', maps the 
Postmodern re-writing of Modernism's relation with the past. Postmodernism recognises 
the connection of being across time, the intermingle of the many plateaux of past, present 
and future. Hence, we see a turn to the past that Modernism had sought to overcome. In 
Eco's (1994: 67) words, a "recognizing that the past, since it cannot really be destroyed, 
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FIGURE 19: THE RHIZOME. 
SOURCE: DELEUZE & GUATrARI, "MILLE PLATrEAUX" (1988). 
because its destruction leads to silence, must be revisited: but with irony". 
Eco argued (1994: 59-62) that the Modem novel diminished amusement resulting 
from the plot in order to "encourage pure epiphany in its extreme form of materialistic 
'ecstasy"'. However, citing Aristotle's Poetics, Eco claimed that "no matter what, a novel 
must also - especially - amuse through its plot" (Aristotle added that it should also mix 
order with an unexpected twist - Apollo/Dionysus). Hence in Eco's The Name of the Rose 
a plot is developed, but through reference to other plots. It operated at the fourth level 
removed, with autre action set in motion by a quotation from a discovered manuscript. 
Eco then set about writing what Vallet said that Mabillon said that Adso said 
In talking about the construction of his work, Eco noted (1994) his re-appreciation 
that books always speak of other books (this is close to Derrida's view (1976: 158; 1978: 
226) that there is "nothing outside the text, " that meaning is driven by the surface 
connections with previous texts experienced by the reader and writer, connections that 
"disseminate", like a drop of ink discharged into water). There are no necessarily new 
elements, but one might set about linking elements in inventive ways. Thus, Eco had no 
qualms about borrowing quotations from Wittgenstein and placing them in the mouths of 
his Middle Ages characters. They are, despite Modernism's view of the evolution of 
thought, things that his characters might well have said. 
Eco (1994: 68-71) also sees the Postmodern as re-writing a connection between 
another Modem binary dichotomy: the cutting-edge and the popular. Modernists held that 
the approval of the public was a bad sign: if a novel was popular, this was because it said 
nothing new and only provided what the masses were expecting. By contrast, Postmodern 
literature seeks to create works that are high and low brow, challenging and generally 
enjoyable, to move beyond "the quarrel between realism and irrealism, formalism and 
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ccontentism, ' pure and committed literature, coterie fiction and junk fiction". 
We may return to the Post-Industrial city to illustrate how one may act in such a 
rhizomic world. For Harvey (1990: 1-5), Raban's Soft City, an account of London life, is 
a "historical marker, written at... that cusp in intellectual and cultural history when 
something called 'postmodemism' emerged from its chrysalis of the anti-Modem to 
establish itself as a cultural aesthetic in its own right". The soft city is 'pliable', a 
"labyrinth, honeycombed with such diverse networks of social interaction oriented to 
such diverse goals that the encyclopaedia [of Modernism] becomes a maniacal scrapbook 
filled with colourful entries which have no determining, rational or economic scheme": 
[flor better or worse [the city] invites you to remake it, to consolidate it into a 
shape you can live in... Decide who you are, and the city will again assume a fixed 
form around you. Decide what it is, and your own identity will be revealed, like a 
map fixed by triangulation. Cities, unlike villages and small towns, are plastic by 
nature. We mould them in out images: they, in their turn, shape us by the 
resistance they offer when we try and impose our personal form on them. In this 
sense, it seems to me that living in a city is an art, and we need the vocabulary of 
art, or style, to describe the peculiar relation between man and material that exists 
in the continual creative play of urban living. The city as we imagine it, the soft 
city of illusion, myth, aspiration, nightmare, is as real, maybe more real, than the 
hard city one can locate in maps and statistics, in monographs on urban sociology 
and demography and architecture (Raban 1974: 9-10) 
III Discovery as nomadology and eclecticism 
Discovering no longer means finally reading an 
essential coherence beneath a disorder. 
Foucault, The Birth of the Clinic (1975). 
The multiple must be inade, not by always adding a 
higher dimension, but rather in the simplest of ways, 
by dint of sobriety, with the number of dimensions 
one already has available - always n-1. 
Deleuze & Guattari, Mille Plateaux (1988). 
Pulling back from the metanarratives at the level above being and resisting the urge to 
look for the synthesis underneath, the Postmodernist sees the world from the surface as a 
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rhizome. Here language and what the Modernist calls 'Mind' are intertwined with the 
customs and practices of being, thereby losing their objective representational ability. 
Knowledge and discovery must come from shuttling between forms (of language, of 
perceived objects or tree-formed orders) and drawing connections, the eclectic and 
pragmatic combination of what unfolds on one's way. 
Deleuze and Guttari develop the term nomadology to depict such an approach. In 
Anti-Oedipus (1977) they argue that Modernity's unifying system of capitalism promotes 
paradoxical 'schizoid' d9sirants, individuals with multiple personalities, thanks to 
revolutionary desires for the avant-garde and innovation being always-already mingled 
with opposing desires for repression and confonnity. The work then attacks Freudian 
psychoanalysis as a mechanism for policing and channelling vagrant and molecular 
dimensions of desire, thus privileging and reinforcing the molar dictates of the capitalist- 
Modernist order. As a counter-measure, rather than see it channelled away, they wish to 
celebrate this schizoid tendency by promoting a nomadism that spreads across and picks 
up elements of Modernism's and other era's tracts as a means of inventing fresh desires 
across the structural limits of the capitalism. 
In the face of the treasure trove of choice contained in the databases that the 
information-age now places at our fingertips, Lyotard (1984: 76) similarly promotes the 
view that "eclecticism" must be the eventual result of "the degree zero of contemporary 
general culture". One is now free, he claims, "to listen to reggae, watch a Western, eat 
Macdonald's for lunch and local cuisine for dinner, wear Paris perfume in Tokyo and 
retro clothes in Hong Kong ...... What forms spring from this nomadology? 
Postmodem architecture reflects the recognition of a failure on Modem architect's 
own tenns, as Mies, Le Corbuiser and Wright inspired an over-population of shoddy 
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glass boxes rather than emancipating. However, it is also a recognition that architecture's 
scope for innovation had been exhausted by the dictates of the Modem fathers (Jencks 
1991; Blake 1977). By 1966, Venturi (1966) was proclaiming that "less is a bore" (being 
ironic with Mies' dictum "less is more") and advocating an architecture concerned with 
the quirks of its users based on a kind of collage -a 'personable' architecture; an 
architecture without expert architect, employing the languages of local consumers. In 
1972, he advocated an ethic of superficiality and the forgetting of 'deep meanings', 
leading Jameson (1984: xviii) to declare Postmodernism as "about a commitment to 
surface... in all senses of the word" (ironically, however, one must think deeply to come 
to the decision to contrive depthlessness - Eagleton 1987). Postmodern architecture 
reflected a view of society no longer based on a belief in unitary progression. Since the 
Postmodern distrusts unifying or totalising discourses, one must be content with a modest 
fragmentary architecture of mixed codes. Whereas Modernism, believing its calling to be 
universal, erected the same building everywhere, Postmodernism was free to enjoy an 
"eclectic collage of contrasting architectural styles pillaged from disparate periods of 
history, together with borrowings from the contemporary vernacular" (Burgin 1986). 
Along these lines, Jencks (1991) argued for an architecture that was pro-ornament, 
pro-metaphor, pro-humour, pro-historical reference, taking its cue from local conditions 
and their different user-constituencies and, thus, piecemeal, hybrid, complex, eclectic, 
ambiguous and about collage and collision; but mostly, an architecture with a split 
personality or about 'double-coding' - operating at more than one level. An architecture 
that is new and old, elitist and popular, ironic and sincere, even Mannerist and Baroque. 
An architecture that may combine the tools and techniques provided by Modernism with 
other historical approaches in order to communicate with different communities of public. 
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Jencks (1991: 6-7), describes Stirling's Stawsgalerie in Stuttgart as an exemplar: 
Here one can find the fabric of the city and the existing museum extended in 
amusing and ironic ways. The U-shaped palazzo form of the old gallery is echoed 
and placed on a high plinth, or 'Acropolis', above the traffic. But this classical 
base holds a very real and necessary parking garage, one that is ironically 
indicated by stones which have fallen to the ground. The resultant holes show the 
real construction - not the thick marble blocks of the real Acropolis, but a steel 
frame holding stone cladding which allows the air ventilation required by law. 
One can sit on these false ruins and ponder the truth of our lost innocence: that we 
live in an age which can build with beautiful, expressive masonry as long as we 
make it skin deep and hang it on a steel skeleton. A Modernist would of course 
deny himself and us this pleasure for a number of reasons: 'truth to materials', 
'logical consistency', 'straightforwardness', 'simplicity'... 
To signify the permanent nature of the museum, [Stirling] has used 
traditional rustication and classical forms including an Egyptian cornice, an open- 
air pantheon, and segmental arches. These are beautiful in an understated and 
conventional way, but they aren't revivalist either because of small distortions, or 
the use of a Modem material such as reinforced concrete. They say, 'We are 
beautiful like the Acropolis or pantheon, but we are also based on concrete 
technology and deceit'. The extreme form of this double coding is visible at the 
entry points: a steel temple outline which announces the taxi drop-off point, and 
the Modernist steel canopies which tell the public where to walk in. These forms 
and colours are reminiscent of De Stijl, that quintessentially Modem language, but 
they are collaged into a traditional background. Thus Modernism confronts 
classicism to such an extent that both Modernists and classicists would be 
surprised, if not offended. There is not the simple harmony and consistency of 
either language; instead we are uneasily confronted with the understanding that 
we live in a complex world where we can't deny either the past and conventional 
beauty, or the present and current technical and social reality... 
At Stuttgart the blue and red handrails and vibrant polychromy fit in with 
the youth that use the museum ... while the classicism appeals more to the lovers of Schinkel. This is a very popular building with young and old, and when I 
interviewed people there -a group of plein air painters, school children, and 
businessmen -I found their different perceptions were accommodated and 
stretched. 
Likernindedly, Compagnon (1994) finds Postmodernism's emergence in painting 
between Modem Abstract Expressionism and Pop Art's simple-deep philosophy, best 
captured in Warhol's re-productions of everyday 'icons'. After Abstract Expressionism, 
Pop problernatised the distinction between elite and mass art. Pop recognised Modem art 
unwittingly being a bedfellow to capitalism, but rather than criticising capitalism or 
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feeling any angst about such an unholy alliance, it was happy to cynically exploit the link. 
Art now recognised the media as a 'partner in crime' and no longer had tradition as an 
opponent. Unfolding into the space left by Pop's diminution of Modem art, Jencks (199 1) 
points to Mariani's Postmodern incorporation of a Renaissance style as a conduit for 
depicting an illogicality in a manner reminiscent of Escher's 'Drawing Hands' (1948); 
while Harvey (1990) highlights Shennan's self-portrait depictions of the plural plasticity 
of human personality - how one can be different but connected at once (Figure 20). 
Postmodernism re-thinks a number of Modernism's dichotomous contrasts: that 
new is better than old, present is ahead of thepast, progress is better than reaction, avant- 
garde is better than kitsch, higli culture is superior to low culture. Instead of Modernism's 
cutting-edge, where one always sought to be ahead of the past, at the benchmark of the 
present and moving into the future, to be avant-garde ahead of kitsch, or to be progressive 
- above and beyond tradition rather than merely reflecting it - Postmodernism saw the flat 
surface of an artist's palette with traditional styles co-existing, waiting to be connected. In 
the absence of a religion of the future, Postmodemism did not seek to 'change the world'. 
With Modernism's hierarchical dichotomies flattening out, it was free to explore a 
nomadic trans-avantgardism: an uncommitted travelling, or weaving, over a broad 
repertory of forms in any direction. 
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FIGURE 20: POSTMODERN FORMS - MARIANI'S "THE HAND SLI13MITS TO THE 
ARCHITECT", SOURCE: PAPADAKIS (1987)-, 
SHERMAN'S "UNTITLED" AND "UNTITLED #92", SOURCE: HARVEY (1990). 
IV. History and time as more than linear andprogressive 
Temporalizing does not signify that [the] ecstases [of 
time: past, present and future] come in a 'succession'. 
The future is not later than having been, and having 
been is not earlier than the Present. Temporality 
temporalizes itself as a future which makes itself 
present in the process of having been. 
Heidegger, Being & Tinie 350. 
We can see... a slow movement of our culture, now 
world wide, back to a "centre which could not hold" (to 
misquote Yeats). The return has various causes, but 
among the most important is that the value of any work 
must depend partly on tradition, both for its placement 
and quality. The [Modem] tradition of the new has 
made such a fetish of discontinuity that now a radical 
work of quality is likely to have the shock of the old. 
Jencks, Postinodern vs. Late Modern (199 1). 
If the desire to publish of 'the new' dismissing tradition was a significant marker of 
Modernity, then the book title tenns that signal the emergence of a Postmodem zeitgeist 
are the 'end' or 'death' of- the death of things that sustained and drew upon the Modem 
apparatus: The End of Law? (O'Hagan 1984), The End of Economic Man (Marsden 
1986), The End of Organized Capitalism (Lash & Urry 1987), The End of the History of 
Art? (Belting 1987), The End of Ideology (Bell 1988), The Death of the Author (Adair 
1992), The End of History (Fukuyama 1992), The End of Macro-Econonzics? (Simpson 
1994), The End of the Nation-state (Ohmac 1995) and The End of Science (Horgan 1997). 
These titles signify the calling into question of the vehicles by which Modernity was to 
achieve progress away from particular conventions. Postmodernism sees a world beyond 
universal progress, questioning Modernism's linear conception of history and time. 
Heidegger, for example, made a distinction between the 'historiographical' view 
of history that Modernism concerns itself with and what he called 'true history'. 
Historiography is concerned with the past as an object that no longer exists. It studies 'the 
facts' as facta: deeds and things that are over and done with - no longer here. Every 
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significant element of the past is a stepping stone toward the present, something to get 
beyond as we move on time's arrow. Heidegger's alternative view looked at the past with 
a sense of the way that it is still with us, still making its presence felt - not simply the 
isolated, analysed, categorised and explained 'has been' of the past, but the 'has been' 
(BT 393 ff. ). Consequently, the future is no later than the has been, and this no earlier than 
the present (BT 350). All three are interwoven, are inherent within and run through one 
another. The fragments that have been are the mix from which the present is formed 
(Noujain 1987), and the sequence of history, like "twists of a kaleidoscope" (Miller 1993: 
153), conformed to no universal nonn of reason and evinced no higher purpose. It 
followed that no metanarrative existed by which a period could be judged better or worse 
than what had gone before. History, therefore, could not be regarded as linear progress. 
Derrida's work came to the same point. For Derrida, with no God or belief in 
tradition to guarantee them, language signifiers float free, only able to be understood 
relative to one another. Consequently, he highlighted the inability of concepts to mean 
without the presence of opposites. The relationship between terms is one of mutual 
definition, so opposites must be always-already present in language. This calls into 
question the way in which an episteme will privilege one term (e. g., civilisation) above 
another (e. g., barbarian) by seeing one as an advance on the other. Derrida (1988) argued 
that the Modem episteme privileges terms via the marginalisation of its opposites, 
enabling people to determine a linear path of progress. However, such privilege is not 
linked to any objective truth but to contingencies and traditional precedents. Claims that 
'civilised' is a later evolutionary stage thus cannot be objectively supported. In a similar 
manner, Nietzsche (GS 34) had hoped to see "history placed in the balance again". This, 
in his words, would allow "a thousand secrets of the past" confined to history by 
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Modernism's certain path, "to crawl out of their hiding places - into the sunlight". 
The paragraphs above also indicate Postmodemism's aversion to being typecast as 
belonging to a particular epoch as opposed to another, due to its belief that being may be 
simultaneously interconnected without regard for Modem exclusive categories of space 
and time. As such, the chronological boundaries of Postmodernism are constantly being 
re-written. Eco (1994: 65-6), for example, reports the way in which the Postmodern has 
become increasingly retro-active: "first it was apparently applied to certain writers and 
artists active in the last twenty years, then gradually it reached the beginning of the 
century, then still back further. And this reverse procedure continues: soon the 
Postmodern category will include Homer". 
Postmodernism's activation of the retro in this way was inevitable once the 
assertion that Western thinking was in the process of recovering from Platonism became 
a Postmodem motif (Rorty 1982; Severino 1982; Vattimo 1988; Lovibond 1990), and 
Nietzsche and Heidegger consequently came to be seen as leading lights (Arac 1987; 
Lyon 1994). Nietzsche depends on a recovery of. "Homer, tragedy, Democritus, 
Thucydides, the older Hellenic instinct, and Dionysus" (Lampert 1993: 443), while 
Heidegger (ID: 24; Siedel 1964) believed that understanding our present and future 
required a 'mental leap' into the pre-Modem thinking of the likes of Heraclitus and 
Pannenides. In this respect, Postmodemism is a recovery, a crawling out of thoughts 
rejected by the Platonic-Cartesian-Newtonian thrust, a resurfacing of many of the aspects 
that Modernism sought to assert itself over (Eagleton 1987; Toulmin 1990; Harvey 1990; 
Lovibond 1990). The diminution of the Modem metanarrative of linear progress and 
forgoing the past has enabled Postmodern thinkers to see development in thought as 
about drawing connections across Modem boundaries of space and time. Thus the 
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relativism that Feyerabend (1993: 226) connected to is: "the kind that seems to have been 
defended by Protagoras"; while Durand (1979) sees a stream of thought running in 
opposition to the Modem mechanistic paradigm through the "vivifying breath of Hennes, 
a breath that runs through Nietzsche, Foucault, Derrida, Barthes and Deleuze". 
These views of a rhizomatic rather than a linear development of knowledge can be 
seen now in many spheres' re-connections with the ancient past. Political theorists argue 
that the Thucydidean approach to analysing international political conduct, which broadly 
incorporated national character and tradition, individual characters of statesmen and the 
role of rhetoric, should be re-animated as an alternative to the Hobbesian approach that 
reduces human thought and action to one cause (Johnson 1993). In ecology, the Modem 
search for the universal mechanisms that govern ecosystemic community structure, has 
been joined by a transdisciplinary 'landscape ecology' and an Aristotelian recognition 
that there is no correct scale with which to conduct all inquiries (Zonnefeld 1990; Levin 
1992; With 1994). In psychotherapy, authors have begun to see people as contradictory 
rather than straight-forward beings, examine the way that Modernity marginalised the 
study of the soul because it could not objectively quantify and measure its effects, and 
recover the role of the "soul's call" against conventional psychology's explanation of 
behaviour as reaction to external events (Moore 1993; Hillman 1996). And, in physics, 
developments from Schrodinger's (1954: 1-19) argument for a return to the ideas of the 
Presocratics who worked "without the fateful [Cartesian] division that has hampered us 
for centuries", where the delimitation of disciplines "in water-tight compartments had not 
yet sprung up"; to Capra's The Web q Life, A New Synthesis ofMind and Matter (1996), )f 
illustrate a shift from an emphasis on objects to non-grounded relationships. 
Postmodemism is incredulous to the Modem privilege afforded the idea of linear 
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time and the corresponding progressive or Hegelian view of historical development. 
However, just as the rhizome incorporates the tree rather than signaling its extinction, 
Postmodernism's re-writing of Modernism's time coils about the linear. Burrell (1992) 
advocates a "spiral" view of time in this respect. Identifying two main conceptions of 
time: "unitary linear" and the "cyclical" where history repeats rather than advances, he 
associates the Postmodern with a cyclical-linear "spiral" concept. Here aspects of the past 
will resonate in the present and future without things ever being as they were, while we 
may still observe progress within the framework of a particular language-game. Burrell 
illustrates the spiral view with the metaphor of the Cretan Phiastos disc, noting the 
Minoan's labyrinthine aversion to the straight line and the closed circle. Thus, the 
direction of time or history, like an Escher print, depends on how one looks (Figure 21). 
V. Science as one language game aniong many 
I think that I have at last made you realize one thing, 
Aristos, that any expression of an abstract idea can only be 
an analogy. By an odd fate, the very metaphysicians; who 
think to escape the world of appearances are constrained to 
live perpetually in allegory. A sorry lot of poets they dim 
the colours of the ancient fables, and are themselves but 
gatherers of fables. They produce white mythology. 
Derrida, Margins of Philosophy (1982). 
Just as Modem art had led to a blank white canvas, Modem Science's dominance as a 
mode of inquiry can be seen as dimming the lights of alternative approaches while 
sterilising and eventually denuding knowledge. (Horgan (1997), for example, argues that 
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science is increasingly unable to find anything new because of its long static method and 
the 'theory of diminishing returns'). Postmodernism is dubious not so much toward 
science as to its dominance, incredulous to just another language game (and a not 
particularly colourful one at that) being hoisted above others. Lyotard's attack on the 
164 
FIGURE 21: ESCHER'S "RELATIVITY" (1953). 
hegemony of Modem science reflects the intellectual environment of philosophers like 
Derrida for whom science is sheer surface masquerading as something more substantial. 
However, The Postmodern Condition (1984: vii) is described in its preface as more 
particularly a "discussion of the consequences of the new views of scientific research 
opened up by theorists like Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend". 
Prompted by a chance reading of Aristotle's Physics (like most science students, 
Kuhn had never read "an old document in science" - Rogers 1997: 121), Kuhn began to 
question the textbook view of science as a sequence of theories replacing one another and 
improving itself by getting closer to a grasp of reality. He (1962: 2-3) concluded that 
Aristotle just looked at the world differently, and that: 
The more carefully [one] stud[ies], say Aristotelian dynamics, philogistic 
chemistry, or caloric thermodynamics, the more certain they feel that these once 
current views of nature were, as a whole, neither less scientific nor the product of 
human idiosyncrasy than those current today. If these out-of-date beliefs are to be 
called myths, then myths can be produced by the same sorts of methods and held 
for the same sorts of reasons that now lead to scientific knowledge. If, on the 
other hand they are to be called science, then science has included bodies of belief 
quite incompatible with the ones we hold today. Given these alternatives, the 
historian must choose the latter. Out-of-date theories are not in principle 
unscientific because they have been discarded. That choice, however, makes it 
difficult to see scientific development as a process of accretion. 
Kuhn wrote his ideas up in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, arguing that science 
does not develop 'rationally' through the accumulation of individual discoveries and 
theories bringing us ever closer to the 'real thing'. All theories are based upon sets of 
underlying assumptions by which the world is understood, and these are shaped by 
custom, tradition and myth. Kuhn termed these sets 'paradigms'. Once a paradigm is set 
(by becoming the dominant way of looking at the world and hence dismissing other 
alternatives), it constrains approaches to knowledge via educational initiation into a 
disciplinary branch, whereby research becomes a "strenuous and devoted attempt to force 
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nature into the conceptual boxes supplied by [this] education" (Kuhn 1962: 5). Paradigms 
thus tend not to shift when 'new evidence' is found but when broader community-wide 
assumptions alter. That Newton's theories were accepted in Modernity did not make his 
concepts more true than Aristotle's. One could not choose objectively between them. 
Both had to be judged on the tenns of their own particular enviromnents. 
Feyerabend joined Kuhn's quest for a method that acknowledged the inescapable 
role of tradition in formulating knowledge. Modem science, for Feyerabend (1993), was a 
tradition-bound practice that did not recognise itself so, while criticising other traditions 
on these same grounds. He thus (1993: viii) claimed that "science should be taught as one 
view among many and not as the one and only road to truth and reality". His own work 
found that science knows no 'bare facts'. Indeed, any 'fact' is already viewed in a certain 
way, and is therefore ideational - ordered by one's particular gaze. This being so, the 
progress of knowledge "will be as complex, chaotic, full of mistakes, and entertaining as 
the ideas it contains, and these ideas in turn will be as complex, chaotic, full of mistakes, 
and entertaining as the minds of those who invented them" (Feyerabend 1993: 9). While 
Modem science has sought to unify into one paradigm or view, Feyerabend's analysis 
ironically showed science's great discoveries as the result of disparate practices or 
traditions coming together. This lead him to a different strategy for the development of 
knowledge by deconstructing Modernism's dichotomy of reason and practice. 
Feyerabend. argued that brought up under the influence of the Cartesian split 
Modems differentiate thinking from doing, place reason above practice, and wonder at 
the relationship between them (e. g., for idealists, reason's authority is independent of 
practices and traditions and reason should guide good practice; for naturalists - and 
materialists and empiricists - reason is guided by practice, simply describing the way that 
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practice works and hence relies upon practice for both its content and its authority). 
However, Feyerabend argues that any concept of reason is always dependent on an 
opposing conception of unreason, and the difference between reason and something 
unreasonable can only arise from categorising different types of practice into differences 
of 'kind'. Thus, reason is based on identifying things as either positive or negative, a 
categorisation process that is in itself a practice. Reason and practice are thus two 
different types of practice rather than different entities. 
Illustrating how such practices must intermingle to create knowledge, Feyerabend 
(1993) invoked the analogies of the relations between an old map and an experienced 
traveller. Originally, maps were constructed as images of, and guides to, the nature of 
reality as experienced and idealised by those who drew them (presumably reason was also 
once understood in this way). The traveller uses the map of someone-who-has-gone- 
before to guide their way, but the map does not tell them what to do - it must be tempered 
according to their own purposes, and its use influenced by their own background of 
practical experiences. The traveller's action is thus guided through the pragmatic 
interaction between the tradition or past embodied in the map, and their own personal 
aims for the future and other traditional approaches acting upon them in the present. 
Feyerabend argued that using reason (practice that has become embodied over time - like 
a map), without paying heed to practical environmental contingencies (like weather 
conditions) will soon lead one astray; while reason without the guidance of a particular 
practical purpose cannot lead us anywhere - the map does not tell us where to go. 
However, at the same time, practice is vastly improved by the structure and impetus 
provided by a map depicting some reason or order. Different practices and reason (i. e., 
two types of practice based on tradition) must spark off one another for invention or 
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intelligence to take shape. Ironically perhaps, one of Feyerabend's key examples of this 
process in practice is Galileo's interaction of his own aims, the traditions of his role 
models like Plato and Copernicus and his telescopic instrument. Again, Postmodernism is 
not anti-science, it just seeks to re-write its dominance. 
Consequently, Feyerabend advocated a 'pragmatic philosophy' that viewed 
different practices and traditions relatively, much as a traveller views different countries. 
Each country will have things that they like and dislike. In making a decision to act, such 
as deciding where to spend time, they will compare traditions: climate, landscape, 
language, temperament of the inhabitants, possibilities of change, opportunities for 
advancement, vices and so on. They will also be aware that initial demands and 
expectations may turn out to be inappropriate and so permit the process of choice to 
affect and change their nature, which is, after all, another tradition influencing the 
process. In this way, traditions are always relative to one another, and relative to the 
pragmatist, who is both a participant and an observer, both subjective and objective, and 
inseparably so. 
Feyerabend (1993) concluded that if no one paradigm can represent reality, if they 
are all based on particular traditions, contingencies and chance, then the only defensible 
approaches to knowledge are an ideology of the end of ideologies, a realisation that there 
is no tradition however ancient or absurd that is not capable of adding to knowledge, and 
relativism. This, he (1987: 15) argued, would help "overcome the chauvinism of science" 
and thus be "excellent medicine for episteniology, and for the philosophy ofscience ". 
This reconfiguration of the approach to knowledge, reliant as it is upon the 
reconnection of things split by Descartes and a realisation that knowledge is informed by 




Maturana and Francesco Varela's biological studiesý 
Maturana and Varela argue that cognition is not transfonning transcendental data into 
objective mirror pictures in the brain. Rather, it is a projection of an individual and 
community's own cognitive structure or experiential mind-set. Given that observation 
circumscribes all knowledge and we constitute the reality of our observations through 
language, knowledge is relative to the languaging observer. The languaging observer's 
ability to receive knowledge is shaped by their previous experiences or the experiences of 
those who have informed them, and the patterns of language that their community uses to 
express things. All of these aspects are culture and experience-specific. They overlay our 
biological make-up with impressions and rhizomatic 'waterways' that eventually shape 
our biology and steer behaviour and interactions by 'structurally coupling' us to our 
environments in particular ways. Hence, how we receive the world depends on the way 
our cognitive streams or patterns emerge (Maturana 1990: 13). Thus, nothing external to 
the biology and languaging of observers can detennine how a phenomenon will be 
received or determine its effect. Cognitans and extensa, mind and matter, cannot be 
separated, pure objectivity operating above experience is unattainable, and invention can 
only come from the interaction of different structural couplings. 
In the light of Kuhn, Feyerabend and Maturana, scientific commentators like 
Koestler, Monod and Sagan have recognised 'the death of the spectator' and questioned 
Modem assumptions about the arboreal separation of intellectual disciplines that frustrate 
the combination of different logics. In place of this they seek a return to an un-specialised 
approach, and promote a Postmodem view where the scientist "includes himself in his 
science" (Toulmin 1982). A conclusion not unlike Nietzsche's call in The Gay Science to 
make science a little "jaunty and ignorant again". 
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VI. The death of Man and the return to particularity 
Every culture that has lost myth has lost, by the same 
token, its natural healthy creativity. 
Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy 23 
What matters most... is always culture. 
Nietzsche, Tivilight of the Idols, Germans 4. 
Lyotard (1984: 37) claims that Postmodernism is the result of a huge "delegitimation" 
movement in European Modernity for which the philosophy of Nietzsche is a central 
document. What is central (or 'nodal') in Nietzsche, is his announcement of the death of 
the Rational Universal God and the generic Man that belief in Him inspired. Vattimo 
(1988) suggests this death to be the "the birth" of Postmodernity. 
The death of Man can be seen as the result of the diminution of Modernism's 
apparatus indicated in the sections above, and, in this respect, perhaps this may be more 
correctly regarded as the death of two characters, both of which had been given life by the 
ascendancy of the Cartesian cogito. The death of man the subject, the detached scientist 
who looks down upon things. Moreover, the death of the Man the _Qbjecl, 
the humanistic 
belief that enabled Man with generic characteristics to become a general object subject to 
the scientist's gaze. Nietzsche's rumbling of Man inspires all the thinkers focussed on in 
this chapter: from Heidegger's questioning of the spectator attitude, to Foucault's 
engagement with Modernism's interpretation of subjectivity as a manifestation of the Age 
of Man rather than a universal foundation stone; to Derrida's exposition of the death of 
the controlling author in the face of the realisation that words are caught up in a play of 
forces that inhere within writing itself-, to Deleuze and Guttari's letting go the unified ego 
in favour of the 'schizoid' dispersive nomad. 
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The death of Man makes Postmodernism incredulous toward the human sciences, 
and particularly Modernism's appeal to self-evident human characteristics that formed the 
basis for the universal moral codes that would take the place of particular custom, culture 
or tradition-led ethics. By the end of the 20th century, moral historians were beginning to 
record the crumbling of the Enlightenment's search for the objective ethics, as it 
eventually hoisted itself on its own petard in much the same way as Modem art and 
architecture. Alaisdair MacIntyre (1981) describes the turn of events in After Virtue, 
arguing that in its quest for a global, secular and rational morality in place of Aristotelian 
particularism, the Enlightenment project created a global-culture in which an 
unresolvable tension was inevitable and no moral judgements possible. 
MacIntyre explains that the aims of Modernity are firmly grounded in a belief in 
liberal individualisni. Men were to detach themselves from the shackles of custom and 
tradition to become the masters of their own destinies. However, the problem with this 
was that it tended to produce societies that were difficult and inefficient to control, thus 
hindering the development of Man's collective progress. Hence, Modernity spawned 
bureaucracy as a global form to keep operations progressing smoothly (even though we 
have no real rational basis underpinning our faith in these institutions, Modems come to 
consider believing in them preferable to believing in other non-secular institutions). 
Unfortunately, there is no way in which bureaucratic rationality and liberal individualism 
can be achieved without one compromising the other. Thus, MacIntyre (1981: 33) 
concludes that there are now only two: 
modes of social life open to us, one in which the free and arbitrary choices of 
individuals are sovereign and one in which the bureaucracy is sovereign, precisely 
so that it may limit the free and arbitrary choice of individuals. Given this... it is 
unsurprising that the politics of Modem societies oscillate between a freedom 
which is nothing but a lack of regulation of individual behaviour and forms of 
collectivist control designed only to limit the anarchy of self-interest. 
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Uncoupling morality from the custom-based Aristotelian schema, could only lead, 
argues MacIntyre, to a succession of failed attempts to find an objective moral code and 
on to the blank canvas of the 'everybody does what they feel' psychology of emotivism. 
This is held in place by an overarching "bureaucratic rationality" maintained by managers 
who claim not to engage in moral questions, preferring to refer decision-making back to 
what are regarded as the objective principle of bureaucratic rationality: efficiency. Hence, 
the West is left with only a "simulacra of morality". This enables us to talk and act as 
though we have recourse to a framework for resolving moral issues universally and 
objectively, which we cannot, while at the same time particular moral debates can find no 
terminus as the appeal to particular circumstances is no longer considered legitimate. 
Nietzsche argued that the nihilistic conclusion described above offered a way 
around Modernity. God's death leaving history opening out into a void, the death of the 
foundation stones of the general characteristics of Modem Man, and the realisation that 
an objective science of ethics is a sham, means that we each just owe allegiance to our 
own historical tradition, which is but the contingent product of a shifting deployment of 
cultural and corporeal forces rather than unquestionable self-evident truths. Recognising 
this frees us up to question some of the 'borrowed manners' and 'received opinions' that 
any culture implants, enabling a person to 're-style' themselves to an extent, or to 're- 
write' their own histories, to be subject to their own 'subjectivity' rather than the dictates 
of externally imposed meta-narratives. 
However, this does not leave one completely free to start from a clean slate, or 
mean that 'anything goes'. Heidegger's (M) concept of 'thrownness' expresses the limit 
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nicely. Here one is thrown in the present toward the future in a direction shaped by 
historical experience. However, if one recognises that this is the case and begins to 
question some of the aspects of the past that are throwing a subject in this way, one may 
put something of a rudder in the wash so as to influence their travelling to some extent. 
This view in no small part draws upon a re-recognition of the role played by 
culture, practice, myth, and narrative as things that unite past and future so as to give the 
present meaning and provide decision making guidance. These are aspects that must be 
subject to interpretation, the sorts of things that Modernism's emancipatory spirit sought 
to overcome but could not dismiss (even the belief in the scientific method required a 
faith in the tales of its history). Thus, we should perhaps not be too surprised to find 
Lyotard (1991: 56) responding to this dimension of Postmodernism by co-opting 
Aristotle to express the idea that justice cannot be a matter of conforming to 
predetermined objective conceptual schemes: "a judge worthy of his name has no true 
model to guide his judgements, [he must] pronounce judgements... just so, without 
criteria, This is, after all, what Aristotle calls prudence. It consists is dispensing justice 
without models". Knowledge of our particular place in the world, experience of situations 
analogous to that before which we find ourselves in the present and awareness of 
particular circumstances and customs can be our only guides. We have come back around 
to the position of Aristotle's prudent individual. " 
16 Maturana and Varela's studies bring a similar reappreciation of Aristotelian tradition in asking how might we assess 
different knowledge claims in an epistcme like this? Maturana (1990) focuses on how we recognize knowledge. If we 
observe someone acting effectively in a domain then we assume that they have knowledge relevant to it. Hence, the 
only way of assessing knowledge is through observing action. Here we may find objective knowledge ("in 
parentheses" - to use their terminology) if the domain or language game is made explicit (e. g., the domain defined by 
the rules of mathematics). Thus, 'knowing' can only be verified through effective action within domains set by 
tradition, rather than through reference to any abstract un-tradition-bound criteria. Knowledge or intelligence is 
"effective action within traditional doniains toward particularpurposes " (Brocklesby 1997: 6). 
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VU. Summary - seeing and expressing thinking asparalogy 
Knowledge so conceived is not a series of self-consistent 
theories that converge towards an ideal view; it is not a 
gradual approach to the truth. It is rather an ever 
increasing ocean of mutually incompatible alternatives, 
each single theory, each fairy-tale, each myth that is part 
of the collection forcing others into greater articulation 
and all of them contributing, via this process of 
competition, to the development of our consciousness. 
Nothing is ever settled, no view can ever be omitted 
from a comprehensive account. Plutarch or Diogenes 
Laertius, and not Dirac or von Neumann, are the models 
for presenting a knowledge of this kind. 
Feyerabend, Against Method (1993). 
Postmodem knowledge['s] principle is not the expert's 
homology, but the inventor's paralogy. 
Lyotard, The Postinodem Condition (1984). 
Modernism privileges a style of thought that seeks progress through the abolition of 
chaos or uncertainty, via the development of an apparatus that looks down on things in 
the world through the lens of one central logos, so as to see the general orders underlying 
these things. Postmodernism questions this apparatus in a number of interconnected 
ways. The idea that there can be the co-dependant dimensions of an objective view above 
and a universal grid below that enables objective measurement is called into doubt as 
Postmodernism seeks to acknowledge our being on the surface. Consequently, the idea 
that there exist metanarratives that can judge local narratives is questioned. Consequently, 
the tidy centralising, hierarchical, linear and binary analogy of the tree is crossed with the 
analogy of the rhizome to indicate how the Modem distinctions of discrete space and 
place; past, present and future; primary and surface; more evolved and less, may be seen 
as simultaneous and interconnected - washing into one another. Consequently, discovery 
as abstracting and representing the essence of what underlies is joined by an approach 
that seeks to spread across connections and eclectically open (or re-join) connections -a 
nomadology or trans-avant-gardism. Consequently, Modernism's key metanarrative of 
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the new being separate from, more advanced, and hence better than, the old - time as 
linear; history as progressive; knowledge as cumulative - is undermined. Consequently, 
science becomes one local language game, one form or order, or one way of travelling 
across forms, among many others. And, consequently, the primary generic object caught 
between Modernism's universal apparatuses: Man, is questioned, as a person's particular 
background of traditions, experiences and circumstances are seen as guiding their actions, 
rather than some universal underlying characteristic of the species or humanistic aim. 
In the light of these views, Postmodernism privileges a different approach to 
thinking or action. Lyotard terms this 'paralogy': an approach based on the irregular 
juxtaposition of traditions and 'faulty' logic that spawns invention, as opposed to an 
emphasis on the consonance and sameness of relations that leads to refinement within 
pre-set boundaries. This view detennines Lyotard's (1984: 65-6) vision of knowledge as 
a search not for consensus, but for 'instabilities' and 'undecidibles', as a practice of many 
logoi grating against one another, of keeping the question of method open, as opposed to 
the repeated implementation of a dominant logos. It is an approach that Modernism 
would see as naive, "pre-science" in Kuhn's (1962) tenns ('Science -l' in Deleuze and 
Guatarri's). The view of Postmodernism in this respect is that of Levinas' 'end of history' 
(as described in Derrida 1978), where the realisation "is not absolute Logic, absolute 
coherence of the Logos with itself in itself, is not agreement in the absolute system, but 
Peace in separation, the Diaspora of absolutes". Hence Lyotard's (1984: 80) claim that it 
is the preservation of "difference on which the fate of thought depends", and his (1991) 
interest in developing an approach that favours the acknowledgement of the "differend" 
as opposed to one that must litigate a close in order to dispense with things and put them 
behind us. Featherstone (1991: ix) paradoxically suggests that the Postmodern aims for a 
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"commonality [that] entails the capacity to recognise differences as legitimate and valid". 
We may see Foucault's attraction to Blanchot's presentation of 'otherness' and the 
'outside of thought' in this light (Blanchot 1991). Descartes cogito led to the Modem 
belief in the certainty of the "I". In turn, this put the emphasis on interiorising thought - 
we must bring knowledge inside our heads, visualise it, define it and thus own it, and in 
doing this we must assume we have an objective method for doing so decided in advance. 
In Maturana's language, this structurally couples us to receive only those responses that 
match our predetermined way of inquiring. Knowledge defined in this way must tend 
toward homology, the answer is always closed somehow by the mode of questioning. By 
contrast, Foucault describes Blanchot as writing not 'in' the first or third person but of the 
void, the surrounding space: of that which is "exterior to our interiority"; of that which 
cannot be determined or represented (cf Lyotard's encouragement of "putting forward 
the unpresentable in presentation itself' 1984: 78-82). For Blanchot, what is important "is 
never in things or people, but in the impossible verisimilitude of what lies between them: 
encounters, the proximity of what is most distant, the absolute dissimulation in our very 
midsf' (Foucault, in Blanchot 1991). Blanchot writes in a manner "attracted and 
negligent", in the sense that the inquirer is unaware of the attraction so that he may lose 
himself in its object (in much the same way as Aristotle's notion of eidos). A sense that 
enables the naivet6 of paralogy to be enacted. A sense that keeps one open to being led by 
what they encounter rather than fitting objects into a pre-detennined way of seeing. 
In keeping, Foucault's own method and practice was purposely inimitable. "Every 
issue", he claimed, "is a separate battle" (in Sheridan 1985: 18), hence, he insisted that 
"the intellectual can no longer play the role of the adviser. The project, tactics, and goals 
to be adopted are a matter for those who do the fighting" (Foucault 1980: 188). Thus, his 
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texts, like all texts, should be seen as toolkits, elements of which could be used or 
discarded by anyone to ask old questions in new ways and new questions of old problems 
"as they would a screwdriver or monkey wrench, in order to short circuit or disqualify 
systems of power" (in Weeks 1985: 21). Alternatively, they may be seen as "instruments 
of analysis... In other words, a topological and geological survey of the battlefield". 
These instruments or surveys gain their currency not from providing clear goals, or 
capturing or representing truth, but in the sense that Feyerabend talks of maps as 
traditions in their own right, frameworks that can order particular thoughts or that can be 
used as a comparator against situational experiences. By different instruments or 
traditions being brought together in this way inventive local solutions may be sparked off, 
or how being may be shaped and hemmed by structures driven by the accidents and 
quirks of history may be seen, so as to help local people force greater articulation. In 
Postmodemism, the 'intellectual' can no longer tell people what must be done, correct 
laypersons' views, find a logical coherence across cultures or co-ordinate efforts towards 
some utopic vision of collective progress. They can only investigate the opportunities that 
such diversity offers as "the rules of law, the techniques of management, and also the 
ethics, the ethos, the practice of self' are transferred to individuals (Foucault 1988b: 18; 
Bauman 1987; 1992). 
While many have been quick to associate Postmodernism with the Critical 
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Modernism of Habermas and Adorno (Kellner 1988; Poster 1989), it on this line of 
argument that one can see the problem that Foucault and Lyotard have with Habermas. 
We may see their differences more clearly by contrasting the two views' readings of 
Kant's definition of 'critique' from Hat is Eiiligliteiziýieiit? (underlining added): 
Enlightenment is man's exit from his self-incurred tutelage. Tutelage is man's 
inability to make use of his understanding without direction from another. Self- 
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incurred is this tutelage when its cause lies not in lack of reason but in lack of 
resolution and courage to use it without direction from another. Sapere aude! 
Have courage to use your own reason! 
Critical Modems, still believing that Man must share a fundamental unitary essence and 
seeing universal emancipation to still be a relevant meta-narrative, sought to discover and 
provide the theoretical framework that showed everyone how to escape their 'self- 
incurred tutelage'. Foucault and Lyotard, inspired by Nietzsche and Heidegger, take a 
different slant, re-writing the notions of 'self-incurred tutelage' and 'enlightenment'. On 
their view, accepting any objective criteria, approach, essence, ethical or cultural end as 
above others, would be a further form of self-incurred tutelage. For them, critical thinking 
is about highlighting the idea that any categories, utopias, models or frameworks, whether 
they be the categories of scientific reason or Habennas' theory of knowledge constitutive 
interests, are subjective and contingent on particular traditions and without natural 
foundation. This view argues that Critical Modernists, in order to free us from historically 
imposed structures and categories, simply promote further universal structures and 
categories based on their own historical traditions - universal structures that 'do violence' 
to individual divergence. From this view-point, individuals should be encouraged or left 
to think for theinselves about how categories shape them; indeed, to question any set of 
categories. Local people possess their own reason, but after being conditioned to defer to 
the objectivity of experts, they lack the resolution and courage to employ it. There is a 
sense of freedom in this, but one that comes from accepting that a common end may not 
be nonnal. Consequently, we are free to accept, that difference will likely, and quite 
normally, counter the achievement of consensus, free to be different or 'abnormal' to see 
non-conformity as legitimate rather than as holding up progress. 
However, Postmodemism does not underwrite non-reflective pragmatism. It is not 
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so much that 'anything goes'; rather that 'everything depends'. A community or 
individual depends upon its own particular history and traditions. Thus, recognising that 
people must act in communities, Postmodemism promotes providing tools for the 
analysis of the history of epistenies or paradigms and the people who play roles in them. 
While locals would be able to apply the tools they wished, in the manner that they felt 
appropriate, it would not mean that any recommendations that stemmed from such 
analyses would necessarily work. A conununity or an individual is always affected by 
what tradition deems desirable and what historical decisions make feasible. There may 
not be one truth, but there will be compelling local narratives to be worked with. 
Thus, Postmodernism is not opposed to rationality per se or about abandoning 
rationality (Smart 1992; Raulet 1986; Ghirardo 1984), but about allowing both Modem 
and un-Modern frameworks to compete for attention. Rorty (1992: 92) describes this 
realisation as a "stage in which all descriptions are evaluated according to their efficacy 
as instruments for purposes, rather than by their fidelity to the object described". 
In summary, Postmodernism sees the depth (wherein lies the essence of things) 
and height (from which one should look down upon things), that Modernism draws upon, 
as an artificial creation. It sees life on the surface, like a rhizome, ungrounded but held 
together by a web of cross-cutting traditions and individual paths, with past present and 
future running in to one another. In doing so it is free to look beyond those approaches 
held up by Modernism to other forms and styles of thought. In this way we may let in an 
ever "increasing ocean of mutually incompatible alternatives" that sparks invention. A 
manner that may be illustrated by a wash of both the symbolic forms of Modernism (from 
pg. 88) and the Ancients (from pg. 136). 
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In keeping, Postmodernism can recognise no universal language with which to 
speak this world, no general objective theories, only particular local language games. It 
recognises that there must always be different schools of thought and sees knowledge 
gained by individuals engaging in an eclectic nomadology - connecting different schools, 
ideas, analogies and fornis. Each path fashioned individually by drawing upon one)s 
experienced traditions. One might visualise such a path by superimposing Deleuze and 
Guattari's Dionysian string of a "piano piece" (see Figure 19, pg. 153) onto the mesh of 
symbols above. 
Consequently, the style of thought privileged is not Modernism's homology, but 
paralogy: the 'faulty' logic that accepts the non-flush, the differend and the combination 
of many logoi by 'slaloming' the chaos between different forms and orders (Foucault 
likemindedly describes a "'slalom' (of personal communication) between traditional 
philosophy and an abandonment of all seriousness" (in Dreyfus & Rabinow 1983: 205)). 
A style of thinking that promotes moving between and invoking different approaches as 
circumstances arise. A style not unlike metis. 
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PART TH-REE, ,* ANALYSIS 
Part Three uses the non-native grid developed in Part Two as a framework for analysing 
the forms that Management incorporates, the bodies through which these forms are 
spoken of, repeated and institutionalised so as to reinforce their legitimacy, and 
consequently, Management's 'visibility' - its mode of seeing and speaking. 
Chapter 3 described the Ancient Greek episteme as one where language was 
relativistic and contextual; where the architecture for seeing was based around a co- 
appreciation of kosmos and chaos; around particular perspectives, traditions and 
connections; around the interconnectedness of beings that later societies would separate 
through their cohabitation seeming illogical: mind and body; past and present; 
individual and community. Wisdom was seen as nielis, the ability to be resourceful 
enough to move quickly between kosmos and chaos, or ordered frameworks and 
particular contingencies, to be inventive enough to combine different tools to combat 
particular problems. 
Chapter 4 outlined the Modem episteme as seeking to assert order over this 
hitherto 'hotchpotch' arrangement through the development of universal grids and 
essences below, and apparatus hoisting an objective viewpoint above, the plane of 
action. Modernism's sights are thus configured by a triangular hierarchy, with 
knowledge looked at from above, thanks to an apex provided by a centralised stem of 
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knowledge or school of thought that may be decentralised and applied to all branches of 
life 'on the ground'. In keeping, it seeks to speak positivistically so as to objectively 
represent the objects of its inquiries, and to speak with universal, de-personalised meta- 
narratives, normal measures and ends against which things may be plotted and toward 
which they may be aimed. In the past century, performative efficiency has established 
itself as the most pervasive of these non-personal meta-narratives. 
Chapter 5 showed Postmodernism as a re-connection with Ancient thinking on 
two counts. Firstly, by re-appreciating the forras and traditions of the past that 'crawl 
out' as Modernism's meta-narratives descend. Secondly, by developing a style of 
thinking not unlike metis. However, while we can say that the Postmodern requires their 
recovery, this is not to say that the Postmodem episteme is the same as that of the 
Greeks. To think it so would be to overlook Postmodemism's dependence on the re- 
appreciation of local tradition and spiral view of history. Postmodernism must recognise 
Modernism's influence now as such traditional influences can never be fully overcome. 
Hence, Postmodernism only seeks to 'rewrite' some of Modernism's aspects rather than 
cconsign it to history'. Jencks (1988: 45-6) consequently describes Postmodernism as a 
language that "revives, simultaneously, every single period of Classicism. That's what 
is so extraordinary. It revives all periods, Egyptian architecture and painting". In this 
way, Postmodernism is clearly a recovery of the Ancient. However, Jencks goes on to 
claim that, Postmodernism also revives: "Hockney, let's say, in his early phase, and 
Michael Graves among other people. It revives Mannerism. It revives 1900. It revives 
Rationalism". By recovering the pre-Modem while seeking to maintain rather than 
overcome Modernism, Jencks argues that Postmodernism "doesn't look like anything 
we've ever seen before". Herein lies the difficulty for Management. 
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As Part Three will show, Management, as it has been conceived, finds it has an 
incredible strength in Modernism but will find itself unable to see and speak in other 
episteme because its historical configuration has created a line of the outside that prevents 
it from recognising anything beyond the Modem. Unlike other fields discussed in Chapter 
5's review of Postmodemism - Art, Architecture, Philosophy, Ecology, Physics - 
Management can see nothing un-Modem to recover, no alternative styles with which it 
might relativise its Modem approaches, no other Classicisms with which it might become 
Postmodem. 
Foucault (1978: 8) began Volume I of the History of Sexuality by outlining how 
historical assumptions incorporate "the form of a sermon" that indicates how a field or 
subject should develop and how this is at once a "statement of oppression" in that it limits 
alternative futures. Chapter 6 demonstrates how Management has developed a particular 
reinforcing history that only sees the present and can only ever speak of the future in 
Modem terms. It shows how the sermon that springs from this is now taken for granted as 
providing a universal view of Management, a view that is protected by a dense web of 
experts and institutions. This formation makes a singular view: that of Modem Western 
historians in the 1950s and 1960s who read a particular situation in America in the first 
decades of the 20th century (a response to a specific problem that required reference to a 
general de-personalised end that would make Modernity's political apparatus make sense) 
appear as the grand-origin of Management, the moment of the scientific discovery of 
Management's universal object. In this way, a particular subjective set of historical views 
limits Management's future in a manner that is as unnecessary as it is unrecognised. 
Chapter 7 shows how a particular form of the 'Business School', the key 'pulpit' 
from which this sermon is delivered, re-doubles this singular formation, and thus, further 
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lessens the likelihood of its supposed objectivity being called into question. 
'Organization', the primary object of Management, the subject 'Management' and the 
institution of the 'Business School', were not developed one after the other in a linear- 
logical manner. They emerged simultaneously, reflecting a particular logic back to one 
another, and consequently contribute to a formation that works in perfect harmony to 
promote the supposed universality of its conception of Management. 
Chapter 8 investigates how the formation of Management, the historical 'sermon' 
and 'pulpit' through which this is issued in the present, has shaped Management's 
'prophesies' or its visible futures, in such a way that Management continues to 
unwittingly promote the same singularly Modem perspectives. How Management, given 
its historical appreciation of itself and its general lack of awareness of the contingent 
particularity of this appreciation, finds it almost impossible to see or to say anything 
substantially different. 
These three chapters draw upon a wide range of texts, across a spectrum that 
might be termed 'low-brow' to 'high-brow', to analyse the forms and formation of 
Management. As Foucault (1989: 9) made clear, "many things contain thought" and we 
should not necessarily be compelled to look to the latest 'cutting-edge' contributions to 
ascertain the current state of knowledge. Indeed, being concerned in this thesis with what 
might be termed the 'background noise', the taken-for-granted assumptions or 'munnur' 
that supports the formation of Management, would encourage looking more to standard 
textbooks than scholarly monographs, as it is here that we might find the more settled or 
less contested premises. Thus, most of what is examined here is taken from history books, 
standard teaching texts, old canonical 'classics', encyclopedia and dictionaries, public 
reports and mainstream articles. In certain circumstances more current scholarly discourse 
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is drawn upon, as in Chapter 8's discussion of Postmodernism in Management, but this is 
due to the fact that this discourse has only just begun to settle into the main fabric. In any 
case, it should be remembered that what is required of the counter-history that follows is 
not an all-encompassing survey just enough to encourage others to question the 
universiality of Management as it is currently formed. 
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Management's history claims that Management principles are universal but only since the application of a 
scientific approach has Man begun to fully understand them. This view is made regular by a tight knit, but 
not obvious, web of different fora that repeat the same message. However, it is demonstrated that this is 
based on the prevailing beliefs of Management historians in the 1950s and 1960s. They identified the 
origins of their present in the work of engineers who they saw as the first to begin uncovering 
Management's basic good: 'efficiency'. However, this discovery can be shown to be due to subjective 
beliefs and politically contingent expedients encouraged by problems bought to the fore by Modernism. As 
Management sought more academic credibility, a more ancient heritage was sought. But the past was 
looked at only in terms of the Modem principles that historians had determined as their object. Thus, 
Management sees nothing of the past apart from that which further strengthens the belief in the universality 
of prevailing Modem beliefs. The 'sermon of development' promoted by Management's history is a 
singular view that maps neatly onto the beliefs of Modernism. 
6. SERMON - THE HISTORY OF 
MANAGEMENT 
Aprox. Year IndividuallEthnic Group Aprox. Year IndividuallEthnic Group 
2700 B. C. Egyptians 1810 Robert Owen 
1491 Hebrews 1832 Charles Babbage 
1100 Chinese 1900 F. W. Taylor 
350 Plato 1910 Hugo Munsterberg 
50 Varro 1915 Thomas Edison 
20 A. D. Jesus Christ 1916 Henri Fayol 
1436 Venetians 1927 Elton Mayo 
1500 Sir Thomas More 1931 James. D. Mooney 
1525 Machiavelli 1938 Chester Barnard 
1776 Adam Smith 1943 Colonel Urwick 
1785 Thomas Jefferson 1947 Max Weber 
1799 Eli Whitney 1955 Herbert Simon 
1800 Boulton and Watt 
George, excerpt from his The Managerial Continuum 
outlining the key contributors to the development of 
Management, The History ofManagenient (1968 & 1972). 
There is not a great deal of discourse on the history of Management. This may be for a 
number of reasons. Firstly, through its association with economics (which will be 
discussed in the next chapter), most view Management as 'timeless', 'ahistorical' or 
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concerned with the present and the future, with being at the cutting edge. Hence, 
Management history is akin to Economic history. It is not seen as particularly useful and 
to study it is taken as a sign of failure to achieve the level of proficiency necessary for 
really meaningful work: "best left to those underendowed for fully professional work at 
the modem level" (Stigler 1982: 107). Secondly, because Management defines itself as 
based upon other disciplines like Economics, Psychology and Sociology, it views an 
understanding of their history as sufficient for understanding its own. Thirdly, the history 
of Management is not contested. There is little debate as to its key moments. After a 
flurry of works in the 1950s and 1960s, no comprehensive new history of Management 
has appeared in the past two decades. The history of Management is so regular that it 
offers no scope for the ambitious historian. It is this regularity which makes it little more 
than a munnur -a background noise taken for granted in Western societies, and more 
powerful for being so. This marks it out as a target for a Foucauldian counter-history. 
The list presented at the head of this chapter is just such a regular view (although 
others give more time to events rather than people: the advent of Protestantism, the 
Scientific Revolution, the American Civil War, the spread of U. S. Railways - Chandler 
1962; 1977; Gross 1964; Wren 1994). It is a summary of the 95 ethnic groups, men and 
one woman (Parker Follett) who fill C. S. George's (1968) "Managerial Continuum" at 
the beginning of his History of Maiiagemew Thought (see Figure 22 for a copy of the 
beginning of this Continuum outlining the 'discoveries' of the key contributors). Being 
part of the history of Management connects all of these people and events - from the 
Egyptians to Simon. 
Apart from George, there are very few volumes written on the history of 
Management. Standing over what has been written is the spectre of Alfred Chandler, who 
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THE MANAGERIAL CONTINUUM 
Approxinwre Individual or 


















325 Alexander the Great 
20 A. D. Jesus Christ 
Recognized need for planning, organiz- 
ing, and controlling. 
Recognized need for honesty or fair 
play in management. Therapy inter- 
view-"get it off your chest. " 
Decentralization in organization. 
Recognized need for written word in 
requests. Use of staff advice. 
Use of witnesses and writing for control; 
establishment of minimum wage; recog- 
nition that responsibility cannot be 
shifted. 
Centralization in organization. 
Concepts of organization, scalar princi- 
ple, exception principle. 
Recognized need for organization, plan- 
ning, 'directing, and controlling. 
Production control and wage incentives. 
Recognized need for systems. =d stand- 
ards. 
Principle of specialization recognized. 
Recognized need for planning, directing, 
and organizing. 
Enunciation of universality of manage- 
Recognized management as a separate 
art. 
Recognized need for human relations. 
Useof motion study, layout, and 
materials handling. 
Scientific ihethod applied. Use of work 
methods and tempo. 
Principle of specialization-' enunciated. 
Use of staff. 
Unity of command. Golden rule. Human 
relations. 
FIGURE 22: THE MANAGEMENT CONTINUUM - TIMELINE OUTLINING THE KEY 
DISCOVERIES OF MANAGEMENT. SOURCE GEORGE "THE HISTORY OF 
MANAGEMENT" (1968 & 1972). ONLY A PORTION IS SHOWN HERE. 
"singlehandedly developed the reference points in business history on which management 
researchers must rely" (Leontiades 1989: 30). His work, particularly Beginnings of Big 
Business (1959), Strategy and Structure (1962) and The Visible Hand (1977), is seen as 
the "signal contribution" (Lee 1990: 176; Jones 1997), a "landmark [that has not] been 
updated" (Leontiades 1989: 109) and providing "the paradigm for future research" 
(Waring 1991). 
While the research agenda in the United States is "cast within Chandler's 
conceptual frameworle', in Britain the "Chandlerian revolutioif' has been less marked 
(Harvey & Jones 1990: 5). The British doyen of Management history is Colonel Lyndall 
Urwick. Urwick's historical work in marking out Management's foundation has seen him 
lauded as "the only Englishman to rank beside the great management pioneers" 
(Management Today 1984: 50; Child 1969; Huczynski 1993). Particularly influential is 
Urwick's series The Making of Scientific Maiiagemeid, written with Edward Brech (195 1; 
1953) and published in the decade after World War 11. 
Beyond Urwick, Chandler and George, there are a few other works of note: 
Mooney's (1947) ThePrinciples of Organization; Bendix's (1956) Work mul Authority in 
Industry, Merrill's (1960) Classics in Management; Dale's (1960) The Great Organizers; 
Gross's (1964) The Managing of Organizations - The Administrative Stniggle; Sidney 
Pollard's (1965) The Genesis of Modern Management; Brech's (1965) Organization - 
The Framework of Management; Light's (1966) Nature of Management; Child's (1969) 
British Management Thought; H. R. Pollard's (1974) Developments in Manage"Ie"t 
Thought; and Wren's (1974) Evolution of Managenient Thought. They all issue similar 
perspectives. What variations exist between them can be explained by their focus on 
particular moments of the same continuum or upon events to a greater extent than 
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individuals. According to these works the history of Management runs as follows. 
L The accepted history 
Management "is as old as human society itself' (Mooney 1947: ix). Its "roots... go deep, 
just as do those of such other, older professions as theology, law, medicine, and 
education" (Appley, in Merrill 1960). Consequently, Management's history begins with 
those clever civilisations like the Egyptians, who "recognized the need for planning, 
organizing and controlling" (quotation marks, unless otherwise stated, refer to George 
(1972)) and the Chinese who "recognized the need for organization, planning, directing 
and controlling, and the principle of specialization". The Greeks also recognised the 
"principle of specialization" and "applied the scientific method", albeit not to the 
principle of specialisation, while the Romans developed bureaucracies. All of these 
civilisations, and the Hebrews, acted according to organisation's three universal 
principles: "co-ordination, scalar hierarchy and the functional division of labour" 
(Mooney 1947). 
Then there are key contributions from prominent individuals. Jethro lectured 
Moses on "the benefits of delegation and sound organization" (Mooney 1947; Merrill 
1960; Dale 1960; Caplow 1964). Plato and Socrates made "timeless observations about 
the management of people" (Merrill 1960). Jesus applied "unity of command" and 
discovered the need for "human relations" in Management. A number of Italians 
developed accounting procedures. Thomas More "called for specialization". 
These ideas were further advanced with the coming of Protestantism. "As 
civilization developed, so did more positive feelings about work. Following the teachings 
of Judeo-Christian philosophers (such as Luther and Calvin), beliefs in the value of work 
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eventually became a cherished tradition in American society". This enabled the discovery 
that "Labor is good in itself [and that one] becomes a better person by virtue of the act of 
working" (Greenberg & Baron 1995: 127). These discoveries, and the related concept of 
economic individualism, "put great stress on the religious and economic advantages of 
highly specialized work" (Dessler 1986: 35) and "resulted in specific guidelines for the 
creation of a capitalist spirit" (Wren 1994: 25). 
The coming of the Scientific Revolution "made it inevitable that some hardy 
pioneers should attempt to provide scientific principles for the management of man" and 
offered "a scientific vehicle upon which the manager could begin to build his discipline". 
Gross' (1964: 117-8) The Managing of Organizations explains the development thus: 
All the ancestors of administrative thought operated on the premise that by the 
exercise of reason men could devise feasible and consistent means for attaining 
desirable ends. During the great intellectual upsurge of the Enlightenment this 
premise became an explicit and articulated principle... Copernicus, Galileo, 
Bruno and Kepler destroyed the old image of man and his planet as the center of 
the universe... By the time of Descartes, Spinoza, Newton, and Locke, rationality 
had become a widespread article of faith. Both man and universe were seen as 
behaving in accordance with natural laws... By discovering these laws and acting 
in accordance with them, man could control his irrational impulses and win true 
freedom... Throughout this entire development, superstition, supernaturalism and 
the dead hand of tradition were persistently countered by sober, skeptical and 
scientific calculation... if we look closely enough, we can find in the 
Enlightenment the seed germs of modem administration. Without exception the 
pioneers of administrative thought addressed themselves to the extension... of the 
rule of reason. [Thus t]he Enlightenment provided the broad set of cultural values 
within which the industrial and administrative revolutions emerged and grew. 
Light's (1966) The Nature ofManagenient tells of Modernity conquering Aristotelianism 
along similar lines while in Brown's (1971) Organization, the triumph over 
Aristotelianism is held up as a prescription for the way that Management should advance. 
Building upon the Enlightenment's advance, Adam Smith applied the Newtonian 
method to economic endeavour so as to see the connection between the division of labour 
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and the progress of civilisation. This led to his "brilliant argument on the economic 
advantages that society would reap from the division of labor" (Robbins 1993); his 
applying the "principle of specialization to manufacturing workers"; his discovery that 
division of labour is a universal characteristic of organisation (Khandwalla 1977); and his 
foundation of the field of economics (Lekachman 1964). Economics is, thus, the 
discipline on which Management is based. Smith's discoveries drove the Industrial 
Revolution and the rise of the factory. This is where "management in the sense which we 
know it" begins (Sheldon 1924: 37; Urwick & Brech 1951; Bendix 1956) and where the 
problems Management is concerned with "first reared their heads" (Pollard 1965). 
Hence the importance of Thomas Jefferson. In addition to his constitutional 
contributions to the formation of America, Jefferson wrote to his friends from France of 
techniques inspired by Smith's idea. These "anticipated Whitney's whole interchangeable 
parts idea" (relatedly, Wren (1994: 28-30) incorporates the Declaration of Independence 
and a discussion on Locke's work inspiring the American and French Revolutions into 
The Evolution of Manageniew Yhought). Whitney and his partner, clockmaker Simeon 
North, developed an approach to assembly that "absorbed Adam Smith's concepts of how 
to control organizations" in such a way as to anticipate the factory system (Clutterbuck & 
Crainer 1990: 3). Boulton and Watt are doubly important. On the one hand, "the heart of 
the industrial revolution was really the steam engine" (Wren 1994: 37). On the other, 
their Soho factory was "an organization in which all of the current and accepted methods 
of production planning were to be found in embryo" (Urwick 1956). 
Babbage (1835: 261) then contributes by expanding on the virtues of the division 
of labour, determining that it is "no less applicable to mental productions than to those in 
which material bodies are concerned". He (1835: 268) described his major managerial 
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work, as "one of the consequences that has resulted from [my work on] the calculating 
engine", and recognised that Management's evolution was tied to its increasingly 
intimate connection with the calculating sciences. 
In the same era, Robert Owen (1813: 17) was seeking a manufacturing principle 
that would: 
speedily divest [us] of all the ridiculous and absurd mystery with which it has 
hitherto enveloped by the ignorance of preceding times. [Hence] all the 
complicated and counteracting motives for good conduct, which have been 
multiplied almost to infinity, will be reduced to a single principle of action, 
which, by its evident operation and sufficiency, shall render this intricate system 
unnecessary, and ultimately supersede it in all parts of the earth. 
In his quest, Owen was "far ahead of his time in urging that [we pay] at least as much 
attention to the welfare of 'vital machines' as 'inanimate machines... (Merrill 1960). 
"Living machines", Owen (in George 1972: 63) informs us, "may be easily trained and 
directed to procure a large increase of pecuniary gain... The economy of living machinery 
is to keep it neat and clean, treat it with kindness that its mental movements might not 
experience too much irritating friction". Having had an "intuitive grasp of the principles 
of sound management", Owen is obviously "the pioneer of personnel management" 
(Urwick & Brech 195 1). 
By focusing on the rise of big business in the United States, Chandler, beyond 
references to the emergence of classical economics, focuses on the next key period: from 
1850. This was when Management became a separate and full-time task with the rise of 
the railways. Their growth across the US enabled companies to become geographically 
dispersed which, in turn, made the personal surveillance of many business transactions 
impossible or at least inefficient. These companies had to develop an alternative and this 
was found in the adoption of military models of bureaucracy. At the same time, the 
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railroads opened up new markets, enabling companies to expand production and improve 
economies-of-scale. This could only be done by employing the same bureaucratic 
principles. As they did so, companies found that many economic transaction costs, for 
things that would have previously been bought from commission agents on the market, 
were minimised by their being standardised and carried out under one 'roof. Chandler 
showed how the 'visible hand' of organisation came into being by more efficiently 
fulfilling the market's ordering functions, thus surpassing Smith's invisible hand of the 
market. Subsequently, Management became widespread as it became a necessary 
function to maximise the efficiency of the structures and technology required for 
operationalising such large-scale organisations. Williamson (1983: 125), for whom, like 
Chandler, "efficiency is the main and only systematic factor response", conversely argued 
that organisations emerge as a response to market failure and not because the latter 
become more efficient markets. In other words, organisations emerge when markets lapse 
and become inefficient (i. e., individual transaction costs become too high). Efficiency is, 
for both Chandler and Williamson, the cause of organisation. 
At the turn of the 20th century, a group of "pioneers" that recognised the "gospel 
of efficiency" emerged into this organisational environment. They "started to apply to 
administration the methods of scientific observation which had already yielded dramatic 
and highly applauded results in the physical sciences" (Gross 1964: 119). Management's 
Pioneers, "comparable to Galileo" (Urwick & Brech 195 1), were those who: 
recognized that the 'antiquated scheme of business principles'... bore no logical 
relation to the intellectual standards, the mode of thinking customary in the exact 
sciences. Yet it was these standards, this mode of thinking, which were the basis 
of the inventions which had revolutionised its technical processes and were 
adding incalculably to its productive potential by the decade. On the principle of 
the 'hair of the dog' they attempted to apply the methods of science to the 
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problems of direction and control. 
These Pioneers brought together the strands of Management's ancestry: bureaucratic 
organisation, efficiency, planning, coordinating, directing and controlling, the industrial 
revolution and factory production, the division of labour, specialisation and the scientific 
method so as "to correlate the growing mass of intuitive ground rules into clearly 
enunciated principles" (Gross 1964: 119). It is not surprising, therefore, that these 
pioneers of Management should be industrial engineers: "As engineers attempted to make 
machines more efficient, it was a natural extension of their efforts to work on the human 
side of the equationý' (Greenberg & Baron 1995: 17). Most prominent among these 
pioneers were Frederick Taylor and Henri Fayol. 
Taylor "marked the new industrial spirit [with] his substitution of the scientific 
method [over] records of what has been done or opinion of what can be done" (Gantt 
1961: 39). He (1911) described the necessity of a "great mental revolution" that would 
focus on: "Science, not rule of thumb" (this now considered part of the dead hand of 
tradition). Taylor's (1911) work resulted in Management's "four universal principles". " 
Hence, "any book which attempts to show how management thought was developed must 
inevitably start with Fredrick Winslow Taylor" (Pollard 1974: 3; Kelly 1968: 18; Brech 
1967). His list of contributions is twice the length of the next most significant individual 
or group on George's Continuum. His Principles qfScientific Managenient "is not merely 
the precursor of modem organization... it is in many respects its origiW' (Dotson 1967). 
Whereas Taylor is the "father of scientific management", Fayol is "the father of 
17 First: Develop a science for each element of a man's work, which replaces the old rule-of-thumb method. Second: 
Scientifically select and then train, teach, and develop the workman. Third: Heartily cooperate with the men so as to 
insure all of the work being done in accordance with the principles of science which has been developed. Fourth: The 
management takes over all the work for which they are better fitted than the workmen, while in the past almost all of 
the work and the greater part of the responsibility were thrown upon the men (Taylor 1911). 
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management principles" (Greenwood 1965: 5). He revolutionised Management by 
conceptualising it as a separate body of knowledge that was applicable to all fonns of 
group activity, and developing the first comprehensive theory of Management that could 
be applied to all endeavours. Fayol (1916) defined Management as a universal set of 
functions: planning, organising, directing, coordinating and controlling; and identified its 
14 general principles, the first of which is the division of labour. In 1947, with the 
publication The Theory of Social and Economic Organisations, Weber consolidated these 
ideas with his depiction of the matching principles of organisation: bureaucratic 
specialisation and the division of labour, hierarchisation, standardised training, status 
differentiation, centralisation, and impersonalised and disciplinised behaviour. 
AfIcr thinkers like these had laid the foundations of Management proper, "New 
Pioneers" emerged (Gross 1964; Wren 1974). Munsterberg, Mayo and Parker Follett 
discovered that "Man is a human being - even in industry" (Whyte 1959: 3). They 
focused upon the "human" or "other" side of work to that of the engineering Pioneers. In 
so doing, they sought to build upon and surpass them via a rigorous application of 
"more" or "better science in management", by drawing upon advances in the new 
sciences of psychology and sociology. Consequently, one important trend that sprang 
from the thinking of the new pioneers was the emphasis placed on attaching the word 
cnew' to Management works. Now that the groundwork of Management was set in place, 
great currency was attached to improving upon it (Child 1969) 
If the Pioneers brought an engineering outlook to bear and the New Pioneers 
sought to build on this with a psychological perspective, Chester Bamard was a "pioneer 
in developing the philosophical groundwork of management" (Miller 1978: 410), 
showing that "one must begin on the theory of organization with Plato" (Barnard, in 
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Pauchant 1994: 825). Barnard (1938) saw that traditional mechanistic definitions of 
organisation were naive and sought to define organisation. as an "open system of 
consciously coordinated activities". 
While later theorists would see Bamard's approach as both a step toward 
integration in his own day and as an ideal unifying framework for grasping Management 
thought in our times (Wren 1994; Robbins & Mukeji 1990), the period through to the 
1940s generally suffered through a lack of integration. The writers listed above "did 
recognise and understand the functions of management [but] no unified theory of 
management was developed" (George 1968: 76). Because of this, the first half of the 20th 
century is inauspiciously termed "a period of diversity in management thought" (Robbins 
1991: 33). Urwick (Urwick & Brech 1953: 160) describes the problem thus: 
earlier publications have a historical significance in line with the story of the 
evolution of management itself [because] they represent the oozing out of the 
spring at source and its first trickling together into the tiny brook. By the 1920s it 
was growing into a stream, continuous, swelling, broadening. And within ten 
years - to continue the analogy - it had become necessary to build the reservoir 
that would contain and marshall the growing flood. 
This is how Mooney and Urwick find their niche on Management's Continuum. Mooney 
surveyed the history of humankind to discover the three universal principles underlying 
all organisation: co-ordination, scalar hierarchy and the functional division of labour. 
Greatly inspired by Mooney proving the universality of organising principles, Urwick 
surveyed the extant Management literature so as to "collect, consolidate, and correlate the 
principles of management". These studies lead us from the "period of diversity" toward 
the period in Management characterised by a sermon of "integration" (Gross 1964). 
While Herbert Simon castigated Urwick for being naive, old-hat and unscientific 
196 
(using "terms not unlike those used by an Ubangi medicine man to discuss disease" - 
Simon, in Gross 1964: 182), his aims during the post-diversity phase of Management 
were much the same as the historian. "We require a serious effort toward the construction 
of a common language [to] bring together this scattered and diverse body of writing about 
organizations into a coherent whole" (March & Simon 1958). George's Continuum ends 
with Simon but he is a key contributor to the project that most clearly embodies the aims 
of Management's integration phase in the 1950s and 1960s. A project inspired by the 
publication of "The Management Theory Jungle" by Harold Koontz in 1961. 
Koontz (1961) recognised that: "No science, now regarded as mature, started out 
with a complete statement of incontrovertibly valid principles". Consequently, he 
claimed that while the period of diversity had been a necessary stepping stone, "any 
science proceeded, and more than that has been useful, for centuries, on the basis of 
generalizations, some laws, some principles, and some hypotheses". Koontz argued that 
Management must now take four steps toward maturation: distilling and testing 
fundamentals; defining a body of knowledge (Management, he claimed, "should deal 
with an area of knowledge and inquiry that is 'manageable' [as] no great advances in 
knowledge were made so long as man contemplated the whole universe"); clarifying 
management semantics; and making Management a specific discipline so that more 
established branches of knowledge could be identified as its basis. Koontz's own strategy 
toward these aims was to "encompass and synthesize the diversity of the day" via the 
"process approach" which sees managers "performing the four [Fayolian] functions of 
planning, organizing, leading, controlling", with a feedback loop incorporated, in keeping 
with open-systems thinking pioneered by Bamard (see Figure 23). 
The following year, Koontz played host to a conference of the world's most 
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FIGURE 23: THE 'REVOLUTIONARY' PROCESS APPROACH. 
SOURCE: ROBBINS & MUKERJ1 "MANAGING ORGANIZATIONS" (1990). 
distinguished management academics and practitioners with the intention of "working 
toward a unified theory of management" (Koontz 1964). While a consensus was not 
achieved, most remained optimistic that "within perhaps five years - certainly not more 
than ten years hence -a general theory of management will be evolved, stated, and 
generally accepted in management circles" (Frederick 1963: 212). At this point, having 
produced a regular understanding of Management's past that legitimates it as a worthy 
field of knowledge, the histories of Management tend to tail off. 
A Management history's key continuities and discontinuities 
Apart from one or two interesting but minor items from 
British Industrial literature, serious thought on 
4 organization' begins with F. W. Taylor in the United States 
and Henri Fayol in France... Management subsequent 
writings go back to the bases provided by these men. 
Brech, Organization: The Franjework ofManagenjent (1965). 
The accepted history, related above, indicates several key moments of continuity and 
discontinuity that enable its sermon to make sense. Management is as old as civilisation. 
It is, therefore, an important, constant and distinguished object. However, key 
discontinuities occur in the 17th and 18th centuries as the method by which Management 
can be best understood emerges (during the Scientific Revolution) and the conditions in 
which Management now works arrives (during the Industrial Revolution). A further break 
takes place at the cusp of the 20th century as Pioneers bring these two strands together by 
applying scientific methods to industrial problems. In fact, as we have seen, this is where 
Management 'really, seriously begins'. This raises a problem. How can Management be 
as old as civilisation and really begin at the turn of the 20th century? 
Management historians circumvent this illogicality by drawing on various 
Modem devices. In a manner reminiscent of the approach of the historians of Psychology 
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(see Chapter 2), it is claimed that earlier approaches were not civilised or clever enough 
to properly recognise their object and/or failed to apply the proper method (i. e., scientific 
principles). Hence, Mooney (1947) points out that while some Ancients were clever 
enough to act according to Management principles, they were not so clever as to 
articulate them. Wren (1974) similarly diminishes pre-Modem thinking by noting that it 
was "dominated by cultural values that were antibusiness, antiachievement and largely 
antihuman". Greenberg and Baron (1995) show pre-Protestant people to be less civilised 
for not knowing the "true value of work", and Light (1966: 10,17) explains that while: 
Men have always acted in groups... It is only in the last sixty years that serious 
attempts have been made to deal with the subject of organization analytically and 
to apply general principles to building up the structure of industrial enterprises. 
This work originated with Frederick Winslow Taylor [and this is t]he origin of 
organization study... It has only recently been recognized that there is a general 
ability to manage which can be made the subject of a recognized 'discipline' 
based on objective research. 
Hence, one may draw upon the notion of a Cartesian split between thinking and doing 
Management, and associate the adjective 'serious' and 'rational' with the nouns 
'scientific', 'ordered' and 'disciplined' to further smooth over the illogicality of 
Management's dual beginnings. "The emergence of modem management had to be based 
on rational ways of making decisions", explains Wren (1994: 33,1), hence, "the genesis 
of modem management thought is found in the work of early pioneers who sought to 
solve the problems created by the factory system". Duncan (1990: 2-3) agrees that: 
the seeds of management thought were not planted when people started 'doing 
management'; they were sowed, quite literally, into the soil of human history 
when people started trying to make sense out of what was being done. 
Management as a discipline began when people started systematizing it, codifying 
it, and developing prescriptions for how to manage it better. Eventually theories 
that could be taught and learned emerged. That was the beginning of 
management... Of course there were managers and organizations, and some 
people understood management processes and leadership [previous to this]. But 
there was no discipline management. 
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Correspondingly, George's (1972: 45) second chapter, Management During the Medieval 
Period, concludes that: "From the viewpoint of management thought, the period is not 
especially noteworthy", while his third chapter, on the 1700s, is given a telling title: A 
Managerial Awakening. Here we find "a series of happenings had had a real impact on 
managerial practices". While the "practice of management is ancient the formal study of 
the body of management is relatively new" (Wren 1974: 3). 
The co-existence of Ancient origins and Modem beginnings are also, somewhat 
circularly, explained away by relating the idea that Management only really began when 
it was a separate field. In other words, when the Modem principle of specialisation, of 
which Management seems to want to be the science, had developed far enough to ensure 
that it could emerge. Incorporating this distinction, Gross (1964: 9 1) explains that while: 
For tens of centuries considerable thought has been given to organizations and 
their governance. Only by thoughtful and deliberate effort was it possible to build 
and operate the world's earliest armies, churches, governments, empires and other 
complex enterprises... But this belongs to the history of administration, not of 
administrative thought... Only in the 20th century has administrative thought 
emerged as a differentiated field of sustained writing, conscious observation, 
abstract theory, and specialized terminology. 
Similarly, Child (1969: 13-16) argues that "Management as a purely technical factor has 
always been pursued to some degree wherever work activities have been organized". 
However, his History begins when managers were "set apart from other employees", 
when "a distinct managerial social stratum" emerged, with the "foundation of specialized 
institutes catering for a specifically managerial management" (a wonderful term) -and with 
the emergence of a "specialized literature". Consequently, according to Child (1969), 
nothing of great import happened prior to 1911. 
One final way of relating to a grand heritage while not feeling compelled to dwell 
upon it, to claim both a glorious ancient past and a scientific foundation, is enabled by 
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applying the Modem criterion of the cumulation and integration of knowledge. Thus, 
Gross (1964: 115) points out that, "although the early political philosophers often 
discussed aspects of formal organization structure, their thought reveals no clearly- 
articulated concept of an organization". Wren (1974: 32) notes that we need not take pre- 
Modem Management too seriously because its ideas "were largely localized" seeing as 
"there was little or no need to develop a formal body of management thought under 
nonindustrialized circumstances". Further, George (1968: 26) makes it clear that while 
"in these early times, management thought existed, [it did so] only in a somewhat 
nebulous and unsophisticated state... the principles were not united in a scheme of 
management thought, nor is there any evidence of any chronological building of various 
management techniques upon previous conceived ones". 
In keeping with this association of unification with worthiness, the "mental 
revolution" that began Management thought around 1911 (as the continuous and grand 
object of Management was subject to proper scientific examination within a Modem 
industrial context), is seen to be followed by a linear and positive continuity of increasing 
integration. The sermon is that Management has developed by becoming more integrated, 
more scientific and hence closer to the truth and it should continue to do so. New cutting- 
edge approaches should be developed so as to build upon and integrate the principles 
developed by the pioneers toward an ever more mature scientific field. These key 
moments of continuity and discontinuity mean that the forms incorporated by the history 
of Management - Platonism, the machine metaphor, the quest for a unified science, a 
specific specialised discipline contributing to the centralised Commonwealth of 
Knowledge, the application of the human sciences, bureaucracy, planning, coordination 
and control, the good of efficiency, history as evolution and knowledge as cumulative, 
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revolution followed by the integrated quest for the new advance - are all Modernist. The 
key chronological boundaries - the Enlightenment of the 17th and 18th centuries, the 
Revolutions, the turn of the 20th century and it mechanistic-scientific optimism, the 
1950s where the history of Management was first written up and the quest for integration 
began, are all key Modem boundaries or lines of the outside. 
Despite the acceptance, or lack of critical comment on, the history described 
above, the historical understanding of Management is not based on a universal view, or 
the correct view of a universal object that we have only recently been clever enough to 
properly recognise. It is based upon a contingent view that found efficiency to be 'the 
problem' and the Modem scientific method to be t1je approach toward solving this 
problem, and correspondingly, created a specific object which has been solidified by a 
historical understanding that makes it seem solid and universal to us. The sections that 
follow present a counter-history that undermines this history on the following bases: by 
showing it to be based on specific subjective views held by those first historians who 
wrote it up in the 1950s and 1960s; by demonstrating that a key moment of discontinuity, 
Taylor's 'discovery' of Scientific Management in 1911, was a result of social 
circumstances particular to the turn of the century and political and legal expedients (in 
any case, Scientific Management was not new nor particularly scientific); by highlighting 
how the universal object of Management was created by looking at pre-1900 events as 
anticipating our present understanding; by outlining how this history turns men into 
Modernists by focusing only on the aspects of their work that fit the accepted Continuum; 
and by showing that despite the attempts to integrate Management and thereby 'mature it' 
as a science, the field shows no signs of achieving this aim. 
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III. Counter-history 1. A specific view 
The concept of management as a specific body of knowledge 
and practice forming the basis of a specialized profession has 
begin to emerge only in very recent times. Until the science and 
art of management was thus recognized as a subject in itself, a 
discrete discipline, there was no foundation on which to build 
an interest in its history. 
Urwick & Brech, The Making ofScientific Managenient (1953). 
In explaining the uniqueness of their history, Urwick and Brech, as an aside, 
acknowledge something very important. Their history is unique to their time because it 
was in this period that Management was regarded as 'serious enough' (i. e., coming close 
to fulfilling Modem criteria) to have a history. Perhaps it is not surprising that despite 
assuming that it is reporting on universal objects and principles, what their history sees is 
related to their specific predilections and the prevailing understanding of their time. 
The most obvious observation that one could make to begin is that almost all of 
those who are serious contributors to Management's history are white men, as are those 
who wrote their history. Indeed, almost every one of the entries on George's Continuum 
dated after the advent of Protestantism refers to White Anglo-Saxon Protestant males. 
Beyond this, we may observe that those pioneering Management historians worked with 
very particular views as to what their object was and with very specific views as to their 
historical task. Further, they worked within in a time with a very set view of 
Management. 
The 1950s saw the professionalisation of Management, with the foundation of 
schools of business as normal parts of most American universities, the beginning of 
doctoral programmes to train Management scholars, the establishment of academic 
journals and the fannation of professional associations. Selznick (1948) had published 
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his oft-cited article Foundations of the Amy of Organization, laying down the subject's 
epistemological foundations using Barnard's definition of his object and citing Parsons' 
structural-functional analysis, "relat[ing] contemporary and variable behavior to a 
presumptively stable system of needs and mechanisms", as exemplary. In 1954, the 
newly-formed American Management Association (AMA) was deten-nining the 
"universality of the basic functions" of Management (Greenwood 1965: 2-3). They found 
these functions to be "planning, organizing and executing, " organizing effectively 
meaning 'the division and ordering of labour', and executing being, by its AMA 
definition, "synonyinous with controlling" (Appley 1954: 11). Within a decade Mee's 
(1963) study of "writers, consultants, industrialists and 'academicians"' confirmed that 
these fundamental functions of Management were 'true' because they were accepted by 
most of his respondents to be so when they were put to them as such. The pioneering 
historians of Management wrote in this environment, with aims, methods and particular 
appreciations of the object of their inquiries that could not but see only that which related 
to Management thus defined. 
Koontz (1964), for example, whose prolific output from the 1950s to the 1980s 
mark him out as a"tracer element' throughout Management, admitted that his project was 
"influenced by the concern that the development of management theory and research was 
going off in many directions, with confusion, interschool rivalries, and wasted research 
efforts". The ultimate purpose of his quest for unity was "increasing efficiency" which 
was also the reason for developing Management theory and the "goal of all managers" 
(Koontz & O'Donnell 1974: 7). " 
18 Koontz (Koontz & O'Donnell 1974: 7) went on to make the curious claim that "since in all fields of human 
cooperation, efficiency of group effort lags far behind that of machines, application of principles of management will 
further human progress". 
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Urwick's historical aim was "to demonstrate that the body of knowledge about 
management is sufficiently large to make it a more scientific, more unified field than was 
commonly supposed" via the "collection, consolidation, and correction of [existing] 
principles of managemenf'. To "crystallize the similar concepts that had been 
independently developed, thereby giving them more credence and serving to mold them 
into a system of managerial thought" (in George 1972: xii, 142-3). He believed 
Management theorists should "apply the methods of thought developed by the physical 
sciences so as to build a store of general principles, arrived at by induction, that can then 
lift management from the plane of empiricism and tradition" (Urwick 1937: 49; 1956: ix; 
1960: 12). He viewed organising as a process of "subdividing all the activities necessary 
to any purpose and arranging them in groups which may be assigned to individuals... in a 
cold-blooded, detached spirit" like the preparation of an "engineering design" (Urwick 
1956: 289-91; 1947). Further, Urwick's regular co-author, Luther Gulick (in Gross 1964: 
120), sums up the corresponding purpose of Management succinctly: "whether public or 
private, the basic 'good' is efficiency". 
It is not surprising, therefore, that Urwick, "an early disciple of Taylor" (Kelly 
1968: 18), identified Management's pioneers as those first concerned with applying the 
discourse of reason' to the problems of industrial management, to bring an adequate 
intelligence to the control of the forces released by a mechanised economy" (Urwick & 
Brech 1951: 9): Taylor and Fayol, in other words. Thus, Urwick wove their thinking to 
form his history's ideological template. Fayolian managerial tasks - forecasting, planning, 
organisation (i. e., the division of labour), directing and control - provided a means of 
categorisation (George 1972). Taylor's ideas provided Urwick (1947) with what 
Management should strive for, its evolutionary meta-narrative: 'scientificity'. Hence, 
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Urwick effectively wrote the history of his own beliefs. Despite occasionally suggesting 
as much (e. g., Child 1969), later historians still followed his lines. 
When Chandler came to the fore, Management histories had largely been 
concerned with tales of individual businesses and entrepreneurs (Greiner 1972). Arguing 
that "historians ha[d] provided social scientists with little empirical data on which to base 
generalizations or hypotheses concerning the administration of great enterprises [and had 
not] formulated many theories or generalizations of their own", Chandler (1962: 1) 
proposed "an examination of the way different enterprises carried out the sai)ie activity". 
He subsequently provided a "spur to generalization extraordinary in its impact" (Harvey 
& Jones 1990: 12; Jones 1997). However, it was not so much that Chandler discovered 
the generality that others had not be clever enough to see, as his background and Modem 
definition of the object of his inquiry that lead him to see commonalities. 
Chandler was greatly influenced by Talcott Parsons, for whom he worked as a 
graduate student, was even greater. Parsons introduced him to structural-functionalist 
sociology and to the theories of Weber, Durkheim, Taylor, Mayo and Barnard. It is 
perhaps not surprising that Chandler (1962: 1) should define his role as "to provide social 
scientists with empirical data on which to base generalizations or hypotheses". McCraw 
(1988: 19-21) suggests that Chandler's "absorption of Weber's maxim that bureaucracy 
represents the institutionalization of rationalism" caused a "lifelong preoccupation with 
rationality". Indeed, Chandler (1977) came to assume that managers were so rational that 
he described them as seeking to "perfect their techniques" (an expression repeated 23 
times in The Visible Haiid). His notion of perfection amounted to a standard that 
evaluated techniques according to their productive efficiency and Darwinian survival. If a 
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technique contributed to material growth and was used for a long time, it had been 
perfected and its existence within the business enviromnent was assured (Waring 1991). 
The object of Chandler's inquiries was also particularly Modernist. "Modem 
business enterprise is easily defined", he claims on page one of The Visible Hand (1977). 
"As 1 indicates [shown here as Figure 24], it has two specific characteristics: it contains 
many distinct operating units and it is managed by a hierarchy of salaried executives". 
The figure (a replica of one from Strategy and Structure), is a complete reflection of 
Diderot's "Tree of Knowledge" (see Figure 16, pg. 123), the central disciplining core 
enabling unified specialisation along pre-detennined lines. Chandler (1962) recognised 
that his concerns, thus defined, were somewhat particular. Subsequently, however, his 
work gained such kudos that later historians will understand him to be defining the field 
of research for the history of Management in general. 
Those few critics who have sought to doubt the visibilities described have 
generally been rebuked through applying the very criteria to which these visibilities 
relate. Pre-empting any who might criticise his boundaries, Urwick (Urwick & Brech 
1951: 177; 1953: 222), while always being keen to be seen to appeal to scientific logic 
rather than reportage of opinions, is not shy of twisting back to popular beliefs to justify 
his views. He states that critics of Management should note that "[w]ith every decade it 
becomes clearer that those who believe in management in the modem sense are 
'inherently in line with the march of events"'. Child (1969: 27) similarly justifies 
concentrating only on "industrial management" because "in this it adheres to the 
predominant emphasis in management thought". 
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idea that a managerial revolution occurred in the mid and late 19th century in America 
(John 1997). Of those who do not question this discontinuity but question whether it did 
in fact mark an advance, perhaps the most vociferous have been Piore and Sabel (1984). 
They contend that crossing from labour-intensive craft manufacture to capital-intensive 
production was a mistake and advocate moving back toward more flexible, labour 
intensive production. However, what is primarily a moral argument has been processed in 
standard fashion by the majority of historians. Piore and Sabel are criticised for 
neglecting to provide any quantitative demonstration that craft production could be 
economically competitive with bureaucratic production (Williams et al. 1987). 
IV. Counter-histoty2. Taylor and Roosevelt's particular world 
President Roosevelt, in his address to the Governors at the 
White House, prophetically remarked that "The 
conservation of our national resources is only preliminary 
to the larger question of national efficiency". 
F. W. Taylor, opening line The Principles ofScientific 
Management (1911). 
Looking in the manner described above, it is not surprising that historians should see 
Taylor's (1911) Principles ofScientific Managenient as Management's origin. Taylor was 
the first to study and develop theories of Management scientifically and to do so against 
the universal, objective, and hence, unquestionable criterion of efficiency. 
Acknowledging President Roosevelt may seem a simple opening demonstration of the 
importance of the subject matter to follow, but the nature of this grand origin may be 
better revealed with a knowledge of the contingent relationship between the President and 
the engineer, and the engineer and a lawyer named Louis Brandeis. Scientific 
Management, rather than being an objective discovery of the foundational attributes of 
Management, is the coming together of the interests of these three men in a particular 
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culture faced with specific problems. 
Theodore Roosevelt was the most successful politician in what is referred to as 
the Progressive Movement during what is now called the Progressive Era in American 
history (generally, 1890-1920). The United States had grown on the back of a laissez- 
faire economic outlook and the assumption that the country's natural resources were 
inexhaustible (Ekirch 1974). The Progressive Movement developed in response to the 
problems that this psyche had caused by the end of the 1800s. Namely the ad hoc and 
self-serving development of newly mapped resources in the West by particular business 
interests, and, partly in relation to this exploitation, glaring social and political abuses 
fostered by rampant big-business lobbying (Hofstadter 1962). In hindsight, Roosevelt (in 
Andrews 1958) claimed that "The relation of the conservation of natural resources to the 
problems of national efficiency had not yet dawned on the public mind". One of the main 
reasons why it had not yet dawned was that Roosevelt had yet to employ his great flair 
for publicity and weaving expedients to promote this view to the American public (Barck 
Blake 1965). 
In response to the problems of the day, Roosevelt's platform for the 1901 
Presidential Election was the progressive refonn of government practices and national 
conservation. The momentum granted by his winning the election helped him to quickly 
bring forward his Reclamation Act, which was passed in 1902 so as to centralise the 
development of new lands (Andrews 1958). However, the conservation programme soon 
ran into formidable obstacles as business interests, other economic groups and Western 
politicians who saw it as retarding growth, began to organise against it. 
The psyche that had led to the problems that Roosevelt sought to address was well 
set. American nationality had increasingly absorbed the ideas of individuality, the 
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freedom to do as one wanted, to stake one's own claims and develop things as the 
individual saw fit and as his savvy allowed. Disavowal of these ideas left one's patriotism 
open to question. As Samuel Haber's (1964: xii) study of this period observes, these ideas 
"could not with ease be attacked frontally, they could [only] be outflanked - and this most 
successfully when almost inadvertently". At this point in time the term "efficiency" 
provided the best possible means for such a manoeuvre - for promoting centralisation and 
conservation without appearing anti-American. 
As Haber (1964: ix-x) explains, the development of efficiency in the decades 
either side of 1900 changed the term in such a way that "efficient and good came closer to 
meaning the same thing in these years than in any other period". Efficiency had for some 
time been used as a personal attribute: to describe somebody who was effective, who got 
things done. In the last quarter of the 19th century a concept of mechanical efficiency 
developed out of the application of the laws of thennodynamics to the technology of the 
steam engine. This became intermingled with the previous meaning in such a way as to 
indicate a general objective measure of effectiveness - the ratio of output relative to 
energy inputs or, when applied to business, the output-input ratio of dollars. Eventually, 
just as the efficiency of a machine or an individual could be related to the way their parts 
combined, efficiency came to also signify a relationship between men - particularly 
"social harmony". Efficiency had, in the short space of two or three decades, come to be a 
wide-ranging term that, through association with machines, had been granted an air of 
benign and unquestionable objectivity and, through its association with social harmony, a 
sense of obvious 'rightness' not based on any particular interests or beliefs. 
Roosevelt's conservation policies, lacking public support, were running aground. 
However, toward the end of the first decade of the 20th century, Roosevelt began to focus 
210 
the attention of the electorate on what he had come to see as the 'other side' of 
conservation. Roosevelt (1910) now pitched that "conservation meant development as 
much as it does protection" and that the best forrn of development should obviously be 
one that develops the most out of the least. In this way, Gifford Pinchot (in Ekirch 1974: 
150), Roosevelt's advisor and most enthusiastic lieutenant, described how both 
"government and business [came] to accept conservation in terms of simple efficiency 
and conservation [came to] stand for the same kind of practical commonsense 
management of this country by the people that every business man stands for in his own 
business". Interpreted in this way, conservation as national efficiency appeared to: 
provide a popular scientific answer to the new national problems of the twentieth 
century. It appealed not only to the Progressive reformer's nationalism and 
patriotism, but also to his interest in social control and planning. It was 
democratic in a nationalistic rather than an individualistic sense (Ekirch 1974: 
150-1). 
So successful was this tack that by the time of Roosevelt's Seventh Annual 
Message to Congress which sought to show that "the conservation of our natural 
resources and their proper use constitute the fundamental problem which underlies almost 
every other problem of our National life", Roosevelt was happy to state that the 
conservation of national resources was preliminary to the larger question of national 
efficiency (the line that Taylor begins The Principles of Scientific Management with). By 
1908, Progressivism, a manifesto that had always been difficult to define, had come 
primarily to mean "efficiency plus a commitment to collective betterment through the 
application of the latest advances in science" and leaders in most fields of endeavour 
were afraid to be thought not "Progressive" (Ekirch 1974; Calvert 1972). 
His quest for conservation reinvigorated, Roosevelt announced that a National 
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Conservation Congress would take place in December 1908. In so doing, the Progressive 
leadership, always keen to associate their cause with the latest and best in "expert 
knowledge", turned their eyes to the professions, who they now accused of hiding behind 
their expertise as an excuse for inaction on social problems. They particularly looked to 
engineering, and mechanical engineers were given pride of place at the Congress (Calvert 
1972). 
If the Congress had been held 30 years earlier, it is doubtful that there would have 
been any engineers involved. Elevated by now being considered scientific, the 
development of professional associations and new sources of recruitment as the 
engineering schools at the land-grant colleges finally took hold (with the scientific 
association encouraging more boys to take engineering up as a career). Mechanical 
engineering had been miraculously converted from a trade to a profession in less than 20 
years (Calvert 1972). Further, although engineers frequently complained about a lack of 
status and public recognition, the period from the 1870s through the 1920s was a golden 
age of prestige. Everybody knew the stories of heroic engineers like the Roeblings and 
the Brooklyn Bridge. If anything, the image of engineering declined after 1930, its high 
standing superseded in the public eye by new sciences. 
The Association of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) were impressed by Roosevelt, 
and, for an organisation not reknowned for quick unanimity and consensus, were quick to 
agree to throw its weight behind his programme. The Society president declared that 
ASME members must "direct themselves to the larger interests of humanity" and fall in 
with conservation (Haber 1964). It was not a difficult decision, however. Falling in line 
enabled engineers to encourage patronage for themselves as members of an important 
profession at the cost of supporting a programme whose emphasis on efficiency seemed 
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to further elevate their expertise. 
One engineer enthused by his profession's developing social significance and 
political influence was Frederick Taylor. Taylor's greatest technological achievement had 
been the development of high-speed carbon tools that permitted a more rapid cutting of 
steel, greater precision, and hence the possibility of turning out interchangeable parts 
(Clough 1953). He also had had complementary ideas as to how men might be best 
arranged to perform work tasks. In 1895 he present his first paper at an ASME conference 
on "A Piece Rate System". This contained the gist of what would become the Principles 
although it was much more overtly moralistic and personalised ("if a man won't do what 
is right", Taylor said, "make him" - in Copely 1923: 183). Those who heard the paper 
considered it to be nothing special. Continuing with the themes presented in 1895, Taylor 
published a book called Shop Management in 1903 that achieved a loyal but limited 
following. In 1910 the ASME shelved a paper by Taylor on the grounds that there was 
nothing new or interesting in it. As Haber (1964: ix-x) concludes, "the checkered career 
of the Taylor system might have been completely disheartening to the Taylorites had it 
not been for the fullness of response that scientific management found among the 
[Progressive] reformers and their public". A clever lawyer named Louis Brandeis, in what 
became known as The Eastern Rate Case, would stir up this 'fullness'. 
In the decade preceding America's entry into World War I, the high cost of living 
and persistent price rises were perhaps the most talked about public issues in the U. S., 
particularly among middle-class and professional families whose incomes were least 
responsive to general price changes at this time. This group provided the most vocal 
segment of the population arguing for reform and their attention was aroused and given a 
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focal point by The Eastern Rate Case of 19 10-11. 
Action was brought before the Interstate Commerce Commission against the 
railroad companies' proposed increase in freight rates in the northeastern states. In early 
hearings other counsel had presented an argument based on a maze of inassimilable 
statistics along traditional lines, emphasising the hardship that an increase would bring to 
fanners and other shippers. Unfortunately this line was not particularly successful in 
capturing public opinion. The general conception was that fanners had never had it so 
good. Brandeis, who had come directly to represent eastern business associations from 
working with Pinchot on his and Roosevelt's conservation campaign, where efficiency 
had become something of a buzzword, was more resourceful. He went on the offensive. 
Even if the railroads could justify the increase, Brandeis argued that the solutions to 
everybody's problems lay in introducing efficiency into railroading, and he promised to 
show how the railroads could actually save themselves a million dollars by doing so -a 
boast that lifted the case from inside the daily papers to the front page. 
As an interested public watched, Brandeis paraded engineers and businessmen 
like Harrington Emerson who had employed time study techniques in his factories, to 
argue his case. Taylor's ideas also caught Brandeis' eye. However, Brandeis, the expert 
publicist, recognised their lack of appeal. Taylor's methods had generally been called by 
such names as "functional management" and "the Taylor System". However, when 
Brandeis, in an informal meeting with some of Taylor's followers, asked for an attractive 
label with which to refer to Taylor's methods, the more commonly used names were 
rejected and "scientific management" was chosen (Drury 1922: 55). 
Brandeis was well aware that attaching "scientific" would strengthen Taylor's 
appeal by suggesting disinterestedness, rigour and a method employing the power of laws 
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of nature to enable Man's control. This was, after all, the age where Modernism was at its 
height, where Lippmann's (1914) Drift and Mastery captured the zeitgeist (Lippmann 
argued that the rise of science, "the only discipline which gives any assurance that from 
the same set of facts men will come approximately to the same conclusion", meant that 
"change had become a matter of deliberate experiment"). The phrase "social science", 
used to describe a group of new academic disciplines, had caught the public fancy and the 
adjective "scientific" went far in ensuring any appeal to the public of at least an interested 
hearing (Mowry 1958). Subsequently, "efficiency" and "scientific management" became 
the two catchwords of the popular excitement that followed the case. 
On the crest of this wave of interest, Taylor quickly released The Prhiciples of 
Scientific Management in 1911. There was nothing very new about the content. 
Effectively the work was that which the ASME had rejected the year before, which was 
in itself a continuity of the kernel of the 1895 paper. However, it had a new title and the 
'old fashioned' moralism of his system had been toned down to give it the appearance of 
a neutral device. The focus on efficiency was now also completely overt. Indeed, 
efficiency is the object of the first five paragraphs of Taylor's 1911 introduction (see 
Figure 25). Prhiciples was serialised in the Ameficayi Magazine just as what 
commentators call "an efficiency craze" or a "secular Great Awakening" hit America like 
a "Rash flood" (Haber 1964: 52). Roosevelt's continued exhortations, The Eastern Rate 
Case and the scientific-mechanistic optimism of the day saw the spontaneous creation of 
efficiency societies, journals devoted to efficiency and groups from women's consumer 
leagues to school boards to the Protestant church associations exhorting their constituents 
to investigate their operations toward becoming more efficient. Further, Taylor's 
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"President Roosevelt, in his address to the Governors at 
the White House, prophetically remarked that 'The conservation 
of our national resources is only preliminary to the larger 
question of national efficiency. I 
The whole country at once recognized the importance of 
conserving our material resources and a large movement has 
been started which will. be effective in accomplishing this 
object. As yet, however, we have but vaguely appreciated the 
importance of the larger question of increasing our national 
efficiency., 
We can see our forests vanishing, our water-powers going 
to waste, our soil being- carried by floods into the sea; and 
the end of our coal and our iron is in sight. But our larger 
wastes of human effort, which go on every day through such of 
our acts as are blundering, ill-directed, or inefficient, and 
which Mr. Roosevelt refers to as a. lack of national 
efficiency, I are less visible, less tangible, and are but 
vaguely appreciated. 
We can see 'and feel the waste of material things. 
Awkward, inefficient, or ill-directed movements of men, 
however, leave nothing visible or tangible behind them. Their 
appreciation calls for an act of memory, and effort of 
imagination. And for this reason, even though our daily loss 
from this source is greater than from our waste of material 
things, the one has stirred us deeply, while the other has 
moved us but little. 
As yet there has been no public agitation for 'greater 
national efficiency, ' no meetings have been called to consider 
how this is to be brought about. And still there are signs 
that the need for greater efficiency is widely felt-,, 
FIGURE 25: OPENING PARAGRAPHS OF TAYLOR'S 1911 'PRINCIPLES OF 
SCIENTIFIC NIANAGEMENT". 
Scientific Management now appeared to be the most obvious mechanism for achieving 
this aim. 
The development of efficiency had enabled a programme that had some few years 
previous seemed stymied through being perceived as anti-American, to become 
quintessentially American. The extent to which efficiency had become a feature of 
America's (or at least its middle-classes) psyche at this point, is illustrated by histories of 
efficiency that were briskly written which installed Benjamin Franklin, that most 
American of Americans, as the "Father of Efficiency" (Haber 1964). 
So far had things turned that Roosevelt now drew on efficiency in order to give 
substance to the political issue that inspired his later years: the articulation of a "New 
Nationalism" or "Americanization". A burst of immigration around the turn of the 
century had led to increasingly obvious ethnic communities and what Roosevelt called 
"hyphenated-Americans" (e. g., Italian-Americans, Irish-Americans). Roosevelt (in 
Hagedorn 1957) began to speak of there being "no such thing as a hyphenated American 
who is a good American"; of how "throughout our whole land we must have fundamental 
common purposes". He appealed "to all Americans to join in the common effort for the 
common good", claiming that "The prime problem of our nation [now was] to get the 
right type of good citizenship, and, to get it, we must have progress, and our public men 
must be genuinely progressive". What this good all-Americanism actually meant was 
difficult to articulate until efficiency was applied to the problem. Roosevelt (in Hofstadter 
1963: 132-48) began to relate efficiency to his New Nationalism: 
National efficiency... a necessary result of the principle of conservation widely 
applied... will determine our failure and success as a nation. National efficiency 
has to do, not only with natural resources and with men, but it is equally 
concerned with institutions. The state must be made efficient [and] the American 
people are right in demanding that New Nationalism. 
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By the time that Americanization, as a programme for nation-building, made its first 
appearance in US politics on the Progressive party platfonn of 1912, 'efficiency' was one 
of its foremost catch-cries. Indeed, Progressivism's most famous slogan: "100% 
Americanism" was proudly derived from Emerson's popular phrase "100% Efficiency" 
"Higham 1955). k-n 
While World War I made efficiency appear common sense internationally (in 
Britain interest in Scientific Management boomed - by 1916 even the Fabian society 
offered its conditional endorsement; in France Clemenceau ordered that Taylor's 
principles be applied in military plants (Seldes 1917; Thompson 1917)), the efficiency 
craze soon fizzled out in the US. By 1920 social mores had shifled and the efficiency 
associations and journals had largely vanished. 
While Taylor's system retreated from the public domain back to the factory and 
the use of efficiency in the sense of 'social-hannony' declined, the particular nuances of 
this period had lasting effect. That "Americans love efficiency" in its mechanistic- 
effective sense slipped into the national fabric, to the extent that "serious students of 
American character have come to see such statements as obvious universal 
commonplaces that deaden our understanding of Americans rather than enlivening it" 
(Haber 1964: ix). In addition, this specific moment has now come to be known as (the 
point in time) when the universal basis of Management was discovered. However, it was 
certainly not seen this way at the time. In 1917, when Seldes (1917) reported on the 
spread of Scientific Management into Britain, he had to indicate the strange sense in 
which he was using the word efficiency by labeling it "American Efficiency". 
It is important to emphasise that the events that cluster around this period so as to 
217 
be seen by Management historians as a key point of origin are particular politically 
contingent responses to the specific problems of one society at a specific point in time. 
For an engineering community keen to solidify and advance its status in American 
society, Roosevelt's conservation initiative offered a programme to which the engineer 
could not only contribute but which placed him near the top of the tree in terms of 
deten-nining the future development of society. For politicians trying to create a program 
of reform without an obvious appeal to conscience or particular interests, without 
appearing against long-established American values, engineering knowledge of efficiency 
and Taylor's Scientific Management had an intrinsic appeal. The Progressives developed 
the notion of social control into a programme of planning that legitimised the role of the 
politician who sought to centralise government with himself as the overseer at the top. In 
Haber's (1964: xi) words: 
The progressive movement is often described as an attempt to revitalize 
government by the people... However, alongside the attempt to bring government 
close to the people was an attempt to keep government somewhat distant. The 
second tendency was usually explained away as necessary in order to achieve 
efficiency in the name of scientific management. 
The science of efficiency or scientific management legitimated a view of democracy that 
pleased both politicians and engineers and provided a platform that not only placated the 
general public - it positively excited its most vocal slice. This set of ideas also legitimated 
the elevation of the professions and expertise controlled by the middle-classes and 
university educated. 
Thus, Scientific Management came into being to accommodate particular interests 
that believed in the need for an ultimate authority 'on top' to the environment of political 
democracy in which ultimate authority is believed to lie 'at the bottom'. In other words, it 
emerged to legitimise Modernism's triangular-hierarchical bureaucratic form. It 
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legitimised the idea that those with 'expertise' should operate above the masses so as to 
ensure the optimal achievement of the greatest good, as measured by objective universal 
criteria such as the efficient use of resources, even if this impinged upon individual 
liberty. It legitimised the particular form that Management's pioneering historians of the 
1950s saw as their object: the universal form or organisation that Management was 
concemed with. 
Scientific Management was not a scientific discovery that was the first to discover 
universal principles so as to give birth to the study of Management in 1911, and beyond 
the specificities described above, it was certainly not new. It was a more publicity- 
conscious continuation of the ideas that Taylor articulated at least 16 years previously. 
Even the term Scientific Management was not new. In 1900 vice-president Roosevelt had 
called for "scientific management" of the tariff (in Debs 1948), but at this point it aroused 
no great interest. Nor was Taylor's system particularly scientific. While he fashioned his 
methods after the exact sciences and this attachment gave his system the appearance and 
some of the 'inevitability' and objectivity of science and technology, this obscured rather 
than eliminated his bias. Indeed, in response to a 1912 ASME report on time study that 
referenced Smith and Babbage but made no mention of Taylor (claiming that his work 
offered "nothing new"), Taylor argued that he used time study for analytical rather than 
descriptive purposes. While Babbage was content with gross times of actual performance, 
Taylor claimed that he broke the job into component parts, tested them (i. e., timed 
different approaches) and re-engineered the job as it should ideally (i. e., most efficiently) 
be done. In other words, there was nothing particularly inductive about the development 
of Taylor's "laws". They were based only upon his personally specific, and timely, 
predilection: that efficiency was morally good. 
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V. Counter-history 3. Management history's anticipation of thepresent 
When we look for recorded administrative thought in a 
more general sense, we find that in most cases it is part of 
the rich tapestry of philosophic (or even religious) 
commentary on man and his relations to fellowmen, state 
and society. At times we find flashes of intellectual 
lightning that directly illuminate major aspects of 
administration. At other times... we find writings, that 
relating to organization and their administration, are 
presented in a broader context and with a different 
vocabulary than is usually used today. 
Gross, The Managing of Organizations (1964). 
Once the fact that Management began, seriously, with the likes of Taylor and the arrival 
of organisations that were more efficient than the market was established, people began 
to seek the history of these events so as to provide them with greater gravity. In Gross's 
words, historians claimed to look for the "intellectual lightning" of the past - not only 
those flashes that speak of our present concerns but those that speak with a "different 
vocabulary". However, as the history of Management has been written and solidified, the 
possibility of different vocabularies has faded rather than increased. As George (1972: 
xv) points out: "Ferreting out managerial thought today is no easy task because men, 
though managers, did not write about or recognise management as such until fairly recent 
times. The management historian must therefore interpret man's actions in a managerial 
light. And this selective process makes the whole what it is". As Management historians 
have been very Modem ferrets, their interpretations have seen only those instances that 
correspond with or anticipate Modem practice. In a history of the sort developed by 
Management it should be remembered that light only travels from the present into the 
past so as to see that which confinns our current 'heights'. After all, it is only our Modem 
agreement as to what Management is that allow us to identify something as "lightning". 
Thus, "this selective process that makes the whole what it is" has made Management, 
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even in Ancient times, wholly Modem. 
Consequently, Urwick's histories looked prior to Taylor and Fayol, only to see 
when the emergence of their principles was discerned. For example, he parochially held 
up Babbage's "remarkable achievement" as having said most of what Taylor would say 
some 70 years later as an indication that Britain did play a role in the shaping of 
Management (Urwick & Brech 1951). George (1968: 76-7) similarly describes Babbage 
as "the harbinger of the new scientific management", noteworthy for "predating" or 
"preceding" aspects of Taylor's work. Owen is important because he anticipates 
personnel management; Boulton and Watt because their factory represented Modem 
organisation "in embryo"; Whitney because he anticipated the factory system; and 
Jefferson because he anticipated Whitney (and was a "first-class American" to boot). The 
reason for Chandler's pre-1850 material is shown by the name of his Harvard course: 
"The Coming of Managerial Capitalism" (Chandler et al. 1996). 
With like-minded hindsight, Caplow (1964) developed his 'principle of 
organisation' (effectively an organisation chart 6 la Chandler) and found it "feasible to 
reconstruct tables of organization for the towns and city states of medieval and early 
modem times, or of early navies and banking houses". He (1964: 51-5) explained that 
while "the table of organization seems to be a modem device... the concept it represents 
is very ancient. A famous example is Exodus xviii: 14-22" - Jethro's Management lecture 
to Moses (see also Dale's (1964: 10-13) use of an organisation chart to see the "Israelites' 
restructuring" along the lines suggested by Moses the "consultant"). Thus, looking in this 
way, we can see that "[e]ven the bible refers to management concepts" (Robbins 1991: 
31), allowing writers to confin-n the age-old importance of Management: "[w]ould you 
believe that organization theory issues were addressed in the bible? Well they were! " 
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(Robbins 1983: 32). To go back to George's Continuum, we might remember Jesus' 
expert use of human relations and his application of the principle of unity of command. 
Urwick (Urwick & Brech 1953: 216) claimed that "the workshops and markets of Greece 
and Rome and of earlier civilizations had to be organized, to be managed, just as are the 
factories and shops of today". However, is this really how the Ancients thought? 
One of the historians' most Ancient examples of Management, the Egyptian 
pyramids, provides a good example of how the intellectual lightening that Gross wrote of 
merely confirms Modem beliefs as universal. The building of the pyramids is typically 
discussed because a large group of people were ordered towards a common goal, labour 
was broken down, standardized and specialized, and a minimum wage was set (e. g., 
George 1968). Robbins (1991: 31) describes the "breakthrough" represented by the 
pyramids thus: "someone had to pLan what was to be done, organize people and materials 
to do it, lead and dLire! A the workers, and impose controls to ensure that everything was 
done as planned". Robbins wonders "[w]ho told each worker what he or she was 
supposed to do? Who ensured that there would be enough stones at the site to keep 
workers busy? The answers to questions such as these is Management". The implication 
is that these are the questions all civilisations have always been most concerned with. 
However, to categorise and discuss the building of pyramids from the point-of-view of 
labour division, standardisation and specialisation is to miss any different meanings of 
work in that society at that time. If one stops to think, perhaps the most remarkable thing 
about the building of the pyramids is why they were built? What beliefs possessed people 
to create these structures? But Management does not enter into discussion about 
particular values or traditional ends. With such a view, a discussion on the 'different 
vocabulary' that could incorporate the importance of particular spiritual beliefs, that may 
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have been inseparable from the work 'itself, cannot be seen. Indeed, upon reflection, 
perhaps we should be a little disappointed that great civilisations like the Egyptians and 
the Chinese can only offer us what we already know, that Management is for all people 
always and only about planning, directing, coordinating and controlling (George 1968). It 
is not a particularly rich tapestry. 
In a more general way, Mooney's history also blotted out any alternative light. 
Mooney (1947: ix-x) introduced his history thus: "Organization in the formal sense 
means order, and its corollary, an organized and orderly procedure. To find and correlate 
the formal principles that make this order is the aim of this book". It is no surprise then 
that he should find formal principles of organisation, and that they should be: co- 
ordination, scalar hierarchy and the functional division of labour. While Mooney (1947: 
4) had to admit that Ancient people did not speak in these Modem terms, even this was 
used to add power to his argument: "That the great organizers of history applied these 
principles unconsciously proves only that their technique was inherent in their genius". 
Thus, he went on to claim that his principles were universal and consequently, would 
hold true in the future as well. 
While George (1968: 7) felt that Mooney's work did not pay enough mind to the 
"human side of work", he admits that "subsequent writers [including himselfl borrowed 
freely from Mooney's analysis and have [subsequently] used his concepts as a framework 
on which to hang more humanistic approaches to the managerial problem of 
organizatioif'. Indeed, in more recent times, Wren (1994: 428) has had no qualms about 
declaring that "The managerial functions [which Wren takes to be planning, organising, 
leading, controlling] form a convenient framework for a summary discussion of the past 
and future", let alone the present. No problem is seen in viewing the past in tenns of the 
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present. The quotation from Merrill's (1960) Classics in Managenjent that began this 
work (p. 1), that "the principal directions in which management thought will develop in 
the foreseeable future have already been pointed out by the pioneer thinkers who provide 
the substance of this book", is more than mere empty rhetoric. It represents a sermon on 
future development. The historical assumptions that underlie our present understanding 
of Management shape our visibility of the past. Chapter 8 will investigate in more detail 
the way they shape the future. However, at this point it is enough to reiterate that it was 
not so much that the Ancient Egyptians and Chinese saw things in terms of planning, 
directing, the division of labour and controlling, as the accepted history of Management 
would have us believe; as that it suited historians of a field that was attempting to 
establish itself to find that grand old civilisations should see Management as they saw it, 
albeit more simplistically. 
VI. Counter-history 4. Men made Modern 
SUAEMIARY 
... 8. Max Weber defined the ideal bureaucracy as having division of labour, a clearly defined hierarchy, detailed 
rules and regulations and impersonal relationships.... 
REVIEW QUESTIONS 
... 7. Describe Weber's ideal organization. 
In a standard textbook procedure, Robbins and Mukeji (1990: 42-3) conclude each 
chapter of Managing Organizations: Neiv Challenges and Perspectives with 'summary 
points' and 'review questions'. The above excerpts are taken from the end of Chapter 2, 
"The Evolution of Management Thought". One crucial point on this evolution is Weber's 
definition of the ideal bureaucracy, as "Summary Point" 8 makes clear. However, one can 
see how Weber is made a contributor to 'The Continuum' in the answer expected of 
"Review Question7' 7. At the end of this chapter, students are expected to know that 
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Weber's "ideal organizatioW' (not his "ideal bureaucracy") exhibits bureaucratic 
principles. In this way Weber can at once be seen as a founding father of Management 
and a simple man whose thinking has been moved beyond. This can easily be countered. 
In addition to the marking of Taylor's work at 1911, some years after its 
substance was conceived, it is worth noting the year in which Weber is placed on 
Management time-lines: 1947, the same year that Urwick's series on Scientific 
Management began and the post-war republication of Mooney and Taylor works. That 
Weber had been dead for 27 years makes 1947 seem an unusual choice, until one 
recognises that this was the year that Talcott Parsons' American translation of The Theoty 
of Social and Economic Organization appeared. In the 1950s, when scholars in the 
fledgling subject began to systematically trace the development of Management, they 
turned to Parsons' recent translation of Weber to legitimate their work (Clegg 1990). 
However, these scholars only set upon specific aspects of Weber's work. Weber's 
individual projects were set against the theme that civilisations could be seen in terms of 
the balance between rationality and magic, a model that resonates with Nietzsche's 
Apollo/Dionysis framework (Weber also did not see the problem as choosing one side 
over the other, but rather how to appreciate both). However, Weber is constantly referred 
to in Management texts with respect to his investigations into bureaucracy as the most 
rational form of organising, but not in ten-ns of the other side of this coin that Weber (in 
MacRae 1974: 87) struggled with: the corresponding "driving out of magic from things". 
Weber (1948: 337) was sure that bureaucracy was "always, from a formal technical point 
of view, the most rational type". However, he only believed that this made it the obvious 
or inevitable form because the particular value set of his times: the manifestation of a 
"victorious capitalism" resting on "mechanical foundations" where the "'objective' 
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discharge of business primarily means a discharge of business according to calculable 
rules and without regard for persons" (Weber 1930: 181-2; 1948: 215) made it so. For 
Weber (1948: 214), there were still other forms of organisation. Bureaucracy was one 
specific mode, exhibiting only a "purely technical superiority over other forms", but this 
was the criterion that Modernity, and, hence, Management historians, brought to the fore. 
For those later theorists who read Parson's freshly translated Theory of Social and 
Economic Organization but lacked the broad historical overview that Weber possessed 
(or a knowledge of his earlier works that placed this work in context), bureaucracy 
defined what organisation was, or at least where it started from. By the 1950s, 
bureaucratic rationality was no longer regarded as a specific way of seeing but as the 
truthful objective way. Correspondingly, ends like efficiency and mechanistic means like 
functional sub-division, hierarchy and standardisation, were not particular culture-bound 
ways of assessing organisation (remember that by this point Mooney had 'proved' this by 
seeing them in the subconscious of great thinkers from all walks). 
Weber is thus cast in Management as an "organizational theorist" or Management 
expert (DuBrin 1984; Wren 1994; Greenberg & Baron 1995) whose "main concern [was] 
the nature of bureaucracies" (Clutterbuck & Crainer 1990: 18). Moreover, his expertise 
made him able to see the universality of bureaucracy as the rational and hence only or 
best form of organisation. By the 1950s, the nature of the age and those doing the 
interpreting, meant that only particular aspects of his broad ranging concerns were seen, 
those that supported the prevailing view. A more technologically optimistic age saw 
Weber's pessimism dismissed, watered down or not dwelt upon. In this way, Weber was 
constituted as a precursor of Management, one of its legitimate forebears. By the late 
1960s, Weber was so distorted that respected theorists could complain that Weber "went 
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too far in advocating a machine-like organization" (Dale 1967: 12) and that he paid 
"repeated homage" to the "Taylor system" (Gerth & Mills 1954: 261; Gross 1964). He 
was criticised for advocating efficiency to too great an extent despite the fact that the 
Modem sense of efficiency was a term foreign to Weber's German tongue at the time he 
wrote (Albrow 1970). In this way his work could be shown to be naive in contrast to later 
new and improved ideas. 
Weber is not the only thinker shaped by a later age to confonn to the needs of a 
history of Management written after his death. One may have been surprised to see 
Machiavelli listed on George's Continuum at the head of this chapter. However, when 
one looks to see what George lists as his achievements, one can see how Machiavelli's 
thought is 'made to measure'. Apparently, "Machiavelli", according to George's ferreting 
(1972: 47), "gave us clear insight into the machinations of young prince-managers and 
distilled the thinking of the time into four managerial principles: (1) reliance on 
managerial consent, (2) cohesiveness, (3) leadership, and (4) will to survive". No mention 
is made of the un-Modern mode of thinking attributed to him earlier in this thesis. 
Other men get pulled into the fray on what seem quite tenuous grounds, often for 
little other reason than their being 'great Americans'. The obscure reference to Jefferson 
once writing a letter from France that reported 'a factory in embryo' has been mentioned. 
However, even more incredulous is the inclusion of Thomas Edison, the great American 
inventor. Despite Edison being prominent on the Management Continuum, all George 
(1972: 160) can find to say about him relates to his study of anti-submarine warfare, a 
study that even George admits "did not [even] have any noticeable impact on military 
operations". 
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Looking with hopeful hindsight may also reconfigure events. The American Civil 
War, regarded as a key moment in the making of Modem America, is noted as important 
to the history of Management because it spurred "considerable study of managerial 
methods as a means to raising productivity and coping with growing organisational scale 
and technological complexity" (Child 1969: 37). This may well be true but Chapter 7 
shows someone who was actually involved in the Civil War, taking from his experiences 
a quite different view of management than the one that is being countered here. 
VII Counter-history S. Not heconting a science 
It is scarcely too much to say that the most important 
index of a science is the state of its systematic theory. 
This includes the kinds and degrees of logical integration 
of the different elements which make it up. 
Parsons, The Structure ofSocial Action (1949). 
The sermon of development promoted by the history of Management tells us that 
Management's progress is connected to its increasing scientificity. Hence, while L. A. 
Appley, Head of the AMA, asks in the foreword to Merrill's (1960) Classics in 
Management, "should not the professional manager be familiar with the 'classic' body of 
management literature as the theologian is familiar with the Scriptures, the lawyer with 
Blackstone, the physician with Osler, and the educator with Plato? ", what Merrill calls 
the "straight-line progression" of Management "begins with Babbage... as exemplified in 
his essay on the division of labor [and the] application of the scientific method [that] 
brought management within the range of.. an institution based on a proved body of 
knowledge". Management must have classics, just like other fields, but Management's 
classics, unlike other fields, begin with the establishment of Modernity. This seems so 
obvious that Merrill and other historians never feel the need to justify why the Educator 
can start with Greek philosophy while the Manager must start with science. In keeping, 
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Koontz (1964) summed up at the end of Toward a Unified Themy of Manageniew, by 
reproducing the quotation from Parsons at the head of this section. He went on to claim 
that there "seemed to be a tacit recognition of Talcott Parson's statement which places the 
need for theory in the correct perspective". 
Despite the on-going sermon of scientificity, Koontz's thinking was somewhat 
wishful. A review of the discussions presented in the book indicates that the conference 
participants left as entrenched in their individual perspectives as when they arrived. Two 
years after the conference, Scott (1964: 485) lamented that "there does yet exist a single, 
widely accepted theory of organizations". The following year, Greenwood (1965: 27,3 1) 
described the continued "storm over management doctrines" and noted "organization 
experts" were continuing to band together in discussion groups in the hope of countering 
"the dangers of chronic schizophrenia". At the end of the 1960s, Child (1969: 144) 
claimed that "the problem of variations in terminology continues to trouble... the study of 
organization [and] management". In the 1970s, Bennis (1973) still described the nature of 
Management as diverse, inchoate, erratic and disorganised, "without a central theoretical 
armature or empirical base" and Miller's (1978) research indicated that organisation 
studies still lacked integration. Even Koontz (1980: 186) had to conclude that at the end 
of the 1970s, "despite some signs of hope the management theory jungle is still with us". 
Pfeffer (1982: 1) took up Koontz's cudgels in the 1980s, lamenting that "[t]he 
domain of organization theory is coming to resemble more of a weed patch than a well 
tended garden". Pfeffer sought to "focus research in ways that make the development and 
refutation of theory occur in a more efficient and faster manner" but, nevertheless, a 
decade later, he (1993: 608,599) was still bothered about Management still being 
"fragmented", not sharing the "consensus characterizing more paradigmatically 
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developed disciples": 
in part because of values that emphasize representativeness, inclusiveness, and 
theoretical and methodological diversity. Although these values are attractive 
ideals, there are [negative] consequences for the field's ability to make scientific 
progress. 
However, Pfeffer's call for paradigm consensus has sparked more "paradigm wars" and 
divisive debate within the field than ever before (Burrell 1996). While some may 
maintain the sennon that Management is still closing in, and must close, on scientific 
normality, after 40 years of attempted integration, it remains a 'doubtful science' at best. 
VIII. A web of regularity 
To use the language of Deleuze's Foucault from Chapter 2 (see Figure 4), the history of 
Management presents a strata of solely Modernist forms and views. The line of the 
outside that reflects the nature of the subject back to itself bounds the field in such a way 
as to only incorporate the Modem. The counter-history above has shown this to be a 
singular conception, based on accidents, quirks, particular perspectives and temporal 
contingencies. How then is Management's notion that it speaks and sees with the 
authority of grand origins and in a universal manner maintained? It is partly because of a 
web of links or formation that cuts across the domain of this history, Management and 
beyond, repeating the historical line thus described so regularly to the point of it hardly 
being heard. Management historians have cross-referenced one another religiously. The 
key moments of discontinuity are repeated implicitly in the professional journals of 
experts. The 'Continuum' is abbreviated in introductory textbooks for the benefit of 
initiates. The same boundaries are accepted by those critical of Management's power and 
the popular Management books that are read by those who exercise that power reinforce 
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them. Further, all of these works gain weight as they are re-issued in updated fonns. 
To begin, it should be noted that the historians of Management worked with few 
tangible reference points. The pioneering Chandler and Urwick were left to draw on the 
work of economic historians. Urwick (1956), for example, credits Roll (1930) for having 
pointed out the importance of Boulton and Watt, while Chandler was heavily influenced 
by Shumpeter (McCraw 1988 - this connection to economic history further shields the 
status of Management's Modem forms, as Chapter 7 will demonstrate). More recent 
historians legitimated their work through reference to the pioneers who struck out before 
them, in the process doing little more than embellishing their lines. George (1968) 
regularly cites Urwick, Merrill and Chandler's early work. Child (1971) saw few 
precedents for his study, but lists Urwick's as the first "significant history". Gross' 
(1964) often cites Urwick, as does Light (1966) for whom Urwick wrote a preface. And 
Wren's (1974) work, the last significant comprehensive volume on Management's 
history, takes liberally from Chandler, Urwick and both Sidney and H. R. Pollard. The 
influence of Chandler and Urwick continues to be felt. Wilson's (1995) British Business 
History explicitly models the development it depicts via a synthesis of Chandler and 
Urwick's evolutionary models. 
Management's historical boundaries are also effectively and quietly maintained 
by academic journals that have unquestioningly showed a heavy Anglo-centric emphasis 
on the period 1750-1914 (Church 1976; Slaven 1984). The British-based journal Business 
History has (as at 1996) published 344 papers over the previous 20 years. Of these, none 
focused on a period prior to 1675. No papers investigated thought systems not associated 
with a Modem world-view. In a recent review of the field published in this journal, 
Chandler's work was lauded as the "paradigm for future research" (Harvey & Jones 
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1990). Business History Review, published from Harvard, has printed 720 papers in its 41 
year history. Of these, three took as their object periods prior to the European 
Renaissance. None looked at the West prior to medieval times. Only one paper of the 
1064 reviewed, on Japanese feudal systems (Carosso 1973), looked beyond that which 
lead directly to or are an essential part of the Modem Western industrial experience. 
In 1995, The Journal of Management Histoty was launched with the expressed 
aim of "exploring the whole history of management thought", enabling "subscriber[s] to 
judge for [themselves] what contribution the major management theorists have made, and 
how their ideas have been built on or rejected by subsequent thinkers". However, who we 
are steered to see as the "major management theorists" is apparent in the selection of the 
first four special issues of the journal. These are devoted to Taylor, Fayol, Weber and 
"The Engineering Approach to Management". A good majority of the first 48 papers 
published (as at 1997) have Taylor, Scientific Management, Fayol or Weber as their 
object. Prominent on the editorial board are Wren and Brech. 
There are no explicitly marked out chronological boundaries put before 
prospective article writers for the journals described above. In fact, the two business 
history journals are devoid of terms of reference recommending subject matter. Perhaps if 
there were, they might be questioned, but as things stand, Management's continuities and 
discontinuities are so regular as to be taken for granted and warrant little critical thought - 
although, the one paper on Ancient Japan demonstrates that such boundaries need not 
apply. 
One reason why such things go without critical examination is that for most 
students of Management, the field's history is glossed over (or processed) in introductory 
textbooks that summarise the accepted history before moving on to the 'subject itself'. 
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Textbooks indulge in history for two reasons. Firstly, it demonstrates the worth of the 
subject that the reader has chosen to study. Robbins (1991) tells us that: 
Organized endeavors overseen by people responsible for planning, organizing, 
leading and controlling activities have existed for thousands of years [this] 
demonstrate[s] that organizations have been with us for thousands of years and 
that management has been practiced for an equivalent period. 
Secondly, these examples put current knowledge 'in perspective', showing the basis of 
Management and how far we have progressed from this basis: 
An understanding of this [pre-industrial] background is important for putting the 
classical theories in perspective. [For examplej the highly centralized and 
mechanistic structures of classical theory had their genesis in the state monopolies 
of Egypt and the military empire of Rome (Dessler 1986: 15). 
However, once this is pointed out it, is made clear that "it has been only in the past 
several hundred years, particularly in the last century, that management has undergone 
systematic investigation, acquired a common body of knowledge, and become a formal 
discipline for study" (Robbins 1991: 3 1). 
Consequently, textbooks follow the lines of laid down by historians: 
Despite [Premodern] accomplishments and the practical experience on which they 
were based, informal knowledge was, and remains, incomplete. What kind of 
leadership is best? Should decisions be made by groups or individuals? What 
tactics are most effective in bringing negotiations to a successful conclusion? 
Common sense [which the Ancients are seen to have relied on] offers only 
fragmentary and inaccurate answers to these and many other crucial questions 
(Baron & Greenberg 1995: 6). 
Koontz (Koontz et al. 1980: 54), who also wrote textbooks, similarly concluded that "the 
development of management thought has had a fairly long history, although most of it 
belongs to the twentieth century. The early strands of thinking evolved around the ideas 
of the introduction of science into the art of managing". 
In addition to this story, textbooks will often produce surnmarised Management 
continuum. For example, the first part of Greenberg and Baron's (1983) "Timeline of 
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Milestones" is reproduced below (Figure 26). It follows George's suit, placing Weber at 
1947, Mayo at 1927 and Taylor at 1911. A teaching text authored by Chandler (1996), 
with its cover imagery of a man's fist squeezing money in front of a clock (Figure 27), 
begins its introductory timeline in 1789 with the French Revolution, The Constitution and 
Bill of Rights and Eli Whitney. It also lists Taylor at 1911. The authors claim that their 
"comprehensive coverage of important points in history" is used as the basis of their 
Management history course at Harvard (the most prestigious of all Business Schools) and 
that this course has "become an integral part of [Harvard's] curriculum". 
After the history of Management, textbooks generally make the transition to the 
'material of Management' by beginning with its integration. Robbins and Mukedi's 
(1990: 39) text points out that: 
Concern with developing a unifying framework for management only began in 
earnest in the early 1960s. Like most fields of study, management, in its maturity, 
has moved towards integration. [The] fact that the most popular current 
management textbooks follow the process orientation is evidence that the process 
approach [i. e., the line of planning, organizing, leading, controlling (Figure 23 pg. 
197, is from Robbins & Mukedi)] continues to be a viable integrative framework. 
Even proclaimed critical texts, like Thompson and McHugh's (1995), the stated 
aim of which is "to provide a critical alternative to the standard, often American, texts 
that still predominate", do not question the assumptions at issue here. "The theory and 
practice of organization", they reiterate, "has developed around bureaucracies, deriving 
partly from the work of Max Weber, who... was most responsible for drawing our 
attention to the significance of large-scale organizations". Their critical approach follows 
this lead. The chapter after their introduction aims to "locate and explain the formation of 
the large-scale industrial bureaucracies that have been the primary object of analysis of 
the subject of organization studies". This focus on large-scale organisation was the 
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criterion used by Pollard (1965: 51) to "define his ternis tightly enough so as to find no 
significant precedents for management problems prior to 1750". Thompson and McHugh 
(1995: 52) cite Pollard's History as "evidence" for their views. 
Monographs critical of Management power in society do likewise. Braverman's 
(1974) Labor and Monopoly Capital's second chapter, "The Origins of Management", 
begins with "Industrial capitalism begins when a significant number of workers is 
employed by a single capitalist". In the next chapter, "The Division of Labor", we are 
told that the division of labour is the "earliest innovative principle of the capitalist mode 
of production" and that it has remained "the fundamental principle of industrial 
organization". Following other historians (in particular Pollard, to whom Braverman 
(1974: 61) claims to be "indebted"), Braverman mentions the antecedents of the 
Pyramids, the Great Wall and the Roman Army, but concludes that the "management 
required in such situations remained elementary" and does not dwell on them. Because 
the "classical economists were the first to approach the problems of the organization of 
labor within capitalist relations of production from a theoretical point of view", 
Braverman argues that they "may thus be called the first management experts". 
Elsewhere, following Chandler, he cites 1850 as a key point of origin. 
Other Critical Management theorists take history on board similarly, as do those 
with a claimed Postmodern bent. Morgan (1986; 1997) begins his chronologically- 
ordered list of views of organisation with the machine metaphor and the theories of 
Smith, Babbage, Taylor, Fayol, Urwick, Mooney and Weber. Hatch (1997: 34) begins her 
history of organisation theory with "industrialization" and represents the classical 
theorists whose ideas "ideas fonn... a backdrop to our discussion of the roots of 
organization theory" as Smith, Marx, Durkheim, Taylor, Fayol, Weber and Barnard. 
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Finally, the popular Management literature that informs those who most visibly 
represent Management's power in society reinforces the standard. Clutterbuck and 
Crainer's (1990) Makers of Management draws extensively on Urwick, Wren and 
Chandler to present a "Chronology of Management Thinking" similar in form to 
George's (1968) although their first two chapters are devoted to Fayol and Taylor. Their 
Chronology draws upon Drucker's "seven conceptual foundations to the post-war 
management boom" (the first of which is "Scientific Management") as evaluative criteria. 
Clutterbuch and Crainer's last entry is " 1986 Drucker's The Frontiers of Matiagement " 
(one can see how self-referential this web has become). Drucker, the most authoritative of 
Management gurus (Huczynski 1993 - his biography is titled The Man Ho Invented 
Management), confirms what has become a truism. Citing Chandler, Drucker (199 1: 11) 
tells us that "The roots of the disciplines of management go back 150 years... But 
management as a function, management as a distinct work, management as a discipline 
and area of study - these are all products of this century. " 
This cross-referencing is redoubled as great works are reproduced. Drucker's 
(1991) Managenzent, from which the above quote is taken, was first published in 1974 
and reprinted five times before 1991. Sidney Pollard's (1965) history was re-issued in 
1993 as part of a series of "seminal works in economic and social history". The 
republication of Bamard's (1938) Finictions of the Executive in 1968 inspired a new 
generation to declare his thinking as ahead of its time and seek to think of organisations 
as more like organisms than machines (discussed in greater detail in Chapter 8). Wren's 
Evolution o Management, which was first published in 1972, was into its fourth edition !f 
by 1994. Robbins' (1996) text (which cites Wren as the basis of its historical appreciation 
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and lists Urwick as a key pioneer) was first published in 1979. Similarly, Greenberg and 
Baron's book was into its fifth edition by 1995, having first been issued in 1983. 
Koontz's Managenient was first published in 1955. It was published for the ninth time in 
1988, eight years after Koontz's death, by a previous co-author. This is not to mention 
the re-awakening interest in Urwick's work on his death in the 1980s Management 
jo-day 1984), and the numerous repackaging and tribute collections recently issued to 
celebrate Chandler's life work. Returning to where this section started, with Chandler and 
Urwick drawing from economic historians, Chandler's paramount status is now seen to 
be reinforced by the spread and "growing citation of his work beyond the confines of 
business history, in the economics [and] sociology literature" (Harvey & Jones 1990: 5). 
In addition to his 'ivory-tower' acclaim, the awarding of both the Pulitzer and Bancroft 
prizes for literature to The Visible Hand indicates just how wide Chandler's sphere of 
influence is. 
The web that maintains Management's 'line of the outside' has operated so 
quietly and successfully that the history of Management is no longer written or read. It is 
just 'known' (how many within the Academy have recently read a history of 
Management, for example? ). After the burst of enthusiasm that culminated in the 1970s, 
few books on Management history are now produced. The story of Management and the 
sermon it promotes is only a munnur in the undisputed background of Management and, 
consequently, society in general. It is more entrenched and more powerful for being so. 
This chapter has sifted out the forms that history promotes as belonging to 
Management's field, the web of repetition and reciprocity that maintains them and the 
sermon thus promoted. These things, objects seen and a way of seeing and saying, are 
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legitimated as universal or an objective advance on earlier understandings by this calm, 
unitary history. Placed up against Part Two's interpretive grid, one can see that the shape 
of this history maps neatly around the Modem strata, only incorporating its specific 
fonns. 
This legitimacy of this history and the universality of what it promotes has been 
called into question. Firstly, the history of Management is based upon the particular aims 
and influences of those who first wrote it in the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s. Secondly, what 
their particular gaze sees as the beginning of the subject, Scientific Management, is less a 
new scientific discovery than old ideas cobbled together under a new title which, thanks 
largely to a high profile court case, Roosevelt's political agenda and particular cultural 
leanings, found unusual favour in the second decade of this century in America. Thirdly, 
this is a history that puts words in the mouths of pre-Modem civilisations and respected 
historical figures so as to make Modem views appear universal. And fourthly, despite the 
sermon of Management indicating an increasing scientificity the field shows no signs of 
agreement as to a unitary method or a logical integration of its different elements. 
Many more counter-historical questions could have been pondered here. For 
example, why is it that Management really begins when people started thinking 
Management rather than doing Management? Surely to do Management one must think 
it? Why is it decided that Management must wait for science before beginning whereas 
the same criteria is not applied to what might be seen as related fields? The chapter that 
follows investigates the institution, that alongside the history described here, has done 
more than any other to maintain the singular formation and corresponding visibility of 
Management in the present. This is the pulpit from which Management's sermon is 
issued: the Business School. 
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Doubling the formation of Management's historical sermon is the simultaneous emergence of a pulpit: the 
Business School. In the 1950s and 1960s the professionalisation of Management saw the development of 
complementary associations concerned with the subject and a particular form of Business School come to 
be regarded as belonging at universities. A large contributing factor to these schools being taken seriously 
was the establishment of a standard curriculum that located Management's place on the 'Tree of 
Knowledge'. This curricula promoted a way of seeing re-iterating that of the history of Management, by 
drawing from psychology, sociology and, in particular, economics. As the histories of these subjects are 
wholly Modem, these connections further reinforce the acceptance of the forms that are taken as 
contributing to Management. This Business School, a singularly American institution, is entrenched as it is 
identified as a 'best practice' model for the rest of the world. 
7. PULPIT - THE SHAPE OF THE 
BUSINESS SCHOOL 
Whatever else can be said about the American collegiate 
business school, one thing is certain: It is the nzechanisin 
for bringing about any change in business education. If 
innovations are to be made, it will be through the 
business schools. 
Porter & McKibbin, Managenient Education - Drift or 
Thnist into the 21st Century, (1988, their emphasis). 
The establishment of the first school of Management, under the auspices of a university, 
is generally attributed to ironmaster Joseph Warton and the University of Pennsylvania in 
1881. The next two schools, at the Universities of Chicago and California, emerged 
around the turn of the century, and a small number of schools followed prior to World 
War 11. However, it was not until the 1950s that Business Schools were generally 
accepted as members of the academic fratemity across America (Wheatcroft 1970; 
McKenna 1989). " In this decade, and the one that followed, Management was 
19 New Business School start ups in the US did rise steadily from the turn of the century through the 1920s. However, 
they fell off again in the period from 1930 until the national surge of the 1950s as the status of Management was 
increasingly contested during this period (Urwick 195 1). 
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increasingly recognised as a serious academic subject, and one that people in business, 
social organisations and governments believed they needed to know about. 
We may observe here a development similar to that outlined in the previous 
chapter with regard to Management's history. Some pioneering attempts are seen to have 
taken place near the turn of the 20th century. However, it is not until the 1950s that the 
field comes to be considered a viable academic subject. How this came to be may be 
outlined at the outset by relating the simultaneous emergence of the Business School, 
Management's written history, various professional and academic associations and 
Management's most prestigious scholarly journals, to Meyer, Powell and DiMaggio's 
'New Institutionalism'. 
Opposing prevailing assumptions in organisation theory (that organising is 
rationally purposive and progresses linearly toward expressions closer to optimum 
efficiency or 'best practice'), New Institutionalism argues that institutions emerge in self- 
reinforcing clusters as responses to and reflections of structures and prevailing beliefs 
held in a particular environment. Networks of like-minded institutions spring up to 
reinforce each other's view so that their patterns of behaviour and assumptions are 
institutionalised and taken for granted as nonnal, lawful or beyond reproach. 
Powell and DiMaggio (1983) posit three general interrelated pressures which act 
upon the institutionalisation of a particular field: coercive forces, which relate to 
problems of legitimacy and political influence; professionalism, or the development of 
communities based on knowledge produced or legitimated by university based specialists 
or experts with academic credentials; and, mimetic changes, whereby uncertainty is 
countered by isomorphic behaviour between interacting institutions so that they reflect 
and reconfirm their practices back to one another. After World War II, Management was 
240 
recognised as an important concern. However, to be taken seriously and establish itself it 
needed professional associations to give it a central voice and secure a place in academia. 
This required being seen as legitimate by the existing boards of universities and reflecting 
back their established procedures. Importantly, how Management fitted into the 
established Tree of Knowledge had to be detennined. Once this was ascertained, a 
standard of minimum specifications for Business Schools could be seen. Moreover, given 
the initial uncertainty as to whether Management really belonged, Business Schools, and 
the field in general, were keen to see this form replicated, reinforced and legitimated by 
other institutions: professional management associations, a grand history and specialised 
academic journals. " In keeping with Meyer's (1977; Meyer & Rowan 1977; Meyer & 
Scott 1983) work on education as an institution, the formation of Business Schools could 
only take hold if they reflected the wider cultural and symbolic understandings within 
which they were established. Thus, a self-sustaining network that sees the 
institutionalisation of Management, and Business Schools as a key component of this, 
emerged to satisfy the prevailing sensibilities of the American academic and wider social 
enviromnent particular to the 1950s. 
Neo-institutionalism allows us to see how Business Schools are influenced by the 
structure of the society within which they have emerged, and subsequently the structural 
isomorphism between schools that follows on from this. While this is a convenient means 
of marking out the territory, this chapter wishes to get beyond the structuralist limits of 
this approach by keeping in mind that within the structures that impact upon the form of 
the Business School, things could have been different. In other words, following 
20 Most of what are now considered Management's leading journals began in the late 1950s and early 1960s: 
Adminstrative Science Quarterly in 1956; The Academy of Management Journal in 1958; Business Horizons in 1958; 
Sloan Management Review in 1959; Business History in 1959; The Journal ofAlanagement Studies in 1962; and, The 
Journal ofApplied Behavioral Scielice in 1965. 
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Foucault, things here are not seen to be so structurally detennined that they could not 
have been otherwise. While reflecting Modem structures, the fonns of the Business 
School is not wholly determined by them: different fonns could have taken shape and in 
certain instances did. Given that things could have been different, they could be thought 
differently now. 
Thus, in Foucault's tenns, this chapter seeks to show how the visibility, 
statements and forms promoted by the accepted history of Management, which the 
previous chapter demonstrated to be a view specific to the times in which it was 
conceived, had its perceived universality reinforced by the formation of a particular type 
of American Business School. This formation is both determined by its structural 
surroundings and the specific existential viewpoints of individuals who made key 
choices. This chapter demonstrates how this fon-nation came to be divided in different 
decentralised units by basing itself on the central branch of economics and capped by 
ccapstone' courses in corporate strategy - thus re-iterating the triangular-hierarchical way 
of seeing that is Modernism's particular vision. It outlines how its contributing 
disciplines come to be economics, sociology and psychology, all of whose histories 
repeat the view promoted by Management's history which limits the field of vision and 
modes of expression to Modernist forms. Furthermore, it examines the way in which the 
power of this fonnation has spread as other countries, keen to respond to a perceived 
need for 'better Management', have developed their own Business Schools, not 
necessarily as isomorphic copies of their American counterparts, but by acknowledging 
the US model as accepted 'best practice' and drawing heavily upon it in their discussions 
as to what forms their schools should take. 
The consequence of these developments is that the mechanism of the US Business 
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School thus described may indeed be becoming the only 'mechanism for promoting 
innovation'. However, given that it reinforces Management's historical view that 
homogeneously only incorporates Modem ways of saying and seeing, it is a mechanism 
which is not well suited to innovating in any substantial way. Furthennore, it is a 
mechanism that could have been, and could be, otherwise. 
L The advent of a curricithim: the reinforcement of a way ofseeing and saying 
Mathematics, geometry and drawing, book-keeping and 
penmanship, correspondence and the correct use of the 
English language, geography, technology, law, economy, 
history and biography, modem languages. Ten subject 
areas, to be studied as equal parts. 
General Robert E. Lee's suggested curriculum for a 
"Students' Business School" (1869). 
Economics has traditionally provided the only theoretical 
framework for the study of business, and even today the 
two fields are so closely related they can hardly be 
discussed separately. 
Pierson, Education of the Anzerican Businessinan (1959). 
The first quotation above is General Lee's suggested Business School curriculum, 
presented before Washington College's (now Washington and Lee University) Board of 
Trustees (Lee had become president of the college after the Civil War). After this entry in 
the University's records, a brief note explains that "General Lee's death in 1870 
prevented the fulfillment of his plans". As already described, the first Business School to 
materialise was that of Joseph Wharton in the 1880s. However, it would not be until the 
late 1950s that the Business School would be generally accepted as part of America's 
academic fraternity. Playing a large part in this establishment, was the formation of 
centralised bodies that would ensure that Business Schools were properly standardised 
and policed. In the early 1950s, the recently fonnedAmerican Association of Collegiate 
Schools of Business (AACSB), closely affiliated with the AMA, began to exert 
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considerable influence. It now required that schools seeking membership offer instruction 
in the areas of economics, accounting, statistics, business law and finance (McKenna 
1989). Further to this end, two of the most important studies influencing the development 
of post-war Management education were published at the end of the 1950s and 
sanctioned by the AASCB: Pierson's (1959) The Education of the American 
Businessman, sponsored by the Camegie Foundation, and Gordon and Howell's (1959) 
Higher Education for Business, sponsored by Ford. The authors of both reports 
collaborated closely and came to the same conclusions. 
Primary among these was the view expressed by Pierson in the quotation below 
General Lee's: that economics provides the only theoretical framework for the study of 
Management, and therefore that the standardisation of Business Schools' curricula must 
be based on economics. While Pierson's perspective suggests to him the obviousness and 
universality of such an assumption, this section hopes to show that only since the second 
half of the 20th century would the association with economics provide the necessary 
academic foundation upon which Business Schools might establish themselves. The 
pivotal relationship with economics, and the way of seeing that is reinforced by this, is a 
specific view based on the subjective understandings and subsequent decisions of key 
individuals and a set of circumstances and contingencies particular to this period. 
To begin, it is important to remember that the authors of these studies were 
economists by trade and that their works consequently "bear the unmistakable imprint of 
the philosophy of economic science" (Leontiades 1989: 2). Thus, having identified 
Business Schools' main problem as being that "Dozens of minor fields of specialization 
have been pennitted to develop that never should have been introduced at all" (Gordon & 
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Howell 1959: 217); and that "there is a need for a general tightening of standards in tenns 
of the scope of the core studies" (Pierson 1959: 196), it is perhaps not surprising that they 
should see 'the answer' as the science of economics. The reports called for Management 
to be rationalised and secured upon a clearly defined academic foundational core. For 
Pierson, economics provided the "only theoretical framework", while Gordon and 
Howell's model for future curriculum development was organised around three generic 
disciplines: behavioral sciences (psychology and sociology), applied mathematics and 
also, but primarily, economics. 
Having prescribed a central stem, the reports turned to consider the proper 
decentralisation, of the curricula. The AACSB stated that at least 40 percent of the total 
hours required for the bachelor's degree in business must, at the student's discretion, be 
taken in any subjects other than business and economics. While not questioning this 
percentage, both reports complained that "the work that students do in liberal arts 
subjects appears to have little relation to their studies in business and economics" 
(Pierson 1959: 164). Thus, both urged schools to specify which types of course students 
should take outside of the core by designating particular subject areas as "relevanf'. 
Pierson (1959: 233) went on to complain that he found Management "a vague, 
shifting, rather fonnless subject in which neither the foundations at the undergraduate 
level nor the super-structure at the graduate level can be sharply defined". Having 
outlined the central core and then using this as a basis to determine a properly ordered 
range of contributing subjects, Pierson and Gordon and Howe sought to standardise the 
curricula's super-level or 'sharp end'. They recommended the development of "capstone 
courses". These courses, termed "business policy", would "give students an opportunity 
to pull together what they have learned in the separate business fields [and] concentrate 
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on integrating what already has been acquired" (Gordon & Howell 1959: 206). 
The model presented by the reports is quite distinct from that of General Lee. In 
1960, Huff and McGuire's (1960), Interdisciplinary Approach to the Study of Business, 
promoted a General Lee type blend of anthropology, biology, ecology, geography, 
mathematics, philosophy, physics, political science, psychology, and sociology 
(economics is not mentioned). Two years later, when the 1959 reports had settled into 
Management's fabric, the relevant contributing disciplines were clearly only: 
a) the engineering approach, which emphasizes productivity increases through 
organizational efficiency; b) the human relations approach, incorporating 
psychological and sociological concerns; c) the economic approach, which 
emphasizes the development of resource allocation and cost control; and d) the 
systems approach, with emphasis on models and the use of mathematical 
techniques (Meij 1962). 
The increasing lack of acceptance of seeing humans explicitly as machines has seen 
engineering and mathematics lose favour as Management's stated disciplinary influences, 
and led to the adoption of a general set of three - economics, psychology and sociology 
(Gross 1964; Robbins 1984; Pettinger 1996). Since the early 1960s: 
These academic fields [have] serve[d] as the research and literature foundation for 
any school of business and the various functional subdivisions of the business 
school [have] draw[n] on the intellectual wisdom of the generic disciplines. In this 
way the functional divisions of any school would maintain a general business 
integrity based on the three common properties of their model (McKenna 1989: 
46; see also Leontiades 1989: 18). 
However, there is a clear pecking order with regard to the contribution of these three 
contributing disciplines. Mosson's comparative history of Management education 
systems (1965: 198) found that while "[e]conomics, psychology and sociology are all to 
be found in varying degrees... the high prestige of economics - in academic circles at least 
- has meant that it has been the dominant discipline". 
The standardised formation, enshrined in the Carnegie and Ford reports, came to 
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be accepted as a universal norm of what Business Schools should be or aspire to be. 
However, the way of seeing promoted by this formation - the centralised core of 
economic rationality enabling an ordered decentralisation of contributing activities 
working toward a capstone from which all can be overseen (a triangular-hierarchy in 
other words) - is particularly Modem. Indeed, while "the science known as economics" 
had, by the mid-1950s, "often been defined as the social science of business" (van Metre 
1954: 7), and Pierson, Gordon and Howe, would, by the end of this decade, see 
economics as the only and traditional foundation for Management, the following 
paragraphs seek to demonstrate that this perspective is specific to the middle of the 20th 
century. In the 1860s, when Lee spoke, economics was not even considered a worthy 
academic discipline. While in the first decades of this century economics spoke a 
language that was seen as of little relevance to business, and the majority of economists' 
disdain for the fledgling subject of Management was palpable. Only in the 1950s was 
economics academically accepted, willing to contribute to the establishment of Business 
Schools and capable of speaking in terms deemed relatable to Management. The 
contingent alliance between economics and Management would see Business Schools 
establish themselves, but this is not to say that the fonnation that grew out of this is a 
universal arrangement. 
Locke's comprehensive study (1989: 5) outlines the problem that Business 
Schools had to overcome before being accepted as worthy, as being to develop a 
historical connection between what they taught and an accepted scientific discipline, so 
as to build a bridge between that discipline's theory and Management practice: 
The gap, moreover, was hard to fill, for it was not a question of finding an 
existing bridge between theory and practice, one that had been shrouded in a fog 
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of haughty academic prejudice, but of building a bridge between the two. People 
who established business schools in institutions of higher education quickly 
learned this lesson for there was, at the outset, no discipline to teach. Science- 
based management had to be invented. 
Such an invention would not have been aided through association with economics in the 
middle of the 19th century. 
While economics was seen as the obvious and natural bridge between established 
subjects and a science of Management in the mid-20th century, by the late 19th century 
economics itself was still a marginal concern. At this time, most economists were of what 
is referred to as the Institutional school, which drew from Adam Smith's more historical 
and humanistic interests. Empirical, inductive and non-theoretical in orientation, this 
school encouraged research into specific socio-economic contexts. Economists wrote 
regional studies about the growth of specific industries and institutions. This was clearly 
not the stuff to gain acceptance from the mainstream scholarship of the day, which 
consisted of the traditional arts, the formal or pure sciences (e. g., mathematics, logic) and 
the empirical sciences. A Historical-Institutional economics was not a traditional art, nor 
did it replicate the form of a Modem science. 
However, another economics emerged in the second half of the 19th century. This 
took quite different aspects from Smith: the view of man as a Rational-economic being, 
of each individual capable of evaluating actions in terms of economic utility, and the 
liberal conception of each man as separate from family, class, country and custom and 
thus self-determining. Abstracting economic behaviour away from the world of art, law, 
traditional morality and history, the Neoclassical school offered a more exacting 
expression of Smith's assertion that the pursuit of individual self-interest produces an 
optimal social outcome. Further, all of their key determining factors (e. g., marginalism, 
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utility maximisation, equilibrium) could be mathematically expressed (Toohey 1994). 
Thus the Neoclassicists borrowed heavily from mechanistic physics and the 
language of Modem mathematics. Walras' (1834-1910) sought a pure theory of 
economics that "resembles the physico-mathematical sciences in every respect" (Walras 
1954: 71). Jevons' (1835-82) claimed to offer "a close analogy to the science of Statical 
Mechanics and the Laws of Exchange that resemble the [Newtonian] Laws of 
Equilibrium" (Jevons 1888). Pareto (1848-1926) explained that the equations that 
determine equilibrium are not "new to me, I know them well, they are old friends. They 
are the equations of rational mechanics. That is why pure economics is a sort of 
mechanics or akin to mathematics". Adding mathematics to Smith's thinking in order to 
rid their universe of purposive human activity, they made an abstract model of economic 
reality just as Newton had created his model of physical reality (Bell & Kristol 198 1). 21 
For the Neoclassicists' all of economics key concepts were comparable to 
physics. A particle in physics equaled an individual in economics, work in physics 
equaled disutility in economics, energy equaled utility, force equaled marginal utility. 
This attachment enabled the psychological concepts of utility to be considered as if they 
were suffused throughout an abstract 'commodity space' that behaves like an objective 
field in physics. This 'utility field' becomes the primary motivating force behind all 
economic activity, ensuring that the natural tendency of the system is always towards an 
equilibrium state of maximum utility. Further, one particle-individual could be any 
particle-individual, as against this space all humans, being at base of the same matter or 
genus (Rational-economic Man), were subject to the same economic laws (Mirowski 
1986; 1989). Hence, Walras (1954: 69), the father of Neoclassicism, developed a 'system 
21 While Smith's Mealth ofNalions vision was Newtonian, it was only so in an analogical and qualitative sense. Smith 
was no ]over of this sort of mathematics and had no pretensions to qualitative precision. 
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of equilibrium' which discovered that while people could make individual choices, in 
aggregate their behaviour would be entirely predictable. Accordingly, he saw market 
prices resulting from those individual choices as isomorphic to what was known by this 
time of the mechanistic "character of natural phenomena". 
Given that the Neoclassicists argued from assumptions that were not intended to 
be empirically examined, their debate with the Institutionalists was largely a dialogue of 
the deaf. In any case, it was the Neoclassicists who won out. Their view of economics, 
isomorphic to physics and connected to other established disciplines on the Tree of 
Knowledge through the common language of mathematics, was accepted as a Modem 
science and the Institutional school declined. " Economics was now considered a worthy 
academic subject, just as the first schools of Management were being established in the 
United States. Why was it then that Management and economics did not form the 
allegiance that would take place after the World War 11 and lead to the establishment of a 
generic US Business School? 
The optimistic Neoclassicists argued that economics should be purer, based far 
more on a priori logic and rational deduction, than other sciences: 
The science of Economics... is in some degree peculiar, owing to the fact that its 
ultimate laws are known to us immediately by intuition or at any rate are 
fumished to us ready made by other mental or physical sciences. [Economists 
make] simple inductions on which we can proceed to reason deductively with 
great confidence. From these axioms we can deduce the laws of supply and 
demand, the laws of that difficult concept, value, and all the intricate results of 
commerce. [Our] method is as sure and demonstrative as that of kinematics or 
statics, nay, almost as self evident as are the Euclid (Jevons 1888: 18,21). 
22 There is some irony in the fact that Neoclassical economics arrived just as that which had it 'piggy-backcd' upon 
was leaving. The economics of the late 19th century was based upon a view of physics that held favour in the first half 
of that century, but physics itself had changed greatly by the beginning of the 20th. In the version of physics that the 
Neoclassicists 'climbed aboard', history and time held no sway. Not surprisingly, the concept of entropy or disorder 
and decay that emerged in physics in the second half of the 19th century, not to mention notions of endemic instability, 
uncertainty, the disturbance caused by the observer, theories of catastrophe, chaos and complexity that have come to be 
commonplace in 20th century physics, were not paid any mind by the Neoclassicists. 
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Indeed, the Neoclassicists abstracted to the point where things were always about utility 
optimisation. To the point where Marshall (in Bell & Kristol 1981: 56) could argue that 
Man does not make particular things: "when he is said to produce material things, he 
really only produces utilities". By converting economics into abstract model building, the 
Neoclassicists could concentrate on general variables. This moved them away from 
problems of causation, with which the empirical sciences were concerned (which stressed 
temporal events), to problems of functionalism (i. e., perfecting models). Consequently, 
they could drop literary forms of analysis in favour of mathematical analysis because all 
of the important propositions could be stated in equations. 
However, the sort of calculi that sprang from this gave scant guidance to 
entrepreneurs and managers. The Neoclassicists were concerned to express the 
mechanism of how the market as a whole worked, aspects that the manager had no direct 
influence over. In Locke's words (1989: 15), the Neoclassical theory of the finn was: 
outward-looking, the entrepreneur's viewpoint inward-looking, for the theory of 
the firm treats the operations within the firm as a black box, an unknown, a 
problem that has already been solved. Because it assumes that the entrepreneur 
knows how to run his firrn efficiently, it stops at the point where the entrepreneur 
wants analysis really to begin. 
Even if the Neoclassicists had spoken in terms of the problems facing managers, their 
calculi stating general hypotheses would have been less than applicable. Managers had to 
operate in the practical world without perfect knowledge of cause-and-effect or 
functionality. They were not faced with perfect solutions and a logic that could be either 
true or false. At best, they could hope to think in terms of probabilities of outcomes. 
Events in Wharton's first decades demonstrate how economics was unable to 
provide the bridge that Locke identified as necessary for the establishment of a perceived 
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science-based Management at this point in time. The early Wharton professors were of 
two types. There were those, who, in the words of one historian, found "their curricula 
material in the business world, not in the universities (in science)" and of whom the same 
writer disparagingly says that "[d]espite their energy and enthusiasm, their scholarship 
had essentially been an extended fonn of business journalism" (Sass 1982: 268). 
Alternatively, they were teachers who came from other faculties to teach traditional 
academic subjects as part of the curriculum. 
Among these were economists. However, Sass (1982) and Locke (1989) note that, 
on the one hand, the Neoclassicists, the most highly regarded economists of the time, 
were cool to the practical descriptive thrust of Wharton's business programs, let alone 
interested in teaching on them. Having established themselves as academically 
legitimate, they held the general academic view of these 'schools of business' at the time. 
They were suspicious and skeptical of their practical or career orientation. One typical 
commentator noted that this "deprive[d] the university of its only excuse for existence, 
which is to provide a haven where the search for truth may go unhampered by utility or 
pressure for results" (Hutchins, in Pierson 1959). On the other hand, those economists 
who did deign to teach at the fledgling business schools, were roundly criticised for - 
having nothing of relevance to say to their classes. Looking back from the 1950s, 
commentators expressed surprise that: "[e]ven the economists in th[is] group [of 
traditional academic instructors], whose discipline necessarily called for some 
acquaintance with business aims and practices, were wont to seek enlightenment more 
largely by speculative than by strictly scientific methods" (van Metre 1954: 3-4). Of 
course, while in the 1950s commentators looking back might be astonished that these 
economists should be purely abstract as opposed to empirical (which van Metre sees as 
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"strictly scientific"), and unacquainted with business, the leading economists of the day 
did not see this necessity. This passage from a German commentator from the early part 
of the 20th century outlines what his contemporaries saw as an irredeemable divide 
between Management and economics: 
Economics and business economics [may] handle, to a large extent, the same 
material but they do not have the same spirit. Economics is a philosophical 
science with philosophical characteristics. Business economics is, on the other 
hand, an applied science. Chemistry and mechanical technology are closer in 
spirit to business economics than is economics (Schmalenbach 1919). 
What was seen in the 1950s was by no means obvious to thinkers of other ages. 
Economics would have to take a further turn before the view that shaped the formation of 
the Business School would appear obvious and universal. 
Economists' inability to test their hypotheses in the established manner of the 
empirical sciences (under laboratory conditions), made it contingent for the subject to 
adapt into a pure science in order to gain access to the club of accepted academic 
subjects. However, advances made by the mathematicians of the generation after Boole, 
such as Quetelet, Galton and Pearson, brought mathematical statistics to a point where its 
workings could be accepted as a substitute for laboratory experimentation. 
Beyond the key advance into Modernity where contrived experiments could be 
taken as representing or standing for things in the empirical world, statistical testing 
enabled thinkers to forgo experiment. Given that mathematical principles since the end of 
the 18th century had been shown to be isomorphic to phenomena, mathematical 
expressions, developed via the gathering and testing of statistics for probabilities, could 
be seen as standing for experiment and replicating things-in-the-world. Some economists, 
tiring of Neoclassical dogma and the consequent lack of applicability of their field 
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preventing them from availing of the professional opportunities available if their theories 
could be more practical, found statistics liberating. As economists adopted statistics, 
econometrics was born, a school of thought that appeared more empirically applicable. 
These advances allowed economists to assume a more practical view of decision- 
making processes in organisations, and the wedding of statistics and economics proved 
convenient in that probability-based mathematics enabled decisions to be weighed in a 
manner that seemed to provide advice for business people wid leave room for judgment - 
without undermining Neoclassicism's hard-fought principles. However, statistics was 
still about numerical data and the inferences that could be made from them. It did not 
speak a language that managers of the period could relate to. For this to happen, 
algorithms, sets of rules or routines by which things could be carried out but not 
necessarily expressed in mathematical symbols, statements that could be related to 
Neoclassical theory but with apparent 'operational significance', had to be developed. 
Statistical mathematicians had applied themselves to making predictions about 
games of chance from the 1920s. However, with a rising interest in making economics 
more practically applicable, theorists began to explore the business implications of this 
thinking with developments like 'game theory'. Here Von Neumann and Morgenstern 
(1944) sought to show how entrepreneurs could, under certain assumptions, act so as to 
achieve a certain minimum gain by following the correct algorithm. By using algebra, 
matrix theory and probability theory in its calculations, this sort of thinking kept 
economics connected to its mathematical roots, while bringing it into contact with the 
realm of electrical engineers working on defense projects during World War II. With 
extensive funding, these engineers were working on the linear programming of early 
computers, using Boolean logic to provide algorithms. Danzing, for example, developed 
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the simplex linear programming algorithm for the United States Air Force in 1947, 
utilising matrix theory, vector algebra, symbolic logic and statistical techniques to 
provide comparisons of sets of ratios existing among sets of consumption of various 
inputs and rates of production of various outputs. While algorithms like these required 
more information than economics' traditional emphasis on macro costs and revenues, 
they enabled businesses to define goals in tenns of individual optimal quantities of inputs 
and outputs, and obtain specific directions about how to achieve these goals stated in 
terms of the various steps available to the firm (Dorfman, Samuelson & Solow 1958). 
Economists of the day recognised that these methods approached the firm more 
from the viewpoint of engineering than economics (in fact much of the mathematics that 
it required was at this point completely foreign to economists and had to be leamt). 
However, they were drawn to linear programming as much for psychological reasons as 
for practical, because whereas it was helpful to Management, it did not undermine the 
body of economic theory which had been built up so painfully during the 20th century. 
Linear programming was, the economists insisted, just a special case of marginal analysis 
and, hence, quite compatible with neoclassical economic theory (Locke 1989). By the 
1950s, Neoclassical economics, econometrics and the advance of engineering to 
incorporate greater levels of complexity, had come together in a new field termed 
'business economics'. This field enabled Management to bridge the divide necessary to 
be taken seriously as an academic subject, an underpinning that granted acadendc 
gravitas and supplied methods that it thought it could usefully apply. 
Subsequently, van Metre (1954: 7) was able to put the emerging transformation, 
from broad and academically unacceptable schools of Management to their standardised 
and acceptable face, down to what he terms the "evolution of economics": 
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A highly interesting and unforeseen development which has paralleled the growth 
of business education in American universities has been the transformation in the 
science known as economics... Economists are today treading the paths of science 
in search of signposts to economic truths, rather than scanning the skies of 
speculative thought for guides to the interpretation of social action. Business 
practitioners, business teachers and economic scientists all work in varying 
degrees with the same data in devising their respective plans and procedures. It is 
important that the body of such data be adequate and that it undergo interpretation 
relevant to necessary uses in business practice, business education and in the 
shaping of public policies. Schools of business form the best available middle 
ground for a juncture of forces pursuing these objectives by businessmen and 
economists; though in this pursuit the application of science in psychology, 
engineering, and other fields cannot be ignored. 
While early Management programs were associated with departments of 
economics, these were initially dominated by those committed to the proposition that a 
proper Management discipline could never be or by those who feared that if it did come 
into being it would impair traditional concepts of economics. However, as Business 
School "programs matured, and as economists came more and more to grips with the 
realities of the world, these men began to make many substantial contributions to 
administrative thought" (Gross 1964: 195). 'Economists coming to grips with the real 
world' meant economics becoming a discipline with academic backing which at once 
could offer a theoretical framework for Management. 'Business School programmes 
maturing' meant their becoming standardised. These two things coinciding in the middle 
of this century bequeathed the shape of the Management curricula. It did not take long for 
this particularity to become shrouded in a manner that gave it the air of a universal 
association. While van Metre would still recognise the transformation of economics as an 
tc unforeseen development" in 1954, by 1959 the generic Business School's foundational 
documents, seemingly unaware of this history, would see economics as always providing 
these schools "only theoretical framework". 
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The alliance between Management and economics at this 'juncture of forces' was 
mutually beneficial. Management, like economics, began to attract top students because 
of its newfound intellectuality, and economics, like Management, started to draw greater 
numbers because of its greater utility. Economists could begin to speak to governments 
and business corporations with the authority granted by an air of practical awareness. 
Management academics could now speak to business corporations and governments with 
the air of authority granted by the aura of science. Management literature consequently 
underwent a transformation that was seen to achieve the best of both worlds: "Rhapsodies 
on the heroic achievements of 'captains of industry' gave way to informative, sober 
treatises on business and organization and administration, and a rich crop... dealing with 
the actualities of business life" (van Metre 1954: 4). 
The Business School fonned a 'juncture' for the forces of businessmen and 
economists that enabled them to gain greater influence in society. This was not because 
Business Schools finally recognised that economics had always been Management's 
natural foundation and organised themselves accordingly, or because conditions meant it 
could be no other way. Rather it was Management's (or key players within Management) 
contingent need to be seen to be founded at a time when economics had gained itself 
scientific status and was now seeking to appear more practically relevant -a set of 
circumstances quite particular to Western society in the middle of the 20th century. 
Economics, as opposed to chemistry, engineering or any number of other alternatives, 
came to be seen as Management's natural foundation. 
257 
II Disciplinary connections - history redoubled 
Out of the melee came... a philosopher of astonishing scope. 
Adam Smith published his Inquiry Into the Nature and 
Causes of the Wealth ofNations in 1776, thereby adding a 
second revolutionary event to that fateful year. A political 
democracy was bom on one side of the ocean; an economic 
blueprint was unfolded on the other. But while not all of 
Europe followed America's political lead, after Smith had 
displayed the first true tableau of modem society, all of the 
Western world became the world of Adam Smith: his vision 
became the prescription for the spectacles of generations. 
Adam Smith... gave the world the image of itself for which it 
had been searching. After the Wealth ofNations, men began 
to see the world about them with new eyes; they saw how the 
tasks they did fitted into the whole of society, and saw that 
society as a whole was proceeding at a majestic pace toward 
a distant but clearly visible goal. 
Heilbroner & Streeten, The Great Econondsts (1955). 
The professionalisation of Management in the 1950s incorporated the standardisation of 
Business School curricula. The gaze of the time defined a set of contributing disciplines 
far narrower than may have been the case in an earlier age. Economics, was emphasised, 
as were psychology and sociology, albeit to a lesser extent. Engineering and mathematics 
were acknowledged as historically significant to the formation of Management but not 
seen as necessary for the, aspiring manager or Management theorist. Many other subjects, 
prominent on General Lee's list, were marginalised: geometry and drawing, geography, 
law and, in particular, history (Locke 1989; Leontiades 1989). Pierson's (1959) study 
made no mention of, or recommendation for, history at either an undergraduate or 
postgraduate level. Gordon and Howell's (1959) report recommended 12 hours of either 
economic or business history but only in the first two years prior to admission into a 
business program. In keeping, nothing in the AACSB's accreditation standards required 
students to take a course in history. The exposure a student receives is "confined within 
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the context of other business courses and limited to brief comments on the 
accomplishments of specific individuals in the history of management thought, such as 
Frederick Taylor, Frank Gilbreth, Elton Mayo, etc. " (Leontiades 1989: 29). 
Given its close association with Modernism, it is perhaps not surprising that 
Management should not see much need to look to the past or critically examine its 
assumed origins. It is far more concerned with the cutting-edge and the future. While 
some histories of Management have been written, they are few and far between, say more 
or less the same thing, and tend to arouse no debate. They generally repeat what people in 
Management assume to be the case. Thus, people work with an implicit understanding of 
the basic principles of Management and see no need to question them. 
Historical analysis is further discouraged by the belief that Management shoots 
from the branches of economics, sociology and psychology. Given that these subjects are 
seen as the 'contributing disciplines', their histories can simply be referred to should 
further historical reference be required. As they are also framed by a Modernist 
understanding of the world, the histories of psychology, sociology and economics further 
buttress the contingent Modem views and forms that Management promotes as universal. 
Chapter 2's discussion of Foucault noted psychology's Modem understanding of 
its past. While recent years have seen a number of critical histories of psychology, 
questioning the assumptions that Foucault highlighted (Smith 1988; Richards 1996), the 
standard history is still alive and influential. Smith's (1988: 148-9) study demonstrates 
that histories of psychology still point to the "continuity between powerful symbols of 
scientific advance and modem psychology". He provides the following archetype: 
to cite a rather crude but certainly revealing example, a well-known collection of 
readings in the history of psychology begins with an extract from Galileo, where 
Galileo describes what is later known as a distinction between the primary and 
secondary qualities. [Thus, m]odem psychology 'begins' with Galileo. 
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Beyond the formation of the scientific method providing a point of origin, the crucial 
period in psychology's history is that from 1870-1920, when advances in the life sciences 
enabled their research techniques to be applied to human mental problems previously 
seen as the preserve of philosophy, and psychology became an academic discipline 
(Hearnshaw 1964; O'Donnell 1979; Robinson 1995). 
Prior to this, histories may draw links between 'pre-psychology' and selected 
'academic classics', in sections with labels like "The Philosophical Antecedents of 
Psychology" or "Presocratic Speculation". Psychology is in this way embellished not 
only with the authority of science, but also with Ancient wisdom that both confirms the 
application of Modem science as an advance and adds gravity. Heamshaw's history 
(1987), is typical, including short preliminary chapters on the Greek philosophers, 
Christian theologians and "significant developments" during the Middle Ages, before 
three chapters describe the Scientific Revolution. However, these chapters are only a 
prelude to the discussion of the "metamorphosis of psychology" in the 19th century, 
"from speculative philosophy to scientific discipline". We can see the 'misrecognised 
object' thesis and history being read in terms of the present in statements such as "The 
Sophists themselves may have been embryo practical psychologists, but they contributed 
very little to psychology as such" (Heamshaw 1987: 18). ' 
The cost of this legitimating history's one-dimensional view of what is 
23 The boundary of relevance around psychology as it particularly applies to Management is even narrower. The sub- 
discipline of industrial psychology is seen as being "bom" with MOnstcrberg. Mansterberg received his training in 
Wundt's University of Leipzig laboratory, before moving to Harvard at the turn of the century where he was in a 
position to observe the "birth" of Management theory in America and "create the field of industrial psychology with 
the publication of his text Psychology and Indusirial Efficiency in 1913" (Robbins 1993: 700). Thus, industrial 
psychology is sometimes traced back to the experimental psychology taught in 19th century Germany, but is also seen 
as coming into being following Taylor. MOnstcrberg (1913: 3) outlined the field's aim as being to "sketch the outlines 
of a new science which is intermediate between the modem laboratory psychology and the problems of economics". 
Industrial psychology "grew up with the encouragement of the followers of both Taylor, who wanted to design 
machines and people to fit together, and of Mayo and Rocthlisberger, who felt that psychology was key to 
understanding the operations of industrial enterprises" (Gross 1964: 197-8). 
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significant, is now recognised by a small minority as detrimental to psychology's future 
development. Smith (1988: 148) argues that this history, in: 
assum[ing] a direct line from the past toward the present, [and] awarding praise 
for contributions to progress... contribute[s] to the normative framework of 
psychological communities. History texts embody, and hence transmit to students, 
values important to psychologists' sense of worth and identity. In portraying 
modem psychology as the inevitable or 'natural' outcome of the application of 
scientific procedures to psychological topics, they give modem psychology its 
authority. The student experiences what it is like to inherit a uniquely objective 
and hence instrumentally effective endeavour... The danger to psychology is that 
selective history privileges one body of knowledge and practice as 'truth', 
reducing the imagination's power to conceptualize alternative truths. 
Sociology's history marks similarly Modem boundary lines around the strata of 
Management and its contributors. This is the view from a leading introductory text: 
Major questions about the individual and society have preoccupied thinkers in all 
periods of history: the philosophers of Ancient Greece and Rome reflected upon 
the way society operated and/or should operate, and for centuries afterwards 
social and political theorists and philosophers applied themselves to similar 
questions. But the 'philosophical' analyses of society were essentially based on 
speculation, on dubious and untested assumptions about the motives of human 
beings in their behaviour, and on undisciplined theorising, and they lacked 
systematic analysis of the structure and workings of societies... However, from 
the 18th century onwards in Western Europe, important changes took place... 
Many considerable advances were taking place in scientific discovery with regard 
to the structure and composition of the physical world surrounding human beings, 
and with regard to the physical nature and make-up of human beings 
themselves... Could such a scientific, 'rational' approach also be applied to the 
analysis of humans' social worlds, their relationships, experiences and behaviour 
within it? Scientific and technological advances laid the foundations for the 
transformation from a predominantly rural, agricultural, 'manual' way of life to an 
urban, industrial , 'mechanised' pattern of living... Sociology... emerged against the background of these intellectual and material changes in the second half of the 
19th century (Bilton et al. 1987: 2-3). 
In this light, it is no surprise to find that the founding fathers of sociology are thoroughly 
Modem (or interpreted as such): Comte, the "founder of positivism" (Honderich 1995: 
705ff ) who stressed the adoption of a scientific method to analyse society so that we 
might, "know, predict and control" it (a statement that flows into Management texts: e. g., 
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"the purpose of OB is to help you to explain, predict, and control human behaviour" 
(Robbins 1984; DuBrin 1984)); Saint-Simon, who saw in the rationally developed 
bureaucracy hope for stability and progress in the aftennath of the French Revolution. 
Marx, who aligned his critique against capitalism in a Modernist fashion (see Chapter 4); 
Durkheim (1947: 406), who accepted the premise that "the ideal of human fraternity can 
be realised only in proportion to the progress of the division of labour"; and Weber, 
whose Modem interpretation by Management historians was discussed in Chapter 6. 
Sociology's founders shared a universalistic conception of the Modernization they 
saw around them leading further into Modernity, a "gradual obliteration of cultural and 
social differences in favour of an increasingly broad participation of all in one and the 
same general model of modernity" (Touraine 1988: 443). Subsequently, the sociology 
that is seen as an underlying discipline of Management is that which sought to understand 
the contours of Modernity as they appeared in the 19th century and is framed by the 
emergence of Modem capitalism and the origin of Modem economics (Smart 1990). 
Management's history claims a special bond to the history of economics. In the 
first article published in the journal Business History, Ashton (1959: 1-2) argued that the 
field must be recognised as an offshoot of economic history, its "parent study". 
Consequently, in congratulating those who founded the journal, he was pleased to note 
that their "provenance is a guarantee that business-men and their works will be surveyed 
with the same passionless eyes as political historians turn on statesmen and diplomats, or 
sociologists on God's creatures in general". Mosson's (1965: 198) review of 
Management education in the 1960s is proud to claim that it is greatly "influenced by its 
history and the prestige of economics". Since the articulation of this bond, Management 
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historians have sought closer relations. In reviewing business history's past and future, 
Lee's (1990) prognosis is that it must seek closer links with economics. " 
This association both produces and reinforces Management's understanding that it 
begins properly with Adam Smith's division of labour. The quotation from Heilbroner 
and Strecten at the head of this section, while more emotive than most, captures the 
general pathos that economic historians felt for Smith at the time the history of 
Management was being drafted. For them "Smith was the great starting point for all" 
(Lekachman. 1964: 102) and The Wealth of Nations "was destined to become the fons et 
origo of economics for subsequent generations" (Roll 1992: 121). Marshell (1967) begins 
his chapter Adam Smitli - Beginnings of Political Economy with "the whole of political 
economy might be divided into two parts - before and since Adam Smith; the first part 
being a prelude and the second a sequel". He then goes on to state that "Adam Smith's 
first name is peculiarly appropriate, since it is generally agreed that he was the 'father of 
political economy' and the first real economist deserving the title". Shumpeter, the great 
economic historian and influence on Chandler, is also clear that "The First Classical 
Situation" follows upon Smith's analysis, in 1790. Correspondingly, "There is a 
surprising unanimity of opinion among historians of economic doctrine [that] political 
economy as a science [i. e., as a serious subject] begins at a time when the foundations of 
industrial capitalism were already well laid" (Roll 1992: 10). " Hence, while earlier 
periods are acknowledged by Management as "undoubtedly producing many useful forms 
of organization... With the development of economics, organization was treated more 
24 Despite business historians admiration for economic history, economic history itself does not a particular high 
standing in the eyes of its parent discipline - economics (Stigler 1982). This is hardly surprising for a field that prefers 
to see itself as ahistorical. 
25 This is the same Roll that Urwick drew upon for placing Boulton and Watt at the forefront of Management's history. 
His A History of Economic Thought, first published 1938, the same year as Bamard's Functions of the Executive, is 
one of the most widely read texts on the history of economics. The 1992 edition is its fifth incamation. 
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systematically. For example, the great economist Alfred Marshall classed organization as 
one of the basic factors in production" (Dale 1967: 12). The fonnation of Modem 
economics provides Management's outer limit of serious contributions. No surprise, 
therefore, that to this day: "the notion of specialization, as developed in economics, 
serves as business education's basic rationale of how and why businesses evolve" 
(Leontiades 1989). 
However, as in Management's history, further weight is often added to economics 
by looking beyond Smith to the gravity of ancient times. Again, as with Management, 
this is very much a history of the past as the anticipation of the present. Roll's (1992) 
'pre-history' simply charts the arrival of the 'Classics'. One early chapter begins: "In the 
three centuries that elapsed between the end of the Middle Ages and the appearance of 
Wealth ofNations, the classical system of political economy was being prepared". 
The "contributions" of the Ancient Greeks are encountered in a similarly Modem 
manner. Thus Plato finds a place in economic history: "Plato's analysis is of interest to 
the economist because one of his central concepts, the division of labour, is of paramount 
importance in the history of economics" (Spiegel 1971: 15). It is interesting to wonder by 
what reckoning the division of labour is discerned to be one of Plato's "central concepts" 
as he himself never termed it so. Descent is also often claimed from Aristotle, with 
particular emphasis being placed by historians on this passage from Politics (1,9): 
Of everything which we possess there are two uses: both belong to the thing as 
such, but not in the same manner, for one is the proper, and the other the improper 
or secondary use of it. For example, a shoe is used for wear, and is used for 
exchange; both are uses of the shoe. 
In these words, Roll (1992: 16,21-2) claims that: "Aristotle laid the foundation of the 
distinction between use-value and exchange-value [and thus] the foundations of much of 
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later economic thought... Although his words are obscure, Aristotle seems to say that the 
secondary value of an article - as a means of exchange - is not necessarily 'unnatural"'. 
Roll addresses this quotation with more than a little wishful thinking though. 
. stotle, throughout his work, was clear that money was barren and that use was far 
preferable to exchange. For Modems to see this passage as 'a breakthrough' (because 
exchange value is not "necessarily" deemed "unnatural"), and then read this as the 
"foundation" of a world view where exchange and the pre-eminence of the market are the 
tableau against which all human behaviour should be properly understood, seems 
somewhat hopeful. 
Indeed, Aristotle did not possess a "theory of value" as such, and could not 
adequately explain the commensurability of products, because, unlike Neoclassical 
economics (which connects use-value with exchange-value via the concept of utility), he 
assigned these things to different categories, with different ends requiring different 
courses of action. Antiquity was predominantly governed by a system of use-value and 
not the market-oriented exchange value that has given rise to the discipline of economics. 
Thus, the Greeks could not have contemplated economic thought as the Modem world 
now conceives it. Aristotle's work only deals with the metaphysics of exchange value - 
what kind of property is it and to what order it belongs. Exchange-value does not really 
deal with ends and, as such, Aristotle's inquiries are more ethical and metaphysical than 
economic in the Modem sense. Aristotle's finding was that the pursuit of exchange-value 
must be subject to human ends that are explicated in ethics and politics (Meikle 1994; 
McLellan 1996). 
In any case, the great Shumpeter at once manages to highlight the "indirect 
influence" of Greek philosophy on economic thought and minimise its contribution. 
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While he noted Aristotle's "embryonic" differentiation between use and exchange value, 
he added that "this is not only commonplace but common sense, and further than this 
[Aristotle] did not advance" (Shumpeter 1954: 57-60). Moreover, he terms Aristotle's 
placing the concept 'happiness' in the centre of his social philosophy without giving a 
utilitarian account of it, "the original sin". Aristotle's analysis is further found wanting 
because he "gave in, and led his followers to give in, to... the teleological error" and 
because he went "hortatory on Virtue and Vice" - interested, emotive and irrational terms 
that Smith's thinking did away with. In this manner, the Ancients can be seen as 
contributing to economics (Lekachman 1964) and adding gravity to the field by showing 
its basis to be a universal human concern, while historians can at once see their views as 
naive and to be overcome by cleverer Modem thinkers (Cannan 1929). 
Lowry (1987: xiv) argues that the way economics has configured the line of the 
outside that creates its self-understanding, means that its "accepted tenet [is] that 
economic science sprang full-blown from Zeus's head in 1776 with Adam Smith's 
Wealth of Nations". Thus, it goes against a trend that since the 1970s has seen "works 
appear daily analysing our ancient debts in areas from physics to city planning, politics, 
and philosophy to mathematics and the exact sciences". Management, by developing a 
family tree for itself that has economics as the father, and sociology (also the progeny of 
Modem economic developments) and psychology (bom of Modem science) as its next 
closest relations, has created an inheritance which brings forward this rogue gene. An 
inheritance that further ingrains and ingratiates Management within Modernism. 
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III The American Business School as global 'bestpractice' 
In the United States management education is extensive, 
widely accepted, firmly institutionalized; above all it is 
vigorous, self-confident, and successful. In a business 
society formal education for the higher ranks of business 
has more scope, more energy, more encouragement. And, in 
addition, it takes its place as one of the many mechanisms 
intended to further the democratic ideal... The impetus and 
original model for European management education was the 
American business school, and the contrast in development 
and achievement remains a strong incentive to European 
management teachers. 
Mosson, Teaching the Process ofManagenzent (1967). 
The influence of the American understanding of Management on the rest of the world has 
already been broached in Chapter 6's discussion on Taylorism meeting certain needs 
abroad in World War I. However, despite Taylorism's influence on Europe, Chandler's 
(1990: 389) studies would still find fault with Europe's businessmen as they failed to 
move in the "appropriate direction" in the period up until the second World War. A 
number of studies have examined how the Marshall Plan helped rectify this situation by 
putting all parties on more or less the same path (Mosson 1965; Kipping & Bjamar 
1998). The period after World War II saw the revival of the concept of the finn and 
American technology and managerial know-how mobilised as the best means of 
improving European firms in the rebuilding of Europe. However, beyond the post war 
period, this section examines the role played by the adoption of the form of the particular 
Business School described in Section I as 'best practice' in the convergence of Western 
approaches to Management. 
As American Management theorists were simultaneously confinning unifying 
general principles, methodological approaches and standard curricula, other Western 
countries were looking to establish Management at universities. The War had made many 
in Europe recognise the importance of the mathematical and algorithmic disciplines that 
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would provide the basis of Operations Management, criticise accepted Management 
training and practice, and call for government intervention. However, Management had a 
difficult time establishing itself in Europe relative to the US. kcademic institutions were 
more conservative and less open to market forces or endowments, and it was not until the 
late 1960s that European schools of Management began to gain a foothold (Wheatcroft 
1970; Locke 1989). Developments in Britain are indicative of the way in which European 
Business Schools came to pass. 
The British government began to investigate the training of managers needed to 
aid in reconstruction directly after the war, and the Ministry of Education established a 
committee to consider the establishment of a state system of Management education. 
Lyndall Urwick was named chair (it was partly in response to these duties that Urwick 
saw the need to find Management's history). Urwick, as we have seen, was enamoured 
with the American's pioneering works (of the "apparent bias" toward Americans in his 
History, Urwick (1956: xi) countered that this was "merely a matter of chronology... It 
was natural that after Taylor's death, the ideas and skills which he had initiated should 
find their earliest and most widespread application among nationals of his own country"). 
He was similarly glowing about US Management education. Urwick's views of all that 
was good about the American system are made clear in his Managenjent Educatioyi in 
American Business (1954). Here he noted that "management development throughout the 
United States must be predicated on a well designed organization plan" (1954: 68), 
adding, citing Mooney, that this means "with basic management responsibilities properly 
subdivided, classified, grouped, distributed, related and defined". The report of Urwick's 
committee subsequently suggested a curriculum for a national Management certificate 
with "background subjects in economics, law and psychology, some 'tool' subjects such 
268 
as accounting; statistical method; work measurement and incentives; and office 
organization and methods" (Wheatcroft 1970: 89). Despite replicating the emergent 
American Business School approach, the "Urwick Report" is seen by historians as "a 
milestone in the development of management studies" (Child 1969: 242). The "Urwick 
Scheme" continued to be taught, albeit outside of the university system, for 15 years. 
The Urwick Scheme, "the basic difficulty" with which was said to be "the attempt 
to get too many subjects into a course" (Wheatcroft 1970: 89), was superseded by a 
national Diploma in Management Studies. This was offered from 1960 to 1969 as a three- 
year program of nightcourses at a number of universities. In their base year, students took 
"applied economics, business law, finance and costs, human aspects of management [i. e., 
psychology and sociology], marketing, production, purchasing and statistics" (Mosson 
1965: 165). The last two years were spent mainly on practical projects. 
The period after the demise of the Urwick Scheme is defined as when "the real 
'Management education revolution' really started" (Wheatcroft 1970: 94). It was 
considered revolutionary because it was now that the first serious moves were made 
toward the establishment of schools modeled along American lines. Urwick (1950) had 
recommended as much, and a post-experience intensive course for managers had been 
taught at Oxford since 1953 (all its tutors were economics fellows). However, the 
establishment of such permanent schools was not seriously mooted until the 1960s. The 
first two came into being in the last years of that decade. 
Despite being seen as revolutionary, these new schools offered a more refined 
version of what had gone before. The same as the Diploma, the same as the Urwick 
Scheme that the Diploma had grown from, and the same as American practice which the 
Urwick Scheme had grown out of. Wheatcroft (1970) claims the call for such schools 
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happened now as an increasing number of British businesspeople were attending courses 
at American universities. They came back asking: 'why this sort of education was not 
available in BritainT and 'why the USA had so many famous business schools while the 
UK had none'. A number of inquiries and reports into the provision of Management 
education were subsequently drawn up, and the consensus was that recommendations 
should be based upon "the best American practice [as] enshrined in the reports of the 
Ford and Camegie Foundations" (Earle, in Whitley et al. 1981). Overviewing the 
establishment of French and British business schools, Whitley et al. (1981) saw their 
development as answering the needs of the "Chandlerian organization" and reproduced 
Chandler's figure defining organisation from The Visible Hand (see Figure 24, pg. 207) 
to demonstrate the new sorts of skills that British business schools would seek to provide. 
The first postgraduate Management programs were established in London and 
Manchester, and a Bachelors degree in Management Science began at Warwick 
University in 1969. Despite claiming to be multi-disciplinary, Warwick's program was 
primarily "designed to train students in the basic disciplines fundamental to management 
- economics, quantitative methods and the behavioural sciences" (Wheatcroft 1970: 45). 
The Manchester MBA, which has remained largely the same since its establishment, 
provided instruction in: "accounting, finance, law, economics, psychology, sociology, 
organization behaviour, and quantitative methods... to bring everyone up to a basic level 
of knowledge of business functions and management disciplines" (Whitley et al. 1981: 
50). LBS's orientation was narrower, with "a preoccupation with mathematics [that 
arose] from the Principal's belief that it was a subject that was as much a necessary part 
of a manager's education as Latin had once been a gentleman's" (Axis, in Whitley et al. 
1981: 52). By 1986, Forrester's (1986: 9) report into British MBA's found that the 48 
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programs that had now been established had "a basic common syllabi", including 
64 managerial economics, quantitative methods, organizational behaviour, management 
systems, operational management, marketing, finance, accounting and business policy". 
Management education throughout Europe in the 1960s and 1970s came to reflect 
already established American forms (Locke 1989): "In Belgium, France, Italy, Spain and 
the United Kingdom", wrote Mosson (1965: 201), "American experience has been an 
essential building block in the structure of Management education". However, by the 
1980s moves were afoot within the U. S. that might have seen this form reconsidered. 
From the establishment of the standard curriculum of Management's relevant 
contributing disciplines to the end of the 1980s, variations on Pierson, Gordon and 
Howell's 'foundation' were only "flirted with" (McKenna 1989). However, in 1988 the 
AASCB sponsored another major review: Managenient Education and Developnient - 
Drift or Thrust into the 21st Century (a title uncannily reminiscent of Lippmann's Drift 
and Mastery and one that a Freudian might make much of). It was written by two highly 
esteemed products of the education system established in the 1950s and 1960s: Lyman 
Porter and Lawrence McKibbin, " and motivated by the "fact that the two most recent 
comprehensive studies of business school education (the so called Foundation studies) 
were now over a quarter of a century old" (Porter & McKibbin 1988: 4). 
Despite seeking to take a fresh look, the report leant heavily on the logic 
developed in the Ford and Carnegie studies. While Porter and McKibbin (1988) wrote of 
how schools should be more practically minded and pay more attention to business 
ethics, internationalisation and communication in addition to the "adjacent relevant 
disciplines" (for Porter and McKibbin (1988: 326), these are still "economics, 
26 Both gained their doctorates from prestigious universities (Yale and Stanford respectively, although Porter's thesis 
was in Psychology). Both had been long serving members on the AACSB board in the 1970s and early 80s. 
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psychology and the like"), no mention is made of incorporating more history, for 
example, or anything else very removed from Management's established branches. 
Drift or Thnist also comments on the state of doctoral programs in Management, 
from whence most developers of Management thinking now came. They did not 
recommend a great deal of change in the inodus operandi of these programs. However, 
they noted (Porter & McKibbin 1988: 326) that: "new doctorates are emerging who are in 
many cases unduly specialized and lacking a sufficient appreciation of the complexities 
of business problems that extend beyond the confines of their own discipline or 
functional area". At the same time they added that: "this problem is exacerbated, of 
course, by the increasing number of faculty members trained in other disciplines who do 
not even have the benefit of a business school socialization process". The upshot is that 
while we may talk of Management theorists being trained with too narrow a sub- 
disciplinary emphasis, it is at once seen as a problem that they are increasingly being 
trained by people from "unrelated disciplines" (who do not even have the "benefit of a 
business school socialization process" that would educate them as to 'Management's 
ways'), rather than the "adjacent relevant disciplines" of economics and psychology. In 
other words, while we may complain at the field's increasing narrowness, Management's 
line of the outside, established in the 1950s, must still be respected. 
Indeed, Porter and McKibbin (1988: 80) noted a significant difference between 
the climate in Business Schools in the late 1980s and 1950s. "In marked contrast to the 
situation reported in the 1950s", where there was a recognised need to establish the 
underlying subject matter of Management studies and standardise curricula, they "found 
no forceful push for systemic curricula change emanating from business schools 
themselves". It seems that by this time, nouns had established, a centralised order was 
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accepted and Management's educators were happy with the formula that had seen them 
established as a recognised member of the academic community. 
In the 1990s the consolidation of what a Business School should be is now 
enabling a further global push. In the 1997 presidential address to The Academy of 
Management, Michael Hitt (1997: 221) outlined his vision of the future: "Essentially, 
management education and research will be globalized". Despite his claims that their 
will, by 2010, "a much stronger emphasis on multidisciplinary thinking" in Management, 
a recent development lauded by Hitt may see this prospect diminished. "In 1997", writes 
Hitt, "the AACSB was renamed the International Association for Management 
Education". However, that the Association's letterheads continue to refer to the AACSB, 
while people continue to refer to the organisation as such, indicates that this is a very 
American-Global corporation not unlike the Academy itself (see Figure 1, pg. 8). 
This thesis is being written at a British school currently entertaining missions 
from the AACSB toward meeting their criteria for accreditation, an accreditation that will 
keep it, in its own words, at the 'cutting edge' and enable it to be globally ranked against 
its American counterparts. Indeed, "The AACSB", it is claimed, "is well advanced with 
overseas expansion, planning to assess 12 schools in... Japan, Hong Kong, Australia and 
Europe" (Bradshaw 1999: 14). In 1988, the same year as Drift or Thrust, Locke (1988) 
found that American pre-eminence had led Britain to be ignorant of alternative traditions 
and forms of management education present on the Continent, and that British 
management education was the lesser for this. The sort of globalisation that Hitt and 
Bradshaw refer to may mean that alternative local traditions will soon no longer be seen 
as relevant, even in the countries in which they originated. That even those alternative 
views that may have informed Britain in the 1970s and 1980s, and indeed did lead to 
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different forms of schools of management here, may soon be 'confined to history' by the 
American-Global model. 
Drift or Thrust (1988: 342) concludes by stating that innovation is the key for the 
future of Management studies, and that Business Schools are "the niechanisin for 
bringing about any innovations". Subsequently, their very last sentences read: 
Continuous innovation. In our opinion, if any single element of organization 
culture ideally should characterize the U. S. business school in the next decade, it 
should be an ingrained, embedded, and pervasive spirit of innovation. If this 
occurs, society will be the winner. 
Yet, juxtaposed against their earlier quotations with regard to doctoral programs and 
other curricula, and against the now entrenched and tightly defined nature of what 
Management education should be, it is difficult to see how the Business School 
socialisation process that they commend would not work against this. Another, less 
influential non-AACSB sponsored survey concludes with a comment on the unlikelihood 
of innovation being furthered by the educational web thus fon-ned: 
As certain as this author is with regard to the above-mentioned need for 
adaptation and change and the nature of academic governance, he is equally 
convinced that an alternative model... is not likely to arise in the near future. 
Business schools across the US have long and glorious histories of conservative 
practices and faculty and administrators have vested interests in the maintenance 
of past behaviors. One scenario suggests that we may have become victims of our 
pasts... Innovation, adaptation, and change may not come in [such] organized, 
purposeful and systematic procedures (McKenna 1989: 54). 
Without allowing the input of other traditions and disciplines, in order to relativise the 
established Management traditions, it is difficult to see how substantial invention can 
occur. On Feyerabend's logic (see Chapter 5) incremental advancement is the best that 
can be hoped for. The next chapter examines the way in which this formation, the 
historical sermon of Management and the pulpit of the Business School, have blinkered 
the field's view of the future. 
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Management's formation is doubled again by the nature of what is seen by the Business School gaze. In the 
1960s and 1970s the view emerged that organisations were more like organisms than machines. However, 
informed as it is by Modernism, Management's conception of the organism was highly mechanised. In the 
1980s, culture was seen to be the answer to organisational problems but only as it was linked to efficiency 
and viewed in a positivistic and unitary manner. In the 1990s, Management developed a Postmodem 
approach that was, unlike other fields' conceptions, strangely Modernist. Management, tightly bound by its 
singularly Modem historical conception of itself, lacks the ability to access other forms that might enable it 
to relativise this singular view and say anything substantially different. 
8,. PROPHESIES - MANAGEMENT'S 
VISIBLE FUTURES 
In a very real sense, these papers constitute a history of 
management written by those who made that history. They 
present it with vision, with vitality and with an authority 
that is beyond challenge... the principal directions in 
which management thought will develop in the foreseeable 
future have already been pointed out by the pioneer 
thinkers who provide the substance of this book. 
Merrill, Classics in Managenient (1960 & 1970). 
While Merrill's statement may appear a simple self-promotional gesture, having outlined 
the visibility promoted by the institutions and historical configuration of Management, 
this chapter shows how, in a very real sense, those that constitute the history of 
Management not only give the field vitality or produce it but also repress and limit its 
view of the future. In the 1960s and 1970s, Management recognised that the mechanistic 
view of organisations was naive. Organisations, it was claimed, were like organisms -a 
very different visibility. However, given the Modem boundaries of the field, 
Management's view of the organism comes highly mechanised: a machine in sheep's 
clothing. In the 1980s, culture gained centre stage. However, again, rather than promoting 
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a substantially different view, culture was seen through the Modem apparatus of 
Management in a mechanistic and integrative fashion. In the 1990s, Postmodemism 
caught Management's eye but it too became a distinctly Modem form. It seems that 
Management, as it is configured, can only see the Modem. Hence, it has been able to say 
little that is substantially different in the past 100 years. 
L Organism 
Organization theory was locked into a form of 
engineering, pre-occupied with relations between goals, 
structures, and efficiency. The idea that organizations are 
more like organisms has changed all this. 
Morgan, Itnages of Organization (1986; 1997). 
Morgan's (1986; 1997) Iniages of Organization begins by claiming that "one of the most 
basic problems of modem management is that the mechanical way of thinking is so 
ingrained in our everyday conceptions of organization that it is often very difficult to 
organize in any other way". As an antidote, Morgan advocates thinking of organisations 
using different images, ones that are better "suited" to current environmental conditions. 
Having outlined the machine view, Morgan's first chapter that presents a different image 
is devoted to the organism metaphor. However, it is argued here that Morgan's organism, 
representative of Management's view of the organism, is underpinned by Modem, 
mechanistic assumptions. Subsequently, much that is presented as organic in 
Management should be acknowledged as an extension of mechanistic principles in kid 
gloves. The organism metaphor, as it has been developed, has not changed all things 
mechanical. In many ways it has concealed them, and in so doing, mechanistic principles 
have been further ingrained. 
Morgan (1986: 21, underlining added) begins his chapter on the machine 
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metaphor by noting that the word organisation derives: 
from the Greek organon, meaning a tool or instrument. No wonder, therefore that 
ideas about tasks, goals, aims, and objectives have become such fundamental 
organizational concepts. For tools and instruments are mechanical devices 
invented and developed to aid in performing some kind of goal-oriented activity. 
Morgan is correct in tracing organisation to the Ancient Greek 'opyvov' (orgawn). 
However, his next sentence expands upon this idea through very Modem eyes. For the 
Greeks, an organon, a tool or an instrument could be much more than "mechanical 
devices performing some kind of goal-oriented activity". 
In keeping with Ancient Greek's contextual and relativistic arrangement, the 
meaning of orgaiion was wide-ranging. It could refer to any instrument, method or tool 
that helped an individual's living, making or performance. It could also refer to any 
being's form as an instrument for being. Further, it could refer to bodily organs as 
instruments of sense or faculty, to surgical or musical instruments or to an engine of war. 
In later periods, however, its meaning takes on particular emphases. The Latin organuin 
came to refer primarily to a mechanical device, especially war engines, while Medieval 
Christian writers generally related the word to the musical church-organ. 
The OED notes the use of orgaizoiis in English from the 16th century. Here, as is 
often the case in the Renaissance, a more Greek manner of the word returns. It is used at 
this point in two main senses: its primary sense, which the OED distinguishes as 
'naturalised' ("A bodily organ, especially as an instrument of the soul or the mind") and a 
secondary meaning that the OED terms 'alien' ("a system of rules or principles of 
demonstration or investigation"). The earliest uses of to organise (a phonetic rendition of 
organons), organised and organisation in English also appear during the Renaissance. 
They tend towards the Greek relation to 'naturalised' bodily meanings (e. g., "to furnish 
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with organs"; "that [which] is, or has been, endowed with physical life, as an animal or 
plant body"; "the structure of an organised body (animal or plant)"). The OED lists 
references of this sort dating from 1413, tapering off during the 18th century before 
disappearing altogether around 1870. 
Using to organise in this sense ceases in the 19th century because a new variant, 
which first appeared at the end of the 17th century, has, by the end of the 18th, covered 
the bodily sense of the organon: this was the organism. Whilst organisation is 
decreasingly related to individual living organic beings, we find the rise of a meaning that 
focuses on a mechanistic and more general concept of 'being organised'. Unlike the 
organism, 'being organised' was increasingly associated with applying external rules of 
co-ordination, standardisation and order toward efficiency. 
In the Oxford Dictimiaryfor the Bushiess World (Issacs & Martin 1993) we find 
the resonance of the telling split that now exists between the two words once covered by 
one. An organisni equals an "individual plant or animal" or a "living being with 
independent parts". Organisation is, somewhat circularly, defined as "organizing or being 
organized" or an "organized body, system or society". If one seeks further clarification, 
one finds that to organise is defined as "to give an orderly structure to, ". And order is 
defined as "tidiness" (see also Johannsen & Page 1987; French & Saward 1983). 
It is this etymological split that enables us today to take two words that were once 
one and use one as a metaphor for the other. One might expect that by so doing, by 
thinking of organisations as if they were organisms, we would recover the 'naturalised' 
understandings of other civilisations. However, the particularly Modem view of the 
organism, drawn upon by the theorists of the 1930s and reiterated in the 1960s, as 
described by Morgan, ingrains mechanistic assumptions as much as it offers a radical 
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alternative. This is not a view that could mean many different forms of instrument for 
particular purposes, nor one whereby every organism has a particular felos, as in pre- 
Modem times. It is rather a conception shaped by a belief in objective unitary laws 
governing the universe that all organisms are subject to. Where all organisms, following 
Descartes, have basic primary qualities and differences are secondary. Where, 
subsequently, all difference can be looked beyond to find the commonality of the whole 
genus. Where organisms are separate atomic entities characterised by having their parts 
connected up by a unitary logical mind. Where organisms can be seen as made up of 
separate functions that work according to standardised principles, taking inputs and 
turning them into outputs via some structured and predictable process. 
It was this very Modem-mechanistic view of nature, which reached its zenith in 
the 17th and early 18th century, that initially prevented the need for the development of 
separate words for the organism and the organisation. In an age when logical positivism 
and the quest for a universal calculus saw little tolerance for ambiguity of meaning as 
Greek thinking was usurped, the organism and the organisation could be covered by the 
organon as both were seen as subject to the same mechanistic principles. 
However, as the idea that all things could be seen mechanically dimmed, Man and 
other animals were regarded as different or more evolved from inanimate mechanisms, 
and the possibility of a word like the organon that stands for both an individual living 
being and the application of external objective principles diminished. Hence, the 
orgaidsm first appears in the English language at the beginning of the 18th century and 
becomes increasingly frequent in use during the 19th century (coinciding with what 
Foucault termed 'The Age of Man'). Thus, organisation and organism are now different 
words. However, the organism still carries with it a residue from the time when it was 
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both one with organisation and mechanistically conceived. This may be seen if one 
examines the layout of Morgan's chapter on the organisation as an organism closely. 
Morgan begins by claiming that "we can start this story [of the organism 
metaphor] with Elton Mayo". Thus, a chronological development is shown from the 
mechanistic thinkers of the early 20th century he depicted in his previous chapter. Mayo, 
as we have seen, is listed with Munsterberg, Parker Follett and Bamard as the New 
Pioneers who focused upon the 'other' side of work, 'the human side of the equation' or 
"the incorporation of people-related variables into the core of organization theory" 
(Warner 1997: 3811). Indeed, the organic perspective simply overlays some organic 
characteristics onto the existing mechanistic foundations as the new pioneers overlaid 
some new ideas onto the established mechanistic foundations of Management. This is not 
surprising given prevailing views of the organism in Mayo's time, a view illustrated by 
The Science of Life diagram of the human digestion system shown in Chapter 4 (see 
Figure 18, pg. 134). It is this view of the organism that Management builds with. 
After introducing the new pioneers, Morgan moves on to present Maslow's 
Hierarchy of Needs -a triangle moving ftom base physiological things upward to mind 
things (see Figure 28). This 'organism' (? ), with its hierarchical and clearly divided 'mind 
over matter' form, is, of course, a direct replication of the scientific separation of mind 
and body (see pg. 98) and Chandler's historical object (see Figure 24, pg. 207), and a 
mirror image of Diderot's Tree ofKnowledge (see Figure 16, pg. 123). 
Following Maslow is a discussion on organisations as open systems rather than as 
closed mechanistic input-process-output systems (Morgan does not diagrammatise this 
but one may illustrate the 'new' view with reference to another textbook's depiction of it 
- see Figure 29). The advance Morgan describes is made by adding a feedback loop to the 
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Organizational Subsystems 
standard input-process-output view of organisations in a manner similar to that of the 
'process approach' whereby a loop was added to the Fayolian line of "planning, 
organising, leading and controlling" (see Figure 23 pg. 197). This brings the reader to the 
second diagram in Morgan's organism chapter. In order to describe how an organisation 
can be seen as a "set of subsystems", Morgan re-presents the diagram shown here as 
Figure 30. 
This is the only picture of an organism in Morgan's chapter (a picture with the 
same input-process-output characteristics as The Science ofLife's mechanistic organism - 
although Morgan's organism looks less like an actual living being). It is a picture that 
would have been implausible prior to Modernity. Morgan's organism is an ideal, a 
simulacrum - the mechanistic essence of all organisms. It is consequently hard to see how 
this organic depiction has taken the mechanistic view of organisation and, in Morgan's 
words, "changed all this". 
Unfortunately, Morgan's intention to think other than from the ingrained 
mechanistic perspective is undermined by his unwitting adherence to Modem lines of 
history. By viewing, with hindsight, the Greek organon from a Modem perspective; by 
taking aboard the idea that the machine view is the origin of Management; and by 
presenting of a chronological linear advancement of the field from this point, Morgan 
incorporates much under the banner of organism which 'connects' his presentation of 
organism to mechanism. Contrary to his stated aim, Management's organism, founded as 
it is upon mechanistic views, further ingrains the Modem mechanistic model -a model 
which has, in the process, become more difficult to recognise and hence critique. 
This ingraining 'transition' from machine to organism may also be seen in other 
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works. When Simon (March & Simon 1958: 12-22) criticised the Pioneers of 
Management's ideas for fear that they "would transform a general-purpose mechanism, 
such as a person, into a more efficient special-purpose mechanism", the view that 
organisations and their 'components' should be viewed mechanistically was carried 
forward. Man had been naively diagnosed as the wrong type of machine but he was still a 
machine. Simon (1957) still described people in organisations as "decision-making 
mechanisms" and maintained the line that "the fundamental criterion of administrative 
decisions must be a criterion of efficiency". 
When the field took to Barnard and others organic/systemic ideas, the definition 
of organisation that the field works with did not change substantially. A focus upon 'the 
common explicit purpose', the 'coordinated system of specialised activities for the 
purposes of achieving common goals', was overlaid upon the mechanistic division of 
labour basis. Below is Sheldon's (1924: 286) 1920s definition that Urwick worked with: 
Organization: the process of so combining the work which individuals or groups 
have to perform with the faculties necessary for the execution that the duties, so 
formed, provide the best channels for the efficient, systematic, positive and co- 
ordinated application of effort. 
This can be contrasted with Schein's (1965) later "the rational co-ordination of the 
activities of a number of people for the achievement of some common explicit purpose or 
goal, through division of labour and function, and through a hierarchy of authority and 
responsibility"; or, Robbins' (1984) "a fonnal structure of planned coordination, 
involving two or more people, in order to achieve a common goal... characterized by 
authority relationships and some degree of division of labor"; or, the definition that 
Fineman and Gabriel's (1994) study on textbook rhetoric sees as paradigmatic now - "a 
collection of individuals formed into a coordinated system of specialized activities for the 
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purposes of achieving certain goals over some extended period of time, even though 
individual membership may change" (Middlemist & Hitt 1988). The traditional Modem 
triangular visibility of organisation with the centralised core enabling decentralised 
divisions to operate more efficiently has not really been greatly altered by becoming more 
corganic'. 
Even the theorists who critiqued Weber's bureaucratic 'ideal' and supported a 
more organic conception of organisation did so while reiterating, or taking for granted, 
bureaucratic dimensions (e. g., Gouldner 1954; 1957; 1959; Blau 1955; Blau & Scott 
1963; Etzioni 1961; Bums & Stalker 1961; Hage 1965). Taking Weber's dimensions of 
bureaucracy as a starting point, their research proved that some dimensions were not 
fundamental and others were, continuing to show that organisations must, as a general 
principle, evolve into more advanced (i. e., more efficient) fonns of this singular mode. 
Critics after Weber did not show up the 'strawman' that their History had created by 
demonstrating that his 'ideal organisation' was not the only ideal form of organisation 
(which is what Weber actually said). They did not undermine the conceptual starting 
point of bureaucracy. What they did was refine it by disproving particular elements 
according to the criterion of efficiency. 
Organic thinking was also seen as an advancement from the starting point of the 
original universal mechanistic organisational fon-n (universal because it was the most 
efficient) to a contingency perspective whereby one can point to a narrow range of ideal 
organic forms, one of which will be best (i. e., most efficient) for a particular type of 
environment. Robbins (1990: 278), upon reviewing this literature, claims that while there 
is no universally agreed-upon framework for classifying organisations in this way, 
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the standard 'boxes and lines' hierarchy by seeing all organisations as shaped by five 
elements that combine in five main ways to define five main species (see Figure 31). 
Thus, all viable species of organisation are based on the underlying genus of a strategic 
apex where decisions are made, a middle co-ordinating line and a broad operating base 
where action takes place. Mintzberg's forms are just more comfortable looking (or 
gloved) triangle hierarchies. While Mintzberg (1973) had earlier complained that 
Management was hampered by still speaking in terms of "Fayol's words of 1916, that 
managers plan, organize, co-ordinate and control", it appears unlikely that Mintzberg's 
own 'new' organisational visibility does not in some way perpetuate the triangular- 
hierarchical view and this way of articulating Management. 
II Culture 
Overall economic performance depends on transaction 
costs, and these mainly reflect the level of trust in the 
economy. The level of trust depends in turn on culture. 
An effective culture has a strong moral content. Morality 
can overcome problems that formal procedures - based 
on monitoring compliance with contracts - cannot. A 
strong culture therefore reduces transaction costs and 
enhances performance - the success of an economy 
depends on the quality of its culture. 
Casson, The Econoinics ofBitsiness Culture (199 1). 
In the 1980s a new idea entered Management's mainstream: organisations are really 
cultures. In the early 1980s, Japan's success began to undennine the Modem Western 
belief in technology and structure being the only significant variables contributing to 
economic progress. While America might still boast technological supremacy, Japan was 
gaining economic supremacy. Authors like Ouchi (1981) and Pascale and Athos (1981) 
attributed this to Japanese culture. Pop Management writers soon applied this sort of 
thinking to particular corporations, drawing correlations between "excellent" or "strong" 
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cultures and organisational effectiveness (Peters & Waterman 1982; Deal & Kennedy 
1982). Their findings seemed to show that the growth could not just be explained by the 
ethos of the individual "economic man" (Locke 1989: 279). 
Despite indicating that organisational development could not be fully explained 
by the ethos of the economic man, once culture came to be an object in Management, it 
was viewed from a Modem economics perspective toward Management's foundational 
aim of increasing efficiency (thus having become a more tangible synonym for 
'effectiveness'). Not long after Pop-Management gurus brought culture to the fore, more 
sophisticated surveys began to examine its 'causal links'. In 1983, Wilkins and Ouchi 
(1983) published "Efficient Cultures: Exploring the Relationship Between Culture and 
Organizational Perfonnance", presenting a: 
view of organizations that will help us link the concept of organizational culture 
to the economic efficiency of organizations... a utilitarian view... essentially a 
theory of transaction costs, suggest[ting] which governance mode will be most 
efficient (have the lowest transaction costs) under varying exchange conditions. 
This perspective on culture was solidified in titles like: Bfinging culture to the 
bottom line (Dennison 1984), Fhidhig the culture ofproductivity (Akin & Hopelain 1986) 
and The Cmifuchis connection: From cultural roots to economic growth (Hofstede & 
Bond 1988). In this way, rather than challenging the hold of economics, as one might 
think an emphasis on culture could do, culture came to reinforce it. The amorphous nature 
of culture did not change Modem methods of knowing. These methods shaped the way 
we understood culture. Management's 'end' of efficiency remained the same; culture 
simply provided an unexplored means for achieving it. 
Many early writers on culture warned of treating it as a scientific approach might 
seek to grasp an object. Pettigrew (1979) argued against viewing cultures as static, 
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unified objects and for seeing culture as a loose "family of concepts", rather than seeking 
a unifying definition of it. Deal and Kennedy (1983: 503) warned of culture being 
subsumed into: "the dominant norm of the behavioral sciences [which] emphasizes 
definitions, operationalization, measurement and quantitative analysis". Peters and 
Watennan (1982: 107) wrote that we needed "a new language" to appreciate what they 
sought to describe. However, a new language did not eventuate. The object of culture was 
taken into Management's Modem apparatus and viewed in a Modem way so as to 
reinforce the field's established thinking. Management's traditional language was not 
comfortable leaving ideas like Peters and Waten-nan's "simultaneous loose-tight 
properties" to hang ungrounded. They had to be analysed, broken down, codified and 
causal links determined. The following paragraphs examine how Management sees, and 
hence shapes, the object of culture with very Modem predispositions. 
When culture became part of Management's research agenda, when doctoral 
students and those who instructed them fixed their gaze upon culture and its vagaries, 
they set upon it with the instruments they had been trained to use. The annoury with 
which to know culture included economic logic, particularly the notion of the rational- 
economic atomic individual separate from others and her particular traditions, who could 
be quizzed as an individual but whose behaviour represented their organisation in 
microcosm; the idea that individual and organisational sub-consciousness could be 
known if one was rigorous enough; the Cartesian spirit of taking something complex and 
breaking it down into composite parts so as to make it easier to handle; the language of 
statistics; and the idea that the knowledge of an object would enable one to control or 
master it. However, the first thing to do, as in any scientific investigation, was to 
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detennine a universal definition of 'what culture is'. Thus, organisation culture doyen 
Edgar Schein (1990; see also Bate 1990) complained that "the popular use of the concept 
[culture] ha[d] muddied the waters" with regard to arriving at an agreed objective 
definition. While he acknowledged that "culture is a complex phenomenon, and we 
should not rush to measure things until we better understand what we are measuring", the 
underlying assumption is that we should be working toward definitions. Schein (1984; 
1985) believed that in this way, and by applying scientific approaches, the "real" nature 
of organisational. culture could be "surfaced", "uncovered" and "deciphered". Hence, 
Schein (1984: 15) thought that the way forward was "to study a large number of 
organizations using these methods to determine the utility of the concept of organization 
culture and to relate culture variables to other variables, such as strategy, organizational 
structure and ultimately organizational effectiveness". " 
That this predisposition has stuck is evidenced in the textbooks of the 1990s. Such 
works usually conclude their chapters on culture with a questionnaire that can be used to 
ascertain the 'type' of a culture that the student is familiar with (e. g., Robbins 1993: 626- 
7: "Turn to page 718 for scoring directions and key"). Greenberg and Baron (1995: 574- 
5) preface their questionnaire with the following: 
It is often difficult to recognize the culture of an organization without carefully 
assessing it. Typically, this is done by administering a questionnaire to large 
numbers of people working within an organization, and then averaging together 
all their answers. This simple questionnaire is designed to assess only a single 
aspect of culture - concern for people. More complex questionnaires would 
address several different aspects of organizational culture. 
Two such "more complex" approaches are described below. 
In Getting Value Fi-om Shai-ed Values, McDonald and Gandz (1992: 64-7) argue 
27 Despite attempts to arrive at a "stringent conceptual ization", it should be noted that this, like Koontz's quest for 
unity across the field, (see Chapter 6), appears to have foundered (Krciner 1989). 
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that because "[a]n organization can turn shared values into competitive advantage... we 
need to develop values-measurement profiles". By doing so, they suggest that their 
approach might "establish implicit control and create a sense of belonging by building 
work environments that manifest shared values". Toward this aim they begin by asking: 
why the application of hard science has not put such debates [with regard to the 
effects of culture] to rest. The answer lies in the abstract nature of the 
phenomenon. Tangible proof has been elusive as organizational scientists 
continue to search for reliable and valid measures of values. 
McDonald and Gandz claim that "finding answers" to this means 'doing like they 
do', beginning via an empirical approach that focuses on asking "organizational 
practitioners" what they think values "relevant to the modem corporation" are. In this 
way, they claim that they "address the concept of shared values more objectively than has 
been done in the recent past". With questionnaires and interviews they firstly arrive at 24 
values (e. g., "Humor", "Forgiveness", "Logic", "Moral Integrity") and then are able, via 
sophisticated statistical processes, to measure and rank the importance accorded to each 
value in a Company. A Company can then be placed onto a tableau of categories, 
decisions can be made as to whether this profile is what they are seeking and, if not, the 
Company can re-adjust itself accordingly. 
Migliore and Martin's (1994) Use of a Coiporate Culture Planning Index for 
Strategic Planning similarly "proposes a method to measure culture". They do so because 
"measuring anything helps us understand it better" and "closer examination of an 
organization's culture could assist it to adapt and be more effective". They claim that to 
"get to the root of culture, th[e] concealed or unconscious motivation behind... outward 
behaviour must be discovered" and propose 20 measurement categories (e. g., "Goals", 
"Ethics", "People") for doing this. These can be scored by participants from I to 5, and 
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can be added and averaged across the sample. This score then enables an organisation to 
"measure its culture against others" and highlight "weak areas that need improvement". 
Implied in studies like this is the idea that there must be ideal forms of culture. The 
fervour with which researchers attempted to measure culture may be linked to the belief 
that some cultures could be correlated with effectiveness or efficiency. Such cultures 
were generally termed 'strong'. 
Deal and Kennedy (1983: 502) were typically adamant that "while every 
organization has a culture some are stronger than others". As the traits of strong cultures 
were sought, strong became a pseudonym for "homogenized" or "unified" (Ouchi & Price 
1978), or, in other words, "cohesive and tight-knif' (Deal & Kennedy 1983), "thick" 
(Sathe 1983), "congruenf' (Schall 1983), "stable" (Schein 1984), having a high degree of 
"Shared history" (Schein 1990) or "shared values" (McDonald & Gandz 1992). 
The belief that this type of culture leads to greater effectiveness or efficiency may 
be traced back to Blake and Mouton's (1972) differentiation between sound cultures that 
"stimulated efforts to produce" and unsound cultures where "beliefs and values bear little 
relationship to productive achievement or profit seeking". At least since this time, sound 
cultures, or cultures described with pre-nomens like "strong", "powerful", "positive", 
cultures that are "integrated" or "aligned", as opposed to unsound, weak or negative 
cultures that are dispersive and disparate (Robbins 1993; Schein 1996b), have been 
believed to be linked to increased efficiency (Vaill 1984; Mitroff & Kilmann 1984; 
Dennison 1984; Pascale 1985; Stevenson & Gumpert 1985; Akin & Hopelain 1986). 
While the strong culture hypothesis has now been questioned by some (Saffold 
1988), the association of positive ternis with unified homogeneous cultures, and of 
cultural aspects which do not contribute to efficiency with binary opposite negative 
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tenns, continues to influence. The continued use of this language, even by critics of the 
cstrong culture hypothesis', indicates, firstly, that finding the cultural type that best leads 
to efficiency is the goal of Management with regard to culture. Secondly, it encourages 
the Modem view that there must be sets of superior (or more evolved) cultural traits, the 
set that best serves all organisations' ends (Martin & Sielil 1983; Stablein & Nord 1985). 
Thirdly, it suggests that cultures can be measured and differentiated into typologies based 
on this view. Finally, the continued association with positives ('strong' still sounds better 
than 'weak') implies that culture must aim for unity, or be the central stem that holds 
things together, and that nonnal individuals, whether they be nations, organisations or 
humans, should have a "single, unitary" stem (Saffold 1988: 547). Culture was seen first 
in Management as an "integrating mechanism" (Meyerson & Martin 1987: 624), a 
predisposition that still resides in our expressions. 
In addition, codifying and measuring goes hand in hand with the development of 
categorical types that have assigned values. This enables objective grids for plotting 
particular cases. Further, just as the development from the machine to the organism saw a 
move from one ideal 'species' to a few, so it was with culture. Beyond the binary 
classification of strong and weak-, other researchers have developed typologies, that while 
assuming foundational elements suggest a small number of discrete species of culture 
(e. g., Wilkins & Ouchi 1983; Schein 1996a; Quinn & McGrath, in McDonald & Gantz 
1992; Sonnenfeld, in Hymowitz 1989). These typologies promote a contingency 
approach, similar in form to Mintzberg's organic organisations, which recognises that 
different circumstances and environments suit different cultures, allows different types of 
strengths and weaknesses to be identified for each species and prospective employees to 
be asked: What kind of culture fits you best? This enables "good employer-employee 
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matches" (or cultural homogeneity) to be gained (Robbins 1993: 626). 
Finally, all of the above pre-dispositions encourage, and are encouraged by, a 
view of culture as something that an organisation 'has', a separate object, as opposed to 
something that an organisation 'is' (e. g., Deal & Kennedy 1983: 502; Greenberg & Baron 
1995: 574; Robbins 1993: 605; Schein 1984: 5; Migliore & Martin 1994: 97) This 
encourages the view that culture can be 'engineered'. These beliefs are manifest in titles 
like Gaining control of the coiporate culture (Kilmann et al. 1985), Changing the 
company culture (Stevens & Gillespie 1988) and Culture: Softivare of the mind (Hofstede 
1991), and Pascale and Athos' (1981) and Peters and Austin's (1985) description of 
"ambiguity" and "enthusiasm" as "good techniques". 
These ways of seeing and saying culture all rely upon Modernist assumptions. 
They are carried forward in the name of increasing efficiency and encourage an emphasis 
on the Apollonian, integrating dimensions, rather than difference, particularity, 
dissonance, heterogeneity and the ambiguities of culture. In Schein's (1992: 15) words, 
"the concept of culture is most useful if it helps to explain some of the seemingly 
incomprehensible and irrational aspects of groups and organizations". Culture 
subsequently comes to be seen by Management as it may help us explain away chaos. 
However, given a different historical appreciation things may have turned out 
differently. If, for example, Weber's founding role had been interpreted differently, 
culture may have been viewed differently by Management. One part of Weber's project - 
the necessity of bureaucracy given a rationalising culture - is, as Chapter 6 made clear, 
regarded as a key foundation of Management. However, other aspects of Weber's 
thinking were overlooked, including his concern for culture. Weber had a great deal to 
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say on this and given his oft-stated influence one might expect that his ideas would be 
drawn upon. However, even contemporary institutional theorists, Weber's most obvious 
heirs in organisational analysis have, for the most part, neglected this message (Clegg 
1992a). Particularly absent from Management's memory is Weber's view that any 
analysis of organisations must be a cultural analysis of culturally diverse practices. 
Management's focus has been on how differences become eliminated within one 
overarching cultural frame, theorising within a relatively restricted set of cultural 
practices and looking for how organisations can achieve global best practices. 
III. Postmodernism 
And so we've come to postmodernism, which is a kind of 
radical investigation into the classical language that 
revives, simultaneously, every single period of Classicism. 
That's what's so extraordinary. It revives all periods. 
Jencks, Post-niodendsni (1988). 
It is simply enough that one perceives modernity for what it 
was, and to realize that 'yesterday's got nothin' for me'. 
Hetrick & Lozada, first line offheit- editorialfor a special 
issue of "The Jow-nal of Organizational Change 
Managenient " on Postinodern Managenient (1992). 
Two quotations are presented above. The first is Jencks description of Postmodemism. 
The second is a lyric taken from a popular song so as to illustrate what the reader of a 
special issue of a Management journal on Postmodern approaches has in store for him, an 
issue that claims to offer readers something quite different from Jencks' conception. 
Postmodernism is defined not as the reinvigoration of the past, but, in Hetrick and 
Lozada's words, as "an escape from traditional views". Indeed, when Management views 
Postmodernism, it is as an object quite different from other fields' conceptions. 
Management takes up the Postmodern in such a way as to promulgate many of the 
Modem assumptions that others perceive Postmodemism as attempting to get beyond. 
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Postmodernism, in Management's eyes, promotes the new above the old and the 
revolutionary dismissal of tradition, either/or choices as to what most truthfully 
represents The Way Things Really Are (based on dichotomies between mind and matter, 
and subjectivity and objectivity) and, consequently, an anti-pluralistic stance that does not 
draw from many 'Classicisms' at all. 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s Postmodernism was trumpeted as "a new 
approach to organizational analysis" (Hassard 1994: 303), "a new buzzword in the 
organization and management sciences" (Berg 1989: 201). It was described as about 
"ignoring traditional modernist values" (Firat 1992), "an antimodernist program... that 
involves the destruction of economic theory and reasoning" (Wendt 1992: 54), 
"something which is essentially based on the negation of the modem" (Featherstone 
1988) or "something that succeeds the 'modem'... a break with, a shift away from or the 
rupture of the moderný' (Berg 1989: 203). There was much excitement because 
Postmodernism was all new, indeed, "not only new but new in entirely new ways" 
(Yarwood 1994: 34). 
In this manner, Postmodemism was seen as an approach that more realistically 
represented concrete changes. Hence, it is spoken of in terms such as "we are on the brink 
of a fresh mindset, one that will forever sweep away the established foundations of 
business" (Yarwood 1994: 34); "Managers must... accept that to speak of postmodernity 
is to suggest an epochal shift or break from modernity involving the emergence of a new 
social condition with its own distinct organization Principles. Postmodernity addresses 
completely new challenges" (Cova 1996: 16). 
Because "the world is less determinate in times past... old stories of how we came 
to know are no longer serviceable". Thus, 'old' Modernist thinkers are criticised as 
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retarding the field by "shortsightedly appli[ng] positivist epistemology", rather than 
"evolv[ing] to a state that is consistent with the dynamics that now surround us" (Despres 
1995). Chia (1995: 594) outlines an: 
impoverished state of affairs... whereby very few new insights are ever gained into 
the real nature of organization... the task of postmodern organizational analysis is, 
therefore, precisely to sift through these sedimented layers of abstracted concepts 
in order to make contact with the implicate organizational reality beyond. 
Consequently, "much of the [modem] curriculum will have to be confined to history 
because so much of it is irrelevant to the changed conditions of postmodern 
organizations" (Clegg 1992b: 36). Modem approaches are hence destined to "slip quietly 
into the archives of obscurity... where they will keep silent company" (Despres 1995: 73). 
Thus, Gergen and Thatchenkery (1996: 370) promote a "revolution" called 
Postmodernism, where "scholars willing to be audacious, to break the barriers of common 
sense [will] unseat conventional assumptions... by offering new forms of theory". "The 
way forward... for the consciously postmodernist... requires that the [Modernist] brick 
wall be demolished" (Carter& Jackson 1993: 100). 
This revolutionary or empirical-evolutionary predisposition promotes an either/or 
realism illustrated via the construction of tables of binary opposite terms. Modernism is 
associated with the negative old approaches and Postmodernism with the new reality. 
Despres (1995) employs just such a table to demonstrate that an ethnographic approach it 
is "far more intellectually legitimate... [i]f the aim is to fathom a slice of culture". 
Yarwood (1994: 34) like-mindedly describes Postraodernism. via a series of terms 
dichotomous to terms associated with Modernism under the heading "New Words for a 
New Age". Burrell (1989) presents something more academic but entirely similar, as do 
Arnariglio (1992), Clegg (1990; 1992b), Willmott (1992), Boje and Dennehy (1993), 
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Bouchet (1994) and Fox and Miller (1995). Modernism and Postmodemism are seen here 
as "opposing conceptual positions" (Cooper & Burrell 1988: 91). 
Carter and Jackson (1993: 84) employ this sort of thinking in their work. 
Postmodernism, for them, is "conceptualized in contradistinction to modernism, which, it 
is held, it is now succeeding... However, it is not so clear whether postmodcmism stands 
in opposition to modernism, or is the latest stage in the development of modernism". 
Either way, the choice seen is between something that builds on Modernism or 
completely opposes it. In their own words, either "postmodernism is a late fonn of 
modernism or [it is] anti-modemism" (Carter & Jackson 1993). This either/or perspective 
enables Carter and Jackson (1993, underlining added) to say that Postmodernism signifies 
the "emergence of the pre-eminence of relativity over rationality, of the subjective over 
the objective"; and, subsequently, with hindsight, to see that because Vroom's 
Expectancy Theory "introduces the voice of subjective understanding into the issue of 
motivation" it "can be characterised [as] an embryonic [or] prototypically postmodern 
theory" with "far superior explanatory power" than traditional "modem theorising". 
Indeed, with a twist akin to Mooney's history of Management, Carter and Jackson (1993: 
99-100) state that Vroom in fact "failed to fully recognize the key element of his own 
argument, that of subjective rationality" and conclude that Vroom is "unconsciously 
postmodem" and was, subsequently, unwittingly "pointing the way forward". 
This privileging of the new over the old, and subjectivity as more realistically 
capturing reality, sees Postmodernism in Management turn out to be not particularly 
pluralistic or paralogical. Hence, despite Despres' (1995) argument "for an non-reducible 
plurality", he comes to tells us that a "positive methodology is misguided" and "flawed", 
that it "will never achieve the subtlety, the unpretentiousness required to grasp the 
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natives' point of view" and, therefore, that "it is high time that we stop applying positive 
methods and unitary thinking to postmodern phenomena". Despres (1995) even goes so 
far as to claim that the "integrity" of those he criticises is "compromised" by their mixing 
and matching epistemologies, methods and metaphors. Gergen and Thatchenkery (1996) 
similarly recommend replacing the "scientific emphasis on 'the single best account' with 
a multiplicity of constructions or, in short, totalitarianism is replaced by pluralism". 
However, while claiming a world best suited to plurality they "advocate replacing 
modernist assumptions with postmodem ones that... are more consistent with the 
scientific and philosophical advancements of the late twentieth century". 
Given its Modernist formation, it is perhaps not surprising that Management 
should see Postmodemism in this way. The field is so imbued with a Modem 
revolutionary spirit that even Postmodernism must be looked at as a further extension of 
the avant-gardism and iconoclasm of Modernism. Further, within its frame of reference, 
with nothing prior to Modernity to draw upon, Postmodernism does, initially, look 
completely new to Management. However, it is not long before Postmodernism in 
Management is, by this same Modem criterion, dismissed as 'superficial' or 'not new'. 
Reviewing Postmodernism in Management, Eastman and Bailey (1996) somehow 
identify similarities between "major elements within postmodern thought" and "Comte 
and his 19th century positivist movement". From this view, Postmodernism may indeed 
be critiqued and dismissed for being "nothing new". Further, Parker (1992b: 651) 
responds to Tsoukas' (1992) criticism that Postmodernism, as earlier described by Parker 
(1992a), is "nothing new", by accepting this and dismissing Postmodemism accordingly: 
postmodernism [is] nothing more that a new phrase to capture the imagination of 
the jaded reader. The modern/postmodem couplet echoes many of the other 
dichotomies of control versus commitment, Taylor versus Mayo, formal versus 
informal, mechanistic verses organic and so on, but adds little that is new. There 
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seems no reason, apart from academic fashion, to introduce [such] a term. 
Indeed, this dismissal as nothing new and therefore unworthy is perhaps 
inevitable given a continued adherence to time and history as linear and progressive, and 
with Management and its contributing disciplines employing a further Modem distinction 
to break down and understand the Postmodem. With a Cartesian division between 
"postmodernity" as "historical periods within particular discourse communities which 
occurred after the historical period known as modernity" and "postmodemism" as "social, 
political, and aesthetic movements occurring within this" (Goodall 1992: 26; Parker 
1992a), Management seeing Postmodemism as a recovery of pre-Modem approaches 
alongside the Modem did not stand much chance. 
Even when Management does attempt to articulate a pre-Modernism, it does so 
with a relatively narrow frame. Carter and Jackson (1993: 87), for example, table pre- 
Modem, Modem and Postmodem thus: 
Premodem Modem Postmodem 
Meta-thcory Yes Yes No 
Rationality Transcendent/ Transcendent/ Subjective/ 
Doarnatic Objective Rhetorical 
It is clear that a particular type of Tremodernism', one quite different from that put 
forward in Chapter 5 of this work, is used here. It is a Premodernism that equates to what 
is often referred to in Management History as "the pre-industrial period", a period of 
"superstitious dogma" and "blind Judeo-Christian theology" (Wren 1994). With a view of 
pre-Moderuism. as incorporating the Ancient Greeks (or, for that matter, almost any 
Ancient society), the answer to the 'meta-theory' box for Premodern might have been 
'yes and no' rather than just 'yes'. Moreover, with a greater degree of self-reflection, the 
authors of this table may have recognised that even an argument for Postmodernism. relies 
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upon at least the partial acceptance of some meta-theoretical belief. Hence, 'yes and no' 
would have appeared under the Postmodern heading as well. Looking in this way, 
Management might, as fields like those described in Chapter 5, see Postmodernism as in 
some sense a recovery. 
However, perhaps the most obvious reason why Postmodernism may not be seen 
as the resurfacing of many different classicisms is that Management, given its wholly 
Modernist historical understanding of itself, generally has only one classicism that it can 
recognise: Modernism. Indeed, although it is marginal there is some talk of 
Postmodernism as a recovery in Management, but it only occurs in those unusual 
instances where the author is influenced by a broad historical understanding that allows 
them to relativise their subject. For example, Chia (1995) draws from Ancient Greek and 
Chinese thought, theoretical physics, linguistics and poetry to see the Modem as "a 
momentary lapsing into forgetfulness of its necessary postmodern origin" and 
Postmodem Management as about "elaborating the 'initial forgetting' brought about by 
the 'modernist turn"'. Similarly, Tsoukas (1992: 643-5), with reference to the philosopher 
Castoriadis and the pre-Socratics, points out that the social world or any system of being 
or thought must always have: 
both the features of cosinos without which human thought would have been 
impossible; and also, at its roots... chaos -a void nothingness, apeii-on as 
Anaximander put it - without which socio-historic creation would have been impossible... It is the interdependence of chaos and cosmos, well understood by 
pre-Socratic Greek philosophy, that makes social life patterned yet indeterminate, 
and enables the human mind to account for it, though in an irremediably 
incomplete way. 
While he sees little point in going over the ground covered by Management in the guise 
of Postmodernism, Tsoukas does not see returning to the Ancients in the same light. In 
fact, he (1992: 648) appears to believe that this, while nothing new, may be a good way to 
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challenge "the cognitive monopoly of an omniscient subject-centred rationality". 
It is debates like these that demonstrate Management's generally narrow historical 
awareness. Unfortunately Parker (1992b: 652) finds it hard to see the things that Tsoukas 
writes of as "a central element of the 'Greco-Western cultural tradition"'. This is hardly 
surprising, given that in Modem education (and Management education within this), 
Ancient Greece, when it is broached, is generally only seen as the origin of the triumph of 
rationalism. It may only be through more than just a few writers embracing a broader 
historical understanding that Management can develop in ways other than 
incrementalism, appreciate Lyotard or Jencks' Postmodern approach or operate with the 
'ocean of mutually incompatible alternatives' that Feyerabend saw as crucial for the 
development of knowledge at the end of Chapter 5. 
IV. Nothing new 
It is essential for [a field's] future development as well as 
for giving content to the theories that it contains at any 
particular moment [that] the history of a science becomes 
an inseparable part of the science itself. [And that this 
history should not be] a series of self-consistent theories 
that converge towards an ideal view. 
Feyerabend, Against Method (1993). 
Reengineering means doing inore with less. 
Hammer & Champy, Reengineering the Corporation 
(1993). 
Management has a problem with regard to invention. It is a problem to do with its 
history. However, because Management does not pay history much mind, it is a problem 
that Management does not recognise and unwittingly perpetuates. In keeping with his 
ideas with regard to invention (see Chapter 5), Feyerabend argues that substantive 
development can only come from a history that contains within it different traditions that 
can be combined. Management's history only contains one way of seeing and speaking 
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the world. Hence, the organism, culture and Postmodemism were seen by Management in 
a Modernist fashion, realighting established conventions. 
Consequently, when one places Management's most popular new theory of the 
past decade, Hammer and Champy's Business PI-ocess Reengineering (BPR) against 
Taylor's work from one hundred years earlier, one sees that it accentuates more or less 
the same things. They both dismiss tradition. Taylor (1911: 15-6) wrote of overcoming 
"the inefficient rule-of-thumb methods which are in common use", Hammer and Champy 
(1993: 17,49) of "rejecting the conventional wisdom and received assumptions of the 
past" and of how "tradition counts for nothing". Both claim universal validity: "The 
fundamental principles of scientific management are applicable to all kinds of human 
activities"; "Reengineering... applies to any organization in which work is perfonned" 
(Taylor 1911: 7; Hammer & Champy 1993: 5). Further, both reiterate the same visibility 
of organisation - the triangle with the man at the top of the central column best placed to 
see "All of the planning [must] be done by management in accordance with the laws of 
science; because even if the workman was well suited to the development and use of 
scientific data, it would be physically impossible for him to work at his machine and at a 
desk at the same time"; "Reengineering must come from the top of the organization [as] 
people near the front lines lack... broad perspective" (Taylor 1911: 38; Hammer 
Champy 1993: 208). Both are fired by a revolutionary zeal: "scientific management 
involves a complete mental revolution" while "Reengineering rejects the assumptions 
inherent in Adam Smith's industrial paradigm [and] is to the next revolution of business 
what the specialization of labor was to the lase' (Taylor 1947: 27; Hammer & Champy 
1993: 49,30). However, despite its claimed revolt against Smith's taking apart and 
simplifying work tasks into "meaninglessly thin slices", what reengineering offers, it 
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must be remembered, is only the taking apart and simplification of processes (Hammer & 
Champy 1993: 51). Across the century, moreover, the aim of promoting increased 
efficiency goes largely unquestioned, organisations will simply be reconfigured, 
triangularly, in tenns of efficiency of processes rather than efficiency of tasks. Both 
Scientific Management and BPR have the same end: efficiency or, as Hammer and 
Champy (1993) say, "doing more with less". 
What theseýexarnples show is that Management, in its Modernist quest to be at the 
cutting-edge and established on what are perceived to be legitimate and solid foundations, 
or to be continually producing the new while dismissive of the past to such an extent that 
it has no time for 'incorporating a history of its science into itself' as Feyerabend 
recommends, has found it hard to create - apart from incrementally. In a very real sense, 
to quote Merrill (1970), the field has developed the foreseeable future in line with what is 
pointed out by the munnur or background of the pioneer thinkers. In its rush to publish of 
the new, very little critical historical understanding is incorporated into the consideration 
of Management's development. Hence, the field tends to unwittingly reproduce, or just 
add complexity to, its established foundations without changing its underlying way of 
seeing and speaking. 
One may illustrate this by reviewing mainstream management of change theories. 
In 1985, an Academy of Management symposium on organisational change encouraged a 
meeting of academic minds and practical business experience toward the development of 
new theory (Pfeffer 1987). A "dramatic expansion" in the number of attempts to develop 
theoretical frameworks for guiding the management of change has occurred and it has 
been claimed that this effort has led to "more successful examples of organizational 
change than ever before" (Nadler & Tushman 1989). However, despite an 'explosion' in 
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numerical output, a review reveals a certain sameness among the many authors who have 
applied themselves to this issue. This can be seen by the way in which Kotter's (1995) 
recent framework of eight linear steps (establishing a sense of urgency; forming a 
powerful guiding coalition; creating a vision; communicating the vision; empowering 
others to act on the vision; planning for and creating short-term wins; consolidating. 
improvements; and institutionalizing new approaches) easily encapsulates other experts' 
recent contributions. " 
One reason behind this homogeneity becomes clear when one is cognisant of the 
common heritage that these theories, perhaps unwittingly, draw upon. While the 1985 
symposium called particularly for theoretical frameworks for guiding the management of 
change based upon the examination of practice and experience, the view of these authors 
had already been influenced by their uncritical awareness of earlier theories of change. 
While the object of change in Management "lacks a long history of theory and research" 
(Smither 1994: 407), it does stretch back further than 1985. The points of origin paid 
homage to are the science of psychology and Lewin's (195 1) identification of the "three 
basic steps that summarize what's involved in the process of changing people" 
(Greenberg & Baron 1983: 635). These steps - unfreezing, moving and refreezing - were 
reconfirmed by other authorities in the 1950s and 1960s (Schein 1968). Since this point, 
Management's theories of change have built, often unwittingly, upon Lewin's 
foundations. 
28 Identifying a compelling need for change and creating a sense of urgency is seen as crucial by Beer (1987), 
Jobansson ct al. (1993), Tichy (1993; Tichy & Sherman 1993), Nadler and Tushman (1988; 1989), Stacc and Dunphy 
(1994) and The Price Waterhouse Change Integration Team (1995). All of these sources and others (Bcck 1987; Chen 
1994; Larkin & Larkin 1996; Price Waterhouse 1996) cmphasisc the need to develop, effectively communicate and 
empower others to work towards a vision of a future organisational state. We arc reminded of the particular importance 
of being aware of the politics at work in an organisation, gaining commitment and forming a guiding coalition by Price 
Waterhouse (1995), Johansson ct al. (1993), Tichy (1993), Tichy and Sherman (1993) and Nadler and Tushman (1989), 
while cmphasising short-term wins and other means of consolidating improvements, integrating and institutionalizing 
new approaches and forming a platform for further change are highlighted by rccnginccring exponents like Cross, 
Feather and Lynch (1994) and most of the above. 
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FIGURE 32: THE REPFTmvF, EvOLUTION OF MODERN THEORIES OF 
ORGANISA11ONAL CHANGE. 
Figure 32 places Lewin's model and those who built upon him alongside the more 
recent approaches of Kotter and Tichy to demonstrate how Lewin's original view has 
been carried forward, albeit with a variety of 'trim' added. Lippit et al. 's model seems an 
obvious extension of Lewin's, with two more 'mezzanine' steps simply being inserted 
into Lewin's original three. In the 1960s and 1970s a number of authors (Schein & 
Bennis 1965; Froham & Sashkin 1970; Kolb & Froham 1970) developed Lippit et al. 's 
model to create a "seven-step process" (Smither 1994: 409), while Blake and Mouton's 
studies of also resulted in a change management prescription of "six phases" similar to 
what went before it. Kotter and Tichy, in this historical light, really only harden the 
establishment. 
The continuity in Figure 32 indicates a number of unquestioned Modem 
assumptions: a view of time as linear and a view of development as progressive, 
incremental and cumulative over time (see also Tushman 1974; Greiner 1972); a view of 
organisation as an input-process-output system (although some later models incorporate a 
feedback-loop as was the case with the development of the organic approach upon the 
mechanistic); and a tendency to focus on changing tangible, material things. One can only 
speculate as to what might have come to the fore with a broader historical appreciation. 
Perhaps a 'spiral' view of time with past, present and future seen as intenningled 
(Cummings & Brocklesby 1997) or an emphasis upon the creative power of myth in 
carrying past and present into the future as expressed in Nietzsche's The Birth of Tragedy 
for example. After a summary of Part Three, Chapter 9's task is to investigate the extent 
to which working with a critical eye on the accepted history of Management, while at 
once re-thinking it, may enable Management to see and to speak differently. 
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REVIEW OF PART THREE 
But, after all, this was the proper task of a history of 
thought, as against a history of behaviours or 
representations: to define the conditions in which human 
beings 'problematize' what they are, what they do, and 
the world in which they live. 
Michel Foucault, The Use ofPleasure (1984). 
This thesis has sought to investigate how being has become a Management problem, why 
it now seems obvious or natural that much of life should be judged on or subject to the 
principles of 'good Management'. Reviewing the material covered in Part Three, from the 
Foucauldian perspective developed in Part One, against Part Two's grid, we may begin to 
develop some reasons as to why this is. 
Chapter 6 demonstrated how the history of Management was constructed as 
Management sought to establish itself as a field to be taken seriously in the middle of the 
20th century. This history took the post-Enlightenment thought-world, the industrial 
conditions of the 19th century and key scientific 'discoveries' made by engineers in the 
first decade of the 20th century as its crucial points of origin. Beyond these points, 
Management looked to the ancient past to grant itself further gravity but only from a 
viewpoint that confirmed its present understanding as an advance. In other words, this 
history reflected a conception of Management, and Management's conception of 
organisation, that duplicated the key moments that define Modemism as the moments that 
defined it. 
This may be better illustrated by returning to and adapting Delcuze's (1988) 
Foucault diagram with which Chapter 2 closed (Figure 4, pg. 57). Management, thus 
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conceived, fits Modemism. as hand in glove. Consequently, Management's strata of ways 
of seeing and saying is largely one with Modernism. Its arboreal, triangular, hierarchical, 
centralised-specialised way of viewing the world (a replication of the Modem scientific 
gaze, the Tree of Knowledge, the founding principles of economics, Darwin's Tree of 
Life and the Panopticon) encourages speaking in terms of kosmos; in terms of directing, 
planning and controlling, co-ordinating or unifying, and directing; in terms of revolution 
and either/or choices; in tenns of organisation as the triangular division of specialised 
labour. Furthermore, the extent toward which one is making progress with regard to all of 
these terms is judged by the criterion of increased efficiency. 
1. Line of the outside 
2. Webs of power/knowledge 
Op 
3. Stmta 







MODERNISM doubleknot IVIA-NAGEMENTT 
For this reason, Management is in a position where it seems normal that its 
principles should be applied, for example, to hospitals, forestry and gymnasia, whereas it 
would appear odd if the principles of the disciplines that are traditionally regarded as 
underpinning those institutions were used to evaluate other subjects. By defining, 
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alongside Modernism, the line of the outside for life in the 20th century, Management's 
principles may be applied to almost any subject's operations within this period. Whereas 
other fields of knowledge are seen to be concerned with specific 'branches', Management 
is general - it sees the 'tree' as a whole. The language of Management is thus all- 
encompassing. 
Just as Part Two showed Modernism to be a particular mode of thinking, Part 
Three demonstrated that Management's particular strata of forms is specific. They are 
based upon a historical appreciation that turns contingent political happenstances into 
grand scientific origins and adapts the rest of thought to confirm the viewpoint and 
boundaries that stem from these. However, within the sphere of Modernism, a sphere that 
has solidified over the past few centuries to give the appearance of universality, 
Management's visibility appears anything but specific. Modernism's general web of 
power-knowledge shields Management's particularity. It makes Management appear both 
normal and general. 
In addition, Management has developed a web of its own. The institutions of 
Management's history, the particular understanding of organisation that became 
Management's key object, and the specific fonn that would become the model Business 
School, all of whose views reinforce and re-alight the others, come together in the middle 
of the 20th century (see Chapter 7). This co-fon-nation enabled the subject of 
Management or 'Management knowledge', to augment the more obvious aspects of its 
'grubby' technical engineering background and gain a credence that it had struggled to 
achieve in previous decades -a formation that appeared solid, and seemed, at the time, to 
speak a sense that was difficult to challenge. In addition, the historical assumptions upon 
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which these institutions are based continued to redouble this web by repeating and 
restating Management's accepted history to a point where it almost no longer needs to be 
written or read to be understood. It is 'background noise', too obvious to question. 
Management's fit into Modernism is made complete by it becoming a 'science' 
that appears capable of solving one of Modernism's major problematisations: the 
determination of general human ends by which different activities can be judged 
objectively. Management emerges as the field that investigates the solution once thought 
to offer the greatest means to close the gap that Modernism created by dismissing a 
reliance on particular custom and individual telos: 'performative efficiency'. Thus, 
Management has become a subject greatly suited to meet Modernism's needs. Modernism 
and Management come together to promote efficiency as the benign meta-narrative that 
can be applied to judge almost any kind of performance, as the demonstration that there 
can be a universal human end, and which subsequently provides some sort of closure on, 
or makes sense of, all of the parts of Modernism's complex system. Further, speaking in 
temis of efficiency, it reinforces seeing in ternis of unified-specialisation and hierarchies 
of control (cf. the 'maturation' of American democracy under Teddy Roosevelt described 
in Chapter 6). For this reason, Management, as the study of efficiency, has spread further 
and faster than any other field in the 20th century. The diagrams of Management and 
Modemism form a 'double knot' that protects them from other perspectives that might 
threaten their 'righteousness'. 
Management's bringing together of Modernism's 'loose ends' may also be 
illustrated with reference to the diagram that began Chapter 2, Noujain's (1987) depiction 
of Foucault's history of psychoanalysis (Figure 2, pg. 26). Management, as the fonnation 
of the subject of Management, its object the Organisation, the institution of the Business 
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School and the history of Management, provides a conduit that brings together 
Modernity's desire for general human ends and bureaucrac , 
its general fonn of 
organisation (these two aspects may be related to Foucault's (1977a) prongs of 
Modernism's power: 'normalisation' and 'surveillance'). It does so by inciting the 
language of efficiency, a language that at once underpins bureaucratic rationality and 
provides a general end. It was able to do so with great force and hence successfully in the 
1950s. Here, the form of economics and, to a lesser extent, other human sciences, are 
such that Management may 'base itself on these established subjects in a manner that 
enables it to become accepted at the premier knowledge institutes of our century 
(themselves based on arboreal bureaucratic logic) and speak to business in a more 
agreeable way than business' earlier association with economics. Subsequently, 
Management not only links and empowers Modernism's way of seeing, it becomes the 
hub linking two of Modernity's key institutions - the hitherto separated 'capitalist 
business' and 'university system' -a further reason for its power today. 
Desire for general human ends 
Economics & the 
human scien' 






While this formation gives Management great strength within Modernism, it 
should also be recognised as a formation that limits as much as it produces knowledge. 
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This was demonstrated in the discussion of how Management views 'new' objects in 
Chapter 8. The manner in which Management is limited in this respect may again be 
illustrated with reference to Deleuze-Foucault diagram drawn on page 305. 
Management's 'line of the outside' (which exists as a double of Modernism's boundary) 
makes it difficult for anything other, with which it might relativise its current way of 
thinking, to enter into the subject. It makes it difficult, for example, for the ways of pre- 
Modem thinking (symbolised at the end of Chapter 3) to enter with those forms of 
Modernism (drawn at the end of Chapter 4) so as to enable 'thinking differently'. Thus, 
even though Management may alight upon 'new' objects, it sees them through the same 
old 'architecture' and speaks them in Modem terms such as 'efficiency', 'universal units', 
cessential unity', 'species', 'specialisation' and 'either/or', thereby further invigorating its 
own preconceptions. As Management's diagram continues to latch on to Modernism, to 
activate the 'double knot' described earlier, this becomes an issue of wider concern. As 
life becomes increasingly subject to Management, it may become more difficult to think 
differently, not just in Management, but at a more general level as well. 
Management, it is argued here, is a much more recent invention than it might 
seem. Rather than a universal or normal way of judging being, it is a formation that is 
based on singular conceptions and political expediencies. It is also a formation that limits 
as much as it produces knowledge. It should not, therefore, be respected or go 
unquestioned to the degree that it currently is. Part Four begins to examine the extent to 
which one might begin to think differently by working with a counter-historical 
awareness of this formation, while at once failing to respect it. 
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PART FOUR: DISCUSSION 
The more insight we possess into an origin the less 
significant does the origin appear. 
Nietzsche, Daybreak 44. 
The object was to learn to what extent the effort to 
think one's own history can free thought from what it 
silently thinks, and so enable it to think differently. 
Foucault, The Use qfPleasure (1985). 
Part Three demonstrated how the accepted history of Management contributes to a 
fon-nation that both produces and limits what the field sees and says. Management's 
diagram of power/knowledge maps neatly onto the diagram of the Modem episteme so as 
to double a line of the outside that has difficulty incorporating non-Modem forms into its 
strata. Thus, the diagram of Management and its visibility draws great strength from 
Modernism and in turn sustains Modem ways of viewing and speaking the world. 
However, Part Three also demonstrated that Management's fon-nation is largely based 
upon a singular view, inspired by contingencies and specific expedients. These are now 
overlooked, but only because a web of re-iteration has converted them into grand 
immutable origins along a linear continuum that appears so regular that it goes without 
question. 
In so doing, Part Three provided answers to the questions that were posed in 
Chapter 1. Firstly, how does Management come to have such force, a force that is as 
pervasive as it seems unobtrusive? Through its formation being perfectly integrated into 
the 20th century's prevailing way of speaking and seeing - Modernism. Secondly, why 
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does Management have difficulty in seeing Postmodernism as other subjects see it? 
Because its historical understanding of itself is so tightly bound by Modernist ways that 
it, unlike fields such as art, architecture, philosophy and physics that refer to more wide- 
ranging histories, incorporates little with which to relativise its one and only classicism - 
Modernism. Thirdly, why is so much in Management presented as new while appearing 
similar to what has gone before? Because Management, being Modem, is driven by an 
avant-garde, iconoclastic and revolutionary will to speak of new and configured in such a 
way that it finds it difficult to incorporate the 'ocean of mutually incompatible 
alternatives' that enable substantive invention. Management is only able to develop 
incrementally by the principles of the 'expert's homology'. Hence, new names, same 
logic. 
Having demonstrated this limiting effect, while having demonstrated the dubious 
nature and hence the insignificance of the historical points of origin that define 
Management's formation, we may now return to what Foucault ultimatelY recognised as 
his telos: to play a part in the process of subjectivation by re-thinking a subject's history, 
so as to free it from what it unquestioningly assumes about itself, so as to enable it to 
think differently. So as to enable, in this instance, Management to be 're-styled'. 
While space precludes attempting this here in any great detail, Chapter 9 
illustrates how one might undertake such a task by taking two relatively straightforward 
aspects of Management that have recently been problematised by its prevailing formation. 
By firstly being conscious of the contingent historical assumptions that shape the field's 
views in these instances, and then incorporating a broader historical conception so as to 
bring other ways of saying and seeing into the subject, these two examinations attempt to 
think differently about Strategic Management and Business Ethics (see Cummings (1995) 
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and Cummings & Brocklesby (1997) for similar exercises in re-thinking history to re- 
think Management with regard to centralisation and decentralisation and organisational 
change). Chapter 10, the concluding chapter, then discusses the impact of the particularly 
Modernist fonnation on life in general and outlines areas for further research. 
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Having identified Management's tight-knit Modernist history as limiting, one may begin to think 
differently by taking a wider historical view and connecting to un-Modern ways of seeing. Two aspects 
problematised in Management over the past decade are broached as examples: whether strategy is about 
'top-down' design or 'bottom-up' emergence; and why business ethics seems to have little impact on 
decision making. With a broader historical conception of Management, the first problem, based on a 
triangular hierarchical view of organisation and the idea that one must represent the way things are without 
logical contradiction, would not be framed: strategy may be seen as both emergence and design. I'lic 
second problem might be differently addressed by questioning the Modernist assumption that business 
ethics must be about the provision of general codes. 
9. THINKING OTHERWISE: RE- 
FRAMING HISTORY, RE-VIEWING 
MANAGEMENT 
L The 'jvhat is strategy? ' crisis 
Something is amiss, either the practitioners cannot keep 
up with theorists frequent changes of mind or the theorists 
still cannot decipher the practice. Were the many decades 
of vigorous development wasted? Does anybody at least 
lazow what strategy, strategic planning or strategic 
management are? 
Zeleny, Editorial - Hinnan Systeins Managenient (1997). 
In 1997 Strategic Management (SM) was in crisis. Two schools of thought were certain 
that their opposite understandings were correct. The Design School, headed by Igor 
Ansoff, asserted that strategy was about rational planning, about those at the head of the 
corporation determining how the company would seek to match or fit their environment. 
The Emergence School, with Henry Mintzberg at the forefront, argued that Design "got 
the notion of strategy all wrong, 'the wrong way around.. (Zeleny 1997: 77), strategic 
direction emerges through experience and expediency, without or despite purposeful 
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planning or forecasting. These "tectonic debates" raged through the late 1980s and 1990s 
(Pascale 1996), with prominent academics like Stacey (1990), Rumelt (1996) and Hamel 
(1996), coming in behind Emergence, and Porter (1996), Goold (1996) and de Kare- 
Silver (1997) fighting back for Design. It is this situation that Zeleny describes as 
"amiss". How this impasse was arrived at can- be better understood if one is aware of the 
accepted history of SM within the history of Management described in Chapters 7 and 8. 
The clear consensus in SM is that interest in the field began in the 1950s (Ansoff 
1969) and that the subject was "born" in the 1960s as "strategic planning" (Ansoff 1994; 
Mintzberg 1994a; Goold & Luchs 1993; Whittington 1996). Influential early works 
usually listed include: Drucker's (1959) Long-Range Planning; Chandler's (1962) 
Strategy and Structure (Chandler's view of SM as 'the detennination and achievement of 
the basic long-terin goals of an enterprise', is seen as the "classic definition" (Weick 
1987)); Andrews' (1971) Concept of Coipomle Sti-ategy; and, above all, Ansoff s (1965) 
Corporate Strategy. Ansoff is listed as primary among those who "applied the concept of 
strategy to management' 'and defined the "basic concepts of strategy" (Hamel & Prahalad 
1989). His concepts are regarded as "the basic premises of strategic management" and 
form the basis of the Design School: "the classical... oldest and still most influential" 
view (Mintzberg 1990: 171; Whittington 1993: 3; Tsoukas 1994; Stacey 1990). 
Consequently, SM is conceived as Management's history was being recorded and 
soon after what Management was about was clearly defined. Ansoff (1965: viii) 
accordingly pays tribute to "pioneers like F. W. Taylor, Elton Mayo, and Henri Fayol 
beg[inning] to apply science to management" (although Ansoff claims that because they 
began with problems of individual productivity within the organisation while lie was 
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concerned with the external problems of the firm's fit with its environment, "historical 
progress [in the field had] been from the 'inside out ... ). SM emerged as the 
recommendations of the Ford and Carnegie reports were taking effect, as Chandler was 
outlining the evolution toward the multi-divisional structure and when economics was 
found to be Management's 'only theoretical framework-'. As a result, SM comes to be 
largely encased by Modernism. 
The Design School and the basic concepts of SM 'arrived' as Ansoff (1969: 11 ff. ) 
realised a problematic gap between reality and theory. The supposed increasing 
complexity of business-envirom-nents in the 1950s and 60s, compounded by increasingly 
predominant multi-business firms (in keeping with the evolution described by Chandler), 
was creating a desire for foresightful ways of positioning companies in order to exploit 
environmental change. However, at that time current theory included only a business 
policy approach that assumed a company could stipulate what it would do on any given 
occasion (i. e., that assumed simple, stable environments) and the prevailing micro- 
economic theory of the firm. This saw organisations as simply turning resources into 
outputs through a production function and assumed that managers merely manipulated 
the factors under their control (e. g., wages, quantities manufactured, prices) so as to 
maximise profits. This model provided for no differentiation between finns behaviour 
and offered managers little decision-mak-ing guidance. Ansoff sought to fill this gap. 
Ansoff (1965: 118ff. ) saw the promise provided by Von Neumann and 
Morgenstern's Game Themy. Explaining that the concept of strategy is "relatively new", 
Ansoff goes on to tell us that: 
Its historical origin lies in the military art, where it is a broad, rather vaguely 
defined "grand" concept... Strategy is [here] contrasted to tactics, which is a 
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specific scheme for employment of allocated resources. The bridge to business 
was provided in 1948 by Von Neumann and Morgenstern in their now famous 
theory of games.... The concept of strategy is [here] given two meanings. A pure 
strategy is a move or a specific series of moves by a firm, such as a product 
development program in which successive products and markets are clearly 
delineated. A grand or inixed strategy is a statistical decision rule for deciding 
which particular pure strategy the firm should select in a particular situation. 
Influenced by Von Neumann and Morgenstern, Ansoff (1969: lOff. ) defines strategy as a 
rule for making decisions pertaining to a firm's match to its environment and set out to 
"enrich [the] theoretical conception of the firm". ' 
Simply speaking, Ansoff added a layer on top of the traditional mechanistic 
economic model of "resources -> logistic processes -> outputs" called "management 
process" (see Figure 33). He then outlined three distinctive action or decision areas: 
administrative or tactical, operational and strategic. Adininistrative action related to 
establishing the central stem of Management and logistic processes. Operational action 
related to the maximisation of operational efficiency within the process parameters set by 
the administration. Strategic action related to establishing the organisation's relationship 
to the environment and this was carried out by the 'men at the top'. Strategy imposed 
operating requirements. The administrative structure must provide the climate for 
meeting these. The operational level then fulfills the plans provided from above (Ansoff 
1965: 7). The Design School thus perceives strategy as separate from, overseeing and 
proceeding, organisational action in a linear-hierarchical manner. The influence of 
Ansoff s divisions can be seen in texts that speak- of a hierarchy of strategy from 
corporate to business to functional levels (Andrews 1971; Meelan & Hunger 1990; 
Pearce & Robinson 1991), of a hierarchy of control from strategic to tactical to 
29 Thus, when the OED looks back at the development of Strategy as it relates to Management (its meaning in this 
context defined by the OED as "a plan for successful action") it attributes its first use to Von Neumann and 
Morgenstern (1944) ("strategy is a set of rules for making decisions"), the second to a 1954 psychology journal ("a 
strategy is a set of personal rules") and the third to Ansoff's (1965) Corporalc Siratcgy. 
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FIGURE33: ANSOFF's DEVELOPM ENT OF STRATEGY I PONTI IE INP1! T-PR()(ISS- 
OUTPUT THEORY OF THE FIRM. 
SOURCE: ANSOFF "BUSINESS STRATEGY" (1969). LEVELS SUPERIMPOSED. 
operational levels (Lorange, Morton & Ghoshal 1986), and of the importance of 
recognising the difference between strategy and tactics (Rock 1987). 
SM's underlying visibility is thus the same as the Chandlerian form and the 
formation "enshrined" in the Ford and Camegie reports. Indeed, even in his theoretical 
development, Ansoff s (1965: viii) view was obviously triangular and hierarchical, his 
stated aim to "synthesize and unify... into an overall analytic solving the total strategic 
problem of the fin-n [the] partial analytical insights into strategic business problems 
[developed] over the past ten years". The Design School's visibility is the panoptic view 
of Modemism. 
Correspondingly, the Design School speaks in Modem terms. For example, that 
SM is termed as about the "matching" of organisation and environment assumes that 
these are separable objects about which the truth can be objectively known. Also, in order 
to master the complex whole of the SM 'problem' it is broken down into constituent 
parts. While Ansoff (1969: 14) acknowledged that a theory that was useful for analysing 
real world behaviour would "have to integrate and interrelate the three major decision 
areas" (operational, administrative and strategic), he stressed that "to reduce the theory- 
building task to manageable proportions", we should begin by "study[ing] each class of 
decisions separately". SM's 'Cartesian' separations inspired a language that spoke of the 
strategic mind as separate from and above operational matter. 
Despite the separation of SM above and beyond the input-process-output of 
operations, and his claim that the theory of the whole firm would 'have to integrate and 
interrelate the three major decision areas', after breaking the firm down, Ansoff s 
modeling ultimately fell back upon the language of efficiency that was seen to underpin 
operations. Ansoff (1965: 31) explained early on that while firnis had "traditionally and 
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historically" been regarded as solely economically motivated toward the purpose of 
increasing 'return on investment', and toward this 'end' had "developed a measurement 
of efficiency - profit - common and unique to [them]", this had recently been the subject 
of much debate. However, having identified that the object at the operating level of a firm 
is always "to maximise the efficiency of the finn's resource conversion process", Ansoff 
(1965: 208), when finalising his model of the firm, concluded: 
[given that] there is no general agreement on a proper philosophical basis for 
business objectives... our framework for formulating objectives was made 
adaptable to a variety of different management attitudes, so long as the underlying 
concept of the firm is that of an efficiency-seeking organization which meets the 
objectives through the mechanism of making and selling goods and/or services. 
This perspective encouraged the idea that SM could be spoken of mathematically 
and as an engineering problem. Ansoff (1965: 5-6,44) explained that "the strategic 
problem is concerned with establishing an 'impedance match' between the firm and its 
environmenf , 
30 and accordingly explained that SM has generic properties that can be 
abstracted out of their local contexts, correlated with other generic organisational 
properties and used to recommend actions, once such correlations have been determined, 
"at 0.05 or better confidence level" (Ansoff 1991: 459). 
This way of saying and seeing enables SM to neatly latch onto the established 
view of Management. SM is defined as the "planning, directing, organizing and 
controlling of a company's strategy related decisions and actions" - the achievement of 
Management's principles but at a higher level and for the long-term, so as to integrate the 
divisions of Modem organisations (Pearce & Robinson 1991: 3). The basis or Classical 
view of SM thus defines strategy by its not being administration or tactics or operations 
or processes. This, combined with the view of SM as about thinking and operations as 
3' An impedance match adjusts a load impedance to match the source impedance with a transformer or a network, so 
that maximum power is received and three is no reflection loss due to mismatch. 
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about doing, combined with a view of organisations as hierarchies where the further up 
one is the more thinking and less doing one does, meant that SM was seen as the preserve 
of senior managers at the top (those at the bottom lack the ability to detach themselves 
from everyday tasks) - and a detached, objective and logical process (Ansoff 1965: ix). 
The view is that SM means executives, crucially staying above the action, carrying out a 
rational planning process resulting in the provision of simple explicit plans for 
operational action (Tsoukas 1994). This view of SM enables Modem English's need to 
associate tenns with positive objects to be satisfied. Strategy equals a finn's explicit 
long-tenn plans. 
This view of strategy came under attack in the late 1980s. Among those opposed 
was Henry Mintzberg, who had gained a reputation investigating 'what managers really 
did', rather than what academics said they did or should do. He now applied his approach 
to SM. The view associated with what Mintzberg concluded is known as the Emergence 
School. This saw SM as the opposite of what the Design School prescribed. 
Mintzberg's argument was based upon his empirical research indicating that the 
Design School's position was dependent on "the fallacy of detachment", the belief that 
thinking and doing are separate (Mintzberg 1994a: 13-16). Managers were not rational, 
logical, 'clean-sheet' forecasters and positioners, but influenced by politics and historical 
or cultural patterns of traditional behaviour. Hence, Mintzberg argued that the notion that 
"strategy making could be reduced to a series of steps proved to be reductio ad 
absurduni ", that "everyday thinking almost never presents a series of steps [and] even if 
people tried to implement [using such steps], they would find them foreign to what they 
are trying to do". In addition, Mintzberg claimed that environmental turbulence and 
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decision-making complexity are such that forecasting the future environment, in order to 
set plans to determine positioning for the future, is an impossibility. In any case, 
Mintzberg (1987; 1989; 1991) argued that truly creative strategies are the result of the 
opportunistic synthesis of different ideas and aspects rather than detached analytical 
thinking within a set of constructs. Thus, real SM stems from a direct knowledge of local 
contexts and there can be no "fonnal techniques" for strategy. 
Consequently, Mintzberg found that the interaction between 'organisation' and 
cenviromnent' crucial to strategy does not happen between top executives and the 
environment. Rather, it occurs where frontline employees react to and anticipate customer 
needs and wants, or spot gaps and opportunities. Over time, actions may create patterns 
of behaviour that may filter up to be formalised into plans, but these plans did not 
originate at the top. Strategy happens "bottom-up" (Pascale 1984, see Figure 34). 
Given the above conditions, firms must be flexible so as to take paths that 
unexpected opportunities may lead to. Moreover, given that "the purpose of a plan is to 
render things inflexible", and that "a 'flexible plan' is thus an oxymoron", planning turns 
out to be positively the opposite of real SM (Mintzberg 1994a: 14). Mintzberg (1991) 
claims that only now recognising this "points to the poverty of [Management] at the game 
of researcW'. 
Finding opposing schools of thought is problematic for any field seeking to 
develop as a Modem science (Kuhn 1962). However, this problem is overcome if an 
evolutionary chain can demonstrate how schools have built on one another toward a view 
closer to the truth. A good example of SM seeking to make sense of development in this 




FIGURE 34: THE EMERGENCE SCHOOL'S ALTERNATIVE VISION OF STRATEmY - 
STRATEGY ACTUALLY EMERGES FROM THE'BOTTOM-UP'. SENIOR MANAGERS 
TAKE THIS STRATEGIC THINKING AND TURN IT INTO 'TOP-DOWN' PLANNING OR 
'THE OPPOSITE OF TRUE STRATEGY'. 
different schools is seen as due to the "evolution of the strategy construct proceed[ing] 
sequentially through [a] hierarchy, beginning at [a] machine level". "During the past 20 
years, the strategy literature has greatly evolved. Today, in fact, it has almost arrived at 
the point at which it is capable of reflecting the actual level of complexity at which 
organizations operate". " On this logic, the Emergence paradigm would come to be 
categorised as a superior, more representative, view of how SM really is. It was at the 
cutting-edge. 
Mintzberg's (1987; 1988) early attempts to conceptualise an alternative view to 
Ansoff s incorporated planning. Here he argued that strategy happens as a potter makes a 
pot - with an initial plan of action, but also reacting to the particular nature of the clay and 
what takes form during the process to arrive at something quite different from what was 
originally pictured. He called for an "opening up [ofl the definition of strategy" to include 
patterns, perspectives and ploys, in addition to planning and positioning. However, later 
Emergence rhetoric is wholly damning of Design. Convinced that their approach was 
more evolved and representing the way the world really is, the writing of Emergence 
theorists comes to be loaded with revolutionary zeal, thus polarising the debate. 
Stacey (1990: 14-15) begins his Dynandc Strategyfor the 1990s, by criticising the 
traditional view of strategy (analogous, writes Stacey, to a "general who deploys his 
forces tactically within a grand war strategy"), explaining that lie: 
uncompromisingly rejects the conventional strategic management framework, 
with its trite future-mission statements and flimsy strategic plans, as unrealistic, 
impractical and essentially static. I... propose more appropriate ways. The real 
cutting edge of strategic management lies in handling the unknowable, and the 
cast of mind generated by the conventional approach is a positive hindrance to 
such an endeavour... in the dynamic business world of the 1990s it is totally 
inappropriate. 
31 Chaffe writes before the "emergence school" has been tcnTied as such. However, the school that she sees as most 
advanced, which she terms "interpretative", maps neatly onto emergence views. 
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Stacey's (1990) back cover 'blurb' speaks of his work "rendering traditional long ten-n- 
planning, the grand design, redundant". 
Hamel's (1996) Strategy as Revolution, starts out arguing that "top-down and 
bottom-up are not the alternatives" but still conforms to a Modem way of speaking. 
Hamel suggests that what is required "is not a little tweak to the traditional planning 
process but a new philosophical foundation: strategy is revolution; everything else is 
tactics... strategy must be revolution". To add weight to his claim, Hamel invokes: 
"Galileo [who] challenged the centrality of Earth and man in the cosmos. The American 
colonists [who] challenged the feudal dependencies and inherited privileges of European 
society. [And] Picasso and other modernists [who] challenged representational art". 
Hamel tells us that we must "cast off industrial conventions" and presents an instructive 
dichotomy. In "Column A" is the old approach to strategy that must be overcome: 
"Ritualistic, Reductionist, Extrapolative, Positioning, Elitist, Easy"; while "Column B" 
outlines the new way (or the opposite of the old way): "Inquisitive, Expansive, Prescient, 
Inventing, Inclusive, Demanding". "The essential problem in organizations today", 
concludes Hamel (1996: 71), "is a failure to distinguish planning from sh-ategizing". 
This echoes Mintzberg's (1994a: 19) own later conclusions, that "strategic 
planning has never been strategy making" and that "[u]ltimately the term 'strategic 
planning' has proved itself to be something of an oxymoron". Indeed, Mintzberg's 
(1 994b: 1) book, entitled The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning, begins by stating that 
this "history book of sorts... trace[s] the story of that concept [strategic planning] from its 
origins around 1965 through its rise to prominence and its subsequent fall". 
Despite these refutations, Design was not overthrown and consigned to history. It 
held its ground. Ansoff (1994: 31) criticised Mintzberg's use of single case studies, 
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claiming that they made it "difficult for Henry to claim universal validity for his 
emerging strategy model". Mintzberg's descriptions of the environment as an 
unpredictable force were met with Ansoffs (1991: 455) claim that his: "cryptic 
statements beg all kinds of questions: whose environment is being discussed; what kind 
of influence does the force exert on organizations; under what circumstances is it 
exhorted; what impact does it have on strategic behavior, etc. ". Moreover, Ansoff (1994: 
31) compared Mintzberg's notion that planners cannot manage complexity to "a child's 
perception of the adult world". For a descriptive statement to be valid, Ansoff (1991: 455- 
6; 1994: 31) remarked, "it must be an accurate observation of reality", and the Design 
School's views hold up because his studies show that "modem versions of planning are 
alive and well". Further, his (1991: 459) tests continue to prove that: "[t]he levels of 
success in organizations which are aligned with the environment were substantially 
higher than in organizations that were out of alignment". 
More recently, Michael Porter (1996) has entered the fray in his Hat is 
Strategy?, which argues for a "reconnection" with the classical assumptions. The "new 
[Emergence school] dogma" has, according to Porter, short-sightedly rejected positioning 
- "once the heart of strategy". This has led to a number of problems, the root of which is 
"the failure to distinguish between operational effectiveness and strategy" and a 
subsequent lack of focus on real strategy, due to the mistaken belief that strategy happens 
"further dowif ' organisations. "Operational effectiveness", writes Porter (Ansoff tenned it 
64 operational efficiency"), relates to "practices that allow a company to better utilise its 
inputs". This should be taken as a given from a strategic point-of-view. " My SM must 
32 Porter levels a good deal of the blame for this distraction on the recent emphasis on the success of Japanese 
companies. In a clear rejection of Hamel and Prahalad's (1989) and others' attempts at "remaking strategy" by 
incorporating the more Eastern or Japanese conception of strategy as about "intent", Porter tells us that Japanese 
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be about positioning, and not, for example, about patterns, is not justified by Porter, 
unless one counts statements such as "fit is one of the oldest ideas in strategy" or even 
"the essence of strategy", and that those at lower levels of the organisation cannot do 
strategy because they lack the "perspective", or "vision of the whole". 
Thus, we come to what is seen as the 'what is strategy? ' crisis. As has likely been 
recognised, this crisis, the stalemate between Emergence and Design, is founded on the 
Modemist views that SM's history associates itself with. The two schools reflect two of 
the great Modem debates: that between an existentialism that sees humans as free to 
determine their position and a structuralism that sees our paths as shaped by that which 
goes before us; and that between a rationalism that looks to the logical mind for best 
approaches and an empiricism that looks to 'matter' instead. In addition, the idea that 
there should only be one prevailing school of thought; the idea that there can only be one 
view at the cutting edge; the notion that this school is the one that most closely represents 
reality; and, the idea that reality must be represented and understood without logical 
contradiction, have seen the debate polarise into an either/or choice as to whether SM is 
positively about planning, or positively not. Furthennore, this either/or is seen in tenns of 
Modernism's triangular hierarchy. For the Design School strategy happens "top-down". 
The Emergence School, by unquestioningly adopting the accepted foundations of SM, is 
obliged to counter this in like-minded language. Consequently, for them, strategy 
happens from the bottom of the triangle up. In keeping with Management's historical 
understanding of organisation and the Business School's standardised curricula (as a 
leading SM guru explained, "the establishment of Business Schools provided the basis for 
companies in actual fact "rarely have strategies". This is because, in Portcr's (1996) own words, "Japanese companies 
rarely develop... strategic positions of the kind discussed in this article". 
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the education of strategic managers and the divisionalized structure of organizations 
provided the form for them to work within" (Andrews 1969)), the view of the triangle 
still remains as the shape of organisation. A different approach to the history of SM 
would likely not have encouraged the emanation of a debate in these terms. By re-tracing 
the etymology of strategy we may see alternative 'origins' and, consequently, ways of 
thinking differently. 
The word 'strategy' derives from the Athenian position of strategos, a title coined 
in conjunction with the refonns of Kleisthenes of 508BC. Kleisthenes instituted ten new 
tribal divisions as military and political sub-units of Athens. Each was to be commanded 
by an elected strategos. Kleisthenes developed the title by compounding stratos, which 
meant an army spreading out over ground (in this way stratos is allied to strattini), and 
agein, 'to lead'. Its advent paralleled increasing military complexity. Warfare had 
developed to a point where sides increasingly relied upon the connection of many units 
fighting either in close formation or on several different fronts, depending on particular 
circumstances. The proliferation of naval forces, mercenaries and political alliances at 
this time further multiplied the variables that commanders had to consider. The ten 
incumbent strategoi formed a council that made policy recommendations to the general 
assembly when resident in Athens and was given command of the armed forces when 
these were abroad. 
Hence, the organisational. visibility influencing the conception of strategy 
incorporated hierarchical elements, as it was primarily associated with leadership, but it 
was at once different from the Modem triangular view. Strategy here was about detached 
long-tenn planning for the whole corporation. However, as the frontlines were believed to 
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be the best place from which to read the mood of events, to implement plans or to adapt 
and change plans as events unfolded, Sti-ategoi were expected to be present in the thick of 
battle (Xenophon (Mein. 3.6) described the most important attribute for an aspiring 
strategos simply as "to know the business which you propose to carry out"). Thus, 
strategy also happened at the front. Furthennore, given that the organisational fonn 
operated on many different fronts at once, depending on particular circumstances, 
strategy here 'spread out' according to the particular fonn that the organisation took at a 
particular point in time. Hence, strategy occurred, for the Greeks, at all levels and parts of 
what we might see as a Modem organisational hierarchy as a blend of what we call 
strategy, tactics and operations (Whitehead 1986; Cummings & Brocklesby 1993). 
However, it is perhaps more correct to say that they operated with a visibility more like 
that expressed in Chapter 3 (pg. 88) than the Modem triangle. 
For the Athenians, given this fonnation and a way of thinking that did not detach thinking 
from doing or chose between structuralism and existentialism or differentiate strategy, 
tactics and operations, strategy was about both Design and Emergence. 
The Ancients zealously discussed what made a great stralegos. For the Athenians, 
it lay in appreciating the paradoxes of strategy. In the ability to meld past, present and 
future. In the ability to oscillate between detached simplistic plans and practical 
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expedients and opportunities on particular fronts, and being able to go in any direction as 
opportunities emerged. In this way, strategy is about planning, forecasting and 
positioning (such aspects are helpful to provide impetus, coherence and understanding) 
and about breaking plans, opportunism, emergence, patterns, ploys and expediency 
(which are helpful given that there is always some chaos, some void in understanding that 
makes the future impossible to forecast in detail). Indeed, it is this chaos, this lack of 
predictability, that enables those with impetus to change tack, subject themselves to 
different elements and enable innovative strategies to spring. Strategic ability came from 
an awareness that human travels are shaped both by the order of things, the actions that 
one's traditions and experiences inspire from within (to paraphrase Aristotle's 
Metaphysics 1075a) and an ability to shuttle from ordered detachment to chaotic reality, 
and from traditional frame to frame as need be in one's particular strategy making 
process. Not surprisingly, given this visibility (clearly based on an appreciation of metis - 
Plutarch Theni. 2), the most common metaphor used by the Greeks to describe a skillful 
strategist was a kubernetes, the helmsperson on fighting ships that surfed inshore 
currents. This view encouraged an appreciation of how strategy was not about starting 
with a 'clean-sheet', but about working to incorporate corporate direction while working 
with prevailing patterns and conditions. 
Hence, the Ancient's definitions of the work of the sti-ategoi were suitably 
'ample', and to a Modem way of thinking often implausible. Aineias' 4th century BC 
How to Survive Under Siege, saw strategy broadly as about exploring how "human ability 
and other resources might deployed to best advantage" (VAiitehead 1990: 17). His 
thinking is expanded on by Frontinus (Strat. 1) who defined strategy as "everything 
achieved by a commander, be it characterised by foresight, advantage, enterprise, or 
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resolution". However, perhaps the best known description of what it took to be a great 
strategist in this age comes from Xenophon (Meni. 3.1). The strategist, lie claimed: 
must be ingenious, energetic, careful, full of stamina and presence of mind, loving 
and tough, straightforward and crafty, alert and deceptive, ready to gamble 
everything and wishing to have everything, generous and greedy, trusting and 
suspicious. 
The Ancients' approach to educating sti-ategoi followed this type of 'ill-defined' 
thinking. They recognised that there was no transferable universally prescriptive and 
logically consistent approach that could be developed to represent reality (cf Alexander's 
statement to Aristotle on how he could never say what he would certainly do in a 
particular situation until that situation arrived (see Chapter 3); Themistocles' greatness 
was similarly said to simply be due to his ability to "do precisely the right thing at 
precisely the right moment" rather than any particular technique (Thucydides 1.138)). 
Consequently, the Greeks favoured story-telling as a means of "refreshing the vision" and 
firing each strategists unique dasein without "forming his character by mere imitation" as 
expressed by Plutarch in Chapter 3 (pg. 77). Perhaps the greatest stories were those of 
Pericles. 
Pericles attributed his success to his ability "to see what must be done and be able 
to explain it in such a way that people could understand what this meant for them" 
(Pericles, in Kagan 1991: 9; Thucydides 2.60). Indeed, ancient historians claim that the 
most striking proof of Pericles' greatness lay in his ability to persuade the sovereign 
Athenian citizenry to adopt strategies from above that on first glance seem so hard to 
grasp (Delbruck 1975). (Or, in Stacey's dismissive tenns, reducing complex dynamic 
circumstances into "trite future-mission statements" and "flimsy strategic plans"). 
However, in so doing, Pericles was a master at making people see an organisation's past, 
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present and future as intertwined rather than designing an ideal future as if upon a clean 
slate, a skill perhaps most obviously manifest in his well-known 'funeral oration' 
(Thucydides 2.35-46). Hence, Plutarch (Per. 15,33) often speaks of Pericles' "using 
people's hopes and fears as if they were rudders", like a great kubernetes. 
Correspondingly, Pericles was renowned for being methodical in his "making 
plans and then going forward" (Delbruck 1975; Plutarch Per. 18) and being unimpressed 
by placing faith in fortune, luck and "reckless impulses" (Plutarch Per. 10), but he was 
also regarded for recognising the disadvantages of folloiving plans. Thus, Pericles was 
just as renowned for his recognition that competition creates crucial situations that must 
be exploited with bold courage (Plutarch Pen 10,20), his unpredictability (Frontinus 
Strat. 5.10) and for the maxim "opportunity waits for no man" (Thucydides 1.142). This 
preparedness to disregard plans as much as make them, appears to have been based on a 
number of assumptions. On the one hand, goals made in advance of events could never be 
realised exactly, and that "there is often no more logic in the course of events than there is 
in the plans of men, this is why we blame our luck when things happen in ways that we 
did not expect" (in Thucydides 1.120,1.140). On the other, adherence to plans made prior 
to action could stifle the potential gains provided by the sort of opportunistic creativity 
that can only occur as events, problems and contingencies unfold (as Thucydides (2.64) 
records "To face calamity with a mind as unclouded [by preconceived plans] as may be, 
and quickly to react against it - that, in a city and in an individual, is real strength"). It 
seems that strategy, for the Ancient Greeks, was about the coming together of Design and 
Emergence, in the same way that nietis required working with both kositios and chaos. 
Ancient views of strategy such as these could well 'refresh the vision' of SM. 
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However, hemmed in by a Modernist historical gaze, SM now seems unable to recognise 
alternative aspects like those of the Greeks. Ansoff (1965: 118ff. ) notes strategy's older 
military background, but only because he claims this provides the crucial distinction 
between strategy and tactics. Otherwise he appears to dismisses this background as 
simplistic. In a paper describing what he believed to be the true nature of SM, an 
approach that at this point actually shared much with the Ancient Greeks' broader view of 
the concept, Mintzberg (1987) bemoans strategy's Greek military origins as encouraging 
the view of SM as an exercise in detachment and rational planning (it seems that 
Mintzberg has assumed Ancient military thinking to just be a more basic form of Modem 
military thinking). Stacey (1990) is also dismissive of strategy's military associations as 
he sees them as promoting a top-down Design approach. 
Typically when SM 'does history', it does so in such a way as to see only that 
which relates to the latter understanding. Ghemawat (1999), for example, prefaces his 
"Origins of Strategy" chapter with quotations from Barnard and Chandler, stating that a 
historical perspective is important to provide a stable basis in an environment where "a 
rash of manifestos continue to emerge that purport to redefine the term", and begins: 
"Strategy" is a term that can be traced back to the ancient Greeks, who used it to 
mean a chief magistrate or military commander-in-chief. Over the next two 
millennia, refinements of the concept of strategy continued to focus on military 
interpretations. Carl von Clausewitz's attempted synthesis in the first half of the 
nineteenth century is a particularly notable example: He wrote that whereas 
"tactics... [involve] the use of armed forces in the engagement, strategy [is] the 
use of engagements for the object of the war. " (underlining added). 
As we have seen, for the Greeks strategy was conceived quite differently from the 
picture that Ghemawat typically promotes. However, and unfortunately, Ansoff, 
Mintzberg and other 20th century strategists' views of the past are coloured by a 
particularly Modem perspective. A view that is shaped by a particularly Modem 
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understanding of the language involved. It is as if our Modem visibility has encapsulated 
strategy in such a way as to preclude us from recognising the pre-Modem as anything 
other than a simple precursor to the Modem form. A further etymological review may 
illustrate the singularity of view that SM applies. 
When strategoi emerged into English in the 15th century as slralegeiýi, it still 
meant either any "operation or act of generalship", or any act in "devising expedients, 
artifice or cunning" in keeping with an Ancient vista. By the middle of the 17th century, 
Boyle (OR) will still note that "strategems are as Lawful as Expedient". However, as the 
word strategy arises in the middle of the 19th century the OED makes it clear that it 
emerges as "distinguished from tactics, which is the art of handling forces in battle or in 
the immediate presence of the enemy". As the shift takes place, there is some ambiguity 
of meaning. " However, by the turn of the century, what strategy is becomes clearly 
established as relating to the thinking and planning that goes on "before hostile annies or 
fleets are brought into comact (a word which perhaps better than any other indicates the 
dividing line between tactics and strategy)" (Malian 1889). By 1901, Hornung found it 
remarkable that "Raffles was both strategian and tactician, [because] we all now know the 
difference between the twovi. 34 
Consequently, we may relate the changes in the meaning of strategy over the past 
three centuries to two specific temporal events. Firstly, Modernity's particular separation 
33 For example, James (1810) tells us that "strategy, something done out of the sight of the enemy, differs materially 
from tactic; the later belonging to the mechanical movement of bodies, set in motion by the former", while Gilbert 
(1825) explains that it relates to "bringing the mass of one's forces as rapidly as possible on the decisive point the line 
of operation" and MacDougall (1856) writes that "every point on the theatre of war is a strategical point". 3' This distinction between strategy and tactics is made by the Ancient Chinese writer Sun Tzu, who noted (in Hamel 
& Prahalad 1989) that: "all men can see the tactics whereby I conquer, but what none can see is the strategy out of 
which great victory is evolved". Despite their lack of knowledge of the Greek's approach to strategy, Modem SM 
gurus gladly associate with Sun Tzu. 
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of mind and body, thinking and doing, a separation that became commonplace in the 
West as the words linking back to strategos shifIcd emphasis. Secondly, technological 
developments and the increasing size of military organisations. Weapons and information 
technology had increasingly enabled commanders to see the advantages of removing 
themselves from the operations of war outweighing those of being at the frontline, 
enabling thinking and planning to be increasingly removed from doing or action. This, 
combined with the increasing size of armies, promoted hierarchical, bureaucratic military 
organisations requiring mechanistic universal rules and procedures, to ensure control and 
co-ordination. As labour was specialised and divided, strategy became a top management 
task associated with planning in advance of action, differentiated from the tactics and 
operations conceived as taking place further down the hierarchy, toward the frontline. 
Hence, the etymological change of meaning is dependent on the emergence of 
Modernism's particular triangular-hierarchical way of viewing and it is this way of 
viewing that makes it difficult for SM to recognise the Ancient's different approach 
unless it can be made to fit a stream of development that flows directly to present 
concepts (hence, even if SM did recognise the Ancient views described above it would 
likely not see them as 'proper strategy'). SM, thus formed, lacks the ability to recognise 
any other classicisms apart from Modem ways of speaking and seeing. 
This seems an unfortunate limit. Especially as more recent technological trends 
are making the Chandlerian form, upon which this singular view of SM is based, much 
less of a given. For example, Evans and Wurster (1997) see current developments in 
information technology driving a shift from hierarchy to 'hyperarchy' (see Figure 35). If 
we assume a world where organisations and environments can be seen in a rhizomatic 
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FIGURE 35: FROM HIERARCHY To HYPERARCHY, 
SOURCE: EVANS& WURSTER (1997). 
object (indeed with this view the distinction between firm and environment, that much 
Modem SM is based upon, becomes increasingly blurry), then Ancient ways of seeing 
strategy may be at least as insightful as following Management's Modem gaze. 
In any case, this reframing of SM's history enables our Modem vision to be 
refreshed and relativised, increasing the likelihood of thinking differently. It could be 
argued that recent years have seen some theorists arrive at a vision uncannily similar to 
the Athenians without undertaking a historical revision (e. g., Nonaka & Takeuchi 1995; 
de Wit & Meyer 1998; Mintzberg 1998; Pascale 1996: Pascale's conception of "strategic 
agility" is effectively metis). However, such an exercise in historical awareness may at 
least make us question why fifteen years were spent debating whether strategy was 
planning or emergence? It may also prevent us placing these theorists at the 'cutting- 
edge'. For setting them up in this way would likely only create another either-or Modem 
representational battle, as was the case when Emergence was conceptualised as above 
Design. The pre-Modem view explored here may add to the Modem triangular 
perspective. It should not dismiss it. Indeed, as Deleuze and Guattari might say, those 
concerned with strategy today still have the traditional triangles and trees in their heads. It 
would be foolhardy to not recognise the worth and effect of these Modem fonns, not as 
the only tools but as useful tools among many. 
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II The limits of business ethics 
It is necessary to move beyond a preoccupation with the 
development and implementation of codes of conduct if 
the theory and practice of business ethics is not to be 
brought into disrepute. 
Kjonstad and Willmott, Business Ethics: Restrictive or 
Einpowering? (1995). 
A general re-emergence of concern in ethics (Harvey 1990), and the growth and spread of 
Management over the past three decades, have combined to fuel a new field of study: 
Business Ethics (BE). It is a subject that many have hoped would increasingly influence 
organisation's strategic initiatives (Donaldson 1982; De George 1986). However, it is 
claimed, by writers such as Kjonstad and Willmott, that this has not been the case. 
If one looks far enough two approaches to ethics are discernible: "codes of 
behaviour" and "forms of subjectification" (Johnson 1996: 30). Codes of behaviour refer 
to collective rules of conduct that exist over and above actors, meta-narratives in other 
words. These may be used to prove independent actions right or wrong and thus provide 
the means to channel individual behaviour in a common, normal or ideal direction. Forms 
of subjectification refer to individuals constituting or rejuvenating themselves as subjects 
of moral conduct, through the development of relationships for self-examination and 
according to self-delineated, rather than externally imposed, criteria (Gardiner 1996: 28). 
These two modes may be alternatively seen as "deontic" and "aretaic" (Werliane & 
Freeman 1997: 53-6). Deontic from the Greek deos, meaning "duty", referring to 
approaches that view ethical questions with appeal to some external code of rights and 
responsibilities toward others. Aretaic, from the Greek arete, meaning virtue or personal 
excellence (Urmson 1988). Systems of morality generally comprise both modes, but in 
some instances the emphasis is on the former, in others it is on the latter. 
However, The Economist's (1994) encyclopedic review of strategy tells us that 
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ethics is about the "question of what is right and wrong in everyday behaviour" and that 
BE is subsequently about "the codes of behaviour over and above this that professional 
and business people agree among themselves constitute the proper way to deal with the 
general public and each other". The Blackwell Encylopedic Dictionmy of Business Ethics 
(Werhane & Freeman 1997: 5 1) explains that what managers need from BE is "an orderly 
way to think through the moral implications of a policy decision -a perspective and a 
language for appraising the alternatives available from an ethical point of view", or an 
objective view above particular problems. This demand has been met by the publication 
of works such as Manley's (199 1) Executive Handbook of Model Business Codes. BE is 
thus seen as about codifying principles, about the study and development of collective 
charters that provide rules enforceable by independent bodies for individual business 
people, organisations, industries, and professions to act according to. Codes that reassure 
existing or prospective suppliers, customers, employees and regulators that they are 
dealing with a company that can be trusted by the 'outside world' to operate according to 
predetennined principles (Waters et al. 1992; Robertson & Schlegelmilch 1993). Codes 
that provide routinised means of rationalising areas identified as potentially problematic 
and managing or restricting behaviour accordingly. This is now most obviously manifest 
in what is called 'stakeholder theory', whereby an organisation's duties to those identified 
as having a stake in their future development are listed (Freeman 1984; Hill & Jones 
1992). 
BE has emerged as an "industry largely devoted to codifying what is 'ethical 
(VI 
,..:, jonstad & Willmott 1995: 445). Ethics here is nothing to do with amtc or 
subjectification. Indeed, we are told by prominent texts that subjects cannot "create their 
[own] morality" (Beauchamp & Bowie 1993). Which brings us to the crisis that the 
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quotation that began this section referred to. BE is all about general codes. That these 
codes are seen by most companies to have little practical application with respect to the 
development of individual strategy is bringing the field into disrepute. Aretaic approaches 
might offer some means of thinking differently, but BE does not recognise them as part 
of its domain. The emergence of this problem, and a way of thinking otherwise, may be 
gained by reflecting on the fonnation of BE's historical origins and influences. 
Blackwell's Encyclopedia tells us that while the "field of business ethics is at least 
as old as commerce itself.. in the modem period [and it is from here that their discussion 
begins] we can date it from the industrial revolutioW'. A further entry situates another 
origin at that crucial Management juncture of the 1950s and 1960s "with Baumhart's 
revealing 1961 study". Replicating this period's prevailing view of organisations, we find 
that Baumhart's was the first study that "showed that ethical issues and problems were 
[important because they were] found in every industry, in most companies, and on all 
levels of the managerial pyramid". BE is another aspect of Management enclosed within 
a Modem way of seeing by its assumed heritage. 
In Modernity, the word moral is usually only used pertaining to what is generally 
right and wrong, what is good conduct and what is bad, and ethics defined as the science, 
study, or philosophy of morals, or "about how we ought to live", with an emphasis on the 
collective 'we' (Singer 1994: 2). It has been about developing codes with the capacity to 
44 adjust to every possible case and to embrace every area of behaviour", toward the 
provision of general ends seen as so crucial in Modernity (Thacker 1993: 14). It is about 
common codes appealing to one general view of what it is to be moral (hence Migliore 
and Martin's and McDonald and Gandz's culture indexes had no difficulty in using 
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"Ethics" and "Moral Integrity" as objective measurement dimensions - see Chapter 7). It 
is no surprise that the establishment of BE, given its historical appreciation, is seen to 
have "piggybacked" upon this "post-Enlightenment moral tradition" (Starling 1997: 9). 
This tradition is largely shaped by the triangular-hierarchical way of seeing the 
world and the assumptions that contribute to it. As described in Chapter 4, Modernism 
solved the problem of the entry of the individual into the field of knowledge by 
establishing universal backdrops or measures and tableau comprising general categories. 
It put difficult to measure individual characteristics of particular humans to one side, 
seeing them as secondary to the judgment and treatment processes. It abstracted, or 
triangulated out, essential human norms. It then used these essences to establish meta- 
narratives, objective ways of looking down upon particular cases from atop the triangle 
against a universal backdrop. Humans were thus separate entities, but subject to common 
underlying or over-riding norms. These steps made it possible to treat humans as any 
other scientific object, and to develop general theories. Codes of nonnal, general or ideal 
behaviour were greatly encouraged by these developments. 
Moreover, given Modernism's dismissal of the influence of 'surface' traditions 
and the belief in liberty and equality, general codes of conduct were a necessary 
component for sustaining Modernity. Without recourse to the guidance of tradition, there 
had to emerge a belief in some over-riding restrictions or rules of practice, otherwise 
chaos, detrimental to progress and production, would have ensued. Ethical codes were 
deemed necessary to adjudicate between rival 'self-interested' individualistic claims and 
to ensure stability. In addition, while the new sciences of the individual and the 
bureaucracies that developed them added to the cause of liberty (by enabling 
emancipatory knowledge), there was at once a tension between the detenninistic 
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application of analytical frameworks based on objective human nonns and a belief in an 
individual's right to control his or her own destiny. Hence, in addition to codes of 
normality, codes of practice outlining patients rights, doctors responsibilities, criminals 
rights and so forth, became commonplace in the 18th and 19th century. These would 
order the tension created by the juxtaposition of Cartesianism and humanism against 
liberal individualism, or ensure the latter given the former. 
In addition, the bureaucratisation of the West in the 18th and 19th centuries was 
matched by optimism with regard to the creation of a science of ethics. Medical Science 
founded its objective tableau upon the Modem bureaucratic hospital and the Modem legal 
system drew on the Modem prison. A whole society founded on similar principles - 
where individual behaviour could be isolated and judged against general procedures, 
where the common norms or ideals for all operations in society could be specified in 
advance - could support a 'science' of ethics. Modernism's triangular way of seeing, with 
objective norms and a vantage point seen as above particular cases, encouraged thinking 
of ethics as about the perfection of general codes as opposed to arete. Indeed, from a 
Modernist perspective, with its Christian influence and lack of appreciation of the 
individual following his own telos, aretaic approaches were seen as selfish and unethical. 
BE followed suit. 
Unable to determine a universal moral code, Modernism eventually drew upon 
utilitarianism, economics and efficiency to give it a way of speaking with recourse to a 
supposed objective meta-narrative or end. And, given its heritage, BE in turn draws from 
the popular ethical languages of the industrial age to articulate ethics. Stakeholder theory 
is based on the idea of maximising the utility of all concerned. In "interest-bascd 
338 
reasoning", a branch of deontism. and the "most popular and highly developed approach" 
to BE, we find that "moral common sense is... disciplined by a single dominant objective: 
maximising net expectable utility"; and that this generally "manifests itself as a 
commitment to the social value of market forces" (Werhane & Freeman 1997: 55). 
Primeaux and Stieber's work (1994; 1995; 1997a, 1997b; Stieber & Primeaux 
1991; Primeaux 1997) appears exemplary in this regard. They advocate identifying the 
"principles of business itself' as finn foundations upon which "the ethics of business 
should be drawe'. These "principles" turn out to be "defined in tenns of neo-classical 
economics", because "the firm's ethics should be economically determined" (Primeaux & 
Stieber 1994: 289; 1997b). Unsurprisingly, the principles or foundations of BE turn out to 
be: "economic efficiency", "profit maximization" and "opportunity cost". Consequently, 
to find a "common ethical language", Primeaux and Stieber argue that we must 
understand profit "as a means of representing human achievement and social good", 
consider how "profit can be ethically maximized", and define the "inherent ethical 
absolutes of business in tenns of economic efficiency". Thus we may situate "ethical 
decision making for business within opportunity-cost decision making", and "reserve 
judgment, in the final analysis, to the market". Or, in other words, "accept profit 
maximization and the efficiencies of profit maximization as the primary standard of 
judgment". By this logic, Primeaux and Stieber claim that inefficiencies are unethical 
because they violate the principles of good business C'When business men and women 
profit maximize, i. e., allocate resources efficiently, people have more of the things they 
want, and that is good. When they do not profit maximize, i. e., allocate scarce resources 
inefficiently, people have less of the things they want and that is bad - Primeaux & 
Stieber 1994: 289). Furthermore, despite an avowal of religious ethical principles in 
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favour of the objective foundations of "business itself' they, like Benjamin Franklin (see 
Chapter 4), are not shy of giving their views credence via detennining the religious 
origins of their principles: 
The origins of profit maximization, with its own ethical considerations and its 
own tenets, originated in antiquity. When Adam and Eve were evicted from the 
Garden of Eden they discovered how once upon a time, in illo ten1pore, inside the 
garden they had limited resources. They could have anything they wanted. 
Evicted from the garden they discovered that resources were scarce and that 
survival and prosperity demanded efficient management of these scarce resources. 
Because they survived it is safe to assume that they had learned the basic tenets of 
profit maximization (Primeaux & Stieber 1994: 289). 
BE's historical understanding has thus set it on a path where it is seen as the 
provision of general codes to be applied from above and spoken in the Modem terms of 
maximising 'profit', the 'utility of all concerned' or 'efficiency'. Unfortunately, BE, thus 
formed, offers very little practical guidance to organisations and those within them with 
regard to developing strategy. Firstly, Primeaux and Stieber's approach takes us back to 
the micro-economic theory of the firm that Ansoff sought to overcome. It offers nothing 
other than common assumptions about the way that capitalist economies work. Secondly, 
the proliferation of information technology, mobile populations, multi-national 
corporations and so on, has brought about an enviromnent where different cultures and 
traditions wash across and relativise one another, resulting in the disintegration of the 
homogeneous socio-cultural canvas and the triangulation of objective views that 
Modernity strived for and with which codes work best (Gardiner 1996). In other words, a 
Postmodern condition of growing incredulity toward meta-narratives (1\4aclntyre 1981). 
In keeping, many now doubt the notion of general best strategies that can satisfy all, and 
see stakeholder ethics as "fundamentally misguided [and] incapable of providing better 
governance" (Steinberg 1997). The increasing acceptance of incommensurably of 
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diverging interests and the recognition that measuring stakeholder utility is impossible, 
makes balancing stakeholder benefit an unworkable and ultimately frustrating objective. 
At a general level, this situation in BE is indicative of calls encouraging a search 
for altematives to "metaphysical ethics, to the ethics of rules, to the foundationalist 
project" (Caputo 1989: 55). Its fate is quite similar to that of Modem art, as described by 
Eco in Chapter 5. Many now regard the codes that BE produces as so general, bland and 
devoid of meaning for particular organisations, as to be little use as guides to practical 
action. The search for the underlying ethical essences has resulted in blank white canvas. 
It would seem that the one obvious way of thinking differently about BE would be 
to explore aretaic approaches. That BE has refrained from doing so to any meaningful 
extent is, once again, due largely to its historical understanding of itself ruling alternative 
visibilities out-of-bounds. In keeping with Modernity's dismissal of an 'internal' self- 
generated ethics, Blackwell's entry on MacIntyre's promotion of an Aristotelian virtue 
approach explains that: 
It is not clear... that any kind of business could fit the virtue model developed in 
MacIntyre. He distinguishes between the internal and external good of practices. 
The virtues help us to achieve the internal good of a practice (e. g., effective 
teaching in academia); external goods such as wealth, inhibit the development of 
those virtues. Business necessarily involves a focus on the external good of 
wealth, and so precludes the virtues. 
However, if we recognise these boundaries as historical and contingent, and consequently 
respect them less, we may see fruitful avenues for re-thinking. The remainder of this 
section explores an approach beyond the Modem predilection toward codes by drawing 
upon the Ancient Greek's fonns of subjectivication, as seen by Aristotle, Foucault's last 
histories, Nietzsche's aesthetic notions and Deleuze's interpretation of Foucault's last 
works. 
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For the Ancient Greeks, the aspiration to live a virtuous life was characterised by 
a search for an individual 'ethics of existence', or "an effort to affinn one's liberty and to 
give one's own life a certain fonn in which one could recognize oneself, be recognized by 
others, and in which even posterity could find an example" (Foucault 1989: 311). This 
predilection may be shown via a number of particular examples. " However, it is most 
clearly expressed in the Athenian's most popular saying, gizothi seautow 'know thyself'. 
Aristotle's teleological ethics (involving the three elements of untutored human 
nature, the individual-as-they-could-be-if-they-realised-their-telos, and the moral precepts 
that allow one to pass from one to the other) was well suited to such a world view. Once 
one was aware of their particular telos (an awareness that could only come from self- 
reflection on one's tradition and place in one's world), 'is' could imply 'ought', and 
moral statements could be statements of fact. By the same token, 'knowing thyself', 
would enable one to know what one must do in order to be true to one's self - one's 
tradition and community of relationships. (Of course, all of this hinges upon the second 
of the Aristotelian elements' individualistic and custom-shaped nature, precisely what the 
Modem human sciences sought to be above - thus, by contrast, Modernity would make 
knowing one's condition not about self-reflection, but the preserve of objective experts. ) 
Consequently, from an Aristotelian perspective, excellence or vice could not be 
adequately specified independent of circumstances. Principles could only be related to 
specific situations by means of the sort of perception born of a nietis that comes from a 
35 For example, Epicurus' view that it was never too early or too late to occupy "oneself with one's self", for this is 
what philosophizing should be. The Thcrapeutac's practices revolving around their principle task of "the concern for 
oneself'. Socrates' claim that one of his central tasks as a philosopher was to make sure citizen's occupied themselves 
with themselves, which would at once lead them to concern themselves with their city by making them conceive of the 
way they related to their community. And, Socrates' famous self-defence (Plato Apol. 29c) via the claim that his 
prosecutors were "not ashamed to care for the acquisition of wealth and for reputation and honour", but did not 
concern themselves with themselves, or the "wisdom, truth and the perfection" of one's scif 
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familiarity with analogous situations, and a reflective understanding of one's telos. We 
cannot simply follow general abstract moral dictates, as different situations and different 
communities might reasonably support different values. 
Thus, unlike Modem utilitarians, Aristotle rejected the notion of the 
commensurability of all goods. Unlike Modem economists, Aristotle did not presuppose 
psychological egoism as a general underpinning. Unlike Modem emotivists, Aristotle did 
not identify all happiness with the fulfillment of desire. Aristotle saw no general essence 
that could be the starting point for a universal code. Indeed, perhaps the most obvious 
absence from Aristotle's Ethics for a Modem reader is that there is little mention of rules. 
For Aristotle, prudence and individual metis had to play "an indispensable role in the life 
of the virtuous man which it does not and could not have in, for example, the life of the 
merely law-abiding or rule-abiding man' ' (MacIntyre 1981: 144). 
Given this view, Aristotle used stories of virtuous people making particular 
decisions in his ethical works rather than general prescriptions. Moral education came, as 
from Plutarch, by hearing the stories of others who left a good example, connecting these 
examples to one's own experiences and traditions, and learning not by imitation but by 
inspiration and comparison (Tsoukas & Cummings 1997). On this view, one's life-task 
was to make his or her story or journey as good or pleasing to the eye as it could be 
through the everyday act of living, in order to enable a happy ending and the leaving of 
good memories (Herodotus 1.32). 
It was to this type of ethics that Foucault turned in his last works. In The Hislo'Y 
of Sexuality - Vol. 1, Foucault highlighted how ethical relations in the Modem West were 
almost exclusively defined in terms of codes, and how these codes were intertwined with 
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prevailing structures of power, structures that subject people to unrecognised, and not 
necessarily fundamental, normalising pressures. To be good was to passively accept the 
dictates of a general morality, unwitting internalise extant nonns, ideals and values and, 
hence, be normalised and integrated into a general apparatus of power/knowledge 
(Gardiner 1996). This brought Foucault into contact with the study of ethics and the way 
in which humans constitute themselves as subjects. 
In his works after Volume 1, Foucault (1991) sought to question this "search for a 
form of morality acceptable to everybody, in the sense that everybody should submit to 
it". He found that the forms of experience and subjectivity that human beings claim to 
have are possible only if we are capable of developing what Foucault (1985: 334-8) 
termed a "modality of relation to self'. Such a modality "constitutes human beings as 
social and juridical subjects; it is what establishes the relation with oneself and with 
others, and constitutes the human being as an ethical subject". Adopting a Nietzschean 
opposition between aesthetic forms of subjectification and general moral codes, Foucault 
saw two distinct modalities of ethical constitution of the self retrievable today: one could 
either judge, define, and shape the self according to external meta-narrative codes: or 
according to some individual aesthetic or sense of style. 
Foucault was motivated to explore this latter means by his overarching concern 
for thinking differently, and by his view that our time was witnessing a collapse of the 
moral authority of formal codes. This gave the individual a heightened moral authority, 
and decisions involving ethical dilemmas and choices a more immediate and personal 
relevance (Gardiner 1996). With the "idea of a morality as obedience to a code of rules 
now disappearing", and with the Postmodern view that an essential self may not be a 
natural given to us, "only one practical consequence" lay open - we had to "respond 
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[with] an aesthetics of existence... to create ourselves as a work of art" (Foucault 1989: 
311). "One this is needful", wrote Foucault (in Rabinow 1984: 342): 
to 'give style' to one's character -a great and rare art. It is practiced by those who 
survey all the strengths and weaknesses of their nature and fit them into an artistic 
plan until every one of them appears as art and reason, and even weakness 
delights the eye... through long practice and daily work at it. 
However, the Westem world had lost touch with forms of aesthetic self-subjectivication 
that-may have provided a useful spur for thinking like this. Foucault (in Rabinow 1984: 
350) noted that: 
art has become something which is related only to objects and not to individuals, 
or to life. Th[is] art is [now] something which is specialized or which is done by 
experts who are artists, [but c]ouldn't everyone's life become a work- of art? Why 
should the lamp or the house be an art object, but not our life? 
Like Nietzsche, Foucault (1985: 12) argued that such "arts of existence" had lost 
importance as Christianity and then Modernism took hold. Modernity, with its humanistic 
focus on commonality emphasising the downplaying of the difference of the self, could 
only equate a self-aesthetics with self-absorption, self-centredness and irrationality. His 
own times' lack of touch with aesthetic self-subjectification led Foucault (1989) to look 
elsewhere. A particularly important moment for his inquiry appeared to be the Greek 
"discovery" of the doubling or relation with oneself and the nurturing of this relationship 
(Deleuze 1988: 101-2). After the discovery of the relation with oneself and before the 
Christian beginnings of the path to Modernity, how had personal regimens of truth been 
elaborated? Foucault's (1985; 1986) last two books set out to explore modes of 
subjectivication present in Ancient Western societies, as a way of "thinking differently" 
and challenging the dominance of proscriptive moral codes. 
Foucault found that the lack of normalising rule-codes in Ancient times enabled 
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greater latitude with regard to ethical subjectification. " He wrote of the Stoics that: 
I don't think one can find any normalization in [their] ethics [because] the 
principal aim... was an aesthetic one. First, this kind of ethics was only a problem 
of personal choice [and t]he reason for making this choice was the will to live a 
beautiful life... to leave to others memories of a beautiful existence. 
Of the Cynics, Foucault noted that for them a "person is nothing else but his relation to 
truth", and that this takes "shape or is given form" only in a particular "life". Here the 
good could only be embodied - never be handed down in the form of commandment, 
prohibition, or law (Foucault, in Miller 1993: 345,360-1). Foucault (1985: 12; 1986) 
termed what he found instead of a dominance of codes, an "aesthetics of existence". In 
contrast to an approach to ethics that provoked the self to define itself in ternis of a 
system of rules posited as universal, this was an attitude that enjoined a commitment to 
the elaboration of an "oeuvre that carries certain aesthetic values and meets certain 
stylistic criteria", that encouraged the self to see the development of a unique personality 
as the telos of its own individual existence (Foucault 1985: 10). Hence Foucault's liking 
for the term self-aesthetics, as it implied that standards for ethical behaviour were not 
located in some abstract ideal of reason or a conception of collective well-being, but in a 
pragmatic, narrative and idiosyncratic interpretation of attractiveness. The individual 
would seek the satisfaction of a good life by subjecting one's self to a process of shaping 
and re-creating according to personal standards. 
It is important to note that this self-focus was not, for the Greeks, 'selfish' as 
Modernism might conceive it so. The individual always implied a series of relationships - 
with friends, family, work-mates, and the community at large - and the traditions 
" Although he rejected the notion, unlike Nietzsche, of a return to an archaic "Golden Age" (Foucault 1985: 346). it 
should be noted that Foucault did see ancient Greek society through rose-tintcd spectacles to an extent. Although there 
was less emphasis on deontic codes, there were clearly codes of behaviour in the Greek world, particularly with regard 
to sexual practice (Halperin ct al. 1990; Winkler 1990; Cohen 1991). 
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embodied in these. The conceptions that Foucault (1985: 5 1) investigated did not see the 
individual other than inter-subjective relations and communities, liencc their: "activity 
devoted to the self constituted a true social practice". For the Ancient Greeks, each person 
was conceived as a dynamic constellation that could be worked upon and refashioned. 
Instead of Modernity's "double-bind" of "individualization and totalizatioW' (Viskcr 
1995: 101) or its approach that "separates the individual [and] breaks his links with 
others" (Foucault 1983: 211), the Ancients took for granted a view of the self not as 
something pre-given to keep pure and un-sullied (as in the Christian conception of soul or 
a Modem material object), but as constituted by one's developing coninnnifty of 
relationships. In keeping, Foucault (1991: 8-10) noted that "the pleasures of the other" 
must be seen in conjunction with the pursuit of a self-aestlietics, concluding that the 
"practices of self' are not "something that the individual invents by himself. They are 
patterns that he finds in his culture". The individual must work- with these aspects. 37 
Indeed, for the Greeks, the purpose of an aesthetics of existence was not self- 
aggrandisement, but to secure the recognition of others. For them, ethos was about 
individual deportment, about finding a way of 'carrying oneself' in a manner that was 
distinctive enough to enable others to recognise them and think them exemplary in their 
difference (Foucault 1991). Ethics was at once about being different, so as to stand out 
and be remembered, but also complimenting a community so as to be remembered 
favourably. While one could not expect to be seen as good by all 'stakeholders, with their 
multifarious interests and irreconcilable differences, it was important that one had a 
37 Foucault's self-aesthetic perspective has been met by a number of criticisms that miss this point by judging his 
writings on Modem term. For example, it is claimed that "it denies th[at] intcr-subjcctivc relations are ontologically 
primary" (Gardiner 1996: 29). That it fails to realize that at the heart of the social world exists a "group of interrelated, 
interacting beings, and also an environment of objects with which the active, communicating beings in the group arc 
engaged" (Burkitt 1994: 14). That because "there are only scattered references to our relations with others [it] is 
necessarily premised upon an extreme individualism" (Gardiner 1996: 29,38,42). Or, that it promotes a self-centred 
view that advances existing patterns of self-absorbcd consumerism and possessive individualism. 
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positive impact upon those that one thought it important to relate to. To be ethical on this 
view was to leave a strong or clear impression. 
Bearing in mind that ethical concepts may not mean the same things when applied 
to corporations rather than individuals (Honderich 1995: 111), we may use this 
alternative approach as an analogical tool to think differently about BE. By applying t ie 
view described above we may begin to ask questions like: why should the lamp or the 
house be an art object, but not an organisation?; why should we not seek to 'give style' to 
our organisations, surveying all the strengths and weaknesses of their particular nature 
and fitting these into an artistic profile? Furthennore, could these conceptions not act as 
an ethos that might guide an organisation's strategy? 
This aretaic approach would entail key differences of approach in contrast to 
code-based BE. The Modem Western emphasis on turning to detached and objective 
experts to know what one ought to be and do is problematised at the outset. With regard 
to an individual's life, Modernity's experts include the scientist, the doctor, the lawyer, 
the therapist, the financial advisor, and the councilor. In keeping, Modem organisations 
turn to detached and objective consultants for similar advice. These consultants are 
considered expert because they have performed similar tasks across a large number of 
organisations. This leads to a normalisation which is manifest, for example, in mission 
statements where an organisation's name is sandwiched into a coating of bland, well- 
meaning axioms that could apply to any organisation, and best-practice approaches where 
corporations isomorphically seek to imitate each other (Campbell et al. 1993). 
Alternatively, a self-aesthetic view would begin with a desire for those within the 
organisation to know 'its-self. Such knowledge may be sought in reflection upon: the 
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organisations traditions and history; key defining crises faced in the past and how it 
responded to these; how it consequently does things in the present; its historical relations 
with others and how these shape its make up; its view of what it expects of itself; and, 
how others recognise it as opposed to others. 
The reflection outlined above is meant to be an individual reflection. Foucault's 
aim, after all, was to see how subjectification could be taken out of the hands of objective 
experts bearing meta-narratives and 'benclimark-s'. Consequently, the knowledge that 
emerged would constitute an individual profile of the organisation in question. Nietzsche 
(in Miller 1993: 366) once remarked, drawing on the Cynic Diogenes, that "what is truly 
irrefutable" in any philosophy is what is "personal", and that "with three anecdotes, it is 
possible to convey the image of any individual". Perhaps a suitable way to record an 
organisation's 'ethos' would be in such a set of anecdotes. Such a profile would work- as 
does a novelist's preliminary sketch of a character, incorporating that character's key 
historical relationships with other characters so as to enable an author to begin with a 
knowledge of the range of reactions a character could plausibly have to situations that 
emerge as the narrative unfolds. 
This aesthetic or aretaic analogy brings us back to a narrative understanding of 
life and Aristotle's view of being as a temporal unfolding, where no human activity can 
be understood without a conception of being-unto-telos or throwness. Humans and 
organisations are here thrown by the past into the world, unfolding into the future in 
unique and historically influenced directions. It is this unfolding that gives every 
individual a unique point of view, a unique collection of situations to be confronted and 
particular right and wrong ways of confronting them (which cannot, as Alexander said to 
Aristotle, be said until situations occur). Hence, the individual aesthetic or arelaic 
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organisation is required to develop its own personal excellence, to use metis and be 
prudent, rather than just following codes. This view of ethics forces an organisation to 
recognise its unique past in order to know and work on its-self in the present, in order to 
develop its-self into the ftiture. Moreover, it should lead us to be cautious of seeking to 
transplant approaches from one organisation to another. 
Such an approach might be given more structure by organisations applying the 
same analogical framework that this thesis' investigation has drawn upon: Deleuzc's 
(1988) summary of Foucault's investigations (pp. 56-62) or what Deleuze terms the four 
"folds of subjectification". These folds are shaped differently by each subject, be it a 
society, field of knowledge, organisation or individual. 
The first fold, which is related to the strata, concems the material part o 
ourselves which is to be surrounded and enfolded: for the Greeks this was the body and 
its pleasures, the 'aphrodisia'. For Christians it became the flesh and its desires, or 
'desire' itself, and was thus treated very differently. An organisation might question itself 
here along the lines of. what is the material core of this organisation around which 
everything seems to hinge?; what are its key resources?; how are these to be spent and 
restrained?; what does this core need to do or achieve to satisfy and sustain itself? 
Next is the fold of the relation between forces, or the zonc of powerlk-nowledge 
relations, the rules that one follows, for it is always according to a particular rule that the 
relation between forces is "bent bacle' in order to become a relation to oneself. It makes a 
difference whether one's chooses to see oneself in terms of natural, divine, scientifically 
rational, or aesthetic values. Here an organisation may ask: what 'rules of living' arc we 
bound by? What codes do we look up to and wish to evaluate ourselves against? What 
rules are applied for making decisions about our direction? (That general codcs arc useful 
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here indicates how this approach does not seek to dismiss codes - rather the aim is to add 
to the ethical folds that may be related to and make deten-nining "which code? " a more 
individual choice). 
The third fold is the fold of knowledge upon the zone of subjectification, the fold 
of truth in so far as it constitutes the relation of truth to an individual being - i. e., how 
does an individual seek the 'truth' about him or herself.? This serves as the fornial 
condition for any kind of knowledge. For the Greeks this was primarily through a series 
of multifarious relations with various friends, gods and others; for Christians it was more 
likely dependent upon one's relationship with God; while Modems find the truth of the 
self in the human sciences. Of this fold the organisation may ask: what relationships are 
particular important to us in defining our self9; whose reactions to us allow us to see our 
self reflected?; or, what types of research allow us to know about us and how we are seen 
by others? 
The fourth fold is the line of the outside. It is this that constitutes an 'interiority of 
expectation', from which the subject sees itself as different from others and hopes for 
immortality. etemity. salvation, fteedom or detachment. For the Greeks this fold 
provoked a striving for a unique, well-proportioned and aesthetically pleasing life-story. 
Organisations here might ask: how will we be detached from and connected to others?; 
how will we be different, and how will this difference in the way that we carry ourselves 
enable us to be recognised?; what is our place relative to significant others?; what do we 
see as our telos?; how do we want to be remembered?; or, in other words, what is this 
organisation's style? 
An aesthetic approach to BE would encourage organisations to base action not on 
ethical questions like 'what is expected of usT, 'how can we conforniT, 'how do we act 
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in accordance? '; but rather 'who are weT, 'how and why are we differentT, and, 
consequently, when faced with a particular set of circumstances, 'how must we act in 
order to be true to our selff Organisations, on this view, may replace slogans like 'we 
care because you do' and 'everything we do we do it for you', with 'we do what we do 
because we are this which is different from some other organisation. Ethical actions 
would not be scrutinised on the basis of their effects upon others, but on the degree to 
which they flow from or reinforce a virtue or positive character trait. Hence organisations 
can re-style their ethos but they cannot change at will - they have to reflect some 
consistency of action with past behaviour. Individuals may then choose whether they 
wish to relate more to this corporation or another. 
It is argued that this approach would allow an organisation to develop an ethical 
perspective more useful for influencing corporate strategy. Particularly in environments 
where people have less faith in products or services that can satisfy all people, or plans 
that can satisfy all potential stakeholders at once. Environments where organisations, i ze 
people, cannot be 'best friends' with everybody. 
It may appear that this aretaic-aesthetics gives corporations free license to do as 
they feel and still claim to be ethical. However, it should be bome in mind that the views 
of the Greeks were premised on the idea of a public community, of which an individual 
would have at least attract a portion in some way. Recent cases indicate that 
developments in information technology may now be exercising an influence similar to 
that of the public communities within which Aristotle thought. Lyotard (1984: 67) 
concluded The Posmiodern Condition by claiming that there were two directions that 
"computerization" could go. It could become the "dream instrument" for controlling and 
regulating the market system extended to include knowledge itself and governed 
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exclusively by the performativity principle. Conversely, it could give the public freer 
access to infonnation that they would otherwise not have, allowing greater transparency, 
greater debate and enabling divergent views to have more influence. This would make 
language games less "non-zero-sum games". Lyotard's Postmodern preference is clearly 
the latter. Recent developments concerning internet activity appear to offer a glimmer of 
hope, and may be related to the possibility of an aretaic ethics now. Influenced more by 
what might be called community-discussions on the internet than by protests carried out 
via traditional legal channels and codes, several prominent companies have recently had 
to be seen to be "adapting their personalities". Nike and McDonald's are perhaps two 
most prominent examples of organisations who have not completely changed their make- 
up (it is impossible to change a personality in an instant), or sought to satisfy all 
stakeholders at once, but have re-evaluated and re-styled their "virtues" to an extent 
(Melville 1997; Jones 1998; Saporito 1998). 
Despite BE's Modem heritage, encouraging viewing ethical organisations as 
impersonal beings applying general codes dispassionately, researchers are beginning to 
see that people may have always continued to relate to organisations as specific human 
individuals rather than lists of responsibilities. Thus, one recent survey (Snoddy 1998) 
found that of British terrestrial television channels one stood out as having no 
'personality', while the other four tended to be seen by people as Queen Victoria, an 
eccentric but likable professor, Arthur Daley and Richard Branson. While these four 
channels could incorporate these personal associations in their strategy and programming 
(directions and programmes that would be quite different given the different values or 
ethos of these four individuals), the one with no 'personal affinity' appeared to have little 
definition or strategy at all. People could not relate to it, could not attach any positive 
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associations with it, and the organisation was withering accordingly. 
While it must be re-iterated that the argument put fonvard here does not seek to 
dismiss general codes (this would be naYve given that Modernist beliefs are now a 
traditional part of life's mix), it does aim to activate a way of thinking BE differently. 
However, an aretaic or self-aesthetic ethics, by encouraging organisations to develop and 
promote "their legitimate strangeness" (to appropriate one of Foucault's favourite poets, 
Rene Char), rather than following the same idealistic general rules, may prove useful for 
guiding particular organisational strategies in ways that code-based BE has not. 
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Management comes to have such a powerful yet unobtrusive presence in Modem times because its 
particular formation, its ways of seeing and speaking replicate Modernism's beliefs and are well suited to 
providing answers to Modernism's key problematisation: the determination of general non-pcrsonal ends 
toward which progress may be objectively measured and through which control may be maintained without 
recourse to subjective traditions. However, the other side of this productive capacity is that Management is 
so well cut to fit Modernism that its historical formation cannot incorporate anything other than Modem 
forms. This disables its ability to think differently which is why much of what is presented as new in 
Management appears similar to what it has said before. 'nie similarity of their forniations means that not 
only are Management's singular forms maintained and shielded by Modernism, but that Modernism's 
singular perspective is shielded and maintained by Management. Thus, re-framing the history of 
Management, apart ftom enabling Management to think differently, may go some way toward challenging 
Modernism's hold on our world. In light of this, areas for future research toward dimming the limiting 
influence of Management and Modernism's specific diagram are highlighted. 
10., CONCLUSION 
To live in the present, within a single culture, does 
not suffice as a universal prescription: too many 
people of utility who cannot breathe properly would 
die out. With the aid of history one can give them air. 
Nietzsche, Hunian All Too Hunian 188. 
The counter-history presented in the previous chapters has demonstrated how the diagram 
of Management tightly re-presents that of Modernism. This forms a dense line of the 
outside that protects their singular modes of seeing, saying and judging being from 
alternatives and makes them appear to offer universal prescriptions. While this makes 
Management the 20th century's fastest spreading and perhaps most influential new field 
of knowledge (Locke 1988), it stifles its inventive air. Furthennore, the coat that 
Management's seeing of arboreal hierarchies and saying of performativc efficiency layers 
on to the Modernist diagram limits life in general in the Western world. 
This thesis began as an investigation into why most of what was presented as 
Postmodemism in Management fora appeared very different to Postniodernisin as it was 
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expressed in other spheres. It seemed to repeat the predispositions of many of 
Management's previous 'buzz-words'. This then led on to seeing, at a more general level, 
that much of what is presented as new in Management appears an unwitting rc- 
presentation of Management thinking throughout the 20th century. An investigation into 
this phenomenon took on an even wider scope when two versions of Aristotle's 
Metaphysics, one from the turn of the 20th century and the other from the middle, were 
juxtaposed. This highlighted how Management's repetitive thinking was either 
synchronised with or influencing the times to the extent that, by the middle of the 20th 
century, its language seemed to be seamlessly pervading aspects of life, culture and being 
in a manner that had not been the case a few decades earlier. Thus, this thesis' objective 
came to be the investigation of three questions: 'Why does Management have difficulty 
in seeing Postmodernism. as other subjects see iff, 'Why is so much in Management 
presented as new while appearing similar to what has gone before? '; and, 'How does this 
similar line of thought come to have such influence or a force that is as pervasive as it 
seems unobtrusiveT 
The work of Michel Foucault was found to harbour the best method of 
investigating questions such as these. Chapter 2 developed a method influenced by all of 
Foucault's varied counter-historical studies, but drew particularly from Foucault's (1985) 
attempts to connect his previous works in The Use of Pleastwe, and Deleuze (1988) and 
Dreyfus and Rabinow's (1983) interpretations. This method required developing a 
dispotif or normative grid that attempted to isolate the particular arena within which the 
mode of thinking this thesis was concerned with was enacted and at once highlighted the 
possibility of other 'thought-worlds' or episteme where one might think differently. Once 
this was established, it could be used as a particular tableau against which the specific 
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forms and ways of saying and seeing that Management's historical understanding of itself 
privileges; the corresponding boundary line that the subject develops so as to detennine 
what it incorporates; and the fonnation or power/knowl edge web of the different 
institutions of Management that emerges to maintain these 'folds', could be analysed. 
Part Two's dispotif outlined three nonnative episterne. Chapter 3 described the 
Ancient Greek world-view as one where language was relativistic and contextual. Where 
the architecture for seeing was based around a co-appreciation of order and chaos; around 
particular subjective perspectives, traditions and connections; around the 
interconnectedness of beings that later societies would separate through their co- 
habitation seeming illogical: mind and body; past and present; individual and community. 
Wisdom here was seen as i)ietis, the ability to be resourceful enough to move quickly 
between order and chaos or frameworks and particular contingencies, to be inventive 
enough to combine different tools and approaches to combat particular problems. 
Chapter 4 described Modernism as seeking to assert order over this 'hotchpotch' 
system through the development of universal grids and essences below, and apparatus 
hoisting an objective viewpoint above, the plane of action. Modernism's sights are thus 
configured by a triangular hierarchy, with knowledge looked at from above, from an apex 
provided by a centralised stem of knowledge or school of thought that may be 
decentralised and applied to all branches of life on the ground. In keeping, it speaks 
positivistically so as to objectively represent the objects of its inquiries. As it has sought 
to do away with the particular teleological ends that gave meaning to life in the epistcme 
that preceded it, Modernism must also speak- with recourse to universal, dc-personalised 
meta-narratives, normal measures and general ends against which things may be plottcd 
and toward which they may be aimed. Indeed, it must to so in order for its apparatus to 
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continue to appear credible. 
Chapter 5 examined Postmodernism as a third episteme. It presented it as a re- 
connection with the Ancient on two counts: firstly, by re-appreciating the fornis and 
traditions of the past that 'crawl out' as Modernism's meta-narratives descend; secondly, 
by developing a style of thinking not unlike metis. However, while we can say that the 
Postmodern requires their recovery, this is not to say that the Postmodern epistcme is the 
same as that of the Greeks. To think so would be to overlook Postmodemism's 
dependence on the re-appreciation of local tradition and spiral view of history. 
Postmodernism must recognise Modernism's influence now as such traditional influences 
can never be fully overcome. Hence, Postmodemism only seeks to 'rewrite' some of 
Modernism's aspects rather than 'consign it to history. Correspondingly, its 'visibility' 
was depicted by a coming together of the Modem (pg. 136) and pre-Modem (pg. 88) 
symbols used to illustrate their ways of seeing, and its approach to knowledge was thus 
understood as an individual nomadic wandering across, and combination of, thesc forms 
(shown on pg. 180). 
Part Three of this thesis then showed Management's historical conception of itself 
to have created a subject closely attached to Modernist forrns. The boundaries and points 
of origin of the subject are drawn so as to mirror the key moments of Modernism. 
Moreover, when the subject does look beyond these boundaries it does so with a gaze that 
confinns the universality or solidity of its particular fonns and sees its present state as an 
advance. Chapter 6 demonstrated how this historical understanding is largely based upon 
turning political compromises and particular needs into scientific achicvcnicnts, and 
speaking as if the latter were the case so often that these political and contingent clemelits 
are not apparent. 
358 
Management's contingent and singularly Modem way of seeing and speaking the 
world is maintained as 'grander' than this in two further ways. Firstly, by a formation of 
institutions that emerges simultaneously in the decades after World War II: a noble 
history; the confirmation of a particular view of organisation as the object of 
Management; and a specific form of Business School that provides a conduit that, partly 
through a newly transformed science of economics, brings together capitalist enterprise 
and institutes of knowledge. These forms connect together so as to reinforce the views of 
the others and gain solidity as these views are repeated and represented by 'authorities' 
(often 'unconsciously' thereby requiring mind-reading by Modem 'ferrets' like Mooney 
and George to show us what they really meant, cf. Chapter 6). Secondly, Management fits 
Modem needs so neatly that within a Modernist episterne, Management not only seems 
regular, it is exceedingly timely and useful. Modernism, as was shown in Chapter 4, 
required universal non-personal ends that could be objectively applied to solve the 
problem of control brought about by its dismissal of particular traditions and telos. In the 
first decades of the 20th century, after a century of attempting to determine general moral 
ends, economic logic and performative efficiency seemed the ends perhaps most capable 
of fitting Modernism's 'bill'. Management's emergence as the 'science of efficiency' 
made it an interesting new field of endeavour. When, by the 1950s, a formation was in 
place that would see Management as not just useful from a tecImical perspective but an 
academic subject with a grand history, a subject that connected Modernism's quest for 
general ends, its preferred form of organisation (bureaucracy) and its institutions of 
knowledge (cf. Review of Part Three), its standing and spread across Western life was 
assured. 
This analysis enables this thesis' primary question to be answered. How does 
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Management come to have such influence, or a force that is as pervasive as it seems 
unobtrusive? This thesis argues that it is because Management appears to hold the 
promise of answers to a problematisation particular to Modernism, and its forms and 
fonnation and its ways of saying and seeing are neatly integrated into a Modem world- 
view. Its influence is correspondingly seen as both exceedingly useful and completely 
normal. 
While its capability in this regard has given Management great productive ability 
in our times, later parts of this thesis have focused on how its close affiliation to a 
Modem way of seeing and speaking contribute to its greatest limitation. Management 
seems largely unable to think otherwise. Chapter 8 illustrated how Management's 
historical appreciation represses as well as produces knowledge. The examples of the 
organisation as an organism, culture and Postmodernism in Management demonstrated 
the way in which objects new to the subject are fonned by its specific gaze and language 
so as to merely reconfirm its predispositions. 
This analysis enables this thesis to posit reasons for the other phenomena that it 
sought to investigate. So much that is presented in Management as new appears similar to 
what has gone before, because it is dependent on a singularly Modem conception of the 
world. Management has difficulty seeing Postmodernism as other subjects see it because 
unlike other subjects like ecology, physics, philosophy and architecture, whose 
Postmodern appreciations were noted in Chapter 5, Management has no historical 
understanding beyond Modernism. Management, in keeping with those subjects that it 
has related itself to: economics, sociology, psychology; can access no forms with which it 
might engage in paralogy or nietis. Its line of the outside is such that it cannot access the 
'ocean of mutually incompatible forms' that Feyerabend advocated or the wash of pre- 
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Modem symbols into the Modem illustrated at the end of the discussion on 
Postmodernism. Its history limits it to a largely homological or incremental form of 
development, of which 'Postmodemism' is but another Modem instalment (as were the 
objects of culture and the organism). While some theorists in 'related' disciplines, like 
Economics and Psychology, have begun to recognise this historical configuration as a 
problem for their fields (see Chapter 7), this does not appear to have been acknowledged 
in Management. Given the 'double knot' that joins Modernism and Management, at once 
producing and bounding both their ways of seeing, as described in the review of Part 
Three, Management's contingent and singular historical formation also affects and 
increasingly limits other subjects that we might consider removed from it, and even life in 
general. 
Foucault claimed that the ultimate object of study such as this was to get to a 
position where one would be able to attempt to think differently by re-thinking history. 
Uncovering Management's 'ignoble origins' and singularity enables us to question the 
respect that people, often unwittingly, pay Management's formation. The conclusion of 
Chapter 8 illustrated this by showing how mainstream theories of Management and 
organisational. change have largely replicated their predecessors as theorists have worked 
seemingly without an appreciation of what has gone before (indeed, Management often 
seems to lack a regard for history, perhaps by considering itself, like its 'parent 
discipline' economics, largely ahistorical). In the brief space left available, Chapter 9 
sought to re-think two aspects of Management that have recently been problematised, 
strategy and business ethics, by highlighting how Modernist predispositions have shaped 
these problems and seeking to reconceptualise them by incorporating thinking from 
outside of Modemism into the subject. 
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Having concluded thus, it remains to restate the limitations with which this study 
worked and, in light of these, suggest areas where further research should be encouraged. 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, in order to explore a broad area in a confined forniat, this 
thesis had to simplify its object and present a relatively 'arboreal' (or Modernist) counter- 
history. Recognising this, and the irony in it given what has been advocated here, this 
thesis does not wish to be regarded as 'a finished article'. It is hoped that its 'exploratory 
questioning' may spur others to question the formation of Management further, and 
encourage them to do so in different or more particular and in-depth ways. 
There seem, at this point, many potential avenues for doing so. This work has left 
largely untouched the period between the two World Wars where the status of 
Management waxed and waned and was highly contested prior to the establishment of the 
formation described here. It would be interesting to explore how Management overcame 
its setbacks in this period. The role played by both Wars in encouraging a mind-set 
conducive to Management is also a rich seam. What role did World War I play in 
encouraging the spread of Scientific Management and what forces encouraged the 
republication of many of Management's 'classics' after World War II? There is also 
much more to be said about Taylor and Roosevelt's particular world than was able to be 
covered here. In addition to these examples, there remain many more counter-histories to 
be written on particular 'pockets' of activity that would add to the view put forward here. 
Furthermore, while this work, by re-tracing Foucault, has focused on the Ancient Greeks, 
this is not to say that they hold the only spurs for thinking differently. It is hoped that this 
work will encourage others to develop different perspectives of Management by 
exploring societies and cultures hence seen as beyond the pale. In this manner, different 
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classicisms, seen as so vital for a Postmodern approach, may be surfaced. The 
development of more counter-histories along these lines would likely show the formation 
of Management to be less straightforward than what it might appear on reading this 
thesis. 
Finally, on a more general note, it is hoped that this thesis might encourage the 
development of theory in Management to be undertaken while mindful of the origins and 
events that have contributed to the theory production in that sphere, or, to paraphrase 
Nietzsche, to give air to ways of seeing other than the somewhat singular culture of 
Management with the aid of history. Such a historical awareness would make it easier to 
see whether the same ideas are unwittingly continuing to bind particular areas of the field, 
and more easily recognise the insignificance of origins previously regarded as beyond 
doubt, thus encouraging the taking of influences from outside the established line of 
power/knowledge into the subject and hence enabling greater invention. 
Management, as it is presently conceived, has always (and only) been Modem. 
This has made it a tremendously powerful presence in a century that has striven for 
Modernist achievements. However, because Management finds it difficult to recognise 
anything other, or any alternative aspect with which it might relativise its self-fulfilling 
Modernist hegemony, it seems destined to continually re-produce Modem approaches. 
Foucault's conclusion at the end of The Order of Things foresaw Man being erased, "like 
a face drawn in the sand at the edge of the sea", as the belief system that sustained the 
human sciences faded. While one may not be so bold as to suggest that Modernism will 
evaporate and take Management with it (indeed, Foucault's later work- led him to 
recognise that power/knowledge is such that a diagram never just vanishes), one can use 
363 
his or her foresight to outline the two paths left to Management if it does not begin to 
question its borders. Firstly, and less likely, should the forthcoming century see the 
diminution of Modem ways in favour of a more Postmodem mode, then Management, 
thus formed, will become increasingly irrelevant, unable to see and speak- pertinently. 
Alternatively, should Modernism and Management stand firm, their co-determinate 
ability to limit thought in this world, through the application of their 'singular culture', 
will continue to spread. This will mean that an increasing number of subjects and 
situations shall be increasingly evaluated according to Management's seemingly 
universal and benign principles. If this means that even those subjects that were used to 
show Management's historical formation as uncommon, those subjects whose broader 
histories enabled them to think in a Postmodem manner, can have their activities 
increasingly and unquestioningly judged and stifled according to criteria such as 
cefficiency' or 'new-ness' or 'collective progress', then we may have unwittingly limited 
an opportunity to begin the next century 'thinking differently'. 
364 
REFERENCES 
Original source material abbreviations used in text: 
Aristotle: OCTB On Coniing to be and Passing, 4way 
OTS On the Soul 
Bacon: NA Neiv, 4tlantis 
Boyle: OR Occasional Reflections 
Descartes: OM On Method, Optics, Geonimy and Meteorology 
Frontinus: Strat. Strategeiýis 
Galen: EATH. The Elenients. 4ccording to Hippocrates 
Galileo: Dia. Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief fforld Systeiiis 
Heidegger: BPP Basic Probleiýzs ofPhenoi)ienology 
BT Being and Tinie 
ID Identity and Difference 
Heraclitus: frag. The Fragnients 
Hume: Enq. Enquiries Concerning the Hunian Understandhig a? id 
Concenzing the Principles ofMorality 
Marx: GI The Gernian Ideology 
Milton: OE On Education 
Newton: Opt. Opticks 
Nietzsche: GS The Gay Science 
Parmenides: frag. The Fragnients 
Plato: Theact. Theaetetus 
Plutarch: Per. The Life of Pericles 
Them. The Life of Yhendstocles 
Protagoras: frag. The Fragnients 
Refl. Reflections 
Sextus 
Empiricus: ATM Against The Math ematicians 
Simplicus: CoOTH Commentary on 'On the Heavens' 
Sophocles: Ant. Antigone 
Xenophon: Mem. Memorabilia 
Wittgenstein: OC On Certainty 
365 
Adair, G. (1992). The death of the author. London: Heinemann. 
Akin, G., & Hopelain, D. (1986). Finding the culture of productivity. Organizational 
Dynamics, 7(2): 19-32. 
Albrow, M. (1970). Bureaucracy. London: Pall Mall. 
Amariglio, J. (1992). Economics as a postmodern discourse. In W. J. Samuels (Ed. ): 
Economics as Discourse - Ali Analysis of the Language ofEconontics (pp. 15-46). 
Norwell, MA: Kluwer. 
Andrews, K. (1969). Toward professionalism in business management. Harvard Business 
Review, 47(Mar/Apr): 49-60. 
Andrews, K. (1971). The concept of corporate strategy. Homewood, IL: Irwin. 
Annas, J. (1986). Classical Greek philosophy. In J. Boardman, J. Griffen, & 0. Murray 
(Eds. ): The Oxford History of the Classical World (pp. 234-53). Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Ansoff, 1. (1965). Corporate strategy: Ali analytical approach to business policyfor 
growth and expansion. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Ansoff, 1. (1969). Toward a strategic theory of the firm. In 1. Ansoff (Ed. ). Business 
Strategy (pp. 11-42). Hannondsworth, UK: Penguin. 
Ansoff, 1. (1991). Critique of Henry Mintzberg's "The design school: Reconsidering the 
basic premises of strategic management". Strategic Management Journal, 12: 
449-61. 
Ansoff, 1. (1994). Comment on Henry Mintzberg's "Rethinking strategic planning". Long 
Range Planning. 27(3): 31-3. 
Appley, L. A. (1954). Management at mid-century. New York: The American 
Management Association. 
Arac, J. (1987). Critical genealogies - Historical situationsfor postmodern literaty 
studies. New York, NY: Columbia University Press. 
Ashton, T. S. (1959). Business history. Business Histoiy, 1: 1-2. 
Aubenque. P. (1963). Le prudence chez Aristotle. Paris: Universitaires de France. 
Babbage, C. (1835/1989). The economy of machineiy and manufactures (4th ed. ). 
London: William Pickering. 
Barck, O. T. & Blake, N. M. (1965). Since 1900 -A histoiy of the United States in our 
times. New York: MacMillan. 
Barfield, 0. (1926). History in English words. London: Faber & Faber. 
Barnard, C. I. (1938/1968). Thefinictions of the executive. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
Barnes, J. (1987). Early Greekphilosophy. London: Penguin. 
Barnes-Svarney, P. (Ed. ). (1995). New YorkPublicLibraiy science desk reference. New 
York: Macmillan. 
Baron, R. A., & Greenberg, J. (1983). Behavior in organizations: Understanding and 
managing the human side of work. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. 
Baron, R. A., & Greenburg, J. (1990). Behavior in organizations - Understanding and 
managing the human side of work (3rd edition). Boston: Allyn & Bacon. 
Bate, P. (1990). Using the corporate culture concept in an organizational development 
setting. Journal ofApplied Behavioral Science, 26: 83-106. 
Baudrilliard, J. (1988a). The ecstacy of communication. New York: Semiotext(e). 
Baudrilliard, J. (1988b). America. New York: Verso. 
Bauman, Z. (1987). Legislators and interpreters: On modernity, post-modernity and 
intellectuals. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. 
366 
Bauman, Z. (1992). Intimations ofpostniodernity. New York: Routledge. 
Beatson, P. (1990). Notes on postmodernity. Sites 20: 130-9. 
Beauchamp, T. L. & Bowie, N. E. (1993). Ethical theoiy and Business (4th edition). 
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
Beck, R. N. (1987). Visions, values, and strategies: Changing attitudes and culture. 
Academy ofManagement Executive, l(l): 33-40. 
Beer, M. (1987). Revitalizing organizations: Change process and emergent model. 
Academy ofManagenzent Executive, l(l): 51-6. 
Bell, D. (1973). The coming ofpostindustrial society. New York-: Basic Books. 
Bell, D. (1976). The cultural contradictions of capitialisin. New York: Basic Books. 
Bell, D. (1988). The end of ideology. Oil the exhaustion ofpolitical ideas in thefifties. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Bell, D., & Kristol, 1. (198 1). The crisis in economic theoiy. New York: Basic Books. 
Belting, H. (1987). The end of the histoiy of art? (Wood, C. S, Trans. ). Chicago: Chicago 
University Press. 
Bendix, R. (1956). Work and authority in indus0y. New York: Harper & Row. 
Bennis, W. (1973). Beyond bureaucracy. New York: McGraw Hill. 
Berg, P. O. (1989). Postmodem management? From facts to fiction in theory and practice. 
Scandinavian Journal ofManagenient, 5(3): 201-17. 
Berger, P. L., Berger, B., & Kellner, H. (1973). The homeless mind: Modernization and 
consciousness. New York: Random House. 
Beyer, J. M. (1997). Building on past strengths with incremental change. Acadenly of 
Management Journal, 40(6): 1436-41. 
Bilton, T. & Bonnett, K. et. al. (1987). Introductoiy sociology. Basingstoke, UK: 
MacMillan. 
Blake, P. (1977). Form follows fiasco: fPiy niodern architecture hasn't worked. Boston: 
Little & Brown. 
Blake, R. R. & Mouton, J. S. (1972). How to assess the strengths and weak-nesses of a 
business enterprise. Austin, TE: Scientific Methods Inc. 
Blanchot, M. & Foucault, M. (199 1). Foucault-Blanchot. New York: Zone. 
Blau, P. M. (1955). Y7ie dynamics of bureaucracy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Blau, P. M., & Scott, R. S. (1963). Fornial organizations: A comparative approach. 
London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
Blaug, M. (1992). The methodology of economics - Or how economists elplaill. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Boardman, J. (1997). The great god Pan - The survival of all image. London: Thames & 
Hudson. 
Boje, D., & Dennehy, R. (1993). Managing in the post-niodern world. Iowa: Kendall 
Hunt. 
Bonner, J. T. (1962). The ideas of biology. London: Scientific Books. 
Bouchet, D. (1994). Rails without ties: The social imaginary and postmodern culture. Can 
postmodern consumption replace modem questioning? International Journal of 
Research in Marketing, 11: 405-22. 
Bove, P. (1992). In the wake of theory. Hanover, HH: Wesleyan University Press. 
Bowra, M. (1930). Tradition and design in the Illiad. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Bradshaw, D. (1999). Rivals join forces to meet the needs of global market. Financial 
Times, February 15: 14. 
Bravennan, H. (1974). Labor and monopoly capital - The degradation of work in the 
367 
twentieth century. New York: Monthly Review Press. 
Brech, E. F. L. (1965). Organization - Thefi-ainework of management. London: 
Longmans. 
Brech, E. F. L. (1967). Management. Its nature and significance. London: Pitman. 
Bremmer, J. (1983). The early Greek concept of the soul. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press. 
Brenner, N. (1994). Foucault's new functionalism. Thewy and Society, 23: 679-709. 
Brocklesby, J. (1997). Becoming multimethodology literate: An assessment of the 
cognitive difficulties involved in working across different paradigms. In J. 
Mingers & A. Gill (Eds. ): Multinithodology: Towards the themy andpractice of 
combining methods. New York: Wiley. 
Brown, W. (1971). Organization. London: Heinemann. 
Brown (1994). The Renaissance. London: Longman. 
Bryson, G. (1968). Man and society: The Scottish inquity of the eighteenth centuly. New 
York: Augustus M. Kelly. 
Burgin, V. (1986). The end of art theory: Criticism andpostinodernity. London: 
Macmillan. 
Burkitt, I. (1994). The shifting concept of the self. Histoyy of the Human Sciences, 7(2): 
7-28. 
Bums, T., & Stalker, G. M. (1961). 77ie management of innovation. London: Tavistock. 
Burrell, G. (1988). Modernism, postmodemism and organizational analysis 2: The 
contribution of Michel Foucault. Organization Studies, 9(2): 221-35. 
Burrell, G. (1989). The absent centre: The neglect of philosophy in Anglo-American 
management theory. Human Systems Management, 8: 307-12. 
Burrell, G. (1992). Back to the future: Time and organization. In M. Reed & M. Hughes 
(Eds. ): Rethinking Organization - New Directions in Organization Theoly and 
-4nalysis (pp. 165-182). London: Sage. 
Burrell, G. (1996). Organization paradigms. In M. Warner (ed. ): International 
Encyclopedia ofBusiness andManagenient (pp. 3866-80). London: Routledge. 
Calvert, M. A. (1974). The searchfor engineering unity. In J. Israel (ed. ) Building the 
organizational society. New York: Free Press (pp. 42-54). 
Campbell, A., Young, D., & Devine, M. (1993). A sense of mission. London: FT/Pitman. 
Cannan, E. (1929). A review of economic theory. New York: Kelly. 
Caplow, T. (1964). Principles of organization. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World. 
Capra, F. (1996). The web of life: 4 new synthesis of mind and matter. London: Harper- 
Collins. 
Caputo, J. (1989). Disseminating originary ethics and the ethics of dissemination. In A. 
B. Dallery & C. E. Scott (Eds. ): The question of the other: Essays in contempora)), 
continental philosophy (pp. 55-62). Albany, NY: State University of New York 
Press. 
Carosso, V. J. (1973). The development of Za in medieval Japan. Business Histoly 
Review, 47,438-65. 
Carter, P. & Jackson, N. (1993). Modernism, postmodemism and motivation, or why 
expectency theory failed to come up to expectation. In J. Hassard & M. Parker 
(Eds. ): Postmodernism and organizations (pp. 83-100). London: Sage. 
Casson, M. (199 1). The economics of business culture. Oxford: Clarendon. 
Castoriades, C. (1997). The Greek polis and the creation of democracy. In D. A. Curtis 
(ed. ): The Castoriades reader (pp. 267-89). Oxford: Blackwell. 
368 
Chaffe, E. E. (1985). Three models of strategy. Academy ofManagenlent Review, I 0(l): 
89-98. 
Chandler, A. D. (1959). The beginnings of 'big business' in American industry. Business 
History Review, 3 3: 1-3 1. 
Chandler, A. D. (1962). Strategy and structure: Chapters in the histoly of the industrial 
enterprise. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Chandler, A. D. (1977). The visible hand: The managerial revolution inAinerican 
business. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Chandler, A. D. (1990). Scale and scope: the dynamics of industrial capitalism. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Chandler, A. D., McCraw, T. K. & Tedlow, R. S. (1996). Management past andpresent. 
Cincinnati, OH: South-Westem. 
Chen, M. (1994). Sun Tzu's thinking and contemporary business.. Business Horizons, 
Mar/Apr: 42-8. 
Chia, R. (1995). From modem to postmodem organizational analysis. Organization 
Studies, 16(4): 579-604. 
Child, J. (1969). British management thought -A critical analysis. London: Allen Unwin. 
Church, R. (1976). Business history in Britain. Journal ofEuropean Economic Histoly, 
5: 209-28. 
Clark, K. (1969). Civilisation. London: BBC Books. 
Clark, C. M. A. (1992). Economic theory and naturalphilosophy: The searchfor the 
natural laws of the economy. Aldershot: Edward Elgar. 
Clegg, S. R. (1990). Modern organizations: Organization studies in apostmodern world. 
London: Sage. 
Clegg, S. R. (1 992a). Postmodernism and postmodernity in organizational analysis. 
Journal of Organizational Change Management, 5(l): 8-25. 
Clegg, S. R. (1992b). Postmodem management? Journal of Organizational Change 
Management, 5(2): 31-49. 
Clough, S. B. (1953). The American way - The economic bias of our civilization. New 
York: Crowell. 
Clutterbuck, D. & Crainer, S. (1990). Makers of management. London: Macmillan. 
Cohen, D. (199 1). Law, sexuality and society: The enforcement of morals in Classical 
Athens. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Collingwood, R. G. (1960). The idea of history. London: Oxford University Press. 
Collini, S. (1992). Introduction: Interpretation tenninable and intenninable. In S. Collini 
(Ed. ): Interpretation and overinterpretation (pp. 1-22). Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Compagnon, A. (1994). The 5 paradoxes of modernity. New York: Columbia University 
Press. 
Cooper, R. & Burrell, G. (1988). Modernism, postmodernism and organizational 
analysis: An introduction. Organization Studies, 9(l): 91-112. 
Copely, F. B. (1923). Frederick Winslow Taylor. New York: Harper. 
Cova, B. (1996). The postmodern explained to managers: Implications for marketing. 
Business Horizons, Nov/Dee: 15-23. 
Crombie, A. C. (1957). Augustine to Galileo -A histoiy ofscience A. D. 400-1650. 
London: Heinemann. 
Cross, K. F., Feather, J. J. & Lynch, R. L. (1994). Corporate renaissance: The art of 
reengineering. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell. 
369 
Cummings, S. (1995). Centralization and decentralization: The never-ending story of 
separation and betrayal. Scandinavian Journal ofManagenient, 11(2): 103-17. 
Cummings, S. & Brocklesby, J. (1993). The classical system: Organizational insights into 
what made Periclean Athens great. Systems Practice, 6(4): 335-57. 
Cummings, S. & Brocklesby, J. (1997). Towards Demokratia: Myth and the management 
of change in ancient Athens. Journal of Organizational Change Management, 
10(l): 71-95. 
Dale, E. (1960). The great organizers. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Dale, E. (1967). Organization. New York: American Management Association. 
Davies, J. K. (1984). Democracy and classical Greece. Glasgow: Fontana. 
de Kare-Silver, M. (1997). Strategy in crisis: gqiy business needs a completely new 
approach. London: Routledge. 
de Wit, B. & Meyer, R. (1998). Strategy: process, content, context. London: Thompson. 
Deal, T. & Kennedy, A. A. (1982). Corporate cultures: The rites and rituals of cotporale 
life. Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley. 
Deal, T. & Kennedy, A. A. (1983). Culture: A new look through old lenses. Journal of 
Applied Behavioral Science, 19(4): 498-505. 
Debs, E. V. (1948). Writings and speeches. New York. 
Delbruck, H. (1975). The history of the art ofwar - Within thefi-aineivork- ofpolitical 
history (Renfroe, W, Trans. ). Westport, CT: Greenwood. 
Deleuze, G. (1988). Foucault. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. 
Deleuze, G., & Guattari, F. (1977). Anti-Oedipus. New York: Viking. 
Deleuze, G., & Guattari, F. (1988). A thousandplatueaus: Capitalism and schizophrenia. 
London: Althone. 
Dennison, D. (1984). Bringing corporate culture to the bottom line. Organizational 
Dynamics, 13(2): 5-22. 
Derrida, J. (1976). Ofgrammatology. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press. 
Derrida, J. (1978). Writing and difference. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
Derrida, J. (1981). Dissemination. London: Althone. 
Derrida, J. (1982). Margins ofphilosophy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Derrida, J. (1988). Limited Inc. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. 
Despres, C. J-N. (1995). Culture, surveys, culture surveys and other obfuscations. Journal 
ofStrategic Change, 4: 65-75. 
Dessler, G. (1986). Organization theory - Integrating structure and behavior (2nd 
edition). Eaglewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
Detienne, M. (1989). Dionysis at large (Goldhammer, A, Trans. ). Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press. 
Detienne, M& Vernant, J-P. (1978). Cunning intelligence in Greek culture and society 
(Lloyd, J, Trans. ). Sussex: Harvester. 
Dodds, E. R. (195 1). The Greeks and the irrational. Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press. 
Donaldson, T. (1982). Corporations and morality. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
Dorfman, R., Samuelson, P. A. & Solow, R. M. (1958). Linearprograynining and 
economic analysis. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Dotson, A. T. (1967). "The Principles of Scientific Management ", by Frederick- if., inslolt, 
Taylor. New York: Norton. 
Dresden, S. (1968). Humanism in the Renaissance. London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson. 
Dreyfus, H. L., & Rabinow, P. (1983). Michel Foucault: Beyond structuralism and 
370 
hermeneutics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Dreyfus, H. L. (1991). Being-in-the-world. A coninientary on Heideggers Being and 
Time, Division 1. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Drucker, P. (1959). Long range planning: Challenge to management science. 
Management Science, 5(3): 238-49. 
Drucker, P. (1991). Management: Tasks, responsibilities, practices. Oxford: Butterworth- 
Heinernann. 
Drury, H. B. (1922). Scientific management: A history and criticism. New York: 
Columbia University Press. 
DuBrin, A. J. (1984). Foundations of organizational behavior -, 4n applied perspective. 
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. 
Duncan, W. J. (1990). Great ideas in management - Lessonsfi-oni thefounders and 
foundations of managerial practice. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. 
Dupre, J. (1993). The disorder of things: Metaphysicalfoundations of the disunio, of 
science. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. 
Durand, G. (1979). Science de Phonnne et tradition. Paris: Berg. 
Duret, C. (1613). Tresor de I'histoire des langues. Cologne. 
Durkheim, E. (1947). The division of labor in society. Glencoe, IL: Free Press. 
Eagleton, T. (1987,20 February). Awakening from modernity. Thnes Literaly 
Supplement. 
Eastman, W. N., & Bailey, J. R. (1996). Epistemology, action and rhetoric: Past and 
present connections. Journal ofApplied Behavioral Science, 32(4): 455-61. 
Eco, U. (1992). Interpretation and overinterpretation. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Eco, U. (1994). Reflections on 'The Name of Y7ie Roseý London: Minerva. 
The Economist. (1994). Pocket strategy. Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin. 
Edgerton, S. (1976). The renaissance re-discovery of linearperspective. New York: 
Basic Books. 
Edmunds, L. (1975). Chance and Intelligence in Thucydides. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
Ekirch, A. A. (1974). Progressism in America. New York: Franklin Watts. 
Eribon, D. (199 1). Michel Foucault. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Etzioni, A. (196 1). The comparative advantage of complex organizations. New York: 
Free Press. 
Evans, P. B. & Wurster, T. S. (1997). Strategy and the new economics of information. 
Harvard Business Review, 75(Sept/Oct): 71-82. 
Farnell, L. R. (1907). The cults of the Greek states. Oxford: Clarendon. 
Fayol, H. (1916/1949). General and industrial inanagenient. London: Pitman & Sons. 
Featherstone, M. (Ed. ). (1988). Postniodernisin. London: Sage. 
Featherstone, M. (1991). Consumer culture andpostniodernity. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. 
Feyerabend, K. S. (1955). Langensheidt's Greek-English dictionaq. London: Methuen. 
Feyerabend, P. (1987). Farewell to reason. London: Verso. 
Feyerabend, P. (1993). Against niethod, third edition. London: Verso. 
Filler, M. (1986). Building and nothingness. New York Review ofBooks, June 12: 26-33. 
Fineman, S., & Gabriel, Y. (1994). Paradigms of organizations: An exploration in 
textbook rhetorics. Organization, 1(2): 375-99. 
Fiol, K. (1991). Managing culture as a competetive resourse: An identity-based view of 
sustainable competitive advantage. Journal ofManagenient, 17: 191-211. 
371 
Firat, A. F. (1992). Postmodernism and the marketing organization. Journal of 
Organizational Change Management, 5(l). 
Florence, M. (1994). Foucault, Michel, 1926 -. In G. Gutting (Ed. ): The Cambridge 
Companion to Foucault (pp. 314-9). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Flynn, T. (1994). Foucault's mapping of history. In G. Gutting (Ed. ): The Cambridge 
Companion to Foucault (pp. 28-46). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Forrester, P. G. (1986). The British MBA. Cranfield, UK. Cranfield University Press. 
Foucault, M. (1965). Madness and civilization -A history of insanity in the age of reason 
(Howard, R, Trans. ). New York: Random House. 
Foucault, M. (1970). The order of things: An archaeology of the human sciences. 
London: Tavistock. 
Foucault, M. (1975). The birth of the clinic. New York: Vintage. 
Foucault, M. (1 976a). The archaeology of Imowledge. New York: Harper Colophon. 
Foucault, M. (1976b). Mental illness andpsychology. New York: Vintage. 
Foucault, M. (1 977a). Discipline andpunish: The birth of the prison. London: Allen 
Lane. 
Foucault, M. (1977b). Language, counter-ineinory, practice. Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press. 
Foucault, M. (1978). The history ofsexuality: An introduction. New York: Random 
House. 
Foucault, M. (1980). Power1knowledge. Selected interviews and otherwritings 1972-77. 
Brighton: Harvester Press. 
Foucault, M. (198 1). Questions of inethod. Ideology and Consciousness, 8(Spring): 3-14. 
Foucault. M. (1983). How is power exercised?. In H. L. Dreyfus & P. Rabinow Michel 
Foucault: Beyond structuralisin and hernzeneutics (pp. 216-226). Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press 
Foucault, M. (1984a). What is enlightenment? In P. Rabinow (Ed. ): The Foucault Reader 
(pp. 32-50). London: Penguin. 
Foucault, M. (1984b, 15-16 July). Une esthetique de Pexistence. Le Monde Aujourd'hui, 
P. xi. 
Foucault, M. (1985). The history ofsexuality: Voluine two - The use offeasure. New 
York: Pantheon. 
Foucault, M. (1986). The history ofsexuality: Volunze three - The care of the sey'. New 
York: Pantheon. 
Foucault, M. (1988a). A political technology of individuals. In L. H. Martin, et. al. (Eds. ) 
Technologies of the Setf A Sendnar with Michel Foucault (pp. 145-62). London: 
Tavistock. 
Foucault, M. (1988b). Technologies of the self. In L. H. Martin, et. al. (Eds. ) Technologies 
of the Setr- A Sendnar with Michel Foucault (pp. 16-49). London: Tavistock. 
Foucault, M. (1989). Foucault live (interviews 1966-1984). New York: Semiotext(e). 
Foucault, M. (1991). The ethic of the care for the self as a practice of freedom. In J. 
Bemauer & D. Rasmussen (Eds. ) The Final Foucault (pp. 1-21). Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press. 
Foucault, M., & Sennett, R. (1981,21 May -3 June). Sexuality and solitude. London 
Review ofBooks, pp. 4-5. 
Fox, C. S., & Miller, H. T. (1995). Postinodern public adininistration: Toward discourse. 
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Fraser, N. (198 1). Foucault on modem power. Empirical insights and normative 
372 
confusions. Praxis International, 1(3): 272-87. 
Frederick, W. C. (1963). The next development in management science: a general theory. 
Journal of the Academy ofManagenzent, 6(3): 212-30. 
Freeman, E. (1984). Strategic management: a stakeholder approach. Boston: Pitman. 
French, D. & Saward, H. (1983). Dictionary ofManagenient. Aldershot, UK: Gower. 
Froham, M. A., & Sashkin, M. (1970). Thepractice oforganizational development: A 
selective review [Technical report]. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan - Institute 
for Social Research. 
Fukuyama, F. (1992). The end of history and the last man. Harmondsworth, UK: 
Penguin. 
Gabbey, A. (1985). The mechanical philosophy and its problems: Mechanical 
explanations, inpenetrability, and perpetual motion. In J. C. Pitt (Ed. ): Change 
andprogress in modern science (pp. 9-84). Dordrecht: D. Riedel. 
Gadamer, H. G. (198 1). Reason in the age ofscience. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. 
Gantt, H. (1961). Gantt on management. New York: American Management Association. 
Gardiner, M. (1996). Foucault, ethics and dialogue. History of the Human Sciences, 9(3): 
27-46. 
George, C. S. (1968/1972). The history of management thought. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice-Hall. 
Gergen, K., & Thatchenkery, T. J. (1996). Organization science as social construction: 
Postmodem potentials. Journal ofApplied Behavioral Science, 32(4): 356-77. 
Gerth, H., & Mills, C. W. (1954). Character andsocial structure, thepsychology ofsocial 
institutions. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
Ghemawat, P. (1999). Strategy and the business landscape. Reading, Mass: Addison- 
Wesley. 
Ghirardo, D. (1984). Past or post-modem in architectural fashion. Telos, 62: 187-96. 
Giddens, A. (1990). The consequences of modernity. Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press. 
Goldhill, S. (1987). The great Dionysia and civic ideology. Journal ofHellenic Studies, 
107: 58-76. 
Goodall, H. L. (1992). Empowerment, culture, and postmodem organizing: 
Deconstructing the Nordstrom Employee Handbook. Journal of Organizational 
Change Management, 5(2): 25-30. 
Goold, M. (1996). Learning, planning, and strategy: extra time. California Management 
Review, 3 8(4): 100-2. 
Goold, M. & Luchs, K., (1993). Why diversify? Four decades of management thinking. 
Academy ofManagenzent Executive, 7(3): 7-25. 
Gordon, R. A., & Howell, J. (1959). Higher educationfor business. New York: Columbia 
University Press. 
Gouldner, A. W. (1954). Patterns of industrial bureaucracy. New York: Free Press. 
Gouldner, A. W. (1957). Cosmopolitans and locals: Toward an analysis of latent social 
roles. Administrative Science Quarterly, 2,281-302,444-480. 
Gouldner, A. (1959). Organizational analysis. In R. K. Merton, L. Bloom, & L. Cottrell 
(Eds. ): Sociology today (pp. 400-27). New York: Basic Books. 
Graves, R. (198 1). The Greek myths. London: Cassell. 
Greenberg, J., & Baron, R. A. (1995). Behavior in organizations: Understanding and 
managing the human side of work (5th edition). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice- 
Hall. 
373 
Greenwood, W. T. (1965). Managenient and organizational behavior theories: All 
interdisciplinary approach. Cincinnati, OH: South-Westem. 
Greiner, L. (1972). Evolution and revolution as organizations grow. Harvar(l Business 
Review, 50(Jul/Aug): 37-46. 
Gross, B. M. (1964). Y7ie inanaging of organizations: The adininistrative struggle. New 
York: Macmillan. 
Gruber, H. E. (1974). Darwin oil Mail -A psychological study ofscientific creativiljý 
London: Wildwood. 
Guttari, F. (1995). Chaosinosis: An ethico-aestheticparadigni (Bains, P, & Pefanis, J, 
Trans. ). Sydney: Power Publications. 
Haber, S. (1964). Efficiency and uplifit - Scientific Alanagenlent ill the Progressive era. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Habermas, J. (1975). Legithnation crisis (McCarthy, T, Trans. ). Boston, MA: Beacon 
Press. 
Habermas, J. (1983). Modernity: An incomplete project. In H. Foster (Ed. ): The Anti- 
Aesthetic: Essays oil Postinodern Culture. Seattle, WN: Bay Press. 
Habermas, J. (1986). Taking ahn at the heart of thepresent. In D. C. Hoy (Ed. ): Foucault: 
A Critical Reader (pp. 5-6). Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
Hage, J. (1965). An axiomatic theory of organizations. Adininistralive Science Quarterly, 
10: 289-320. 
Hagedom, H. (1957). The Theodore Roosevelt Treasuty. New York: Putnam. 
Halperin, D. W., Winkler, J. J. & Zeitlin, F. I. (Eds. ) (1990). Before sexuality: The 
construction of erotic experience in the Ancient Greek- world. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press. 
Hamel, G. (1996). Strategy as revolution. Harvard Business Review, 74 (Jul/Aug): 69-82. 
Hamel, G. & Prahalad, C. K. (1989). Strategic intent. Harvard Business Review, 67 
(May/Jun): 63-76. 
Hammer, M., & Champy, J. (1993). Reengineering the coiporation: A inanifestofor 
business revolution. London: Nicholas Brealy. 
Handy, C. (1978). The gods ofinanagenient. London: Business Books. 
Harari, J. V. (1979). Textual strategies - Perspectives in post-struclural crilicisin. Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press. 
Harvey, C., & Jones, G. (1990). Business history in Britain into the 1990's. Business 
History, 32(l): 5-16. 
Harvey, D. (1990). The condition ofpostinodernity. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Hassard, J. (1994). Postmodern organizational analysis: Towards a conceptual 
framework. Journal ofManagenient Studies, 31(3): 303-24. 
Hatch, M. J. (1997). Organization themy, niodern, synibolic andpostinodern perspectives. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Heamshaw, L. S. (1964). A short histoyy ofBritish psycholog),: 1840-1940. London: 
Methuen. 
Heamshaw, L. S. (1987). The shaping ofinodern psychology. London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul. 
Heidegger, M. (1984). Early Greek thinking. ý The dawn of ffrestern philosophy (Krcll, D. F 
& Capuzzi, F. A, Trans. ). San Francisco: Harper & Row. 
Heilbroner, R. L., & Streeten, P. (1955). The great econondsts - Their lives and 
conceptions of the world. London: Eyre & Spttiswood. 
Helgerson, R. (1986). The land speaks: cartography, chorography, and subversion in 
374 
Renaissance England. Representations, 16: 51-85. 
Hetrick, W. P. & Lozada, H. R. (1992). Postmodernity, organization and hyperchange. 
Journal of Organizational Change Management, 5(l): 5-7. 
Higham, J. (1955). Strangers in the land. patternis ofAinerican Nativism. New 
Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. 
Hill, C. W. L. & Jones, T. M. (1992). Stakeholder-agency theory. Journal ofManagenient 
Studies, 29: 131-54. 
Hillman, J. (1996). The soul's code. New York: Random House. 
Hirschman, A. 0. (1977). The Passions and the Interests: Political Argunientsfor 
Capitalism Before its Triumph. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Hitt, M. A. (1997). Twenty-first-century organizations: Business firms, business schools, 
and the Academy. Academy ofManagenzent Review, 23(2): 218-24. 
Hofstader, R. (1963). Theprogressive movement, 1900-1915. Englewood Cliffs, NJ.: 
Prentice-Hall. 
Hofstede, G. (1991). Culture and organizations: Softivare of the mind - intellectual 
cooperation and its importance to survival. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Hofstede, G. & Bond, M. H. (1988). The Confucius connection: From cultural roots to 
economic growth. Organizational Dynamics, 16(4): 4-21. 
Honderich, T. (Ed. ). (1995). The Oxford companion to philosophy. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Honneth, A. (199 1). Critique ofpoiver: Reflective stage in a critical social theoly. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Horgan, J. (1997). The end ofscience. New York: Little, Brown. 
Huczynski, A. (1993). Management gurus. London: Routledge. 
Huff, D. L. & McGuire, J. W. (1960). The interdisciplinary approach to the study of 
business. Washington Business Review, (June). 
Huisman, D. (1984). Dictionary des philosophes. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 
Hume, D. (1777/1903). Enquiries concerning the human understanding and concerning 
the principles of morals. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Huyssen, A. (1986). After the great divide: Modernism, mass culture, postinodernisin. 
Bloomington, IA: Indiana University Press. 
Hyrnowitz, C. (1989, July 17). Which culture fits you best? Mall Street Journal, p. BI 
Issacs, A. & Martin, E. (Eds. ). (1993). 77te Oxford dictionmy of the business world. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Jencks, C. (1988). Post-niodernism: The new classicism in art & architecture. London: 
Academy Editions. 
Jencks, C. (1991). Postmodem vs. late-modem. In L Hoesterev (Ed. ): Zeitgeist in babel 
(pp. 4-2 1). Indianapolis, IA: Indiana University Press. 
Jevons, W. S. (1888). The theory ofpolitical econonzjý London: MacMillan. 
Johansson, H. J. et. al. (1993). Business process reengineeing: Breakpoint stralegiesfor 
market dominance. New York: Wiley. 
John, R. R. (1997). Elaborations, revisions, dissents: Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. 's, The Visible 
Hand after twenty years. Business Histoiy Review, 71: 151-200. 
Johnson, L. M. (1993). Thucydides, Hobbes, and the Inteipretation ofRealism. DeKalb) 
IL: Northern Illinios University Press. 
Johnson, P. (1996). Nietzsche's reception today. Radical Philosophy, 80(Nov/Dec): 24- 
33. 
Jones, D. (1998). No more Mr Nike guy. Sunday Times Magazine, August 28: 38-44. 
375 
Jones, G. (1997). Business history. In M. Warrier (ed. ) International encylopedia of 
business and management (pp. 483-90). London: Routledge. 
Kagan, D. (199 1). Pericles ofAthens and the birth of democracy. New York: Free Press. 
Kearns, E. (1985). Change and continuity in religious structures after Cleisthenes. In P. A. 
Cartledge & F. D. Harvey (Eds. ) Crux (pp. 189-207). London: Imprint Academic. 
Kellner, D. (1988). Critical theory, Marxism and modernity. Cambridge, UK: Polity 
Press. 
Kelly, J. (1968). Is scientific management possible? London: Faber & Faber. 
Khandwalla, P. N. The design of organizations. New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich. 
Kilmann, R., Saxton, M., Serpa, R., et al. (1990). Gaining control of the coiPorate 
culture. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
Kipling, K. & Bj arner, 0. (1998). The Americanization ofEuipoean business. London: 
Routledge. 
KJ onstad, B. & Willmott, H. (1995). Business ethics: Restrictive or empowering? Journal 
ofBusiness Ethics, 14: 445-64. 
Kolb, D. A. & Froham, A. (1970). An organizational development approach to consulting. 
Sloan Management Review, 12,51-65. 
Koontz, H. (1961). The management theory jungle. Journal of the Acadenly of 
Management, 4(3): 174-88. 
Koontz, H. (1964). Toward a unified theoty ofinanagenzent. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Koontz, H. (1980). The management theory jungle revisited. Academy ofManagenlent 
Review, 5,175-188. 
Koontz, H. & O'Donnell, C. (1974). Essentials ofinanagenlent. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Koontz, H., O'Donnell, C. & Weihrich, H. (1980). Management (7th edition). New York: 
McGraw-Hill. 
Kostof, S. (1985). A history of architecture: Settings and rituals. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Kotter, J. (1995). Leading change: Why transformation efforts fail. Harvard Business 
Review, 73(Mar/Apr): 59-67. 
Kreiner, K. (1989). Culture and meaning: Making sense of conflicting realities in the 
workplace. International Studies ofManagement and Organization, 19: 64-81. 
Kuhn, T. (1962). The structure ofscientific revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 
Kunneman, H. (1986). De waarheidstrechter. Een connnunicatietheoretisch perspectief 
op wetenschap en saineleving. Meppel. 
Lampert, L. (1993). Nietzsche and modern times: A study ofBacon, Descartes, and 
Nietzsche. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Larkin, T. J. & Larkin, S. (1996). Reaching and changing frontline employees. Harvard 
Business Review, (76)May/Jun: 95-104. 
Lash, S., & Urry, J. (1987). The end of organized capitalism. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Lee, C. H. (1990). Corporate behavior in theory and history: 11. The historian's 
perspective. Business Histoiy, 32: 157-79. 
Lekachman, R. (1964). -4 histoty of economic ideas. New York: Harper & Row. 
Leontiades, M. (1989). Mythinanagement - An examination of coyporate diversification 
asfact and theory. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
Levin, S. A. (1992). The problem of pattern and scale in ecology. Ecology, 73(6): 1943- 
67. 
Lewin, K. (195 1). Field theory in social science. New York: Harper & Bros. 
376 
Light, H. R. (1966). The nature of management. London: Pitman. 
Lippmann, W. (1914). Drift and Mastery. New York. 
Locke, R. R. (1988). Educational traditions and the development of business studies after 
1945 (an Anglo-French-German Comparison). Business Histoyy, 30(l): 84-103. 
Locke, R. R. (1989). Management and education since 1940: The influence ofAinerica 
and Japan on West Germany, Great Britain, and France. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Lorange, P., Morton, M. F. S. & Ghoshal, S. (1986). Strategic control. St. Paul, MN: 
West. 
Lovibond, S. (1990). Feminism and postmodernism. In R. Boyle & A. Rattansi (Eds. ): 
Postmodernism and Society (pp. 154-86). London: MacMillan. 
Lowe, A. (195 1). On the mechanistic approach in economics. Social Research, 18: 403- 
34. 
Lowry, S. T. (1987). The archaeology of economic ideas. Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press. 
Lyon, D. (1994). Postmodernity. Buckingham, UK: Open University Press. 
Lyotard, J. F. (1984). Thepostmodern condition: A report on knowledge. Manchester: 
Manchester University Press. 
Lyotard, J. F. (1991). The differend. Phrases in dispute. Manchester: Manchester 
University Press. 
Lyotard, J. F. (1993). Jean-Francois Lyotard -Political writings. Minneapolis, MN: 
University of Minnesota. 
Lyotard, J. F., & Thebaud, J. L. (1985). Just gaining. Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press. 
MacFarlane, A. (1978). The origins ofEnglish individualism: Thejandly, properly and 
social transition. Oxford: Blackwell. 
MacIntyre, A. (198 1). After virtue -A study in nioral themy. London: Duckworth. 
MacIntyre, A. (1988). Whosejustice? ffhich rationality? London: Duckworth. 
MacIntyre, A. (1990). Three rival versions of moral enquity: Encyclopedia, genealogy, 
and tradition. Notre Dame, IA: University of Notre Dame Press. 
MacRae, D. G. (1974). Weber. London: Fontana. 
Management Today. (1984). The Unvick- testament. February: 50-5,122-8. 
Mandeville, B. (1714/1924). Thefable of the bees, orprivate vices, public benejits. 
Oxford: Claredon Press. 
Manley, W. N. (1991). Executives handbook of model business conduct codes. 
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. 
March, J. G., & Simon, H. (1958). Organizations. New York: Wiley. 
Marsden, D. (1986). The end of econondc inan? Custoni and competition in labour 
markets. Brighton, UK: Wheatsheaf. 
Marshell, H. D. (1967). The great economists -A histoiy of economic thought. New 
York: Pitman. 
Martin, J., & Sichl, C. (1983). Organizational culture and counter culture: An uneasy 
symbiosis. Organizational Dynamics, 12: 52-64. 
Maturana, H. (1990). Science and daily life: The ontology of scientific explanations. In 
W. Krohn, G. Kuppers, & H. Nowotny (Eds. ): Seýrbrganization: Portrait ofa 
scientific revolution. Dordrecht: Kluwer Group. 
McCraw, T. K. (1988). The essential Aýrred Chandler, essays toward a histoly of big 
business. Boston: Harvard Business School Press. 
377 
McDonald, P. & Gandz, J. (1992). Getting value from shared values. Organizational 
Dynamics, 21,64-77. 
McKenna, J. F. (1989). Management education in the United States. In W. Bryt (Ed. ): 
Management education: An international survey (pp. 18-54). London: Routledge. 
McLellan, D. (1996). Aristotle's economic thought. Radical Philosophy, 80(Nov-Dec): 
50. 
McMylor, P. (1994). Alasdair MacIntyre - Critic of modernity. London: Routledge. 
Mee, J. F. (1963). A history of twentieth century management thought. Ann Arbor, MA: 
University Microfilms Inc. 
Meij, J. L. (1962). Management, a common province of different sciences. Management 
International, 5. 
Meikle, S. (1994). Aristotle's economic thought. Oxford: Clarendon. 
Melville, G. (1997). Critics can't stop swatting the swoosh. Footwear News, 54(20): 2-3. 
Merrill, H. F. (1960/1970). Classics in management. New York: American Management 
Association. 
Meyer, J. W. (1977). The effects of education as an institution. American Journal of 
Sociology, 88: 55-77. 
Meyer, J. W. & Rowan, B. (1977). Institutionalized organizations: formal structures as 
myth and ceremony. American Journal of Sociology, 83: 340-63. 
Meyer, J. W. & Scott, W. R. (1983). Organizational environments: ritual and rationality. 
Beverley Hills, CA: Sage. 
Meyerson, D. & Martin, J. (1987). Cultural change: An integration of three different 
views. Journal ofManagement Studies, 24(6): 623-47. 
Middlemist, D. R. & Hitt, M. A. (1988). Organizational behavior. Managerial strategies 
forperformance. St Paul, MN: West. 
Midgely, M. (1992). Science as salvation. London: Routledge. 
Migloire, R. H. & Martin, R. T. (1994). Use of a corporate culture index for strategic 
planning. Journal of Strategic Change, 3: 95-105. 
Miller, J. (1993). The passion ofMichel Foucault. New York: Simon & Shuster. 
Miller, J. G. (1978). Living systems. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Mintzberg, H. (1973). The Nature ofManagerial Work-. New York: Harper & Row. 
Mintzberg, H. (1978). Patterns in strategy formation. Management Science, 24,934-48. 
Mintzberg, H. (1983). Structure in Fives: Designing Effective Organizations. Englewood 
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. 
Mintzberg, H. (1987). Crafting strategy. Harvard Business Revieiv, 65 (Jul/Aug): 66-75. 
Mintzberg, H. (1988). Opening up the definition of strategy. In J. B. Quinn, H. Mintzberg 
& R. M. James (Eds. ): The strategy process: concepts, contexts, and cases. 
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
Mintzberg, H. (1989). Mintzberg on management. New York: Free Press. 
Mintzberg, H. (1990). The design school: Reconsidering the basic premises of strategic 
management. Strategic Management Journal, 11: 171-95. 
Mintzberg, H. (1991). Learning 1, planning 0: Reply to Igor Ansoff. Strategic 
Management Journal, 12: 463-6. 
Mintzberg, H. (1994a). Rethinking strategic planning - Part one: pitfalls and fallacies. 
Long Range Planning, 27(3): 12-2 1. 
Mintzberg, H. (1 994b). The rise andfall ofstrategic planning. New York: Free Press. 
Mintzberg, H. (1998). The strategy safari: A guided tour through thejungles ofstrategic 
management. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. 
378 
Mirowski, P. (Ed. ). (1986). The reconstruction of econonlic theoly. Boston: Kluwer- 
Nijhoff. 
Mirowski, P. (1989). More heat than light: Econoinics as socialphysics, physics as 
nature's econotnics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Mitroff, 1. & Kilmann, R. (1984). Corporate tragedies: Product tanipering, sabotage, 
and other catastrophes. New York: Praeger. 
Montaigne, M. D. (1995). Michel de Montaigne: Four essays. London: Penguin. 
Mooney, J. D. (1939 & 1947). Onward industry: Theprinciples of organization. New 
York: Harper & Row. 
Moore, T. (1993). Care of the soul. New York: Harper-Collins. 
Morgan, G. (1986/1997). Iniages of organization. Newbury Park, CA: Sage. 
Mosson, T. (1965). A comparison of inanagenient education systenis. London: Business 
Publications. 
Mosson, T. (1967). Introduction. In Teaching the process of nianagenient: the 
proceedings of an international sendnar. London: Harrap. 
Mowry, G. E. (195 8). The era of Theodore Roosevelt. New York: Harper & Row. 
Munsterberg, H. (1913). Psychology of industrial efficiency. Boston, MA: Houghton 
Mifflin. 
Murray, G. (1934). The rise of the Greek Epic. London: Oxford University Press. 
Murray, 0. (1980). Early Greece. Glasgow: Fontana. 
Nadler, D. & Tushman, M. (1988). Strategic organization design. Glenview, IL: Scott, 
Foresman. 
Nadler, D. & Tushman, M. (1989). Organizational frame bending: Principles for 
managing reorientation. Acadeiny ofManagenient Executive, 3(3): 194-204. 
Newton, 1. (1953). Newton's philosophy of nature: Selectionsfi-ont his writings. New 
York: Hafner Press. 
Nonaka, I. & Takeuchi, H. (1995). The knowledge-creating conipany. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Noujain, E. G. (1987). History as genealogy: An exploration of Foucault's approach to 
history. In A. P. Griffiths (Ed. ): Conteniporaq French Philosophy. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
O'Donnell, J. M. (1979). The crisis of experimentalism in the 1920's: E. G. Boring and his 
uses of history. American Psychologist, 34: 289-95. 
O'Malley, C. D. (1969). Leonardo's legacy. Los Angeles: University of California Press. 
Ohmae, K. (1995). The end of the nation state: The rise of regional econondes. London: 
HarperCollins. 
Osborne, D. & Gaenler, T. (1992). Reinventing governinent. New York: Plume. 
Ouchi, W. & Price, R. (1978). Heirarchies, clans, and theory Z: a new perspective on 
organizational development. Organizational Dynainics, 7(2): 25-44. 
Ouchi, W. (198 1). Theory Z Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. 
Owen, R. (1813/199 1). A new view ofsociety. Oxford: Woodstock Books. 
Papadakis, A. C. (1987). The post-avant-garde: Painting in the eighties. London: 
Academy Editions. 
Parker, M. (I 992a). Post-modem organizations or postmodem organization theory. 
Organization Studies, 13(l): 1-17. 
Parker, M. (1992b). Getting down from the fence: A reply to Haridimos Tsoukas. 
Organization Studies, 13(4): 643-9. 
Parsons, T. (1949). The structure ofsocial action. Glencoe, IL: Free Press. 
379 
Parsons, T. (1954). Essays in sociological themy, pure and applied. Glencoe, IL: Free 
Press. 
Pascale, R. T. & Athos, A. G. (198 1). The art ofJapanese inanagenient. New York: Simon 
& Schuster. 
Pascale, R. T. (1984). Perspectives on strategy: the real story behind Honda's sucess. 
California Managenzent Review, 26(3): 47-72. 
Pascale, R. (1985). The paradox of "corporate culture": Reconciling ourselves to 
socialization. California Managenient Review, 27(2): 26-41. 
Pascale, R. T. (1996). Reflections on Honda. California Management Review, 3 8(4): 112- 
7. 
Pauchant, T. C. (1994). Review of 'Chester I Barnard and the Guardians of Management'. 
, 4cadeniy ofManagentent Review, 19: 823-9. 
Pearce, J. A., & Robinson, R. B. (1991). Strategic inanagenient: Formulation, 
iniplementation, and control (4th edition). Homewood, IL: Irwin. 
Peters, T. J. & Waterman, R. H. (1982). In search of excellence. New York: Warners. 
Peters, T. J. & Austin, N. (1985). -4 passionfor excellence. 
New York: Random House. 
Petherbridge, D. & Jordanova, L. (1997). The quick and the dead. Artists and anatonly. 
London: South Bank Centre. 
Pettigrew, A. M. (1979). On studying organizational cultures. . 4dininistrative Science 
Quarterly, 24: 570-80. 
Pettinger, R. (1996). Introduction to njanageynent. Basingstoke, UK: MacMillan. 
Pfeffer, J. (1982). Organizations and organization themy. Boston, MA: Pitman. 
Pfeffer, J. (1987). The theory practice gap: Myth or reality? Acadenly ofManagenlent 
Executive, l(l): 31-33. 
Pfeffer, J. (1993). Barriers to the advance of organizational science: paradigm 
development as a dependent variable. Acadeiny ofManagenient Review, 18: 599- 
620. 
Pierson, F. C. (1959). The education ofAinerican businessmen. New York-: McGraw-Hill. 
Piore, M. J. & Sabel, C. F. (1984). The second industrial divide: possibilitiesfor 
prosperity. New York. 
Piper, D. (Ed. ). (1988). The Random House dictionary of art and artists. New York-: 
Random House. 
Pollard, H. R. (1974). Developinents in inanagenient thought. London: Heinemann. 
Pollard, S. (1965). The genesis of niodern inanagenzent -A study of the Industrial 
Revolution in Great Britain. London: Edward Arnold. 
Pomeroy, A. (1997, June 3). The Greek patient. The Dominion, p. 20. 
Porter, L. W. & McKibbon, L. E. (1988). Managenient education and development - Drift 
or thrust into the 21st century. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Porter, M. E. (1996). What is strategy? Harvard Business Review, 74(Nov/Dec): 61-78. 
Porter, R. & Teich, M. (Eds. ). (1992). The scientific revolution in national context. 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Porter, R. (1997). The greatest benefit to inankind: A medical histoty of huntanityfi-oni 
antiquity to the present. London: Harper-Collins. 
Posner, B., Kouzes, J. & Schmidt, W. (1985). Shared values make a difference: An 
empirical test of corporate culture. Hunian Resource Managenient, 24: 293-309. 
Poster, M. (1989). Critical theory andpoststructuralisin. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press. 
Powell, P. J. & Dimaggio, W. W. (1983). The iron cage revisited: institutional 
380 
isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields. Anierican 
Sociological Review, 48: 147-60. 
Powell, P. J. & Dimaggio, W. W. (1991). The new institionalisin in organizational 
analysis. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Price Waterhouse. (1995). Better change: Best practices for transforiningyour 
organization. New York: Irwin. 
Price Waterhouse. (1996). The paradox principles. New York: Irwin. 
Primeaux, P. (1997). Business ethics in theory and practice: diagnostic notes, B-A 
prescription for profit maximization. Journal ofBusiness Ethics, 16: 315-22. 
Primeaux, P. & Stieber, J. (1994). Profit maximization: The ethical mandate of business. 
Journal ofBusiness Ethics, 13: 287-94. 
Primeaux, P. & Stieber, J. (1995). Profit niaxiinization: The ethical inandate of business. 
San Francisco: Austin & Winfield. 
Primeaux, P. & Stieber, J. (1997a). Economic efficiency. In P. H. Werhane & R. E. 
Freeman (Eds. ): The Blackwell encyclopedic dictionaq of business ethics (pp. 
182-3). Cambridge, MA: Blackwell. 
Primeaux, P. & Stieber, J. (1997b). Managing business ethics and opportunity costs. 
Journal ofBusiness Ethics, 16: 835-42. 
Raban, J. (1974). Soft city. London: Fontana. 
Rabinow, P. (1984). The Foucault reader. Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin. 
Raulet, G. (1986). Marxism and the post-modem condition. Telos, 67: 147-62. 
Rawlinson, G. (1997). The histories ofHerodotus. New York: Everyman. 
Richards, G. (1996). Putting psychology into perspective: An introductionfi-oni a critical 
historical perspective. London: Routledge. 
Rifkin, J. (1995). The end of work. The decline of the global laborforce and the dawn of 
the post-niarket era. New York: G. P. Putnams Sons. 
Robbins, B. (1992). The East is a career: Edward Said and the logics of professionalism. 
In M. Sprinkler (ed. ) Edward Said: a critical reader (pp. 48-73). Oxford: 
Blackwell. 
Robbins, S. P. (1984). Essentials of organizational behavior. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice-Hall. 
Robbins, S. P. (1990). Organization theory - Structure, design, and applications. 
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. 
Robbins, S. P. (199 1). Management. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
Robbins, S. P. (1993/1996). Organizational behaviour - Concepts, controversies and 
applications. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall'. 
Robbins, S. P. & Mukeji, D. (1990). Managing organizations: New challenges and 
perspectives. New York: Prentice-Hall. 
Robert, J. & Robert, L. (1973). Bulletin epigraphique. Revue des Etudes Grecques, 110- 1. 
Robertson, D. & Schlegelmilch, B. (1993). Corporate institutionalization of ethics in tile 
Unites States and Great Britain. Journal ofBusiness Ethics, 12: 301-12. 
Robinson, D. N. (1995). An intellectual histoiy ofpsychology (3rd ed. ). London: Arnold. 
Rock, A. (1987). Strategy vs. tactics from a venture capitalist. Harvard Business Review, 
65(Nov/Dec): 63-7. 
Rogers, T. (1997). Thomas S. Kuhn 18 July 1922 - 12 June 1996. Histoty of the Hunian 
Sciences, 10(l): 121-34. 
Roll, E. (1930). An early experinient in industrial organization being a histoly of thefirin 
ofBoulton and Watt. London: Longmans, Green & Co. 
381 
Roll, E. (1992). A histoq of economic thought. London: Faber & Faber. 
Ronan, C. A. (1983). The Cambridge illustrated history of the world's science. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Rorty, R. (1982). Consequences ofpragmatism (Essays: 1972-1980). Brighton: Harvester 
Press. 
Rorty, R. (1989). Contingency, irony and solidarity. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Rorty, R. (1992). The pragmatists progress. In S. Collini (Ed. ): Inteipretation and 
overinterpretation (pp. 89-108). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Rumelt, R. (1996). The many faces of Honda. California Management Review, 38: 103- 
11. 
Russell, B. (196 1). History of Western philosophy. London: Allen & Unwin. 
Saffold, G. S. (1988). Culture traits, strength, and organizational performance: moving 
beyond "strong" culture. Academy ofManagement Review, 13(4): 546-58. 
Said, E. (1976). An interview with Edward Said. Diacritics, 6(3): 41. 
Said, E. (1983). The word, the text and the critic. London: Random House. 
Sapporito, B. (1998). Can Nike get unstuck? Thne, 151(12): 48-54. 
Sass, S. A. (1982). The pragmatic imagination: A history of the Tplarton School, 1881- 
1981. Philadelphia, PA. 
Sathe, V. (1983). Implications of corporate culture: A manager's guide to action. 
Organizational Dynamics, 12(2): 5-23. 
Schall, M. (1983). A communications-rules approach to organizational culture. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 28: 557-81. 
Schama, S. (1995). Landscape and Memory. London: HarperCollins. 
Schein, E. H. (1965). Organizational psychology. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. 
Schein, E. H. (1968). Organizational socialization and rhe profession of management. 
Industrial Management Review, 9: 1-15. 
Schein, E. H. (1984). Coming to a new awareness of organizational culture. Sloan 
Management Review, 25(2): 3-16. 
Schein, E. H. (1985). Organizational culture and leadership. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
Schein, E. H. (1990). Organizational culture. American Psychologist, 45(2): 109-19. 
Schein, E. H. (1992). Organizational culture and leadership (2 ed. ). San Francisco: 
Jossey-Bass. 
Schein, E. H. (1996a). Culture: the missing concept in organizational studies. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 41(2): 229-41. 
Schein, E. H. (1996b). Three cultures of management: the key to organizational leaming. 
Sloan Management Review, 3 8(l): 9-2 1. 
Schein, E. H. & Bennis, W. (1965). Personal and organizational change through group 
methods: The laboratory approach. New York: Wiley. 
Schmalenbach, E. (1919). Selbstkostenrechnung. Zj7iF, 13: 257-99. 
Schrodinger, E. (1954). Physics and nature. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
The Science Museum (1997). The making of the modern world - Milestones ofscience 
and technology. London: John Murray. 
Segal, C. (1982). Dionysiac poetic andEuripides'Bacchae. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press. 
Seldes, G. H. (1917). American efficiency in England. Bellman, 22: 122-3. 
Selznick, P. (1948). Foundations of the theory of organization. American Sociological 
Review, 13,25-33. 
382 
Severino, E. (1982). The return to Parmenides. In E. Severino (Ed. ): The essence of 
nihilism. Milan: Aldelphi. 
Seznec, J. (1953). The survival of the pagan gods - The mythological tradition and its 
place in humanism and art. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Shapin, S. (1996). The scientific revolution. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Sheldon, 0. (1924). Thephilosophy of management. New York: Pitman. 
Sheridan, A. (1985). Michel Foucault and the death of the author. In Ideasfi-oln France. 
London: ICA. 
Shumpeter, J. A. (1954). History of economic analysis. London: George Allen & Unwin. 
Siedel, G. J. (1964). Martin Heidegger and the Pre-Socratics:. 4n introduction to his 
thought. Lincoln, NA: University of Nebraska Press. 
Silver, B. L. (1998). The ascent ofscience. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Singer, C. (1922). Greek biology and Greek medicine. Oxford: Clarendon. 
Singer, P. (1994). Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Skinner, Q. & Price, R. (1988). Machiavelli - The Prince. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Slaven, A. (1984). The use of business records: Some recent trends in British business 
history. Business . 4rchives, 49: 17-35. 
Smart, B. (1990). Modernity, postmodernity and the present. In B. S. Turner (Ed. ): 
Theories of modernity andpostmodernity (pp. 14-30). London: Sage. 
Smart, B. (1992). Modern conditions, postinodern controversies. London: Routledge. 
Smith, A. (1983). Lectures on rhetoric and Belles letters. Oxford: Clarendon. 
Smith, J. A. & Ross, W. D. (1908). The works ofAristotle. Oxford: Clarendon. 
Smith, R. (198 8). Does the history of psychology have a subject? Histoyy of the Hunian 
Sciences, 1(2): 145-77. 
Smither, R. D. (1994). The psychology ofwork and hunian performance. New York-: 
Harper-Collins. 
Spiegel, H. W. (197 1). The growth of econoynic thought. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice- 
Hall. 
Spratt, T. (1667/1959). The history of the Royal Society. London: Routledge Kegan Paul. 
Sprinkler, M. (1992). Edward Said -A critical reader. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell. 
Stablein, R. & Nord, W. (1985). Practical and emancipatory interests in organizational 
symbolism: A review and evaluation. Journal ofManagenient, 11(2): 13-28. 
Stace, D. & Dunphy, D. (1994). Beyond the boundaries: Leading and recreating the 
successful organization. Sydney: McGraw-Hill. 
Stacey, R. (1990). Dynamic strategic nianagenientfor the 1990s. London: Kogan Page. 
Starling, G. (1997). Business ethics and Nietzsche. Business Horizons, May/June, 2-12. 
Steinberg, E. (1997). The defects of stakeholder theory. Corporate Governance Quarterly 
Research and Yheory Papers, 5(l). Oxford: Blackwell. 
Sterling, C. (198 1). Still Life painting: From antiquity to the twentieth century. New 
York: Harper & Row. 
Stevenson, H., & Gumpert, D. (1985). The heart of entrepreneurship. Harvard Business 
Review, 63(2): 85-94. 
Stieber, J. & Primeaux, P. (199 1). Economic efficiency: A paradigm for business ethics. 
Journal ofBusiness Ethics, 10: 335-9. 
Stigler, G. J. (1982). The economist aspreacher. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Taylor, C. (1986). Foucault on freedom and truth. In D. C. Hoy (Ed. ): Foucault: A 
Critical Reader (pp. 69-102). Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
383 
Taylor, C. (1987). Overcoming epistemology. In K. Baynes, J. Bohman, & T. McCarthy 
(Eds. ): After philosophy: End or transforniation? (pp. 464-88). Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press. 
Taylor, F. W. (1911/1947). Scientific management. New York: Harper. 
Thacker, A. (1993). Foucault's aesthetics of existence. Radical Philosophy, 63 (Spring): 
13-21. 
Thompson, C. B. (1917). The theory andpractice of Scientific Managenient. Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin. 
Thompson, D. (1993). Postmodernism: Fatal distraction. In J. Hassard & M. Parker 
(Eds. ): Postmodernism and organizations (pp. 183-203). London: Sage. 
Thompson, P. & McHugh, D. (1995). Work organizations. London: MacMillan. 
Tichy, N. (1993). Handbookfor revolutionaries. New York: Doubleday. 
Tichy, N. & Sherman, S. (1993). Control your destiny or sonleone else will. New York: 
Doubleday. 
Toohey, B. (1994). Tunibling dice. Melbourne: Heinemann. 
Toulmin, S. (1982). The return to cosinology: Postinodern science and the theology of 
nature. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 
Toulmin, S. (1990). Cosinopolis: The hidden agenda of njodernity. New York, NY: Free 
Press. 
Touraine, A. (197 1). The post-industrial society, toinorrow's social histoiy: classes, 
conflicts and culture in the progranimed society. New York: Random House. 
Touraine, A. (1988). Modernity and cultural specificities. International Social Sciences 
Journal, 118,443-57. 
Tredennick, H. (193 6). Aristotle's Metaphysics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press. 
Tsoukas, H. (1992). Postmodernism, reflexive rationalism and organization studies: A 
reply to Martin Parker. Organization Studies, 13(4): 643-9. 
Tsoukas, H. (1994). Refining common sence: Types of knowledge in management 
studies. Journal ofManagenient Studies, 31: 761-80. 
Tsoukas, H. & Cummings, S. (1997). Marginalization and recovery: The emergence of 
Aristotelian Themes in organization studies. Organization Studies, 18(4): 655-83. 
Tushman, M. (1974). Organizational change: An exploratory study and case histoiy. 
New York: ILR. 
Urmson, J. O. (1988). Aristotle's ethics. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Unnson, J. O. & Ree, J. (1989). The concise encyclopedia of Western philosophy and 
philosophers. London: Unwin Hyman. 
Urwick, L. (1937). Organization as a technical problem. In L. Gulick & L. Urwick (Eds. ): 
Papers on the Science ofAdniinistration. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Urwick, L. (1947). Eleinents of adnzinistration (2nd edition). London: Pitman and Sons. 
Urwick, L. (1950). A British graduate school of business. Managenzent Review, 9(2). 
Urwick, L. (195 1). Education for inanagenient. London: Anglo-American Council on 
Productivity. 
Urwick, L. (1954). Managenzent education in Ainerican business. New York: American 
Management Association. 
Urwick, L. (1956). The 'Golden Book'of managenzent. London: Millbrook Press. 
Urwick, L. F. (1960a). A short survey of industrial nianagenzent. London: British Institute 
of Management. 
Urwick, L. & Brech, E. F. L. (195 1). The inaking ofscientific inanagenient - Voluille L 
384 
Thirteen pioneers. London: Pitman. 
Urwick, L. & Brech, E. F. L. (1953). The making ofscientific management - Volume H. 
Management in British industry. London: Pitman. 
Vaill, P. (1984). The purposing of high-performing systems. In T. Sergiovanni & J. 
Corbally (Eds. ): Leadership and organizational culture (pp. 85-104). Urbana, IL: 
University of Illinois Press. 
Valentine, J. (1997). Hobbes' dependence on the authority of geometry. Histoty of the 
Human Sciences, 10(2): 23-40. 
van Merte, T. W. (1954). A history of the Graduate School ofBusiness Columbia 
University. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Vattimo, G. (1988). The end of modernity: Nihilism and hermeneutics in post-Inodern 
culture. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Vattimo, G. (1992). The transparent society. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Venturi, R. (1967). Complexity and contradiction in architecture. New York-: Museum of 
Modem Art. 
Venturi, R., Scott-Brown, D. & Izenour, S. (1972). Learningfroln Las Vegas: The 
forgotten symbolism of arch itecturalfonn. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Vemant, J-P. (1978). Ambiguity and reversal: On the enigmatic structure of Oedipux 
Rex. New Literary History, 9: 475-501. 
Visker, R. (1995). Michel Foucault - Genealogy as critique. London: Verso. 
Von Neumann, J. & Morgenstern, 0. (1944). Theory ofgaines and economic behavior. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Walras, L. (1954). Elements ofpure economics (Jaffe, W, Trans. ). New York-: Kelly. 
Waring, S. P. (1991). Taylorism transformed: Scientific management theoly since 1945. 
Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press. 
Warner, M. (1997). International Encyclopedia ofBusiness and Management. London: 
Routledge. 
Waters, J., Bird, F. & Chant, P. (1992). Everyday moral issues experienced by managers. 
Journal ofBusiness Ethics, 11: 445-59. 
Weber, M. (1930). The Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism. London: Allen- 
Unwin. 
Weber, M. (1947). The theory ofsocial and economic organzations. New York: Free 
Press. 
Weber, M. (1948). From Max Weber: Essays in sociology. London: Routledge. 
Weekes, J. (1985). Uses and abuses of Michel Foucault. In Ideasfi-oln France. London: 
ICA. 
Weick, K. E. (1987). Substitutes for strategy. In J. Teece (Ed. ) The competitive challenge - 
Strategiesfor industrial innovation and renewal (pp. 221-33). Cambridge, MA: 
Ballinger. 
Wells, H. G., Huxley, J. & Wells, G. P. (193 1). The science of life. London: Cassell. 
Wendt, P. (1992). Comment - Economics as a postmodem discourse. In W. J. Samuels. 
(Ed. ): Economics as Discourse - An Analysis of the Language ofEconolnics (pp. 
47-64). Norwell, Mass: Kluwer. 
Werhane, P. H. & Freeman, R. E. (Eds. ). (1997). The Black-well encyclopedic dictionaty of 
business ethics. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell. 
Westfall, R. S. (1971). The construction of modern science: mechanism and mathematics. 
New York: John Wiley and Sons. 
Wheatcroft, M. (1970). Yhe revolution in British management education. London: 
385 
Pitman. 
Whelan, T. & Hunger, J. (1990). Strategic managenient. Reading, MA Addison-Wesley. 
Whitehead, A. N. (1926). Science and the niodern world. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Whitehead, D. (1986). The demes of, 4ttica. Princton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Whitehead, D. (1990). Aineias the Tactician - How to survice under seige. Okford: 
Clarendon. 
Whitley, R., Thomas, A. & Marceau, J. (198 1). Masters of business? Business schools 
and business graduates in Britain and France. London: Tavistock. 
Whittington, R. (1993). What is strategy - and does it matter? London: Routledge. 
Whittington, R. (1996). Strategy as practice. Long Range Planning, 29(5): 731-5. 
Whyte, W. F. (1959). Man and organization: Threeproblents in human relations ill 
industry. Homewood, IL: Irwin. 
Wilkins, A. L. & Ouchi, W. G. (1983). Efficient cultures: Exploring the relationship 
between culture and organizational performance. Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 28: 468-81. 
Williams, K. et al. (1987). The end of mass production? Econiony and Society, 16: 405- 
39. 
Williamson, O. E. (1983). Organization form, residual claimants and corporate control. 
Journal ofLaw and Economics, 36: 351-66. 
Willmott, H. (1992). Postmodernism and excellence: The de-differentiation of economy 
and culture. Journal of Organizational Change, 5(l): 58-68. 
Wilson, J. F. (1995). British business history 1720-1994. Manchester: Manchester 
University Press. 
Windsor, P. (1990). Reason and history - Or only a histoiy of reason. Leicester: Leicester 
University Press. 
Winkler, J. J. (1990). The constraints of desire: The anthro ology ofse-x and gender in T 
Ancient Greece. London: Routledge. 
With, K. A. (1994). Using fractal analysis to assess how species perceive landscape 
structure. Landscape Ecology, 9(l): 25-36. 
Wren, D. A. (1972/1994). The evolution of management thought. New York: Wiley. 
Yarwood, V. (1994). Welcome to tomorrow: A guide to coping with chaos. Management, 
June: 32-8. 
Zeleny, M. (1997). The fall of strategic planning. Human Systems Management, 16: 77-9. 
Zonneveld, I. S. (1990). Scope and concepts of landscape ecology as an emerging science. 
In I. S. Zonneveld & R. T. T. Forman (Eds. ): Changing lanscapes: Ali ecological 
perspective. New York: Springer-Verlag. 
386 
